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THE

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Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

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

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ART. I. — 1. *Histoire de Napoléon Ier.* Par P. LANFREY. Tome Premier. Paris. 1870.

2. *Essai sur la Révolution Française.* Par P. LANFREY. Paris. 1858.

3. *Französische Verfassungsgeschichte von* 1789–1852 *in ihrer historischen Aufeinanderfolge und Systematischen Entwickelung.* Dargestellt von SIMON KAISER. Leipzig. 1858.

4. *La Nouvelle France.* Par M. PREVOST-PARADOL, de l'Académie Française. Onzième édition. Paris. 1871.

5. *Vues sur la Gouvernement de la France. Ouvrage inédit du Duc de Broglie.* Publié par son Fils. Deuxième édition. Paris. 1872.

6. *L'Héritage de la Révolution. Questions Constitutionelles.* Par J. G. COURCELLE-SENEUIL. Paris. 1872.

THE most difficult political problems that a nation has to grapple with, are generally those which arise at the close of its civil wars; and the questions then demanding solution are likely to be especially perplexing if the party which threw itself into rebellion has succeeded in winning its cause. A revolution is the result of real or imagined oppression; and oppression, whether real or imaginary, never fits a people or a party for the better exercise of political functions. Whenever a class of people, therefore, which has been long oppressed finds itself by reason of the fortunes of war suddenly raised to a political ascendency, it always finds itself at the same

time confronted with difficulties which neither its training nor its experience has qualified it to surmount. To find the enemy and to overwhelm him requires a far less comprehensive talent than that needed to mould the new elements, hostile as well as friendly, into such a government as shall embody the political theories of the victorious party. It is for this reason that many a time a political party under the lead of a skilful general has succeeded in completely vanquishing its enemies in the field, only to fall a speedy prey to surprising and overwhelming difficulties in the cabinet. There is nothing plainer than that revolutions, begun in the interests of the common people, have often, even when apparently successful, ended in a more complete centralization and oppression.

Perhaps the most remarkable example of this abandonment of the fruits of victory, in modern history, is afforded by France at the close of the great Revolution. It has long been a fond notion with a certain class of writers, especially of French writers, that the government built up by Napoleon I. was but the substantial embodiment and establishment of those principles which impelled the nation into the civil war.

Of late, however, the scales have fallen from a great many eyes, and even French historians are coming to estimate in their true character the labors and the permanent influence of the first French Emperor. The work of Lanfrey alone has been enough to dispel a multitude of illusions. We imagine it would be difficult for any one to follow his volumes honestly through without being profoundly impressed with the fact of the transformation to which we have alluded. At the time when the Revolution was at its fiercest heat, for example, the all-absorbing theory of the revolutionists was that France should not be controlled by any one man, but by the masses of the people at large ; in the reign of Napoleon, however, the people were as destitute of power and influence as they had been in the days of Louis XIV. The revolutionists stoutly maintained that the executive branch of the government, no less than the legislative, should be under the control of *the people ;* but Napoleon raised himself to power without consulting the will of the people, and then crowned his work of usurpation by re-establishing the principle of hereditary succession. The Rev-

olution designed to give the largest possible power into the hands of a representative legislature: the Emperor reduced the power of the legislature practically to nothing. In short, during the Revolution we find the people daring everything and suffering everything for the sake of a democratic republic; while in the time of the Empire we find the same people equally enthusiastic in support of an imperial and hereditary monarchy.

But the question at once arises as to how far this change of form was the result of a change of political doctrines. Had the French people abandoned their republican principles as unsound or as impracticable, or had they rather been deceived into the belief that, while they were having an empire in form, they were in reality enjoying the benefits of a republic?

The latter was undoubtedly the fact. Though under Napoleon I., just as under Napoleon III., the intelligence of the nation saw clearly enough through the thin veil of republicanism, and understood perfectly the imperial character of the government, yet the common people never seem to have suspected the incompatibility of a republic and an hereditary emperor. Now it may be said, both of the Napoleons maintained their hold upon the nation through two classes of people, — the first embracing a small but intelligent minority who believed in an absolute government as the best which the nation could have; the second, made up of the vast but ignorant majority who were easily deluded into the belief that because they were allowed the right of suffrage, and were occasionally consulted, they were exercising a real influence on the character of the government.

With the firm support of the former class in the cabinet, and with the overwhelming numbers of the latter as a kind of ultimate court of appeal, Napoleonism was for a long time able to sustain itself, even in opposition to the great mass of the intelligence of the nation. When at last it gave way, crumbling into very dust at the mere touch of the enemy, the world expressed its surprise and fell to studying the causes of the disaster. What had long been understood by the most intelligent observers came now, on closer observation, to be generally admitted, namely, that Napoleonism has proved a

lamentable failure, and that it may be well characterized as a system of appearances without substance, and of pretence without reality. The rise of this fraudulent system out of the ruins of the Revolution can hardly fail to be a study of interest as well as of profit.

At the moment when the first Bonaparte appeared upon the political stage, the Revolution was in the most chaotic condition. The atrocious excesses of the Reign of Terror had deprived the country of the services of the best talent, and the powers of the government had fallen into the hands of men equally remarkable for their brutality and their incapacity. The original purpose of the Revolution seemed to have been entirely forgotten. The *coup d'état* of the mountain had been a successful attempt of the minority to get control of the majority; it was indeed a virtual abandonment of the principles for which the first blows of the Revolution had been struck. The disorders which arose as a pure result of this action were innumerable, and, from that time on, the nation presents the sad picture of half a score of factions grappling in a death-struggle with each other, not for the sake of principle, but solely for the sake of power.

No party had become so completely triumphant as to be sure of permanent rule; no faction had obtained so exclusive an influence as to discourage the ambition of the aspiring and the violent. And this was not all, nor was it the worst. For reasons which it would be easy to explain, there was prevailing in the nation such a notable want of moral tone, as well as such a morbid craving for the sensational, that the people were in no condition to be repelled by the most audacious scrupulousness, or to be shocked by the most atrocious crimes. It would not be easy to imagine a field presenting larger possibilities to a great, bad genius like Napoleon, than that which opened before him during the latter days of the Revolution.

Moreover, the education of Napoleon was in closest harmony with the spirit of his country. What Mr. Emerson happily calls "the bias of character" was fixed with him at the time of his birth. The island where the Bonaparte family had their home had scarcely emerged from the Middle Ages. Corsica, in its struggle for independence, had fought with an unscrupu-

lous desperation worthy of the most ferocious Italian republic. The Bonapartes were high in rank and influential in society. They threw everything into the contest. But at last the end came; for no amount of heroism and devotion could resist the overwhelming power of France. The last standard of Corsica went down in 1769, and two months later Napoleon was born.

But even when France had taken possession of Corsica, the island was by no means subdued. With that tenacious persistency of opposition which had so successfully defied the Romans, the Corsican chiefs threw themselves into the mountain fastnesses and had to be hunted out one by one. Their struggle was in many respects similar to the contest of the Saxons against the Normans. The contest threatened to be perpetual, and it was in the infancy of Napoleon that this slow work of conquest was going on. Stories of these bloody deeds were the first intellectual food with which the mother, burning with patriotic hatred, fed the precocious imagination of her child. In 1789 Bonaparte wrote to the Corsican chief Paoli: "I was born when my country was sinking; the cries of the dying, the groans of the oppressed, and the tears of despair, surrounded my cradle from my birth."

Perhaps these facts were enough to explain Bonaparte's early transformation from childhood into manhood. If it be true, as he himself once affirmed, that men mature fast on the field of battle, it is no less the fact that the turmoils of civil war are destructive of all the best characteristics of boyhood. But whether these surroundings were sufficient in themselves to account for his remarkable development or not, the fact remains that in his growth the period of childhood was practically omitted. All testimony agrees that, with his first intelligence he manifested an intensity of political feeling such as ordinarily comes only with maturity. It was of an importance which can hardly be overestimated, that his intensity of character was so early developed, and that his first notions of government were associated with relentless power, rather than with the principles of justice.

This exceptional character of the parentage and infancy of Bonaparte made the first ten years of his life a kind of anachronism. The circumstances and training which influenced his

early years were characteristic of the twelfth century rather than of the eighteenth. It is not altogether strange, therefore, that, as his temperament began to unfold itself, it displayed the peculiar characteristics of an imperious leader who had been born and reared in the Middle Ages. Had his lot been cast among the mediæval chieftains of Spain, he would have found congenial spirits among the Laras and the Castroes; had he lived in Italy, he would have secured an appropriate immortality by the side of Azzolino da Romano in the *Inferno* of Dante.*

At the age of eleven the boy went over to France, and soon after began his military studies at Brienne. His father had died, leaving a large family in absolute poverty, and therefore both at Brienne and afterward at Paris, where he went in 1785, he was obliged to remain completely isolated from society. He soon gained a reputation for being a good scholar in the mathematics, and for being thoroughly unsocial. He was morose, and had no companions. A fair proportion of his working time was spent in the routine of his studies, while his recreation consisted in making himself familiar with the few authors who were to exert an influence on his subsequent life and character.

If one were to select from the whole range of historical literature two books fitted to satisfy the intellectual hunger of such a restless, craving, ambitious, military student as Napoleon, what would they be, if not Plutarch and the Commentaries of Cæsar? Over these books the young dreamer of military glory spent his days and his nights, until they became woven into the very tissues of his character. Before he left Brienne his ideals were fixed, and those ideals were the military heroes of antiquity. Thus up to the time when he

* Could anything describe more exquisitely one of the most striking traits of Napoleon's character than the following anecdote of Azzolino? "Being one day with the Emperor on horseback, with all their people, they laid a wager as to which of them had the most beautiful sword. The Emperor drew from its sheath his own, which was wonderfully garnished with gold and precious stones. Then said Messer Azzolino, 'It is very beautiful, but mine, without any great ornament, is far more beautiful'; and he drew it forth. Then six hundred knights, who were with him, all drew theirs. When the Emperor beheld this cloud of swords, he said, 'Yours is the most beautiful.'" — *Cento Novelle Antiche*, No. 83.

became an officer in the French Army, the influences which unite to make up character had been in his case something entirely foreign to his age and country. Without figure of speech, they might be called barbaric. When Napoleon first began to belong to history, he not only seemed to be, as he pretended to be, but he really was a barbarian.

And in cultivated society does not genuine barbarism always carry with it a kind of fascination? Culture and morality have so many hesitations, so many misgivings, so many second thoughts, that they often lose the main chance and appear weak, while the simple and intense passions of barbarism strike suddenly and achieve brilliantly. Hence it is that the man of highest culture is often not the man for the direst emergency; hence it is sometimes that, in the most desperate situation, he who feels simply and wills strongly carries off the palm. And it is to such a victor that vulgar society is wont to shout its loudest pæans of praise. Now Napoleon was just such a man of feeling and will, plus an enormous intellect.

There is one other feature of Napoleon's character which should not be overlooked, for without doubt it was one of the most important elements of his peculiar success. I refer to his freedom from all restraints of morality and good faith. Freedom from all restraint of morality and good faith? Yes, precisely that.

It would doubtless be unreasonable to expect a man trained as Napoleon had been to play the part of a Washington, or perhaps even to understand his true mission. Professor Seeley has somewhere justly remarked, that military government and civil government are such very different things, that a man who has a decided genius for either of them is not likely to excel at the same time in the other.

It might have been predicted with great certainty from the first that Napoleon would turn out something of a tyrant; but it was not too much to hope that he would be a tyrant having some fixed belief, devoted to some cause more noble than that of self. He was sure to be narrow-minded and hard, but narrow-mindedness and hardness are not incompatible with fidelity and even generosity. And yet, when we look for these and other moral qualities in Napoleon, they elude our

inspection. We properly judge of Marat and Robespierre by a moral code, simply because they give evidence of some understanding of virtue and duty. But to apply a code of either to the life of Napoleon is simply absurd; as absurd as to apply it to the deeds of children who have not yet any discrimination of right and wrong, or of truth and falsehood. His despatches and correspondence, recently for the first time published, display the fact that he did not hesitate to resort to the most elaborate falsehood whenever falsehood would best serve his purpose. His ingenuity in misrepresentation amounted to real genius. We soon cease to be astonished at the frequency of his falsehoods, only to be amazed at their audacity and their currency. In his military campaigns he inaugurated a system of pillage unknown in the history of the world since the famous taking of Corinth by the Romans. He robbed the nations not only of their power, but of their works of genius; at once despoiling them of their history and their glory. In the name of expediency he did not hesitate to put to the sword in cold blood a disarmed garrison to whom he had just promised protection in case of surrender; and in the same campaign he sought to rid himself by poison of his own wounded soldiers whom it was convenient to leave behind.* We referred to Napoleon as being free from all restraints of morality and good faith, and we think the facts fully warrant the phrase. And yet how many there are who profess for Napoleon a profound admiration! Where is there a spirited boy who has not wished that the Emperor had conquered at Waterloo, and who has not felt the blood to tingle in his veins with indignation that such a paragon power should be sent to languish at St. Helena? But the fact is not difficult to explain. There is a quality in human nature which refuses to be shocked even at the worst crimes, when those crimes attend upon great success. There is something captivating even in lying, when lying becomes a fine art. Crimes which in the vulgar are rewarded with ignominy, awaken a kind of admiration when they are so colossal as to become sublime.

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* The response of Surgeon Desgenettes to the proposition of Bonaparte is historical: "Sire, my art teaches me to cure men, not to kill them." On the whole subject the reasoning of Lanfrey (Vol. I. p. 292 *et seq.*) is conclusive.

When Napoleon first began to figure in history, his character was fully established. Moreover, to the end he was one of the most consistent of men. In proof of this there still exists an essay written in early life, in which his ideas of statesmanship are developed. It might have been one of the finest essays of a Machiavelli. His philosophy was already the philosophy of success. He professes to have been in active sympathy with the Girondists until their fall, when his sympathy was transferred to their victorious enemies. He argues that it was an act of good citizenship to join the party of the mountain, because the mountain had proved itself the strongest; and if he does not convince his reader of the truth of his proposition, he at least shows with what force the idea had taken possession of his own mind.

We see, then, the character of Bonaparte when he began to be a power among the turbulent elements of France. Calculating self-interest had completely overwhelmed every other motive. He was free from every scruple and proof against every impetuosity. On the best of terms with the party in power, he was ready to be reconciled with the conquered in case of any sudden reverse of the wheel of fortune. With the chaotic elements of a revolutionary government before him, and waiting for a master to mould them, this predestined favorite of fortune entered upon his work with no guide but his own vast genius, and no rule of action but his own ideal greatness.

The Constitution of the year III., all things considered, was by far the best which the Revolution produced. The convention which framed it had become weary of the frenzy and delirium of the multitude. It was a reaction toward a healthful public sentiment, but it was a violent reaction. It closed the Jacobin clubs; it disarmed the faubourgs; it repealed the work of the terrorists; in short, it was a vigorous effort to return to ways of order and good government.

But that effort, from its very violence, contained in itself immense possibilities of harm. It was able to accomplish its ends only by subduing and muzzling the populace, and by this very act it cut off its own principal support. Thus the convention, though it left some of the most liberal laws that France has ever possessed, lost its hold upon the multitude.

Moreover, the distrust of the convention on the part of the populace, and of the populace on the part of the convention, was completely reciprocal. All power was for the time being in the hands of the convention, and consequently the Constitution which it bequeathed to the nation was framed so as to give to the executive the largest independence of the legislative or representative branch of the government. This was the great defect of the Constitution, and it was fatal. There was sure to spring up as a result of this action an inevitable antagonism between the two branches of the government, and there was no provision for a mediatorial power, to prevent an open rupture or complete submission.

Then, as if for the purpose of hastening the very evils which they had thus provided for, the convention decreed that two thirds of its own number should hold seats in the legislature about to assemble, while one third only should be newly elected by the people. This was justly regarded as an insult to the nation. The hostility to the decrees was most intense. When they were submitted to the popular vote, however, the people of the country districts, with that blind custom which no tyranny provokes them to break through, not only ratified the action of the convention, but ratified it by a large majority.

In explanation of this action Mr. Lanfrey has remarked that, in the choice between known and unknown evils, the masses of the people will infallibly embrace the former as the safer of the two. But however this may be, Paris did not acquiesce. Her tribunes resounded with most vehement declamations. At length, finding that their appeals to the nation were in vain, the people of the capital determined to resort to arms.

It was easy for the insurgents to get control of the National Guard, which numbered forty thousand men. The army of the convention numbered only eight thousand. As it became certain that an attack would be made, it was manifestly of the highest importance that the troops of the convention should be ably commanded. After a long discussion, Barras was chosen commander-in-chief. He had seen the flash of Bonaparte's genius at Toulon, and requested that the young artil-

leryman might be made his second in command. Napoleon in his memoirs declares that he hesitated long whether to accept the command; not, indeed, because he had any thought as to which side was in the right, but because he was in some doubt which party could be made to succeed.

But he accepted the sword of the convention. He spent the night in posting his eight thousand troops for the defence of the Tuileries. On the next day, when the National Guard appeared, they found every avenue of approach bristling with cannon. After some hesitation they advanced to the attack, but the artillery of the convention ploughed their ranks through and through. In an hour after Bonaparte had mounted the saddle, the battle was over and the National Guard dispersed. Barras made haste to send in his resignation, and Bonaparte was appointed General of the Interior. Such was the 13th Vendémiaire.

In this struggle the convention would seem to have been technically in the right, and yet it may be doubted whether the day was not a fatal one for the nation. The country had confirmed by its vote, not only the Constitution, but the decrees. And yet the opposition which had just shown itself willing to resort to arms was made up of a class which it was by no means safe to alienate.

Indeed it was the very party with which the convention had just acted, in opposition to the extreme democrats. It included the most enlightened populace of Paris. It embraced the National Guard, nearly the whole of the electoral body of the city, the brilliant middle class, in short the whole of that third estate which had done so much for the nation, and which during the past years had been trodden under foot by the populace of the faubourgs. On this party suspicion had been thrown by the decrees at the very moment when they were striving to blot out the remembrance of so many humiliations. They were endeavoring to recover an influence which was justly theirs, when all at once they were overwhelmed by a measure of distrust, and deprived of the fruits of what they regarded as their rightful conquest.

The convention was in much the same relation to the country at large as was later the government of Napoleon III.

In a vote taken by a people exercising universal franchise, it could boast of a majority; and yet it had arrayed against it the great mass of the intelligence of the nation, for the reason that it had deprived intelligent men of their legitimate hope of influencing the government. The victory of the 13th Vendémiaire had confirmed this alienation. It was easy to foresee that henceforth a spirit of hostility to the convention would pervade all the ranks of intelligence in the nation. Driven from the legislative body by the decrees and their confirmation, the spirit of hostility betook itself to the executive as its stronghold. At the first election the third of the deputies to be added to the members of the convention to form the legislature were chosen from the hostile party. The convention replied by calling into the Directory five regicides of a radical type. As neither the legislative nor the executive body had any control over the other, and as they were now in open antagonism, it followed that there was no way of settling the difficulties but by a resort to force. It might have all been avoided if the convention had remembered and acted on the principle enunciated by Aristotle and more fully elaborated by Cicero, that every government, to be efficient and worthy of confidence, must conserve at once the wealth and intelligence of the land. A nation is in the greatest peril when those in power cease to regard these interests, and rely solely upon the rabble for support; and this was just the condition of France when Napoleon took command of the army.

However, the 13th Vendémiaire had revealed to the different parties the weight of the sword. On the one hand it taught authority how, at all hazards, it must rely on the army; on the other it taught the army how it could dispose of authority. It thus opened wide the doors to a military government.

The foreign policy of France during the Revolution, up to the time of which we are speaking, had been purely a defensive one. Since the outbreak in 1789 the country had entrenched itself firmly in the doctrine that every nation should be allowed to control its own internal affairs, and that no foreign power should be allowed, under any circumstances, the right of interference. But immediately after the appointment of Bonaparte, all was changed. The doctrine which had hith-

erto been such an element of moral power in the conduct of its foreign relations was cast aside, or, rather, it was reversed. An aggressive policy was adopted, and Italy was destined to feel the first blow.

Nothing is now plainer than that the invasion of Italy by Napoleon, in 1796, was in most positive antagonism with the habit as well as the spirit of the Revolution. It was in no sense a war for principles or for right, but a war for aggrandizement. It was the beginning of a policy for offensive warfare, of which it was impossible to foresee the end. Moreover, Italy was regarded, not as an oppressed nation to be delivered, but as a rich country to be seized.*

The relations of Bonaparte with the Directory during this war afford us admirable material for the study of his character. It is the opinion of Lanfrey that the Directory had already begun to fear the power of the General, while at the same time they knew that he was necessary to the support of themselves. Above all things, therefore, it was essential that he should not be alienated. As Bonaparte knew well how indispensable his services were to the Directory, and as it became more and more apparent that they too regarded these services as indispensable, his imperious will was held under no restraint whatever. We see, in consequence, the spectacle of a general who, though acting nominally under the orders of the Directory, followed their instructions only so far as these instructions would best subserve his purpose. In so important a matter even as the framing of treaties, he scarcely hesitated to act in most flagrant violation of his orders. And yet during all this high-handed work of erasing state boundaries, of overthrowing time-honored governments, and of setting up pseudo-republics, the Directory had no word of rebuke to utter. When he carried out their directions, they applauded; when he violated them, they ratified.

* The proclamation of Napoleon on taking the field shows how completely the campaign was a war of conquest and not a war of liberty: "Soldiers, you are hungry and nearly naked. The government owes you much; it can do nothing for you. Your courage and patience do you honor, but cannot procure you either profit or glory. I come to lead you into the most fertile plains of the world. There you will find rich provisions and great towns. There you will find glory, honor, and riches. Soldiers of Italy, can your courage fail you?" Is this less barbarous than the speech which Livy puts into the mouth of Hannibal?

The process by which Napoleon acquired his strange mastery of the army is not difficult to understand. He lost no opportunity of availing himself of the riches of which he had spoken in his first proclamation. His profound knowledge of human nature led him to take nothing for himself, while he gave unbounded opportunities to his subordinates. He knew well that it was of far more consequence to him that, on his return to Paris, he should be able to boast that he remained poor while others became rich, than that he should become possessor of millions. The scandalous fortunes which most of his generals acquired only gave him the more absolute empire over them, while they in no way weakened his popularity at home. His favorite method was to give them a mission in which large sums of money passed through their hands without any supervision; and then, if they took no advantage of these, he laughed at their scruples. When he wanted reinforcements from the army of the Alps, he wrote to Kellermann, the general in command: "Help us as promptly as possible, if you wish us to send you any more seven hundred thousand francs." Once he was offered a present of four million francs by the Duke of Modena. He replied, coldly, "No, I thank you; for such a sum I am not going to put myself in your power." He preferred to confiscate the whole, as he afterwards did; not for himself, but for those from whose hands he awaited still greater power.

If the Directory raised a complaining voice, he knew of an effectual solace. On one such occasion he sent a hundred of the finest horses in Lombardy to the Directory as a present, "to replace," as he wrote, "the middling horses now harnessed to your carriages." The government, too, was in the direst need of money; but Bonaparte kept a steady stream of it flowing toward Paris. Every city which the army approached was laid under heavy contribution. Milan, for example, perhaps in despair of making a successful resistance, ventured to put to the test the commander's magnanimity by spontaneously making the first advances toward submission. What was its reward? It had the privilege of being governed by the French for the price of twenty millions of francs. In Bonaparte's letter to the Directory on the affair are to be found

these words: "The country is one of the richest in the world, but entirely exhausted by five years of war." The Directory accepted the twenty millions complacently, and bestowed upon the giver their smile of approbation.

At about the same time, Turguet, appealing to Bonaparte for contributions to the navy, said: "Let us make Italy proud of contributing to the splendor of our marine." It was much as if, when Germany, at the close of the recent war, was in the act of determining the amount of the French indemnity, Von Roon had written to Bismarck, "Let us make France proud of contributing to the splendor of our navy." It was impudence fairly sublime.

But that which better than all else reveals Bonaparte's method was his dealing with the Republic of Venice.

In the early part of the struggle which had been going on, Venice had succeeded in maintaining a strict neutrality. But at length a quarrel arose which afforded a pretext for war. A French captain ventured to push his vessel up into the vicinity of the Venetian powder-magazine, in violation of a general law which had always been respected by foreign powers. The Venetian commander remonstrated, but received so insulting a reply, that he fired upon the French man-of-war. The affair could have been easily settled, but under existing circumstances it was as sure to produce an explosion as though Captain Laugier had dropped a shell into the middle of the Venetian powder-house. It afforded just the pretext that Bonaparte wanted; and therefore he would listen to no overtures for a settlement. No terms they could offer would satisfy him. At length he dismissed the envoys who had sought a settlement with these words: —

"I have eighty thousand men and some gunboats. I will have in Venice no inquisition and no senate. I will prove an Attila to Venice. I will have no alliance with you. I want none of your proposals. I mean to dictate the law to you. It is of no use to deceive me to gain time. The nobles of your provinces who have hitherto been your slaves are to have a share in the government like the others, but your government is already antiquated and must tumble to pieces."

The violence of this barbarous language may be fully accounted for. The protocols known as the Preliminaries of

Leoben had already been signed, by which Bonaparte, in direct violation of the orders of his government, had entered into contract to give up to Austria all the Venetian provinces between the Oglio, the Po, and the Adriatic, together with Istria and Dalmatia, while, in consideration thereof, Belgium and Lombardy were to be given up to France. The General was certain of securing a ratification of this infamous contract only by previously involving Venice in war, and consequently no opportunity was to be lost. Such a precious occasion as that just afforded could not but be eagerly seized upon. Two days after the harangue just given, Bonaparte published his manifesto, declaring war.

Of course Venice could do nothing before the French armies. Indeed, the conquest was accomplished too soon; for the Preliminaries of Leoben were not yet known, and France was consequently not yet ready to turn Venice over to the Emperor. A treaty was therefore signed at Milan, the most important article of which was that the French occupation should continue until the new government was established and should declare that it had no further need of assistance.

In explaining this treaty to the Directory, Bonaparte laid bare his motives in terms which it seems to us impossible to stigmatize with too great severity. He wrote as follows: —

"I had several motives for concluding the treaty. 1. To enter the town without difficulties; to have the arsenal and all else in our possession in order to take from it whatever we need under pretence of the secret articles. 2. To give us the advantage of all the strength of the Venetian territory in case the treaty with the Emperor should not be executed. 3. To avoid drawing upon ourselves the odium that may attach to the execution of the preliminaries, and at the same time to furnish pretexts for them and to facilitate their execution."

For the complete execution of these purposes, Bonaparte at once despatched General Gentili to take possession of the Venetian fleet and the Venetian provinces in the Levant. The commission was executed with Napoleonic despatch. At Corfu, Gentili took possession of the Venetian navy, together with five hundred guns and an immense magazine.

We now approach the climax of duplicity and hypocrisy. It is important to notice the dates of the letters and despatches.

That sent to the Directory bears the date of May 19, 1797. On the 26th of the same month he wrote to the municipality, entreating them to have full confidence in his movements. He concluded his letter with an appeal which could not fail to touch noble sentiments in those who were proud of their thousand years of mediæval glory.

"Under any circumstances," wrote he, "I shall do all in my power to give you proofs of the great desire I have to guarantee your liberty, and to see this unhappy Italy free from all foreign intervention, and triumphantly placed in that rank among the great nations of the world to which by her nature, position, and destiny she is so justly entitled."

These words were received in good faith and with acclamations of joy. It was on the strength of them that a reception of extraordinary magnificence was given to Josephine, whom Bonaparte had sent as a pledge of friendship. But what followed? These words, as we have stated, were written to the Venetian municipality on the 26th of May. It was only a few hours later, at one o'clock in the morning of May 27th, that the General wrote to the Directory: —

"To-day we have had our first interview on the subject of the treaty of peace, and *we have agreed to present the following propositions:* 1. The boundary of the Rhine for France. 2. Salzburg and Passau for the Emperor. 3. Cleves or its equivalent for Prussia. 4. The maintenance of the Germanic Confederation. 5. The reciprocal guaranties of these articles, and VENICE FOR THE EMPEROR."

Finally, on the same day, that is, on the very day after he had sent the mellifluous message to Venice, as if for the purpose of crowning the infamy of the affair, he wrote to his government: —

"Venice, which has been gradually decaying ever since the discovery of Good Hope and the rise of Trieste and Ancona, can scarcely survive the blows we have just struck. With a cowardly and helpless population, in no way fit for liberty, without territory and without rivers, it is but natural that she should go to those to whom we give the Continent. We will seize the vessels, despoil the arsenal, and carry off the guns; we will destroy the bank and keep Corfu and Ancona for ourselves."

That these accusations against the Venetians were made merely for the purpose of justifying his monstrous conduct, is

shown by the fact that only a short time before the occurrence of these events, in writing to the Directory, the General had referred to the Venetians as "the only people among all the Italians who were worthy of liberty."

The last act of this drama was soon played. The treaty of Campo-Formio completed the work, already so far advanced, by ceding Venice to the Emperor, in accordance with the conditions which Bonaparte had proposed.

When the imperial envoy appeared in the Ducal palace to receive the oath of allegiance of the Venetians, a death-like silence and despair was everywhere manifest. The Ex-Doge Manin was forced to take the oath in the name of his countrymen. As he rose to pronounce the fatal words, he suddenly tottered and fell senseless to the floor, struck down by anguish of heart.

Thus vanished, after a long and glorious career, the foremost of the Italian republics. In the name of liberty another crime had been committed. The military agent of the French Republic had annexed to imperial Austria the state whose inhabitants he himself had characterized as the only people among all the Italians who were worthy of liberty.

While these painful events were transpiring in Italy, an act of no less importance was performed at Paris. The blind acquiescence with which the Directory submitted to the decisions of Bonaparte was not shared by the legislature. The Council of Five Hundred still contained many who had a genuine regard for the spirit of liberty; and these could not be entirely blind to the fact that the fall of Genoa and Venice, the two most prominent republics of Italy, presaged no good to the Republic of France.

On the 23d of June, Dumolard ascended the tribune of the Five Hundred for the purpose of interrogating the Directory in regard to the affairs of Italy. His speech was entirely moderate in tone. He had no personal dislike of Bonaparte; on the other hand, he had often spoken of him with genuine admiration. He neither accused nor blamed the General; he addressed the Directory, and asked above all for accurate information. "How is it," he asked, "that France is at war with Venice before the Directory has consulted the legislative

body, as the Constitution requires? By what authority have they dispensed with the formality of submitting to the Assembly the declaration of war?" Then coming to the acts that followed Bonaparte's entrance into Venice, he exclaimed: "Are we then no longer the same people who proclaimed in principle and sustained by force of arms, that under no pretence whatever ought foreign powers to interfere with the form of government of another state? I will not ask what fate is reserved for Venice; I will not ask whether their invasion, meditated, perhaps, before the commission of the offences which are assigned as motives, will not figure in history as a fit pendant to the partition of Poland." Dumolard closed his speech by declaring that the result of the policy adopted would be endless wars, while France wanted peace. "Every one," said he, "who reflects on the nature of our government, is indignant when he thinks of the blind and silent confidence required of us in everything connected with peace or war. In England, where the Constitution only gives the two houses an indirect participation in foreign affairs, we see them demand and obtain information on all events of importance, while we, republicans, to whom has been delegated the sovereign right of making war and peace, allow our rulers to draw the veil more and more closely over a dark and obscure policy."

These noble words of warning and of reproach stirred the Five Hundred. The motion was carried; but the Directory paid no heed to it whatever. It was evident that the executive was determined to ask no counsel and to receive no advice from the legislature.

When Bonaparte received news of this motion and speech of Dumolard, he was thrown into a genuine rage. What! an obscure representative, one of those lawyers of whom he was always speaking with contempt, had dared to discuss him, the chief of an army of eighty thousand men, the distributer of states, the arbiter of princes. It was too much. He wrote immediately to the Directory a letter which at once revealed the petty nature of his imperious will, and showed plainly what might be expected. He covered Dumolard with abusive epithets, and then expressed his "surprise that this manifesto, got up by an emigrant in the pay of England, should have

obtained more credit in the Council of Five Hundred than his own testimony and that of eighty thousand soldiers." Together with this letter he sent a stiletto, designed, of course, to work with melodramatic effect on the excitable Parisians. He concluded by expressing a purpose to resign and to live in tranquillity, "if, indeed," said he, "the poniards of Clichy will allow me to live at all." In another letter of the same general purpose he apostrophized his enemies thus: "But I give you notice, and I speak in the name of eighty thousand soldiers, that the time when cowardly lawyers and miserable babblers guillotined soldiers is past; and if you compel them, the soldiers of Italy will come to the barrier of Clichy with their general at their head, but woe betide you if they do come."

These words, so much more characteristic of a barbarian chief than of a military officer in civilized society, seem nevertheless to have had a genuine meaning; for a few days later he addressed a proclamation to his army as follows: —

"Soldiers, I know you are deeply stirred by the dangers which threaten the country; but the country can have no real dangers to face. The same men that made France triumph over united Europe still live. Mountains separate us from France; you would cross them with the speed of an eagle, if it were necessary to uphold the Constitution, to defend liberty, to protect the government and the republicans. Soldiers, the government watches over the laws as a sacred deposit committed to them. The royalists, the moment they show themselves, will perish. Banish disquiet. Let us swear by the shades of the heroes who have died by our sides for liberty, — let us swear by our new standards, 'War implacable against the enemies of the Republic and of the Constitution of the year III.'"

Thus, with the public and with the army, Bonaparte prepared the way for what was to follow. His labors in private, moreover, were scarcely less energetic or significant. The new election which had just occurred had strengthened his enemies in the Five Hundred, so that he became more and more convinced that a blow must be struck. Accordingly he sent two agents to Paris, to feel the pulse of the public. To Lavalette he said: "See every one, keep clear of party spirit, give me the truth and give it free of all passion."

A mind so just and enlightened as Lavalette's had no diffi-

culty in comprehending the situation. He seems to have seen the mischief involved in the plot of the Directory, and he warned Bonaparte against it: —

"You will tarnish your reputation if you give your support to measures of such unjust violence, which the position of the government in no way justifies. You will not be forgiven for uniting with the Directory in an effort to overthrow the Constitution and liberty. The proscriptions proposed are directed against the national representation, and against citizens of tried virtue, who are to be punished without trial. The odium of such tyranny would fall, not only on the Directory, but on the whole system of republican government."

This letter of Lavalette's appears to have had a marked influence on the conduct of his chief; for that moment the latter ceased to be conspicuous in the agitations which were going on.

But what was to be done? A *coup d'état* seemed necessary to save the Directory, and yet there might be a reaction which would ingulf all its prominent supporters. Bonaparte did not hesitate. He told Lavalette to offer to Barras, the chief of the Directory, three million francs in case the movement should succeed. At the same time he sent Augereau to Barras, as the fittest officer to execute a *coup de main;* writing to Lavalette meanwhile, "Don't trust Augereau, he is a seditious man." Thus he encouraged Barras to make the attempt, while he furnished him the means by which he was least likely to be permanently successful. It is in the highest degree probable that Bonaparte was willing the affair should miscarry; for in case of an attempt and a failure, who but himself and his army could decide the question in dispute between the two branches of government?

But there was to be no failure. At one o'clock on the morning of September 4th (the 18th Fructidor), Augereau with twelve thousand troops surrounded the Tuileries where the legislative body held its sessions. No resistance was made, and therefore the palace was taken possession of without the firing of a single shot. Vigorous protests were made, but they were useless. The proscribed members were placed under arrest; the others were convoked in another part of the city to ratify the will of the Directors. And this remnant of the

legislature was not slow to confirm with the mockery of a legislative indorsement all that had been done. They voted for the transportation of a great number of their colleagues, including some of the most irreproachable citizens of their time. With these were also included the editors, writers, proprietors, managers, and conductors of forty-two public journals. They annulled the elections in the forty-eight departments which had dared to name deputies opposed to the Directory; they renewed the laws against priests and emigrants; they destroyed all liberty of the press by giving to the Directory the right to suppress journals at pleasure; they abolished all judicial power in the forty-eight departments declared to be seditious, and assigned the appointment of new judges to the Directory; finally they gave to the Directors two new colleagues, and conferred upon the executive power thus arranged the right to reform or dissolve all political societies at pleasure, as well as the right to proclaim a state of siege and to delay to an indefinite period the organization of the National Guard. It should be added as a fit close to the record of this infamous work, that the men condemned to banishment were thrown into iron cages and sent to Rochefort, whence they were embarked for the pestilential shores of Cayenne. Half of them died speedily, thus paying with their lives for the offence of having opposed the schemes of Bonaparte and Barras.

The *coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor opened the way completely for a military dictatorship. Was the nation ready to accept Bonaparte as a master, or was further preparation necessary? That the General himself inclined to the latter opinion we have the declaration of his own words. In his *Mémoires* he declares: "In order that I might be master of France, it was necessary for the Directory to experience reverses during my absence, and for my return to restore victory to the French flag."

This sentence, though written years after the event, probably reveals one of the two great motives of the General in undertaking the expedition into Egypt.

But whether such was actually one of his motives or not, it is certain that he could not have planned in a manner more

likely to involve the Directory in difficulties that were inextricable. The moment the government ceased to receive money from the Italian army, the finances fell into the old confusion. In order to raise money for the Egyptian campaign, Bonaparte, as his correspondence reveals, advised and urged that the Directory seize upon Switzerland and Rome. On the very eve of the departure of his expedition, therefore, this act was done, and with a consequence which it would have been easy to anticipate. The outrage was felt in every corner of Europe. War was instantly declared by the coalition against France, and the nation at once began to suffer from a double disadvantage. In the first place, Bonaparte had with him all the best officers of the army as well as his old veterans; in the second, the French frontier, by the annexations, had been so lengthened that it now extended from Amsterdam to Naples. In consequence of these two circumstances, the French armies all along the frontier were crushed, and Italy together with several of the provinces was lost. Surely the reverses which Bonaparte had deemed it necessary that the Directory during his absence should experience must have been to him in the highest degree satisfactory.

Moreover affairs in Paris were in hopeless confusion. The government was fast sinking into contempt; the people saw their armies defeated and the provinces slipping away; they remembered the glorious days of the Italian campaign, and sighed for a sight of the Little Corporal.

The same favoring fortune, however, did not follow Bonaparte in the affairs of the East. Not content with an effort to reduce Egypt to the condition of a French colony, — a project which had been more or less familiar to France ever since it was proposed by Leibnitz to Louis XIV., — Bonaparte was ambitious to revolutionize the whole of the Eastern world. He talked of ruining the English settlements in India; of chasing the Turks from Constantinople and driving them into Asia by means of a rising of the Greek and Christian populations, and then of returning to Europe, *la prenant à revers.*

The "moderate preliminary" of the occupation of Egypt was no very difficult task. In Syria, however, the obstacles were insurmountable, and the aggressive force of the expedi-

tion was completely broken. After a long siege of Saint Jean d'Acre, and after as many as fourteen assaults upon the city had been made in vain, Bonaparte learned that the Turks were about to embark for an attack upon Lower Egypt. Nothing but a prompt withdrawal of his army could save him from the greatest peril. Reluctantly but promptly he gave the order to retreat. At Saint Helena, he was accustomed to say that a grain of sand had thwarted all his projects. He often repeated the assertion, that if Saint Jean d'Acre had fallen he should have changed the face of the world, and been Emperor of the East.

The disasters of the retreating march were, however, exceeded by the mendacity of the commander. The bulletins reported every movement as a success, and transformed every reverse into an astounding victory. But concerning the true nature of that retreat from Palestine to Egypt, there can no longer be any doubt. The roads were strewn with the sick and the wounded who were left under the scorching sun to die. At one time the troops, exasperated by the distress of their companions who reproached them with outstretched arms for their desertion, rose in mutiny. Bonaparte ordered all the cavalry to dismount that the horses might be devoted to the conveyance of the sick and the wounded. When his equerry came to ask which horse he would have reserved for his own use, he replied with a cut of his riding-whip, "Every one on foot! did you not hear the order?" Did an army of disheartened Frenchmen need any other inspiration than such a reply?

When Bonaparte, by means of the bundle of papers which Sidney Smith caused to find their way through the French lines, learned of the condition of affairs in Europe, there was but one course consistent with his character for him to pursue. There was nothing more to be done in Egypt; there was everything to be done in France. If he were to lead his army back, even in case he should, by some miracle, elude the eager eyes of Lord Nelson, the act would be generally regarded as a confession of disaster. If he were to remain with the army, he could, at best, do nothing but pursue a purely defensive policy; and if the army were to be overwhelmed, it was no part of Napoleonism to be involved in the disaster. It would be

far shrewder to throw the responsibility of the future of Egypt on another, and to transfer himself to the field that was fast ripening for the coveted harvest. Of course Bonaparte, under such circumstances, did not hesitate as to which course to pursue. Robbing the army of such good officers as survived, he left it in command of the only one who had dared to raise his voice in opposition to the work of the 18th Fructidor. Taking with him Lannes, Murat, Berthier, Marmont, Andréossi, Duroc, Bessières, Lavalette, Monge, Berthollet, Denon, he committed the diminished and prostrated army to the heroic but indignant Kléber. Was there ever a more exquisite revenge? And we might ask, was fortune ever more capricious than when she bestowed her rewards on these two men? For the one she had the poniard of a fanatic, for the other the most powerful throne in the world.

On the arrival of Bonaparte in Paris everything seemed ready to his hand. The very events which he had probably anticipated and desired, certainly those which he afterwards declared to have been necessary to his elevation, had taken place. The policy which, in the seizure of Switzerland and the Papal States, he had taken pains to inaugurate before his departure for Egypt had borne its natural fruit. As never before in the history of Europe, England, Holland, Russia, Austria, Naples, and even Turkey had joined hands in a common cause, and as a natural consequence the Directory had been defeated at every point. Nor was it unnatural for the people to attribute all these disasters to the inefficiency of the government. The Directory had really fallen into general contempt, and at the new election on the 30th Prairial it had been practically overthrown. Rewbell, who by his influence had stood at the head of affairs, had been obliged to give way; and, what was quite as important, his place had been filled by one who was known not only to be hostile to the old government, but also to have in his pocket a new constitution which, if adopted, would establish quite another order of things. By the side of this fantastic statesman, Sieyès, Barras had been retained probably for no other reason than that he was sure to be found with the majority, while the other members, Gohier, Moulins, and Roger-Ducos, were men from whose supposed mediocrity no very de-

cided opposition could be anticipated. Thus the popular party was not only revenged for the outrages of Fructidor, but it had also made up the new Directory of men who seemed likely to be nothing but clay in the hands of Bonaparte.

The full importance of this action in a political point of view can only be correctly estimated when it is remembered that the fatal weakness of the Constitution of the year III. was of a nature to make a repetition of such a *coup d'état* as that of the 18th Fructidor perpetually possible. That weakness we have already pointed out to have been a want of all proper means of reconciling the differences that might arise between the legislative and the executive. Differences had at once arisen, and as there was no provision for a mediation, an outbreak was likely to follow. The executive had been the first to begin the contest, and the events of Fructidor had secured for the executive the first victory. But now the tables were turned. The Directory had committed egregious blunders, and the people had in consequence demanded a change of policy. But there was no way of inaugurating a change, except by violently overthrowing the Directory. In other words, the Constitution provided no means by which the legislature could lawfully enforce the will of the people; there was, therefore, nothing for the legislature to do but either to submit tamely, or to resort to the very means previously resorted to by the Directory. In adopting this latter course, the legislature fairly accepted the challenge. The gauntlet thrown down by the Directory on the 18th Fructidor was taken up by the Councils on the 30th Prairial, and henceforth it was to be a war *vi et armis*, in which neither party had a right to ask favor.

The changes which had been enforced by the Councils in the composition of the Directory gave a temporary advantage to the legislature; it was, however, but a trifling victory, to be followed, as we shall see, by an overwhelming defeat.

As was to be anticipated, the victory of the Councils was followed by a somewhat emphatic expression of popular enthusiasm. The people for a considerable time had had no voice either directly or indirectly in the policy of the nation; but now, it was hoped, a real change had taken place. The masses,

therefore, responded heartily to the calls of the new government. The armies were filled, and Bernadotte, now Minister of War, found no difficulty in arousing the slumbering enthusiasm of the nation. "Young men," said he, "there will surely be found some great captains among you"; and once more a French army was seen to be made up of heroes. Holland and Belgium were regained; in a fortnight Masséna completely routed and scattered the Austrians and Russians in Switzerland; Brune defeated the Duke of York and forced him to capitulate; Championnet established a formidable barrier along the southern frontier.

It was while the nation was rejoicing over these victories that the first bulletin was received announcing the success of the French at Aboukir. In the midst of a profound silence the President read to the Assembly of Five Hundred a despatch which painted in brief but glowing terms the extent of the victory. There were reasons why the bulletin was received with unusual enthusiasm. Nothing had been known of the situation of the army in Egypt, and the mystery which hung over the expedition had created an inexpressible anxiety. All this was at once relieved. Then, too, in the heat of political partisanship, it had come to be generally believed by the populace that Bonaparte and the army had been deported to Egypt by the Directory for no other reason than jealousy of their glory. The petitions which poured into the Council of Five Hundred abounded in expressions deploring the *exile of Bonaparte*. Absurd as all this impression was, it had a vast effect upon the nation at large. To Bonaparte's absence they had attributed all their disasters, and in their belief nothing but his return would reinstate their ancient military glory.

With such sentiments as these rife in the nation, it is not difficult to understand the enthusiasm with which the bulletins from Egypt were received. The despatches were contrived with all that clever artifice of theatrical representation of which Bonaparte was so consummate a master. The campaign in Syria, the battle of Mt. Tabor, the pretended destruction of Acre, — these and like inglorious exploits were the pabulum on which the popular enthusiasm fed and increased.

It was while Berthier was thus attempting to throw over that deplorable campaign the halo of his fine words, that the *Moniteur* published an item of intelligence before which all else appeared insignificant. It was announced that Bonaparte had actually returned to France, and that he was at that moment on his way to Paris, everywhere saluted by an unbounded enthusiasm of the people.

The manner in which the General was received can have left no possible doubt remaining in his mind as to the strength of his hold on the hearts of the people. It must have been apparent to all that he needed but to declare himself, in order to secure the wellnigh unanimous support and following of the masses. But with the political leaders the case, for obvious reasons, was far different. From the moment when the news of his landing at Fréjus reached Paris, there were symptoms of uneasiness in the ranks of the old politicians; for it is evident that they already saw in the popular favorite a dangerous enemy. The different political parties were so evenly balanced, that the leaders of each were not without hopes of gaining an ultimate ascendency, but to all such hopes the presence of Bonaparte was sure to be fatal. His popularity was so overwhelming, that in his enmity the leaders could anticipate nothing but annihilation, in his friendship nothing but insignificance.

These considerations, however, could have little weight with any except those who regarded their position and influence as entitling them to hope for the primacy. To the politicians of the second and third rank the new ascendency brought better prospects. Bonaparte, therefore, had no difficulty in surrounding himself with men of more than respectable talent and influence, who were eager to secure his highest favor. His long absence had kept him from all party strife; therefore he was able to secure for himself a following of men who to each other were mutually irreconcilable. The Rue de la Victoire extended hospitality to guests of every political shade. Talleyrand, whose diplomatic ability had already attracted attention; Réal, the able commissioner of the Department of the Seine; Cabanis, the old friend and coadjutor of Mirabeau; Volney, the illustrious and notorious savant; Bruix, the shrewd ex-Minister of the Navy; Cambacérès, the Minister of Justice;

Dubois de Crancé, the Minister of War, — these and others of similar political incompatibility were greeted at Bonaparte's residence with a most friendly welcome. For once the friends of Sieyès sat quietly by the side of those of Bernadotte, and the men of the *Manége* chatted peaceably with the adherents of Barras. Most important of all, three of the five Directors, Gohier, Roger-Ducas, and Moulins, were among the most frequent visitors and among the foremost in their assurances of devotion.

The method in which Bonaparte set about forming a working party out of this heterogeneous material forms a good illustration of his character. The member of the government who at the time wielded most influence was Sieyès, a man for whom personally the General had such an unconquerable aversion, that Josephine was accustomed to refer to him as her husband's *bête noire*. It was evident that Sieyès was the most formidable obstacle to the General's advance. Either the *bête noire* would have to be destroyed or else pacified, or some other pathway of advancement would have to be found. The fact that Bonaparte resorted to each of these methods in quick succession shows at once how completely devoid of principle he was, and how readily he could subordinate all personal antipathies to the interests of his ambition. He first proposed to get himself made a member of the Directory in the place of Sieyès by finding some pretext or other for disputing the legality of his opponent's election. This course he broached to Gohier and Moulins, but they scouted the idea, declaring that, in the first place, no decent pretext for overthrowing Sieyès could be found, and, in the second, that Bonaparte was not yet fifty years old, the age required by the Constitution for all the members of the Directory. It is strange that this proposition, though it was urged with significant persistence, awakened no more alarm. That some suspicion was aroused, however, may be inferred from the fact that an effort was made to get rid of his presence by offering him once more a military command. But Sieyès and Barras were openly of the opinion that he had already made a sufficient fortune out of his military appointments, and accordingly they expressed a decided preference that he should remain at home. These objections afforded

a convenient excuse, and Bonaparte refused the appointment.

The attempt to oust Sieyès having failed, a strenuous effort was made to get control of the party in favor of a republican dictatorship. At the head of this party stood, as a kind of military triumvirate, Bernadotte, Augereau, and Jourdan. This party, without doubt, better than any other, represented the ideas of Bonaparte; for it had gathered together the scattered remains of Jacobinism, and had a strong hold on the lower orders of the people. But Bernadotte remained inflexible, though appealed to by all the ties of friendship and even relationship. It is impossible to believe that he had any objections to a military dictatorship; we are left, therefore, to the inference that he recognized the overwhelming powers of his brother-in-law, and consequently feared that in case of an alliance his own influence would be overshadowed or overwhelmed.

As a third move, Bonaparte attempted a reconciliation with Barras. There were at least apparent reasons why they should be friends. Their careers had begun together at Toulon; and it was to Barras that Bonaparte owed his command on the 13th Vendémiaire. It was known that Fouché was somewhat uneasy from the fact that his patron had fallen into disrepute with the man whose star was evidently rising, and he therefore was employed to effect a reconciliation between the two former friends. He succeeded in getting Barras to take the first step by inviting Bonaparte to dine with him at the Luxembourg. But there was no heartiness in the meeting. Each treated the other with caution and reserve. Barras at length touched upon political matters in a vague and indirect manner, as if to force his rival to commit himself first. "The Republic," said he, "is falling to pieces; it cannot long continue in this state. We must make a great change and name Hédouville President. You will join the army. For my part, I am ill, unpopular, and worn out. I am only fit for private life."

Though this little speech was probably intended simply to draw out Bonaparte, it had the opposite effect. It was evident to the General that there was nothing to hope for from a man who talked of making Hédouville President; and therefore,

instead of replying to his interlocutor, he simply fixed his eyes upon him and remained silent. Barras was utterly disconcerted; a few moments later his guest withdrew.

Thus Bonaparte had attempted to place himself at the head of affairs, first by an effort to remove Sieyès, and then by trying to get control in turn of the two parties which were strong enough to afford him efficient support. In all these attempts he had failed, and there was now nothing left for him but to abandon the effort or to seek an alliance with his worst enemy, Sieyès. After having failed to remove this *bête noire* from his path, and after having been equally unsuccessful in attempting to pass around him, first on the right and then on the left, was there anything more natural than that he should attempt to tame or pacify him, and then, if possible, to use him?

This work of reconciliation, however, was beset with even greater difficulties than would at first appear. It was universally known that, only a few days before the time of which we are speaking, Sieyès had talked of having Bonaparte shot for deserting his military command, and that Bonaparte had reciprocated the ill-will by proposing to have Sieyès removed from the dictatorship because he was sold to Prussia. Talleyrand, however, with a shrewdness for which he afterwards became more famous, saw the great advantage which such an alliance would afford to Bonaparte, and accordingly, notwithstanding the difficulties in the way, did not hesitate to set himself assiduously at work to bring it about. The difficulty of course was to overcome the antipathy of Sieyès; a difficulty which appeared, however, absolutely insurmountable, especially as the Director clearly foresaw the obscurity with which such a reconciliation threatened him. That Sieyès fully understood the danger, we have the amplest evidence. Joseph Bonaparte in his *Mémoires* declares that when he and Cabanis were striving with the Director to arrange for a meeting, the latter declared emphatically, "I know the fate that awaits me in case of a union. After he has succeeded he will separate himself from his colleagues and stand in front of them as I stand in front of you now." And suiting his movement to the word, he stepped forward, pushing his interlocutors behind him.

With Bonaparte, on the other hand, every interest called for

a speedy consummation of the alliance. He had already learned that a conspiracy was formed which embraced a considerable number of powerful adherents, and he rightly conjectured that nothing was wanting to the organization but a man of prompt action like himself. This consideration, perhaps sufficiently powerful in itself, was fortified by the recollection of his repeated failures with other parties, and also by the evident fact that the moment the *coup d'état* had taken place the lion's share would fall to the most popular man. Thus the advocates of Bonaparte had every motive for putting forth their most strenuous efforts.

That Sieyès finally consented to a meeting, when he clearly foresaw the usurpation that was to follow, removes every claim that he might otherwise have had upon our respect and sympathy. Unaccountable as it may seem, he finally threw off his reserve so completely, that when Bonaparte at last called upon him to make proposals, he accepted the first overtures of the General, and that in consequence, on that very night, it was agreed between them that in eight or ten days the decisive blow should be struck. By this action Sieyès fully earned for himself the contempt and oblivion into which he soon after fell.

Such were the preliminary negotiations which led to that dark day in French history known as the 18th Brumaire. It remained only to get absolute control of the military forces, a task in no way difficult. The officers who had returned with Bonaparte from Egypt were impatient to follow wherever their master might lead. Moreau, who, since the death of Hoche, was regarded as standing next to Bonaparte in military ability, was not reluctant to cast in his lot with the others, and Macdonald as well as Sérrurier soon followed his example. Bernadotte alone would yield to neither flattery nor intimidation.

The last to give in his adhesion was Lefebvre. This officer had been regarded by Bonaparte as one of his relentless opponents, and therefore he was not let into the secret until the last moment. On the morning of the 18th, when a crowd of officers of every grade thronged the dwelling of Bonaparte, Lefebvre was among the others. He had been summoned at midnight merely to meet his fellow-officers for a review at six o'clock in

the morning. Meeting a colonel, he asked for an explanation, and was referred to Bonaparte. The latter on being approached exclaimed, "Well, you are one of the supporters of the Republic, and will you leave it to perish at the hands of these lawyers? Here is the sword I wore at the Pyramids. I give it to you as a pledge of my esteem and confidence." Was any of Napoleon's officers likely to resist such an appeal? "Let us throw the lawyers into the river," responded Lefebvre.

It needs only to be added that Bernadotte, Jourdan, and Augereau were the only officers of note whose absence from the *review* attracted attention. Bernadotte was known to be strongly opposed to the movement, while the others had not been admitted to the secret, and had not been invited to be present. On the following day Augereau, meeting Bonaparte, showed his uneasiness by remarking, "So then you have no use for *ton petit Augereau?*" The chief's only response was informing him that in future the quieter he kept the better it would be for him.

While Bonaparte was thus marshalling his forces in the Rue de la Victoire, the way was opening in the Councils. A commission of the Ancients, made up of leading conspirators, worked all night drawing up the proposed articles, in order that in the morning the Council might have nothing to do but to vote them. The meeting was called for seven o'clock, and care was taken not to notify those members whose opposition there was reason to fear. The moment there was an opportunity, Cornet, one of the most active conspirators, mounted the tribune and denounced in most plaintive terms the dangers which threatened the government. He declared that the conspirators were "waiting only for a signal to draw their poniards on the representatives of the nation." "You have but a moment," exclaimed he, "in which to save France. If you let it pass, the Republic will be lost, and its carcass will be the prey of vultures who will quarrel over its torn members."

Now, in all this no names of conspirators were given, no persons were even hinted at. The object of Cornet and his associates was to convince the ignorant of the existence of a conspiracy, and then, after blinding the Council as to the source

of the danger, to call into supreme power the chief conspirator in order to put the conspiracy down. What was this but casting out devils by Beelzebub the prince of devils?

When Cornet sat down, Régnier, another of the conspirators, arose and proposed to the Assembly, for the saving of the government, the adoption of the decrees which had been already prepared. As the opposition, and, indeed, the independent members of the Council, were generally absent, the articles were adopted without discussion. They voted first to remove the sessions of the Councils from Paris to Saint Cloud (a privilege which the Constitution conferred upon the Ancients alone), thus putting them at once beyond the power of influencing the populace and of standing in the way of Bonaparte. They then passed a decree giving to Bonaparte the command of the military forces, at the same time inviting him to come to the Assembly for the purpose of taking the oath of allegiance to the Constitution.

These decrees were at once taken to the expectant Dictator, whom they reached at about ten o'clock in the morning, and were read by him to the throng of officers and soldiers who, as we have just seen, had been for some hours in waiting. After he had concluded the reading of the decrees, he asked the crowd if he could count on their support in this hour of danger; to which they responded with a general flourish of swords. The General then mounted his horse and rode off at the head of the troop.

When Bonaparte arrived at the Hall of the Council, he acted the part of swearing allegiance to the Constitution in a manner that had been hardly anticipated.

"Citizen representatives," said he, "the Republic was in danger; you were informed of it, and your decree has saved it. Woe to those who seek to bring trouble and disorder into it. General Lefebvre, General Berthier, and all my comrades in arms will aid me to stop them. Do not look to the past for a clew to guide your onward march; nothing in history ever resembled the eighteenth century; nothing in the eighteenth century ever resembled the present moment. We want a Republic founded on true liberty and national representation. We will have it, I swear; I swear it in my own name and that of my companions in arms."

Thus, instead of an oath of allegiance to the Constitution, the Councils had merely received an oath that the nation should have a Republic founded on true liberty and national representation. The words have a captivating jingle, but in the mouth of Bonaparte what was the meaning of the phrases "true liberty" and "national representation"? A mere bait with which to catch the popular support.

But this fraud did not pass undetected. As soon as Bonaparte had closed, Garat arose to point out the fact that the citizen-general had forgotten the nature of the oath required, which was, as he supposed, to swear to support the Constitution. Poor innocent Garat, he little knew the resources of Bonaparte's friends. The President instantly interfered, declaring that after the action of the morning no discussion could take place, except at Saint Cloud. Thus the mockery of the oath-taking in the Council of Ancients was accomplished; the General had now a more difficult part to perform in the Council of Five Hundred.

As the meeting of the Assembly was not to occur until twelve o'clock of the following day, Bonaparte made use of the intervening time in posting his forces and in disposing of the Directory. Lannes he placed in command of the Tuileries; Marmont, in that of the École Militaire; Sérurier, at Point du Jour; Macdonald, at Versailles; and Murat, at Saint Cloud. At all of these points it was likely that nothing more than a purely defensive policy would be demanded. But there was one locality in the city where it was probable aggressive force would be required. The Luxembourg was the seat of the Directory, and the Directory must at all hazards be crushed. In case the individual Directors should refuse to yield, it would be absolutely necessary, in order to insure the success of the enterprise in hand, to take possession of the palace by force. But this would involve the arrest of the executive, — an ignominious work which any officer would shrink from performing, since it would require a positive and unmistakable array of the military against the civil authorities. But Bonaparte knew well how to turn all such ignominious service to account. He gave the Luxembourg in charge of the only man in the nation who could now be regarded as his rival for popular favor.

Moreau fell into the snare, and by so doing lost a popularity which he was never afterward able to regain.

Having thus placed his military forces, Bonaparte turned his attention to the Directors. The resignation of Sieyès and of Roger-Ducos he already had upon his table. It remained only to procure the others. Without warning, Barras was confronted with Talleyrand and Bruix, who asked him without circumlocution to resign his office, at the same time presenting him with the paper of resignation already drawn up at the instigation of Bonaparte, and demanding his signature. Barras rubbed his eyes, and, finding that the agents of the General were determined, wrote his name, thus crowning the work of a life equally remarkable for its treachery and its cowardice. The infamy of the act is made all the more conspicuous by the fact that, only a half-hour before, Barras had promised to meet at once his colleagues Gohier and Moulins at the Luxembourg, for the purpose of uniting in a fitting protest, and, if need be, in an energetic resistance.

Three of the Directors thus disposed of, it was left to make away with the remaining two. Bonaparte met them in person and tried every device of flattery and intimidation, but in vain. When he finished his interview by demanding of both their resignation, they flatly refused; but when they returned to the Luxembourg it was only to be made prisoners by Moreau. It might be said that in the course which they pursued Gohier and Moulins simply did their duty; but in view of the acts by which Bonaparte ever after his return from Egypt had been endeavoring to win them over to his purposes, their firm conduct on that fatal day fully justifies the French in claiming that the Republic did not fall without honor. For their conduct on that occasion they are entitled to a permanent tribute of respect. It is only to be regretted that their firmness and their integrity were not equalled by their foresight and their wisdom.

The night of the 18th passed in comparative tranquillity. The fact that there was no organized resistance is accounted for by Lanfrey with a single sad statement, that "nothing of the kind could be expected of a nation that had been decapitated. All the men of rank in France for the previous ten years,

either by character or genius or virtue, had been mown down, first by scaffolds and proscriptions, next by war." These are indeed melancholy words to utter of any nation, but who that has studied the French Revolution is ready to declare that they are not essentially true? The only escape had seemed to be through mediocrity or silence Sieyès, when once urging his claims to notice, was asked what he had done. His reply was a flash of wit which lights up the whole period, "*J'ai vécu.*"

But notwithstanding the force of the reason urged by Lanfrey, it seems to us that the national apathy on this occasion had another and a far more deplorable cause, — a cause which even at the present time entails more woes upon France than almost all others combined. We refer to that condition of political demoralization which comes from repeated acts of revolutionary violence. It requires but a glance at the successive *coups de force* which had taken place within the previous ten years to enable one to perceive ample grounds for that demoralization. On the 14th of July, 1789, absolute royalty succumbed and gave place to a constitutional monarchy. On the 10th of August, 1792, this was overthrown, and in its place was established the Republic. On the 30th of May, 1793, the lawful Republic was displaced by the revolutionary government. On the 9th of Thermidor, 1794, this was in turn overthrown by the legal authority, which held its place until the 18th Fructidor, in 1797, when the first military *coup d'état* substituted the revolutionary in the place of the legal Directory. And now at last this in turn was compelled to give way to the establishment of a military government on the 18th Brumaire. What was all this but the experience painted by the greatest of the Latin poets? —

> .... Et semper victus tristisque recedit;
> Nam petere imperium, quod inane est, nec datur unquam,
> Atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem,
> Hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte
> Saxum, quod tamen e summo jam vertice rursum
> Volvitur, et plani raptim petit æquora came.

Within ten years there had been eight different *coups de force*, the violent establishment of eight different governments, not a single one of which had been the spontaneous expression of the national will. These repeated acts of violence had

resulted in creating a popular insensibility, as well as that confusion of law and force which is fatal to all healthful political feeling and action, and which, it is to be feared, is still the worst malady that France has to overcome.*

But notwithstanding this demoralization of the people, it is not to be asserted that no effort was made to resist the work of usurpation. The feebleness of the movement, however, clearly demonstrates that apathy of the people to which we have referred. A few deputies met in the night at Salicetti's for the purpose of organizing the opposition. As the best preliminary measure they decided that in the morning they would repair to Saint Cloud and would pass a decree to give the command of the guard of the Five Hundred to Bernadotte. But no sooner had the meeting dissolved, than Salicetti himself betrayed the news to Bonaparte and received his reward. Measures were at once taken by the General to prevent the deputies from reaching their destination.

On the following day, before the Council of Ancients was fairly organized, the General was announced. During that morning everything had gone contrary to his expectation, and he bore an anxious and irritated look. It was evident that the sudden *éclat* of his first movement had given way to a general anxiety and a desire to put to the test of examination the pretences in regard to a Jacobin plot. Bonaparte evidently felt himself oppressed by the change of atmosphere, and accordingly he determined to bring the whole matter to a

* On this question of the fatal continuance of a revolutionary spirit in France, the following remarks by M. Paul Janet are so excellent that we cannot abstain from quoting them: —

"On ne peut donc contester à la France que l'on reconnaît aux autres nations; cependant, pour qu'une insurrection soit légitime, il faut qu'elle ne soit qu'une date de déliverance, non le signal de la révolte à perpétuité, — il faut qu'elle ait pour conséquence la paix et l'ordre, et ne soit pas le déchainement illimité du droit de la force. Le jour où la France aura définitivement conquis des destinées paisibles et acceptera sans réserve le règne de la loi, elle pourra revenir sans danger aux souvenirs de son affranchissement, elle fêtera avec joie le jour de sa déliverance; mais tant que le droit de la force n'aura pas abdiqué, — et peut-on dire qu'il ait abdiqué? — tant qu'il y aura lieu de craindre que les partis ne tiennent en réserve cette arme fatale, elle verra toujours avec inquiétude cette invocation persistante d'un droit périlleux qui peut aussi bien tuer que déliverer, et qui retourne si souvent contre ceux qui l'emploient." — *L'Esprit Révolutionaire et la Souveraineté Nationale, Revue des Deux Mondes, Tome Centième*, p. 721.

speedy issue. He drew up a regiment in order of battle in the court, and, referring to the Council, announced to his officers "that he was going to make an end of it." Then, followed by his *aides-de-camp*, he pressed into the presence of the Assembly.

The address by which he attempted to justify his action is remarkable only for its violence and its incoherence. He affirmed the existence of a Jacobin plot to destroy the government; but when pressed for an explanation, he could only declare that Barras and Moulins had proposed to him to be the leader of a party to overthrow all men having liberal opinions. When he was adjuring the Council to save liberty and equality, one of the members added interrogatively, "And the Constitution?" "The Constitution," exclaimed Bonaparte, "you violated it on the 22d Floréal, and you violated it on the 30th Prairial. The Constitution! The Constitution is invoked by all factions, and has been violated by all; it is despised by all; the country cannot be saved by the Constitution, because no one any longer respects it."

This harangue, however eloquent it may have seemed and however truthful the assertions it contained, in the mouth of Bonaparte was simply outrageous; for no one had done so much to violate the Constitution of the year III as Bonaparte himself. But this was not all. When he was pressed for further explanation of the plot of which he was constantly speaking, he tried to extricate himself by changing his former accusations into a violent attack on the Council of Five Hundred. After accusing the members of wishing to re-establish the scaffolds and revolutionary committees, and of having despatched emissaries to Paris to organize a rising, he completed the consternation of his friends by resorting to open threats.

"If any orator in foreign pay talks of outlawry, let him beware of levelling such a decree against himself. At the first sign I should appeal to you, my brave companions in arms; to you, grenadiers, whose caps I perceive yonder; to you, brave soldiers, whose bayonets are in sight. Remember that I go forward accompanied by the God of fortune and the God of war!"

Thus having shifted his attack, first to one quarter and then to another, he ended by making it understood that he was not there to give even plausible reasons, but simply to enforce the commands of his imperious will.

From the Council of Ancients, Bonaparte repaired at once to the Council of Five Hundred. Here his friends were less numerous and less influential. The discussion took the same turn, but was carried on with considerably more warmth and urgency. In their impatience to fathom the plot which had caused their removal to Saint Cloud, they had decided on sending an address to the Council of Ancients, asking for information. The letter of resignation which had been forced upon Barras had just been received, and the Assembly was considering the question whether it was best for them then and there to name his successor, when the door was opened and Bonaparte, surrounded by his grenadiers, entered the hall. A burst of indignation at once arose. Every member sprang to his feet. "What is this," they cried, "swords here! armed men! Away, we will have no dictator here." Then some of the deputies, bolder than the others, surrounded Bonaparte and overwhelmed him with invectives. "You are violating the sanctity of the laws; what are you doing, rash man?" exclaimed Bigonnet. "Is it for this that you have conquered?" demanded Destrem, advancing towards him. Others seized him by the collar of his coat, and, shaking him violently, reproached him with treason.

This reception, though the General had come with the purpose of intimidating the Assembly, fairly overwhelmed him. Eye-witnesses declare that he turned pale, and fell fainting into the arms of his soldiers, who drew him out of the hall.*

The confusion that ensued in the Assembly was indescribable. One member moved that Bonaparte be deprived of his command. Another proposed that the six thousand soldiers then surrounding the hall be declared a part of the guard of the legislative body. Then was raised that terrible cry of *hors la loi!* the cry which had overwhelmed Robespierre himself. It would

* It has been often asserted that at this time daggers were drawn upon the General; but Lanfrey has shown that the story is contradicted by all trustworthy evidence. It would have been easy for his enemies to have assassinated him in a scuffle from which he escaped with his clothes torn. Moreover, the detailed account, which on the next day was published in the *Moniteur*, though written by one of the partisans of Bonaparte, says nothing of an attempt at assassination. The story was doubtless invented by Lucien the second day after the act, for the purpose of justifying his brother's action.

have passed, with but the faintest opposition, had it not been for the action of Lucien, who, as President of the Assembly, steadfastly refused to put the question to vote. He reminded the Assembly of his brother's services, and entreated them not to pass a hasty judgment; after which he surprised the Assembly by resigning his office of President. This action, at first thought, would seem to have been a blunder; but its effect, as was probably designed, only increased the confusion, for no action could now be taken until a President was chosen, and the Council was in no condition whatever to proceed with an election.

But, though this action tied the hands of the Assembly at the moment when it seemed upon the point of outlawing Bonaparte, and thus drawing upon him the dagger of a Brutus or the fate of a Robespierre, it at the same time imposed upon the conspirators themselves an additional necessity of immediate action. Bonaparte saw the importance of bringing the affair to an end before the Council should have time to recover, and he resorted, therefore, at once to the means for which he had made such ample preparation.

When the troops, however, were commanded to advance upon the Council and to break it up by armed force, there was a degree of hesitation which gave a momentary promise of failure. The cause of the delay was the fact that the soldiers to whom the command had been given formed a part of the guard of the legislative body. It seemed for a moment probable that they would remain steadfast in defence of their charge; but Lucien, who was still supposed to be President of the Assembly, showed himself master of the emergency. Since his resignation he had fallen into the hands of his brother, and he now raised his voice in a harangue to the troops in regard to their duty. He assured them that the Council had been crushed by brigands in the pay of England, and that the question was now how it should be rescued from so great a danger. Then drawing his sword in a theatrical manner, he turned to the General and exclaimed, "For my own part I swear to run this through my own brother if ever he should strike a blow at the liberties of the French."

This oratorical flourish saved the conspiracy. The majority

of the guard, still supposing that they were listening to the President of the Assembly, regarded the speech as sufficiently assuring, and instantly responded by shouting "*Vive Bonaparte!*"

In the midst of the excitement Murat placed himself at their head and commanded the drums to beat. When they reached the doors of the Council, the members made an earnest appeal for the legislative inviolability, but it was in vain. When they refused to retire, the drums were again beaten, and the grenadiers poured into the hall. A last cry of *Vive la République* was raised, and, a moment later, the hall was empty. Thus the crime of the conspirators was consummated, and the first French Republic was at an end.

After this action it remained only to put into the hands of Bonaparte the semblance of regular authority. The tragedy which had just ended with the death of a republic was immediately followed by a farce. A phantom of the Council of Five Hundred — Cornet, one of them, says thirty members — met in the evening and voted the measures which had been previously agreed upon by the conspirators. Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Roger-Ducos were appointed provisional consuls; fifty-seven members of the Council who had been most prominent in their opposition were excluded from their seats; a list of proscriptions was prepared; two commissioners chosen from the assemblies were appointed to assist the consuls in their work of organization; and, finally, as if to remove the last possibility of interference with the usurpers, the legislative body was adjourned until the 20th of February.

Here we must pause. It needs, perhaps, hardly to be said in addition that with this victory the triumph of Napoleonism was complete. At the close of the first meeting of the consuls, Sieyès said to the chief supporters of the *coup d'état*, "Gentlemen, you have a master. Bonaparte means to do everything, knows how to do everything, and has the power to do everything." In this extravagant homage time revealed that there was far too much of truth. From this moment there were certain forms to go through with, but, for the most part, they were forms only. In due time, Sieyès drew from his pocket that fantastic roll known as his Constitution, but to

use the happy expression of Madame de Staël, it was only to destroy, *très artistement*, the few remaining chances of liberty. It requires but a glance to see that the complicated provisions of the Constitution of the year VIII simply furnished water for Bonaparte's mill. Sieyès had imagined that all legislative action should be conducted in the form of a judicial trial, and accordingly he had organized his legislature into a species of court of equity. The Council of State as plaintiff was entrusted with the work of proposing and supporting new laws, while the mission of the Tribunate was to oppose the arguments of the Council of State. The legislative body, "silent as a tribunal of judges," was to decide, and finally the decision was to go to the Senate as a grand court of appeal. When Bonaparte came into power as First Consul, France presented the spectacle of a legislative body divided into four parts, each part having a separate function to perform. The first proposed laws, without discussing them; the second discussed, without passing upon them; the third passed upon them, without either proposing or discussing; and the fourth had simply the power of veto. Of these four parts, Bonaparte suppressed the second and retained the remaining three, thus, at a blow, getting rid ostensibly of what he called "*the infinite babbling of the lawyers*"; in reality, of what was the only means in the nation of raising even a faint opposition. Henceforth the legislature was worse than the play of "Hamlet" with Hamlet left out; it was Hamlet abolished, and the rest of the players struck dumb.

Thus it came about that during all those fiery years of the Consulate and the Empire, France had no legislature that possessed even the semblance of independence. There were at times certain formalities that to the eye had a legislstive appearance, but they were mere shadows which only served to conceal the real substance of the government. There were moreover certain changes in the constitution of the legislature, but they were only varying expressions of the same nullity.

Nor had Bonaparte any greater difficulty in brushing his colleagues out of his way. When Sieyès, upon whose face Bourrienne once said was always written, "Give me money,"

saw that the First Consul was absorbing all power, and raised his voice in protest, Bonaparte threw at his feet the estates of Crosne, worth a million, and thus consigned his last rival to silence and to infamy. Henceforth until the Restoration there was but one power in the state; all else were mere words and shadows. If the proudest of the Bourbons, as is commonly believed, characterized happily by his famous aphorism, *L'état, c'est moi*, both the nature of his government and the identity of the state with himself, there was vastly more both of truth and of egotism in the paraphrase of the *parvenu* Emperor Napoleon, when he declared, "*La France, c'est un homme, et cet homme, c'est moi.*"

CHARLES KENDALL ADAMS.

ART. II. — HENRY FLOOD, AND THE CONDITION OF IRELAND FROM SWIFT TO O'CONNELL.*

SWIFT did a great work for Ireland by waking up the nation to thought and political action. He found the people dead, and quickened them into life. Before he wrote his books and pamphlets, there was no public opinion in that country. He created it, and as long as he lived he sustained it by his immense vitality. To love liberty, to live and die for it, was the doctrine which he taught. He wanted a parliament that would represent the people, not the old College Green House of Cards and Corruption, which he despised and satirized. But as a leader he was alone in his patriotic desires and hopes, and it seemed for some time after his death as if such liberty as he dreamed of had died with him. But in due time Henry Flood arose, and took the lead of the scattered armies of freedom. He was a man regularly indentured to learning both in Dublin and Oxford, and qualified himself by his studies to be an orator and tribune of the people. He was a true patriot, and one of the most fascinating and charming of men; a great conversationalist, exceedingly good-tempered, and delighting in social

* Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland. By W. E. H. LECKY. New York: D. Appleton & Son. 1872.

company and debate. He was friendly with everybody, high and low, and was a universal favorite. In 1759 he began his Parliamentary career as member for Kilkenny, at the age of twenty-seven years, and was an opposition man. It was no credit to enter that Parliament unless one went there for the purpose of helping to reform its abuses and intrigues. It was full of corruption and dead men's bones. Mr. Lecky, in his recent book, "The Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland," says that the Stuarts began the borough system in Ireland, and that James I. created forty of these subserviences in the interest of the crown. Out of three hundred members who constituted the Parliament, two hundred were elected by one hundred individuals, and nearly fifty by ten, whilst two hundred and sixteen were returned for boroughs or manors. In 1784 four noblemen returned forty-six members, and an immense pension list was spent in corrupting the constituencies.

These examples are but a fragment of the abuses of the time; and even when the Parliament began to show a small spirit of independence, it was elicited by "selfish interests." The notorious *Poynings' Law*, in Henry VII.'s reign, forbade Ireland to originate or amend any bill of rights, privileges, or civil protection to anybody. Its function was to pass acts which had been approved under the Great Seal of England; and, to increase the bitterness of the insult, the Irish Parliament could not be summoned until that of England had cut and dried the work which it required it to do. "Its sole power," says Mr. Lecky, "was that of respecting the measures thus submitted to it. . . . The ultimate form, therefore, which every Irish measure assumed was determined by the authorities in England, who had the power either of altering or rejecting the bills of the Irish Parliament; and this latter body, though it might reject the bill which was returned to it from England in an amended form, had no power to alter it."

All this was degrading enough. The trade and commerce of the country had been so hampered in Swift's time by restrictions, that in 1729 an Irish author wrote: "The despondency with respect to trade is universal. Men of all degrees give up the thought of improving our commerce. The restrictions are insurmountable, and any attempt on that head would be vain

and fruitless." Ireland had been building up a good woollen trade as well as a first-class linen manufacture. But England, in her short-sighted policy, choked out the former because her own people wanted that branch of industry all to themselves, and William pledged himself to a company of English merchants in 1698 to ruin that trade in Ireland, although he was willing that the Irish should retain their linen trade. But the woollen manufacture was, according to Mr. Lecky, "the chief form of Irish industry"; for that of linen, owing to restrictive laws, even so late as 1700, amounted in exports to not more than fourteen thousand pounds sterling per annum. It was not until the woollen business was utterly destroyed in Ireland, that this struggling, persistent people were permitted to export white and brown linens to the English colonies, although they could not exchange them for colonial produce! The linen trade originated with French Protestant refugees, and the concession to export was a boon to Protestants and not to Catholics, and the very bill for the relief of the linen trade sets forth in the opening clause that "the Protestant interest in Ireland ought to be supported by encouraging the linen manufactures of the kingdom, with a due regard to the interest of their dear brother Protestants, of course, her Majesty's good subjects of her said kingdom"!

Now Swift had created a public opinion against all this, and all the oppressions which choked the life out of the Irish people. Flood in his turn came, and with a learning and eloquence such as the ears of men were not much familiar with in those days, he denounced them, and sought to make Ireland a free country. As an opposition leader he was the terror of the Tories, and his raillery and wit and withering sarcasms made the whole House tremble at times, for no one knew upon whom he might next descend in his wrath. Hely Hutchinson, provost of Trinity College, and a political and commercial writer of great ability, was the one sole man who feared him not, but delighted rather in breaking lances and battle-axes with him. Flood's Parliamentary efforts told with great effect outside, and his armies of opposition were both within and without the walls of the House. He made himself popular by advocating short Parliaments, and the cutting down of the monstrous pen-

sion lists which were merely used to corrupt voters and make placemen. His most popular measure was the formation of a constitutional militia, and his ceaseless iteration of the right of Ireland to govern herself, maintaining, as Molyneux had done before him, that the Irish Parliament had anciently all the rights and supreme powers of legislation which belonged to that of England, and that no act passed by England for the government of Ireland was, or could be, valid, unless it originated with the Irish Parliament, and was passed into a law by that body. Flood was assisted in his powerful agitation by Charles Lucas, an eminent Irish politician, who was as brave and heroic a patriot as he was eloquent and learned. Irish independence was his aim throughout life, and he attacked the oppressive acts of England so mercilessly, that his speeches were ordered to be publicly burned, and in 1794 he was proclaimed a traitor to the Parliament, and fled to England to save his life. During his residence in that country he lost the use of his limbs, and on his return to Ireland he was obliged to deliver his speeches sitting. Flood was one of the writers of the Barataria papers, modelled after the style of Junius, and which created a sensation little short of that which the famous Letters of Junius had produced. Flood's performances were signed *Syndercombe*, and Mr. Lecky says "that they are powerful and well reasoned," but too labored and smelling of the oil. The Letters of Junius were attributed to him at one time, but without any satisfactory proof. He was one of the few publicists in Ireland whose life was not attended by any suspicion of treachery or duplicity. And yet he failed of his ambition, and though the greatest orator Ireland had yet produced, he sank down into comparative obscurity faster than he had risen to eminence. When Lord Harcourt succeeded Lord Townsend in the government of the country, Flood took his stand as an independent member and supported him. But when he accepted the office of Vice-Treasurer under that administration, he seems all in a moment to have lost caste, influence, and the confidence of the people. He vindicated himself in 1783 in reply to Grattan, who had mercilessly pricked him to political death with sharp pins of wit. Mr. Lecky discusses his motives to this act, and on the whole inclines to his defence. "The American war,"

he says, " and the arms of the volunteers, gave an impulse to the national cause which no man then alive could have predicted." Flood's aim was to make the Irish Parliament as independent as that of England; and when Lord Townsend was superseded by a new viceroy, and the popular irritation caused by his rule was allayed, Flood's party declined, according to Mr. Lecky, and was henceforth powerless in all directions save that of modifying the course of events. It was then that Flood advised the patriot party to join issue with the government, and direct as far as possible all its acts to the public good. But this advice, although Townsend's successor (Lord Harcourt) was a most just and honorable man, was sure to beget suspicion of its integrity and singleness of purpose, because it involved the postponement of Irish Parliamentary independence. And so Flood's misfortunes and the final failure of his life began, although he did all that a true patriot could do to prove that " national principles were compatible with perfect attachment to the crown."

He was identified with all the great measures for Irish reform in his time. He was ambitious, but neither place nor money nor rank had any power over him. He liked to be esteemed as the foremost man among the patriots; and indeed he was so, to the end of his career, in spite of his final misfortunes. But his office gagged him for the seven years during which he held it; and as he had changed his policy and to some extent his opinions, the popular party fell away from him, and he was left on his rock with the vulture of discontent gnawing at his vitals. Singularly enough, this man of the people and of liberty was opposed to the American patriots, and believed that their success would ruin England. He called the four thousand Irish troops sent to fight against them " armed negotiators "; and Mr. Lecky says that it was this unfortunate expression to which Grattan alluded when he said of him in his celebrated invective, " that he stood with a metaphor in his mouth, and a bribe in his pocket, a champion against the rights of America, — the only hope of Ireland and the only refuge of the liberty of mankind." By this emigration of troops Ireland was left unprotected, with the French threatening the capital.

It was at this crisis that Ireland, stung with the disgrace which her rulers had brought upon her, roused herself from one end of the island to the other, and, merging all distinctions of race and creed and political parties, called every man to arms for its defence. In an incredibly short time sixty thousand Protestants and Catholics responded to the summons, "disciplined," says Mr. Lecky, "and appointed as a regular army, fired by the strongest enthusiasm, and moving as a single man." Flood was among them, an officer of this sudden army of freedom, — as grand as ever in his intellect, as pure as ever in his character. There, too, was Henry Grattan, "the orator," as Mr. Lecky says, "whose burning sentences became the very proverbs of freedom." And these men and this army were assembled to repel foreign aggression, and to crush an alien and corrupt parliament. "They knew their duty to their sovereign, they were loyal; they knew their duty to themselves, and they were resolved to be free." This was one of their own resolutions, and against such a devoted and enthusiastic body of men, what power could avail?

Another "opportunity for Ireland" had come, and they made the most of it, threatening the empire. England was absorbed with all her populations in war; what could she do against them? They remembered the long centuries of wrong through which they had passed, and by which they had been scathed, robbed, and degraded; their religion a mockery and by-word; their commerce destroyed, that English traders might supersede them. They were maddened by these oppressions, and they planted two cannons before the doors of their convention with these words inscribed upon them, "Free-trade or this!" Can we blame them? Every branch of Irish industry, except the linen trade, had been ruined by cool and deliberate laws. A few trifling reliefs had been granted to Ireland in her commerce, but all the great leading disabilities were unrepealed. Perhaps Lord North would have yielded large reforms to them but for the opposition of the industrial districts of the North of England and of Scotland, — Manchester and Glasgow. The Irish were in earnest, and pledged themselves at great meetings never to consume nor import any articles of English manufacture until they had got free-trade. In 1779 Burgh

moved as an amendment to the address from the throne a petition for the "extension of trade"; when Flood, who was still a minister, proposed to add the words "free-trade" instead, and eloquently defended the amendment, which was carried only because sixty thousand men were in arms out of doors, and a nation had demanded it at the hands of their terrified oppressors. The chief restrictions which crushed the Irish energy and enterprise were subsequently renewed by the action of Lord North; the Irish could now export their woollens and glass, and the markets of the colonies were open to them.

Flood felt all the burdens of his position, and soon after threw up his office as minister and returned to his old compatriots. But his overwhelming influence was gone, and his place in the House knew him no more forever as a great leader. Grattan was the rising star in Parliament. Flood felt the change bitterly. In 1779 Yelverton moved for the repeal of Poynings' infamous law; and with the petulance of a child Flood rose and complained that his twenty years of popular service and special study of this very question were forgotten, and that another had reaped the harvest he had sown. Yelverton with Irish aptness and impromptu replied, "I will call to the mind of the honorable gentleman that if a man desert his wife for seven years, she is no longer bound to him according to the civil law, but may leave him, and another man may take her and give her his protection." It was a passage of deep humiliation, which must have told fearfully upon Flood's sensitive nature.

It was a great fact the achievement of the independence of Parliament in 1782, but it was coerced from the English by the Irish patriots, and was sure, eventually, to have all manner of obstacles thrown in its way to impede its free action. The English Parliament, nevertheless, repealed soon after its Declaratory Act, by which the dependence of the Irish Parliament was enacted. What is called the simple repeal controversy involved Poynings' law, which the English maintained made the Irish Parliament subservient to them and their rulers, whilst the Irish patriots denied the premises and the conclusion. They insisted that an express renunciation should be

made by England; but this, it was argued, would be equivalent to a confession of England's superiority, when the object was to get an equal recognition for both Parliaments. Grattan, however, was opposed to any further demands of concession from the English, and maintained that the repeal of the act was a resignation of the pretended right. Flood represented the party that was not satisfied with this repeal, and his adhesion to it gave it weight and importance, and prolonged a useless and irritating discussion. That he was in earnest, his last great speech upon the subject sufficiently proves, in which he calls upon God to bear him testimony that if he were then using his last breath he would go on and make his exit by a loud demand for the people's liberties. It was in the fury of this battle about a bubble that Flood and Grattan's long alienation came to a crisis which separated them forever. Thus the only two great men of sterling integrity on the popular side, whose united efforts hitherto had done so much for Ireland, were lost to the national cause, so far as concerted action was concerned. Flood was jealous of Grattan. He was older than his rival, quite as eloquent, learned, and brilliant as he, with a vaster amount of experience to guide him. He had made this question his own, and had raised the war-cry of Parliamentary independence when Grattan was in his leading-strings. He could not brook the thought of playing second to a stripling, however talented and influential; for hitherto for twenty years he had been the leading personage in Irish politics, and sat in Parliament sixteen years before Grattan entered it. Grattan on this occasion threw down the gauntlet by some ungenerous remarks on Flood's recent sickness; whereupon the latter arose, and delivered a most fierce, angry, and independent speech, in which he charged Grattan with taking a bribe from the Parliament, stigmatizing him as a "mendicant patriot who was bought by his country, and sold that country for prompt payment." He alluded to a grant of £100,000 made to him by Parliament in recognition of his services, — a large sum in those days, only half of which Grattan could be induced to take. This was as ungenerous in Flood as Grattan's allusion to Flood's sickness was mean and unpardonable. Grattan's reply had evidently been long pre-

pared, to be ready for just such an emergency, and his invective was, as Mr. Lecky says, for concentrated and crushing power almost or altogether unrivalled in modern oratory. These two great men, although they subsequently did justice each to the other's character and abilities, were never friendly again; nor did they ever again pull together at the oars that urged the ship of state through deep waters.

Flood was always influential with the volunteers, and his voice was powerful in the convention, many of whose members were for an open war with England. Some of the patriots were for the dissolution of the convention. Flood was desirous of introducing a reform bill, and of securing the support of the convention to its measures. He could not therefore agree to its dissolution; for this would be like lopping off the chief stay of his strength and power. He had secured the renunciation of all England's claims of supremacy, and had therefore achieved, as he believed, the absolute independence of the Irish Parliament. He now sought to reform the Parliament, so that no traitor could sit there and sell it to the "alien" government by selling himself. He designed to base the Parliament upon the people's will, and make corruption impossible. But even Flood proved himself to be a narrow and limited statesman. In his Reform Bill he added nothing to the political power of the Catholics, although to Protestants the franchise was largely extended. On the other hand, it anticipated the later English county vote of freeholders owning property of the value of forty shillings, by giving votes to such property-holders for boroughs, with a view to throwing all these close-pocket constituencies wide open. Votes were also to be given to leaseholders of thirty-one years, where fifteen of the years had yet to run out. In cases of rotten boroughs he proposed to extend the franchise to the adjoining parishes, and to exclude all pensioners from Parliament who held these gratuities during pleasure, and to cause all who accepted office or a pension for life to vacate their seats. Moreover, this bill made it imperative that every member should swear he had neither bribed anybody to vote for him, nor caused any agent to bribe for him. It further enacted that Parliament should be triennial.

This is Mr. Lecky's analysis of the bill, and had it passed he says it would have effectually cured the corruptions of the Irish Parliament, although he stigmatizes it for its cruel, unjust, and oppressive treatment of the Catholics. The Attorney-General, Yelverton, and most of the members who spoke, opposed the bill, and Yelverton denounced it as an insult because it came from an armed body who threatened to rule the country by a military council. The votes were 158 to 49, and the majority were state paupers. The volunteers were censured by the House, and Lord Charlemont, the President, adjourned it *sine die*. To their honor be it stated that the members made no opposition, but returned to their homes and avocations as if they were leaving a political gathering in some hall of the capital, — a cheering fact, which their enemies never expected to see realized in action. So ended the agitation for the greatest reform bill ever proposed in Britain; for that of Lord John Russell, the demand for which on New Hall Hill in Birmingham, by Atwood with his two hundred thousand men, who there assembled, had made even Wellington tremble in his white waistcoat in the House of Lords, although he laughed at the thunders of Waterloo, — Lord John Russell's bill, we say, was not nearly so comprehensive as this of Flood. The organized armies of Ireland at that time amounted to one hundred thousand men; and if the mad dandy Bishop of Derry had been their leader, he would assuredly have precipitated a war with England; and, what is more, England would have stood less chance at that time, according to Mr. Lecky, to have put down such a large and well-disciplined army as these volunteers had become, than at any previous or subsequent period of her history. Her wars had exhausted her, and both men and money were scarce.

The penal laws were nearly all repealed by this time, and the Catholics were slowly and peaceably advancing towards their final emancipation. Ireland had revived and sprung into new life through the teachings of that mighty Dean Swift, as will be evident to all who may compare the intellectual and political condition of the people when he first appeared upon the scene, with that which made itself so deeply felt at the close of Flood's career. One is sorry, however, to find that a

man like Flood should have been so uniformly intolerant in all matters affecting the emancipation of the Catholics. It was a great and damaging blot upon his character, and at a time when there could be no fear of Catholic ascendency, and so many of the first Protestant patriots of the land were in favor of their equality with them before the law in all things. His standing out against their freedom goes far to bankrupt his claims to unselfish patriotism and greatness. The personal enmity which now existed between him and Grattan very largely influenced his later politics. He was for the continued existence of the convention, although the French war was over, and Grattan was resolutely and firmly against it as a standing menace to the Parliament and the government. After its adjournment *sine die*, as we have said and seen, a portion of the volunteers, through some secret and some open influence, were banded into a powerless organization from whose final dissolution, Mr. Lecky tells us, the United Irishmen's Society sprang into existence.

Flood never ceased to agitate a reform of the Parliament, but without any chance of success. He subsequently entered the English Parliament, and his career there was a lamentable failure, which poisoned the rest of his days. His first speech on the India Bill killed him, and an Irishman named Courtenay apotheosized his death in a speech which, as he told Lord Byron, was steeped to its extreme ultimate in the bitterest personal animosity. He made one more attempt to redeem his reputation by bringing forward a new reform bill in 1790, and he proved in his introductory speech that he could still bend the old bow of Ulysses. The main feature of it was the election of one hundred new Parliament men chosen by county household suffrage ; and Burke very highly extolled his speech upon the occasion as well as the new measure he proposed.

During the remainder of his life he lived a recluse, and fell into gloomy moods and petulant and angry speech. He died in 1791, alone in his chamber, and no human eye saw him breathe his last ; for he sent his people out of the room and gave up the ghost like a Roman. He bequeathed a large property to the Dublin University, for the special encouragement of the study of the old Erse tongue and the purchase of ancient Irish manuscripts.

We cannot but be sorrowful over the fate of this brave, high-minded, and heroic man. His country was his idol, and her freedom and independence of England were the summit of his life's ambition. Few public men ever passed scathless through such a baptism of fire as Flood had to encounter every day of his life. Swift found Ireland in a very similar condition to that which Lord Bacon, Sir Walter Raleigh, and the great secret society of progress found England in Elizabeth's and James's time. And as the members of the society created a dramatic literature, which, enacted upon the stage, — and thereby appealing to the EYE in *living diagrams*, as Bacon expresses it, as well as to the intellect and the conscience, through the ear, — familiarized the people with the noblest sentiments of liberty, culminating in later times in the Cromwell Commonwealth, so did Swift by his stories, allegories, pamphlets, and speeches create a public opinion in Ireland when all the outside world thought that it was a dead country, with no possibilities of resurrection abiding in it. And this "opinion" was sustained nobly by the patriotic efforts of Flood throughout his career, bringing about the independence of Parliament, and the removal of commercial restrictions, and the abrogation of the penal laws. He thus prepared the way for the fiery and impassioned energies of Grattan in the same direction of national progress; and through Grattan the mighty tides rolled on to the days of the great O'Connell and the repeal agitation.

GEORGE L. PHILLIPS.

ART. III. — 1. *Labor and other Capital: the Rights of each secured, and the Wrongs of both eradicated. Or an Exposition of the Cause why few are Wealthy and many Poor, and the Delineation of a System which, without infringing the Rights of Property, will give to Labor its just Reward.* By EDWARD KELLOGG, Author of "Currency the Evil and the Remedy." New York. 1849.

2. *A New Monetary System: the only Means of securing the respective Rights of Labor and Property and of protecting the Public from Financial Revulsions.* By EDWARD KELLOGG. Revised from his Work on "Labor and other Capital," with numerous Additions from his Manuscripts. Edited by his daughter, MARY KELLOGG PUTNAM. New York: Kiggins, Tooker, & Co. 1868.

3. *La Question Ouvrière au XIX^e^ Siècle.* Par M. PAUL LEROY BEAULIEU. Paris: Charpentier et C^ie^. 1872.

THE workingmen of Europe and America — a term limited in its popular acceptation to manual laborers — are in a state of great excitement in respect to questions, the proper solution of which concerns other classes of society scarcely less than themselves. Their grievances are generally admitted by the intelligent and thoughtful; who, however, do not agree with the workingmen as to the special cause of those grievances, nor as to its baleful effects being restricted almost exclusively to the laboring classes. The principal grievance of which they complain is, that of the gross annual product of the world, capital gets far too large a share, and labor correspondingly too little; and this grievance, thus broadly stated, will, for the purpose of this paper, be regarded as including in its scope all minor subjects of complaint. The classes referred to assume to understand fully and beyond all possibility of error the reasons why the joint products of capital and labor are thus wrongfully distributed. They also very generally assume a like infallibility of judgment in respect to the rightfulness and efficiency of remedies for the evils of which they complain. My object is to inquire whether, notwithstanding their confidence in the correctness of their opinions, they may not be at fault both as to causes and remedies.

Whether we apply the proposition to the whole world or restrict it to a particular country, it is clear that every person is entitled in the first division to an annual share of the aggregate product exactly proportioned to the relative aid which his labor or capital or both may have contributed to its production. Considered abstractly, that share is certain and definite; but it is not possible for man to determine precisely what such share is in the concrete, and the best that he can do is to observe as nearly as may be the theory of distribution here indicated. The workingmen possess a decided advantage in their agitation, in the fact that *their* wrongs accruing from an inequitable distribution of wealth are conceded. The International Society is perhaps the most obnoxious and revolutionary in purpose of the various organizations which the workingmen have formed and linked together to promote their common objects. Yet of this society, a member of the British Parliament and an Under Secretary of State, Mr. Grant Duff, says: "In so far as this International Society represents anything except anarchy, it represents a vast amount of perfectly reasonable dissatisfaction at the present unreasonable state of things in Europe, where every nation is standing with the sword in one hand and a protective tariff like a target in the other." He supplements this frank admission of the wrongs of the workingmen, however, by the statement of a great truth, which will doubtless pass unheeded by those whom it primarily concerns. "The schemes of the so-called International Society for regenerating the world," says Mr. Duff, "are based on absolute ignorance or disregard of the economic laws by which the world is governed. That being so, WE KNOW that the end of them must be to perish and come to naught, after no doubt causing more or less of bloodshed and destruction of property in this or that place."

STRIKES.

It is enough for the workingmen that they suffer from wrongs; and they adopt measures of redress, either ignorant or reckless of the fact that if obtained in pursuance of such measures, it must be at the expense of further injustice to other classes who are already suffering in varying degrees from the same causes as themselves. One of the measures

most frequently resorted to is the "strike," having for its object higher wages for the same hours of labor; or its equivalent, fewer hours for the rate of wages then current. A common auxiliary to this "remedy" is a system of terrorism, organized to prevent all dissentients from accepting any other terms of employment than such as the majority of the "union" or "league" see fit to prescribe. These organizations also assert the "right" to dictate the proportion of apprentices to journeymen in the several trades; and it would seem that they exercise the "right," which they do not openly assert, of schooling their adherents to do just as little work as possible in a given time and still keep up the *appearance* of working.* Such are some of the expedients to which the workingmen have recourse for the avowed purpose of correcting abuses in the distribution of wealth and securing "justice" to themselves, by awarding to Labor a share of its own legitimate fruits, of which the "tyrant Capital" would otherwise despoil it! But, strange as it may seem, they recognize no tyranny in their own action.

That no business involving the employment of labor can be carried on successfully, if the employés regulate their own wages without regard to the consent of their employer, dictate how many hours shall constitute "a day," and graduate their working down to the lowest possible standard short of absolute idleness, is a proposition which needs only to be stated to secure the assent of every candid and intelligent man. Were strikes limited in their scope to workers who voluntarily join them, there would be less cause to censure their originators. The right of a man or body of men to refrain from labor until terms are offered that are satisfactory to them will not be questioned; but when they interpose by force or threats to prevent others from working except upon terms dictated by themselves, they invade one of the clearest rights of man and make war upon society itself by attacking one of its fundamental bases.

When these men say, "We have the same right to fix the price of our labor as the trader has to fix the price of his

* M. Leroy Beaulieu's official data would warrant a much stronger affirmation. See p. 96.

wares, and to refuse to take less than our price," they stand on solid ground. But when they say to other workingmen, "You shall not sell your labor at less than the prices we have fixed," and to employers, "You shall hire no labor unless you pay the wages and submit to the rules which we in our councils have prescribed," and proceed to organize a force to give effect to their plans, they repudiate the principles, the language, and the customs of social and business life, and adopt those which properly pertain only to spoliation and war. An indefinite expansion of this "system" would substitute universal spoliation for the present custom of buying, selling, and exchanging all commodities, the parties to every transaction being free to consult their own interests and tastes exclusively; and brute force would take the place of mutual consent in all transfers of property. The universal prevalence of such a system would destroy all sense of security for property and inevitably stop all efforts to accumulate it, beyond the barest and commonest necessaries of life; and as a certain consequence, society as now organized would rapidly give way to lawlessness and savagism. It is perfectly safe to assume that a system of which these are some of the logical and necessary results will not for a very long period receive the support of a number of people sufficiently large to render it an object of dread.

But while the right of man voluntarily to agree not to work, except upon certain conditions, and even to combine for the purpose of securing the terms they "strike" for, will not here be impugned, it may be worth while to show in this connection that all such measures necessarily involve a loss, not only to the participants therein, but to society at large. Two forces, and only two, are indispensable to the production of wealth, — human labor, and the forces (including the raw materials) of nature. The use of capital increases almost immeasurably the efficiency of these two forces or factors; but it is not, like them, absolutely indispensable to production, since there was a time when no capital existed, and the beginning of production must have been made without its assistance. In case of the suspension of human labor, whether voluntary or enforced, the action of the natural forces, which are always awaiting its co-

operation, is necessarily, and to the same extent, suspended also. If man will not plough and sow, if he voluntarily or by compulsion refrains from cultivating the soil, he will get no harvest. But should he plough and sow, and the forces of nature inherent in the soil be suspended, the result would be precisely the same, — he could get no harvest. The suspension of one of these forces is equivalent to the suspension of both. In either event (the suspension of natural forces being impossible, of course, though not unimaginable) the work of production absolutely ceases to the extent of the suspension; the striker loses what he might have gained by his normal activity; and society possesses a proportionately smaller stock of products for distribution among all classes who compose it.

THE NEW MONETARY SYSTEM.

There is, however, a large class of the workingmen of this country — comprising their official leaders and their principal writers — who regard strikes as a temporary expedient, perfectly proper and justifiable indeed, when necessary to enforce the demands of the workers, but destined to be superseded by a grand and comprehensive policy that will secure to labor and capital, with unerring certainty, the exact proportions of gross annual gains to which in strict justice they respectively are entitled. The same policy, in the opinion of its advocates, will also work out the liquidation of the national debt without burdening capital or labor, enable manufactures to flourish in localities where they never could succeed under any degree of tariff protection, provide abundant capital for the industrious and enterprising who cannot now command it, and, in short, reorganize the whole commercial and industrial machinery of the country on a basis as sound and enduring as natural laws. To inaugurate this policy, it is necessary to adopt but a single measure, the issue of an irredeemable paper money, in accordance with Edward Kellogg's so-called "New Monetary System," or with that system as modified by his disciples to adapt it to the altered financial condition of the country.

This system, in my opinion, should be candidly considered and fully and fairly discussed; for, however fallacious and even absurd it may be regarded, circumstances have invested

it with so much importance that it would be impolitic if not unsafe to ignore it. Several millions of our population look to the various organizations of the workingmen for relief from what they sincerely believe to be the unjust exactions of the "capitalist class." The leaders of these organizations have very generally become converts to the doctrines of the "New Monetary System"; and they have the most implicit faith that its adoption by the government would redress all the wrongs of labor, and satisfy every reasonable demand of every class of society. They speak of Kellogg's book as their "Bible"; and his teachings are accepted with as little question as if he were known to be divinely inspired. The most extravagant and indefensible features of this system have found indorsers in the Congress of the United States, one of whose most influential members has reported and zealously advocated a bill avowedly designed to demonetize the precious metals, to prevent a return to a convertible paper currency, and to establish the "New Monetary System" as a part of the permanent financial policy of the country.

There are two modes of dealing with this question and this state of facts, between which we must necessarily choose: first, to treat their pet system and its adherents with contempt; and, second, to appeal to the intelligence of the men who sincerely believe it would prove a panacea for all their ills, and endeavor to convince them that its adoption would inevitably disappoint their expectations and add to their present grievances. To choose the first mode would be equivalent to saying to some millions of our population, "Your wrongs, your remedies, and yourselves are unworthy of our serious consideration"; at least, such would be the interpretation which the workingmen would put upon that kind of treatment. And they would not very unnaturally conclude that the only way to gain the ear of their "oppressors" is, to fill up their own ranks, perfect their organization, confederate their "unions," and school them all to obedience to one central authority, in order that, all milder measures failing, they may be prepared to enforce their demands. The second mode implies the belief that workingmen are essentially like the rest of mankind, pursuing the same objects, moved by the same impulses,

governed by the same motives; and that if you can *convince* them that any line of policy is right or wrong, beneficial or injurious to their own permanent interests and to society at large, you can thereby control their action. Hence it is my purpose to subject some of the salient features of their favorite "New Monetary System" to a somewhat thorough examination.

That system was invented prior to the creation of our large national debt. Its leading features may be briefly stated: "A national safety fund" institution is to be established by the government, which shall issue two kinds of paper: first, "safety-fund *notes*," bearing one per cent per annum interest; and, second, a legal-tender paper-*money*, bearing no interest, but redeemable on demand in the interest-bearing notes. Branches, possessing like powers, to be established in the several States. These institutions or banks to be required to issue their paper "money" at all times, on demand of the owners of productive real estate in exchange for mortgages bearing one and one tenth per cent interest per annum, not exceeding in amount one half the value thereof. A low uniform rate of interest to be established by the Federal government for the whole United States.

Such is a brief outline of Kellogg's "New Monetary System." After the war, his disciples and successors substituted the bonds of the government for real-estate mortgages as the basis of the system. But in order to avoid material changes in Mr. Kellogg's plan, and to secure to labor all its beneficent results, they require the government to make a new issue of bonds bearing a rate of interest not varying largely from that proposed by him for his real-estate mortgages, which bonds shall be convertible at the will of the holder into treasury certificates bearing no interest. These treasury certificates are to be convertible, on demand, into the interest-bearing bonds, and also to be a legal tender for all private debts, as also for all duties and other charges imposed or created by the government of the United States. Moreover, in order to facilitate the placing of the new bonds bearing a low rate of interest, the Secretary of the Treasury is to be "*required* to pay all the outstanding bonds or other obligations of the United States

. . . . when the same shall become due and payable or due and redeemable at the pleasure of the government, *in the treasury certificates* hereby authorized to be issued," excepting from this provision only such obligations of the United States as have been "by law expressly made payable in coin." The "money" provided for by this system is in no event to be redeemable in, nor bear any definite relation to, gold and silver; nor is any other money, either paper or metallic, to be recognized, after this system shall have been fully established.

The reason of this deadly hostility to gold and silver is, that the author of the new system and his followers do not conceive it possible that labor can secure its rights until those metals shall cease to be used as money. Kellogg says, "The law making gold and silver the only tender in payment of debts is well adapted to build up and sustain monarchical governments, because it must infallibly accumulate property in the hands of a few, constituting aristocracies, which are essential to this form of government; but the same reason that qualifies it so admirably for this purpose renders it incompatible with a government having for its sole object the welfare and happiness of the people." And A. Campbell, a disciple of Kellogg, and the highest living financial authority of the workingmen, declares that "the institution of money on the principle of the value inhering in its material, and making it of a substance limited in quantity, in order that the sovereign or a few nobles may have the power to control its value, is indispensable to the maintenance of the autocratic or aristocratic principles of government. Gold is, therefore, the representative of the autocratic principle of government, and is antagonistic to and incompatible with the democratic principle. We cannot maintain the democratic principle unless we institute money upon such a wise and just basis that the sovereign people shall have the power to regulate the volume and control its value. A democracy is but a co-operative association on a grand scale. . . . . Its money should, therefore, be a certificate of service rendered or value given to the government or people in their corporate capacity, and which the government should receive in exchange for its bonds bearing a just rate of interest, and it should likewise be made a legal tender in the

payment of all debts public and private, that it may be fitted for the performance of all the functions of money. This is *democratizing money*."

Vague and crude ideas, somewhat analogous to these, have for centuries been held by "reformers" who have inadequately studied the subject of which they treat; and there seems to be no good reason for questioning the sincerity of the opinions which they express. But it is strange, if not unaccountable, that a member of Congress, as astute and well read on financial subjects as B. F. Butler, should indulge in like utterances. "We have divested our government," says General Butler, "of every trait of the despotisms, every attribute of the monarchies, and every vestige of the slaveries of the Old World, save one, and that is the all-controlling and all-absorbing power by which the masses of the people of all nations of the earth *have ever been enslaved*, — COINED MONEY. More than three thousand years ago, the despots of the world, as the most potent method to enrich themselves and their favorites, and perpetuate their tyranny, hit upon the device of impressing their image and superscription or other peculiar stamp upon pieces of two of the metals. . . . . *Because* of their capabilities of being so converted into *equivalents of power*, the so-called precious metals were eagerly sought after by all men in such degree that they came *falsely* to be deemed to have a special intrinsic value in themselves *equal to the effigy* stamped upon them!" "Coined gold and silver has ever been the handmaid of despotism; the prop of monarchical power; the supporter of thrones; the upholder of nobilities and priesthoods; the engine by which the privileges and pretensions of aristocrats have always been sustained in trampling down the rights, devouring the substance, and absorbing the unrequited labors of the masses."

It cannot be necessary to quote further from the writings of the labor leaders, to show what is the foundation of their hostility to "coined gold and silver"! In their opinion it does not answer a single purpose of "money properly instituted." Their own system, being a perfect one, would leave nothing to be desired by humanity which "money properly instituted" can possibly secure. Some of their fundamental maxims and economical dogmas are worthy of perusal. The following are

selections from the writings of Messrs. Kellogg, Campbell, and Butler: There are two kinds of value, — *actual* value and *legal* value. Actual value, or inherent value, belongs to *anything* that can be employed for any useful purpose without being *exchanged* for any other thing, such as food, clothing, etc. *Legal* value belongs to anything which represents or can be exchanged for things of *real* value. Money has no inherent value; but it must be constituted a *legal* representative of *actual* value. It should be uniform, sound, *cheap*, stable, and elastic. Its value should be as uniform as the length of the yard-stick or the capacity of the bushel; and it should be so instituted that it could be about as easily procured to facilitate all desirable production, trade, and improvements, as *yard-sticks* to measure any quantity of cloth! The right to fix the value of money is as much reserved by the government as the right to fix the length of the yard. Congress has definitely fixed the length of the yard and the size of the bushel, — but it has not fixed the value of money. The value of money is no more fixed or regulated by the laws ordering each piece of money to be coined of a certain *weight and kind of metal*, than the *length* of the yard would be fixed by ordering it to be made of a certain *weight* and kind of wood, without regard to its *length!* The rate or amount of interest that the dollar commands *determines its value.* To keep the *value* of money uniform, the *rate of interest* must be kept uniform. Then it *will* distribute products *equitably*, according to the labor or service performed in their production; and without violating any principle of equity, restore to the industrial classes their natural rights of which they are now deprived by the present iniquitous system.

The main features of the "new monetary system" and of its allied economical philosophy are now before us. They abound in errors of definition, in false analogies, and in other fallacies, some of which are worthy of special notice.

The Kellogg system, as modified by the labor leaders, Sylvis, Campbell, and Casey, and advocated by General Butler in Congress, would almost necessarily prove but a temporary expedient; and for that reason it is entitled to only a brief consideration. Mr. Campbell, writing at a time when our national debt was $2,500,000,000, said: "I have shown that under the

true American system, the debt would be liquidated in twenty years, without the imposition of one farthing of taxes on the people." Mr. Sylvis used the word "absorbed," instead of "liquidated"; but he agreed, as to time, with Mr. Campbell, — the debt would be absorbed in twenty years, without the imposition of taxes, etc. The liquidation or absorption, according to their theory, is to be effected in this manner: A given amount of money is necessary to transact the business of the country at the present time. The required amount will increase in about the same proportion as the population of the country. This is to be the only money recognized or tolerated by the government and people. They prove from known data, to their own satisfaction, that in twenty years the entire $ 2,500,000,000 would be converted into "money" under their system, and that that amount of money would not be in excess of the legitimate wants of the people. Hence the conclusion, "the public debt would be liquidated in twenty years, without the imposition of one farthing of taxes on the people!"

It is obvious, according to their own showing, that another "new monetary system" would become necessary at the end of twenty years. The public debt would be all "absorbed," or "liquidated," and the amount of "money" issuable thereon could not be increased. But the legitimate wants of the people for money would increase at the same rate as the population. What then could be done to supply the demand? Shall more debt be created? If so, for what purpose? Surely labor reformers will not advocate a war of the magnitude of that through which we have recently passed, at intervals of fifteen or twenty years, solely for the purpose of creating a public debt and furnishing the people who should escape death on the battle-field with the only means by which they could supply themselves with "money rightly instituted." This hypothesis may, therefore, be safely dismissed.

There remains one other: public debt could be created by selling bonds and distributing the proceeds thereof among the people as a gratuity, to be used by them for public or private purposes, as Congress might be pleased to direct. But a monetary system requiring the creation of a public debt in this manner, in order to perpetuate itself, would be a fitter subject

of ridicule than of argument. It would seem to be necessary, then, to limit the operation of the modified system to the public debt now existing. And, as already shown, the advocates of the debt basis demonstrate that the debt would be entirely absorbed in twenty years, and an increase in the amount of money would thereafter be impossible, while the legitimate demand for money would keep pace with our rapidly growing population. We are therefore placed in this dilemma as regards the adoption of the modified scheme: We must adhere, more or less rigidly, to the "old ways" and to the old ideas of money; or we must utterly discard the money, the materials and the ideas of money, which, with exceptions scarcely worth noting, have prevailed among all nations from the dawn of civilization, and take up a new and untried system, with full knowledge that it cannot last longer than twenty years. Considering the subject in this aspect, it is quite impossible to suppose that any philosopher or statesman would seriously recommend the adoption of a monetary policy necessarily so ephemeral in its character, and limited in its scope by the amount of a national debt. The original system, whatever may be its defects, possesses at least these dubious merits: it is susceptible of indefinite expansion, and its chosen basis is indestructible by man. Let us return to its consideration.

Kellogg evidently felt greatly embarrassed when he came to lay the foundation of his system, especially in defining "value." It is clear that he had already reasoned himself into the conviction that "money" does not and cannot possibly possess value. This conclusion, from whatever premises, or independent of all premises, was to him an indispensable necessity. "Money *is* the legal representative of property, the *real* value is in the property," he affirms in the outset. Any other conclusion would have been fatal to his "system," which assumes to provide a "money" equally as good as coin in every respect, and better than coin when all the uses of money are included in the comparison. His definition of value must then of necessity be so worded as to place his paper dollar and the metallic dollar in this respect on a par, — divesting both of all pretensions to "real value," and making each the "legal

representative of property." Hence the definition: "Value consists in those properties that render *anything useful.* There are two kinds of value, actual value and legal value. Actual or inherent value belongs to *anything* that can be employed for any useful purpose without being *exchanged* for any other thing. Legal value belongs to anything which represents or which can be exchanged for things of real value."

The author justly observes, that it is very "important in the discussion of this subject clearly to understand the definition of this term." If his definition is correct, it follows that air, water, the heat and the light of the sun, electricity and all other natural forces, possess great "actual or inherent value" in an economic sense; since not only can they all "be employed for useful purposes without being exchanged for any other thing," but unless some of them are "employed," no "things of real value" can be produced by human agencies. Yet no man who understands economic science ever did or ever will so define value as to include light, air, etc., in the list of objects which possess it. Value is simply a relation or proportion between two or more objects of desire produced by labor and other agencies, or between services rendered or to be rendered, indicating the comparative estimation in which such objects or services are held by those who seek to possess them. It follows almost necessarily from this definition, that to "fix the value" of money so as to make it as "definite and uniform" as "the length of the yard-stick or the size of the bushel" is an impossibility; inasmuch as the relations or proportion between money and the products of industry are almost constantly changing. It also follows that the argument based on the alleged reservation of the right by government to fix the value of money, possesses no force whatever. The power to "fix the value of money" has not been given to man nor to human government; and all attempts to exercise it have proved scarcely less futile than the attempt to stay the tide by royal prerogative. Our Constitution assumes to empower Congress to "*regulate* the value" of money and to "*fix* the standard of weights and measures"; but whether the word "regulate" instead of "fix" was used by its framers when treating of the "value of money," because they were conscious

that no government can be invested with power to fix it, is a question not pertinent to this discussion.*

The fiction, "legal value," as distinguished from "actual value," remains to be considered. Money, according to Kellogg and his followers, "possesses only a representative value" or a "legal value"; it is a "legal *medium* by which value is represented and exchanged"; they liken it to a mortgage; as a mortgage is a lien on a specific piece of land, so "money is a public mortgage on all the property for sale in the whole nation!" Governments have "stamped value" on the cheaper metals, such as iron, etc., and by parity of reason our government can "stamp value" on paper "certificates." These "certificates of value," as proposed by General Butler's bill, are not redeemable in anything; nor are they promises to pay, but simply bits of paper on which the government is to "stamp value," and which both government and people are to be compelled to accept at their face value for all debts and dues, public and private. Kellogg's "money" it will be remembered, is redeemable in safety-fund notes; and it is issuable in exchange for mortgages on land worth double the value of the money received. If then the money "represents value," the "real value" must be in the land covered by the mortgage upon which it is issued; and it merely carries with it the ultimate right to claim a portion of the value of the land corresponding to the amount of money in the hands of the respective holders. If a single holder wishes to "realize" on his money, he can get a safety-fund note of $500 for that amount of money. But the safety-fund note is payable not less than one year from the time it is issued; and when it does finally

* It is very convenient to speak of "value," and even of "intrinsic value," as if value, like weight, were simply a property of the material object spoken of. Even Bastiat admits of this use of the word "value,"—it being understood that it is used in a figurative sense. But a British writer, Macleod, ridicules the phrase "intrinsic value," and affirms that "to exterminate it is the first step in the improvement of the science," etc. On a subsequent page, however, of the same volume in which he proposes to "exterminate the phrase," he himself employs it. "The Bank of England," says he, "warned by experience, weighs rigidly every single sovereign paid in by its customers, and does not credit them with more than its *intrinsic value* as bullion!" It is not necessary to suppose that the author had forgotten his affirmation that "value resides *exclusively* in the mind," and cannot therefore attach to any material object; but that he found the phrase convenient!

mature it is payable in the same money that was given for it, redeemable only in safety-fund notes! It would seem that this brief recital is sufficient to convince any man of intelligence that the "legal value" of this kind of money would not avail to make these "paper mortgages as valuable as coin"; nor to vest it with "power to measure value equally with coin"; nor to render it of "unvariable value throughout the Union," so that it "cannot be made to fluctuate more in the measure of property than the yard-stick in the measure of cloth."

But, suppose the holder of $500 of this money owes a debt of £100 payable in London, how can he pay it with the funds he has on hand? There is no "legal" way by which he can get $500 in gold for his $500 in "money." His only resource is to sell his money to a gold broker — whose vocation this "system" promises to do away with forever — for whatever he can get. The moment the sale is made it is reported in the money column of the press; and the authors of the "system" are shocked to learn that their "better than gold" money is away down far below par, when compared with the money of the world!

These financial reformers impose upon their followers by asserting, that, whereas all international payments (excepting mere balances) are made in products or in bills of exchange drawn against products, there will be no occasion for the use of money in international trade except as above noted, and our money will be as independent of the money of other nations as our people are of foreign governments. A very simple illustration ought to suffice to remove this delusion. Suppose the person who had $500 of this money and who owed £100 payable in London, instead of selling his money for gold had gone into the market to buy cotton sufficient to pay his London debt. If his money would sell to the broker for only seventy-five cents on the dollar, it is perfectly clear that he would be obliged to pay one hundred cents in paper for the same amount of cotton that seventy-five cents in gold would buy. And hence the depreciation of our money would be as palpable in one case as in the other. Indeed there is no possible way to prevent the money of one commercial country

from being compared to, and its value quoted in, the money of all other countries with which it has commercial relations. Thus our irredeemable paper-money is now daily quoted in Canada and California as worth so much per dollar in gold; and in every city of the United States the premium on gold is also quoted daily; and that is but another mode of stating the extent to which our legal-tender currency is depreciated. Were the money of the new system substituted for our present circulating medium, it, too, would be daily and hourly quoted; or, in other words, the premium on gold would be thus quoted, and hence the ever-fluctuating "value" of that money, measured by a gold standard, would be constantly known. Doubtless the advocates of the new kind of legal tender would insist that the paper dollar would continue to be as unvarying in value as the yard-stick is in length, and that gold alone would fluctuate! But the supply of gold is known to be tolerably steady and uniform; while the new system proposes to authorize every owner of land in the United States to "coin money" at will, to the amount of one half the value thereof. Under such circumstances it would seem to be an insult to the understanding to argue that it is the paper dollar which is constant and unvarying in value, and that the gold dollar alone is changing its value every hour.

Briefly, on another aspect of the proposition that the holder of legal-tender paper-money virtually holds a mortgage on all property for sale in the nation: Kellogg asserts in the outset that "each man should be at liberty to make his own contracts," which is certainly very sound doctrine. The holder of $10,000 of legal tender, worth say fifty per cent in gold, could "foreclose" on and buy no more of "the property for sale in the nation" with his legal tender than he could with $5,000 in gold; since the owners of "property for sale" would be "at liberty" to exact an equivalent value for it in money, and their asking price would vary just one half, accordingly as they stipulated that payment should be made in gold or in legal tender. Should the law sternly forbid the making of prices in anything but legal tender, the holders of that money would be no better off, inasmuch as the owners of property would still be "at liberty" to graduate prices to corre-

spond to the depreciation of the legal currency, or to decline to sell at all. As to paying in a "cheap" legal-tender currency, debts contracted in a dearer currency, or, say in gold, it is obvious that the law which compels the creditor to accept it at par simply empowers the debtor to rob or defraud his creditor out of a sum equal to the difference between the "stamped value" of the legal tender and the current value of money at the time the debt was contracted. Thus the fiction of "legal value" becomes the synonym of legal spoliation.

A UNIFORM RATE OF INTEREST.

The law can and should establish a fair and uniform rate of interest for the whole United States; and that would secure a just and equitable distribution of wealth between capital and labor, and among all classes of the people. So say the advocates of the new system. But history teaches that no laws limiting or making uniform the rate of interest on money have ever been effectual; and science teaches that they neither should nor can be rendered effectual by any human power.

If A earns and receives $1,000 a year, he thereby makes no man poorer; for he has in fact created $1,000 which but for his industry would not have existed. If he saves $500 of his earnings instead of spending them all during the year, he injures nobody by his economy and gives no just occasion for complaint from any quarter. At the close of the year he has $500 to let for the ensuing year; and he also has his labor and skill to let for the same term. B wants to hire his money; and C wants to hire A, who owns the $500. "Each man," says the author of the new monetary system, — "each man should be at liberty to make his own contracts." That is simply the dictate of common-sense and the assertion and application to business of a universal right. C and A accordingly make their "own contract," A agreeing to serve C faithfully for one year, and C agreeing to pay A $1,000 for his services. Nobody sees anything wrong in this bargain. Each party has agreed to give the other nothing but what is his own, nothing of which his right of control is not exclusively and justly his own, as against all other men; and both consider themselves benefited by the exchange of services which they have agreed to make.

But now comes B, who wants to hire A's $500. "Each man should be at liberty to make his own contracts"; A feels quite as competent to hire out his money for a year as to hire out himself. And B is as able to decide whether he can afford to pay $30 or $40 or $50 for one year's use of A's $500 as C is to decide whether he can afford to pay A $1,000 for a year's services. The same principles and rights under natural laws apply to both transactions; and if human laws should interpose to "regulate" or "fix" the annual hire of A's money, it should also fix the hire of himself. If the laws should be invoked in the one case to deprive A of the "liberty" which Kellogg affirms "each man" enjoys by natural law, no man can give a valid reason why it should not be invoked in the other also. It is very true that if left to his own judgment B may promise to pay so high a rate of interest as to involve him in loss. But it is equally true that C, left to his own judgment, may agree to pay such high wages as to involve him also in loss. How can these possible errors of judgment be prevented? By a law of Congress fixing the rate of interest and of wages, or of either? But is it possible or even conceivable that the Congressmen of to-day are better able to determine what rate of interest B can afford to pay one, two, or five years hence than B himself will be at that time? They have no data on which to base their judgment, and no inducement to make it accurate or just; while B will have the powerful incentive of self-interest and a full knowledge of local circumstances and business prospects to restrain and to guide him. Moreover, it is a fact which few will be inclined to question, that intelligence and conscientiousness do not pertain exclusively to our law makers.

The use of money is actually worth more in Great Britain than in Holland, in America than in Europe, in the Southern than in the Northern States, in California than in Massachusetts; and no law framed by man can make it of equal value in these several sections of country. Were it possible absolutely to prohibit the lending of money in California at a higher rate than six per cent a year, little or none would be lent at all. Nature there furnishes such liberal terms of cooperation to the man of enterprise and capital, that he can pay

from ten to fifteen per cent for the use of money and still make large profits; and this state of things accordingly regulates the rate of interest in that State. If capitalists were prohibited from lending money, except at about one half the actual market rates, it is quite certain they would not lend it. They would be more likely to embark in mining, wool-growing, farming, etc., themselves, than to lend their money at six per cent to parties who had hitherto paid twelve or fifteen and yet realized, if not ample fortunes, at least satisfactory profits.

INTEREST AND THE VALUE OF MONEY.

"The rate of interest determines the value of money; its value is no more fixed by the quantity or quality of its material than the length of the yard or the size of the bushel is fixed by the quantity or quality of their wood." "A dollar that can be loaned for twelve per cent is more valuable than one that can be loaned for six per cent." "To keep the value of money uniform, the rate of interest must be kept uniform." So say the advocates of the new system.

But they recognize money as the medium for exchanging equal values. Now the dollar (or any given weight in gold) will exchange in England, Belgium or Holland for a much larger quantity of iron, or cloth, or almost any other of the great staples in universal demand, than it will in California. Yet in the first-named countries money will command about three per cent interest, while in California it readily commands fifteen per cent. Tried by the interest standard of value, money in California possesses about five times the value it does in the other countries named. But tried by the labor standard, money in California is not one half as valuable as it is in England, Belgium, and Holland. Suppose the advocates of making the value of money uniform, through the instrumentality of a uniform rate of interest, possessed and should exercise the power of applying it to these several countries, what would be the result? It must be obvious to every man of common-sense, that in California nobody would lend money, and that in England, Belgium, and Holland, nobody would borrow it, — certainly not for legitimate business uses. "Uniform" stagnation would necessarily ensue, producing wide-spread if not

"uniform" human suffering, until power should cease to interfere for the purpose of destroying the "liberty of each individual to make his own contracts." Prices and the rate of profits are controlled in all countries by natural laws, subject to more or less of the disturbing and always pernicious influence of the state. If the civil power will in all cases leave its citizens free to choose their own vocation and to make their own contracts, neither granting favors to one form of industry nor imposing special burdens on another, prices and profits will constantly tend towards uniformity, not only in any given country but throughout the world, for the simple reason that every man constantly strives to get the largest return for his capital and his labor; and he will instinctively abandon less for more profitable pursuits, whenever the difference will in his judgment warrant a change. And the tendency to uniformity or equilibrium can in no degree be accelerated by the state's assuming to "fix" a scale of prices for labor, money, or other commodities; since if the legal scale conforms to rates which would obtain under natural laws, it will be nugatory and inoperative; while if the legal differs from the natural rates, one party will not give or the other will not take them, and in that event the law will inevitably obstruct the tendency to equilibrium instead of promoting it.

CHEAP MONEY.

"Reformers" of society, especially those of socialistic proclivities, almost universally advocate "cheap money" as a cure for nearly all the evils by which man, as a social being and a subject of human government, is afflicted. Our labor reformers regard it as a grand panacea. Like Proudhon, they affirm that money should be furnished to the people at a trifle above the cost of making it. Its faculty of measuring and exchanging values, they hold, is due to law alone; and that gold is no better than paper-money for these purposes, since money, as such, does not, and cannot be made to, possess "actual value."

Now, one would suppose that inasmuch as a line or "stick" of known length is required to measure distance or length, and a vessel of known capacity, as a quart or bushel measure, is

required to measure a certain class of quantities, so some object of a known "actual value" would be required to measure value. The practice of all nations has in all ages conformed to this idea; and all writers whom the world accepts as authority have taught to the same effect. For instance, Aristotle, more than two thousand years ago, defined "money as a kind of merchandise designed to facilitate exchanges between other kinds of merchandise." It should be made of a "material useful of itself," such "for example as iron or silver, or similar substance, which in the first instance is measured and weighed, but finally, for the sake of convenience, it receives a *particular impression* to indicate its *value*." So Turgot says to the same general effect: "All merchandise has two of the essential properties of money, — to measure and to represent value, — and in this sense all merchandise is money. Reciprocally all money is essentially merchandise. A common measure of values must be something which has a value, which is received in commerce in exchange for other values; there is no token or thing which universally represents a value, except another equal value. Hence a money of pure convention is an impossible thing. Gold and silver are constituted by the nature of things money, and a universal money, altogether independently of convention and law. . . . . They are not, as many have supposed, merely *signs* of value; but they themselves possess value."

Our "reformers," however, are just as sanguine that their paper-money would prove better than gold or convertible paper currency; and they dogmatize just as confidently as if philosophy and experience both sustained their system instead of condemning it. Can they explain how it would work in such a case as this: Suppose all contracts made under present monetary systems are liquidated to-day to the satisfaction of all parties, and the precious metals are demonetized at the same time. Suppose, further, that the "new system" is ready to take the place of the present monetary systems of all commercial nations *to-morrow;* and that it provides an entirely new nomenclature of its own, in order to render its emancipation from the traditions and prejudices of old systems complete and unqualified. The "money" it supplies to the sev-

eral nations respectively is to be their only money; and it is to be a legal tender for all debts, public as well as private. As the unit of value must receive a new name in every country, the "sovereign" may be changed to the "monarch," the "franc" to the "gaul," the "thaler" to the "William," the "dollar" to the "Washington," and so on through the whole list. The new system is now in working order. Let it be assumed that one of its leading advocates, anxious to set it agoing, undertakes the initiative by proposing to buy a valuable estate in New York. He approaches the owner and asks, "What will you take for your property in cash?" "Well, now — I don't know; it is worth fifty thousand dollars of the old money; but I can't tell what it is worth in your new legal tender, for I don't know anything about it. What is the value of a Washington?" "O, the legal value of a Washington is the same as that of a dollar, the place of which it takes in all future business transactions. It is a dollar under a new name; it is a legal tender, the same as the greenback was; and as to names, — why names are nothing. I will take your property at your price." "Yes; but wait a little; I must see what I *can buy* with your money before I agree to take it; for I owe no debts to citizen or government, and its being a legal tender for debt is of no consequence to *me*. I will inquire about it and see you again." All efforts to conclude the bargain on the spot were unavailing; and the real-estate man took a circuit among the merchants, grocers, bakers, and butchers of his neighborhood, with whom he was accustomed to trade, and inquired of them about the new money, — what it is worth as compared with the old, — what is their scale of prices in legal tender, etc. But he could get no satisfaction; nobody knew what the money was worth; everybody was waiting like himself for something to turn up to determine its value; and there was no such thing as a scale of prices in legal tender. So he returns home, and while waiting for a call from the financier, he reads the law organizing the new system. On a renewal of the negotiation he says to the gentleman, "I can't find anybody who knows what the new money is worth; nobody will make a price for anything he has to sell, and I could n't make a price for my property to be paid in money of

unknown value; indeed, I don't know that it has any value." "O, you don't understand it; it has a legal value, just as greenbacks had a legal value, and just as gold and silver coin had a legal value! The law made greenbacks, and coined gold and silver money, and they were money accordingly, and possessed a legal value. But the law has been changed. The money of yesterday is money no longer. To-day the new legal tender is money, and there is no other money. It alone possesses legal value; and moreover, while in other respects it is as good as gold and greenbacks, it has an advantage over both in that it is secured by mortgage on real estate." "But I do understand it; and what is the legal-tender feature, or the legal value, or the real-estate security worth to me, when I owe no debts, if I can't *buy* anything I want with the money? And why should I *sell* my real estate for fifty thousand Washingtons, so long as under the law I can get twenty-five thousand Washingtons of the government by mortgaging the same property, and yet own it myself? The twenty-five thousand would cost me one and one tenth per cent a year; and I could keep the money as long as I live, should I not fail to pay the interest promptly. So if I sell you my property, worth yesterday $50,000, I shall have a sum of money which at best will bring me five hundred and fifty Washingtons a year. Whether a Washington shall finally exchange for a dime or a dollar I can't possibly tell; but in either event, I should have made a very poor bargain. For if the business public ever receive it as money, possessing anything like a definite 'value,' its circulation must in the nature of things increase with great rapidity. Every man owning real estate can draw at will upon the government agency for money to the amount of half the value thereof, at a nominal rate of interest. Prices of all commodities, including land, will go up in a ratio approximating somewhat nearly the increase in the currency; the land on which to-day the owner can draw but ten thousand Washingtons will next year be a good legal basis or security for five or ten thousand more; and so on to infinity, or until the money becomes so 'cheap' that nobody but luckless creditors will take it at all. Holding these old-fashioned notions, I will keep my property for a while yet."

In the case assumed, that a government should make a "money" of the kind indicated, and absolutely proscribe all other kinds, it might possibly be used temporarily from sheer necessity. But it would be received only at its exchangeable or commercial "value"; and that could be ascertained in no other way than by comparing it either directly or indirectly with other "known values," and they in turn are "known" merely because they are measured by the precious metals. Substantially the same processes would be adopted by the people of every nation where the new system had become the law, to ascertain the value of their respective units of value; for until the nominal value of the new money of the several countries should be settled, by comparing each with a commodity of known and tolerably uniform value, international trade would be impossible. A necessity, therefore, stronger than any human law would compel the people of every nation and of all nations to recognize — informally and indirectly possibly, but none the less really to recognize — a given weight of gold or silver as their practical standard of value.

HOW WOULD THE CHEAP MONEY HELP THE POOR?

Let us once more assume the impossible, — that the new system would furnish a cheap money, of uniform value, which would be generally used in all home business transactions. How would the change from dear to cheap money benefit the poor and the working classes? — that portion of our population who possess skill, ability, and disposition to work, a fair share of intelligence, but no capital. It has been shown that a given amount of capital and labor judiciously employed will yield a larger return in California, for instance, than in Holland or Massachusetts; that it would not be just, even were it possible, to compel labor or capital to accept the same *specific* compensation in California as in Massachusetts, instead of the same *proportion* of the joint product; and, finally, should the law so decree, its enforcement would be absolutely impossible. Hence it necessarily follows that the idea of limiting the share of capital in the joint annual product, at a fixed rate per cent under all circumstances and in all parts of the Union, by means of a law prescribing "a uniform rate of interest," can never

be realized. The question recurs, how then can cheap money benefit labor? This money, according to its advocates, is to possess a steady specific "legal value," and also the faculty of being at all times exchangeable for equal "actual values." They regard money as simply a medium (itself always devoid of real value) by which equal "actual values" are exchanged. It follows of necessity that in order to get a certain amount of "legal value" in this cheap money, the laborer must give an exact equivalent of "actual value," either in his own labor or the proceeds of his labor. Having obtained a given sum of money possessing "legal value" in exchange for equal "actual values" of his own, he, according to the cheap-money theory, holds a "mortgage" of the same amount "on all the property for sale in the nation." But so far he has gained nothing on account of cheap money; he has given value for value, or rather "actual value" for equal "legal value"; and when he comes to foreclose his mortgage, or in ordinary language to buy what he wants with his money, he simply has to reverse the process by which he obtained it, that is, to exchange "legal value" for "actual value" of the same amount. In this transaction too, he gains nothing from cheap money. Had his medium for exchanging equal values been gold, or bank-notes convertible into gold on demand, instead of cheap money redeemable in nothing but paper-money of another kind, he would be just as well off at the conclusion of his purchases; and his several transactions would have been essentially the same, that is, he would have exchanged his labor or its proceeds for gold of equal value; and he would have used the gold to buy commodities of equal value, such as he required to satisfy his wants. So on the ground of the hypothesis, the man who has no interest in making or "coining" cheap money, but who simply uses it in his business affairs, neither gains nor loses in making his exchanges in the cheaper medium. This remark of course applies to a state of things after all adjustments required by a change in the currency shall have been made.

The believer in the new monetary system, in its "legal values" as distinguished from "actual or real values," not unnaturally looks upon the wealth of the world as the product

of labor alone. He sincerely believes that but for craft and cunning, Labor, the creator of all wealth, would to-day be the owner of much the larger portion. He sees that the fact is otherwise; and hence he is too readily persuaded by the precious sophistries of so-called reformers, that cheap money would rectify the great wrong complained of, and put labor in secure possession of the wealth it creates. But here is a general proposition which may be easily comprehended, and its scope fully understood, by any intelligent workingman who will duly ponder it: if without labor, by mere legislation, "*legal* values" can be created which will at all times be exchangeable for equal amounts of "*actual* values," it is clear and unquestionable that at the birth or creation of such "legal values" they will belong to the property-owning class exclusively, and will add by just so much to the preponderance of wealth in its hands, of which the labor class now complain.

Let the workingman pause a moment and think as to the practical results of this theory if they shall ever be realized. The real estate of the whole country is worth to-day something like $10,000,000,000. On this estimate, the owners of real estate would be entitled to receive from the government banks or agencies, on application, the sum of $5,000,000,000 of "money" possessing an equal amount of "legal value" which is exchangeable for the same amount of "actual values." The real-estate owners would virtually add that, or such smaller amount as they should apply for, to their present wealth, subject to the payment of one and one tenth of one per cent a year; but the workingman, owning no real estate, would not get one dollar of the whole issue, except in exchange for an equivalent "actual value" in labor or its proceeds. The same remarks will apply with equal pertinency and force to the modified scheme, of a "money" based upon, and interchangeable at the will of the holder into, government bonds. The possible amount issuable would be smaller; and it would necessarily belong in the first instance to the bondholders instead of the owners of real estate. But in either event the workingman could not get a dollar of this money or "legal value," except by paying the same amount of "actual value" for it. How then is it to benefit him? Why should *he* favor

a system which (always assuming that it is practicable) would add largely to the wealth of the wealthy, but would not add one cent to the pittance of the poor? Why should he favor any paper-money, since under all circumstances it must be based on property in some form, and give to property factitious advantages over labor? The labor reformers assert that physical and intellectual labor creates all wealth; it must necessarily follow that economy alone — the saving of a part of the values it creates — renders accumulation possible. The paper system enables the possessors of wealth to create "legal values" without labor, and thus virtually to transfer to themselves a portion of the earnings and economies of the workingman, giving no equivalent in return.

THE WORKINGMAN'S GRIEVANCES AND THEIR PROPER REMEDIES.

It has been admitted that the workingman has just cause of complaint, and that he is despoiled of his rights in many cases; but this admission is coupled with the allegation that he does not suffer alone. A few of the wrongs here indicated will be briefly and specifically referred to. 1st. The great corporations which enjoy an actual, though not necessarily a legal or technical, monopoly are accustomed to charge the public much more than a fair compensation for the services they render. They virtually possess and freely exercise the power of taxing the public for their own exclusive benefit. Millions upon millions are thus wrongfully abstracted from the pockets of the people every month. These vast sums are to a large extent paid in the form of higher prices upon all products, and the burden is borne in the end mainly by the consumer. Hence the owner of this kind of property gets more than his equitable share of the aggregate annual gains of the whole country, while the rest of the people get correspondingly less than theirs. Here then is a wrong from which the latter class all suffer in common, and not the workingmen alone. They are less able to bear it than their fellow-citizens who possess wealth or a competency, not invested in corporate property; the wrong is more sensibly felt by them, and it is not strange, considering the lack of intelligence on such subjects among all classes, that they should regard all possessors of wealth, with-

out distinction, as their wilful oppressors and natural enemies.

For this class of wrongs it is much easier to prescribe a remedy than to apply and enforce it. Competition here is substantially powerless. Take a railroad, or a confederation of railroads under one management, extending from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, or even to the Pacific, — of what avail is the right to build a road to compete with it? Suppose the managers issue stock to an amount equal to two or three times the cost of their property, and so regulate their fares and freight rates as to insure fifteen or twenty-five per cent dividends on its actual cost; then they say to the public, "If you don't like to pay what we charge, build a road of your own; you are free-traders and so are we; all we ask is what free competition will give us." You are as effectually estopped by the nature of the case from building a competing line as if the law gave the present lines a monopoly in specific terms. The only remedy for this and similar wrongs would seem to be governmental supervision, to which there are very serious objections. But whether such remedy would prove efficient, and whether it would not be fraught with evils as grave as those it should be expected to cure, are questions not proper to be considered here.

2d. The banks of issue — of which there are about two thousand in the United States — circulate some three hundred millions of their notes which pass as money, and on which the banks draw the same rate of interest as on real money. The cost of the notes is so trifling that it may well be omitted in any account between capital and labor; and the interest accruing upon them is substantially a net gain to the bank-owners. Wealth and poverty being comparative terms, it follows that all such gains aggravate existing evils by making "the rich richer and the poor poorer."

This evil might be cured, perhaps, at the expense of causing other evils of a political character, by prohibiting all paper issues not proceeding directly from the government. A free banking system would aggravate instead of curing it; since if every man owning property could convert it into a basis for paper-money on which he would realize interest, he would get a larger proportion of the annual product accruing from labor

and capital than he gets now. The aggregate annual gains of capital would be larger, both absolutely and relatively, leaving to labor relatively, if not absolutely, less than it now realizes. The best that can be said of free banking, as regards the question under consideration, is, that it offers all *owners of property* equal opportunities to increase their gains; but inasmuch as those who own no property cannot profit by it, free banking must necessarily operate prejudicially upon the interests of labor.

3d. The annual war charge is perhaps the most grievous of all the chronic wrongs from which society, and especially the working classes, suffer. Under this head are included the yearly appropriations to pay the cost of past wars, as well as the expenditures necessitated by the large armies and navies of the present day, the loss occasioned by the withdrawal of three million able-bodied men from productive industry, and the almost universal social demoralization which this state of things naturally produces. A very few statistics here may not be inappropriate. Mr. Chrisholm, a British authority, estimates the cost to Great Britain of the wars she has been engaged in since 1688 at over $6,000,000,000 in gold. Add an equal sum for the cost to her foes and the aggregate is $12,000,000,000. The New York "Evening Post" stated, prior to the Franco-Prussian war, that "2,800,000 men, the flower of the people of Europe, are kept under arms from year to year, idly awaiting the orders of their sovereigns, all of them taken from productive industry and trained as machines of destruction." An American authority, Mr. Burritt, calculates the annual war charge of Christian nations in the aggregate at $2,600,000,000. Secretary Boutwell says the public debts of the world have increased from $7,600,000,000 to $23,000,000,000 in the past few years. These figures will suffice to give some faint idea of the extent to which the earnings of labor are drawn upon every year, omitting here the loss to capital, on account of wars past and prospective. Assuming that $2,600,000,000 a year is substantially correct, that sum constitutes a first and indefeasible lien or mortgage upon the earnings of all the workingmen of the civilized world. Nearly $9,000,000 must be earned and set apart for the purposes of war every day, before labor or capital can take a dollar for its own use. The "Evening Post"

well says, that were the world relieved from this fearful burden, "there would no longer be a necessity for poverty or an apology for crime. . . . . Give to labor everywhere its own full reward, untaxed by the selfish ambitions and passions of the great, and poets will no longer look to remote traditions for the golden age."

Can this grand result possibly be attained? And if it can be, how? A way can be pointed out for the attainment of that end; and it would seem to be within the scope of possibilities. Every person now holding a portion of the $23,000,000,000, which, according to Secretary Boutwell, is the aggregate of national debts, possesses a claim against "the state" for a definite sum of money, say every six months; and all such claims constitute a legal first lien or mortgage upon all the property and all the earnings of the people, of whom "the state" is composed. Let every nation, then, determine that instead of paying the interest on this mortgage forever, or for an indefinite period, it will pay the mortgage itself within a short time, — say ten or at most twenty years. The cost of such a procedure would fall mainly on property, and hence it would be a comparative relief to labor even during the process of adjustment. The nations having paid off their debts, let them adopt and firmly adhere to the policy of paying the cost of all future wars as it shall accrue, by levying taxes upon property sufficient for that purpose.

But can the public debts be paid in so short a period? Why may they not be? Take Great Britain as a fair sample of indebted states; her national wealth is some $40,000,000,000, and her debt about $4,000,000,000. Were it possible that the whole debt could be paid to-morrow by the transfer of *property* to the holders of consols, — assuming that the levy and the apportionment be equitably made, — nobody would be poorer than he is to-day. The national wealth would be the same, — $40,000,000,000 unincumbered, instead of $44,000,000,000 incumbered by a mortgage of $4,000,000,000. Can it with truth be said that the resources of statesmanship are inadequate to make an adjustment of that debt in ten or twenty years, using money as its chief instrumentality, without doing flagrant injustice to a single class of the British people? For

the present it will be taken for granted that should the great debtor nations exhibit the same resolute and persistent determination which they have exhibited at certain crises in their respective histories, and bring it to bear on a policy of rapid liquidation of their public debts, the present generation would see the work accomplished. That point reached, workingmen, including the smaller property holders, would be entitled to say to the government, and if united in purpose could say with effect: "If war must be waged let its cost be paid by a tax on property. But do not ask us to do the fighting and then mortgage the earnings of our children and our children's children to pay for a war of your own making, which should be paid for as it progresses. Hitherto the cost of everything we consume has been enhanced by the wars of former generations. We have helped to pay a debt for which our little properties and our earnings were mortgaged without our consent. And our firm resolve is, that if we transmit to our children no other heritage than stout hearts and willing hands, it shall at least be unincumbered and free."

If such a state of things shall ever be realized, Labor as a distinctive interest or element will no longer have a serious grievance to complain of. If "the state" guarantee to all equal opportunities to acquire and hold property, granting no special favors, imposing discriminating burdens upon none, and limiting its own expenditures to legitimate objects of government, each man will find his own proper place in the social organism.

ERRORS OF THE PROPERTY OWNERS.

Excepting manufacturers and other employers of labor, very few of the property-owning classes have deigned to pay the slightest attention to the questions in respect to which the workingmen of the world are so profoundly excited. Property in all countries makes but small direct contributions to the support of national debts and costly military and naval establishments, — the most grevious, perhaps, of all the burdens that afflict modern society. The revenues which they necessitate are chiefly raised by excise and import duties, and these are paid by rich and poor, not at all in proportion to their respective abilities to pay, but in proportion to the quantities

of taxed commodities which they respectively consume. Hence it is not surprising that the very wealthy classes, whose minds are much engrossed with their own affairs, should entirely ignore or greatly underestimate the importance of the desperate struggle that is going on in the social strata below them. They are slow to perceive that it concerns them at all; and to quote one of them literally, who pretty fairly represents the moneyed class, they hold that "money has always beat labor and always will."

That proposition is unphilosophic, and the sentiment which pervades it is inhuman if not even brutal. For it implies that money has always despoiled labor, and always will despoil it, of a part of its own proper rewards. The unaccomplished part of the proposition is simply a prophecy embracing all future time. May capital or wealth safely rely on its fulfilment? It is a fact affirmed by the highest statistical authority, and disputed by no intelligent economist or statesman, that the wealth of the world is rapidly concentrating into fewer and still fewer hands. The number of persons owning little or no property must necessarily be all the while increasing. The favorite investments of the wealthy classes are, first, the bonds of different governments; and second, the stocks of great corporations. The first are exempt from taxation; the second virtually assess their taxes upon the public, by considering their public taxes, the interest upon their capital, and the cost of operating as one sum, to be provided for in their scale of charges, — which they are generally allowed to regulate in their own discretion and with reference to their own interests exclusively. The combined burden ultimately falls on the masses, who are thus "beaten" out of a portion of their rightful property. Growth, a constant tendency to increase, is a "law" of national indebtedness. The oldest national debt dates back only two centuries; and it was but a bagatelle one hundred and seventy years ago. Since that time national debts have largely increased in number, and their rate of growth has increased with much greater rapidity, — as the advance from $7,600,000,000 to $23,000,000,000 in a few years conclusively proves. The demand for this kind of "property" is almost illimitable. For a Turkish national loan

recently put upon the market of Christian Europe, the offers exceeded by one third the amount asked for. The bids for the great loans of Napoleon III. were always largely in excess of the sums required. But the most striking fact to illustrate the eagerness of capitalists for this kind of investment is furnished by President Thiers's French loan. France has lately been shorn of a large slice of territory by the victorious Germans; her capital has been ravaged by the infuriated Commune; tens of thousands of her sons have fallen in battle; her industries have been sadly deranged by the war which humiliated her, and her government has no title to permanence. In this state of affairs she asked the capitalists of Europe to lend her 3,500,000,000 francs to pay her conqueror for leaving what remains of her territory; and the offers mount up to 41,000,000,000 francs! This sum added to the national debt already existing would amount to more than one third of the aggregate wealth of the French people.*

It is evident — for it is a mathematical proposition — that this movement of property from the many to the few, if unchecked, will sooner or later make the few the possessors of all property, while the masses will necessarily be impoverished and virtually enslaved. The ratio of relative increase on the one hand, and of diminution on the other, will make the time required for this consummation proportionally longer or shorter; but it cannot change the result.

Now it would seem to be both the duty and the interest of the class in whose hands the wealth of the world is concentrating, to consider how long this movement can be allowed to go on with safety to themselves and to our social and political institutions. Would property be secure were it all owned by five per cent of the whole population? Would it be secure if ninety per cent owned none? if eighty, or seventy-five? These are questions pregnant with significance to the wealthy, into whose hands property is so rapidly passing. For it must be obvious to them that their own number may become so small — whether it be one or twenty per cent of the population — that legal title to their possessions will avail nothing. With a

* M. de Labry (see Jour. des Economistes for July, 1872, page 130) estimates the national wealth of France at 150,000,000,000 francs.

vast numerical majority holding little or no property, and regarding their own and their children's labor to the latest generation as mortgaged to secure a fixed income to the holders of the public debts and the corporate and consolidated wealth of the world; with such a majority looking upon the few as so managing the machinery of states as to secure to themselves an exemption from all vicissitudes prejudicial to their own interests, by graduating and increasing the burdens and privations of labor to provide against unforeseen contingencies, and thus compelling it to become the guarantor and indemnifier of wealth and privilege, — under such circumstances the power of numbers would certainly be felt, and the possessors of wealth would be simply tenants at will. It is strange that while admitting the rapidly growing inequality of wealth, they appear to be utterly blind to its logical and inevitable consequences. They do not understand as well as the workingmen's leaders that commerce has effected a real solidarity among all nations; that the inordinate profits of corporate or other property, and the import and excise duties imposed upon any people are finally assumed and paid in varying proportions by the whole trading world; and that the colossal debts lately incurred by America and France are slowly but surely causing a rise in the prices of all commodities in all countries, and subtracting more proportionally from the earnings of the workingmen than from the income of the capitalists. So long as this state of things shall continue, every year will add to the actual grievances of labor, as well as to social disaffection and class hostility; but, what is of even more serious import, every year will also add largely to the relative numbers of those by whom and in whose interest and discretion these grievances seem destined ultimately to be avenged.

Isaac Butts.

Art. IV. — Causes of the Commune.

The remote and indirect causes of the insurrection of March 18th, 1871, are well known. Students of French history may differ in matters of detail, but all agree that two conspiracies against order have long existed in France, — a political conspiracy, whose members, though sufficiently divided in opinion to keep the fires of the Revolution of 1793 alive on all its altars, yet united to serve Fouché in 1815, and to plot with Blanqui and Delescluze against Charles X., Louis Philippe, the Republic of 1848, and the Second Empire, in succession; and a social conspiracy, springing from the loins of St. Simon, Babœuf, and Fourier, mastered by Cavaignac in 1848, and kept in subjection by Napoleon III. until the capitulation of Sedan. For more than half a century, conspirators, whether political or social, dreamed of possessing Paris, but awoke in dungeons or in exile.

In 1871, Paris was theirs, and France might be. The city was not only in their possession, it was their accomplice. This is the fact that requires explanation. "People judge wrongly," says Jules Favre, "who think that there is in Socialism, in the action of the International [and the same can be said of Jacobinism], a very powerful force, capable of producing events like that of the 18th of March. Socialist ideas and the action of the International were, as regards that event, like a pinch of powder thrown into a conflagration. The fire was already lighted; its physiognomy alone was changed by the powder, which by itself would have had no effect."

What, then, did cause the conflagration?

The answer to this question is to be found in the volume of testimony (from which the above is quoted) taken before a committee of the National Assembly appointed to investigate the "causes of the 18th of March." The book contains much extraneous matter, witnesses telling what they have heard from others, and what they have evolved from their own consciousness, and often seasoning their facts with personal malice: but though raw material, it is the material of history, being furnished by Thiers and McMahon; by the members of

the "Government of National Defence"; by officers of the line, and of the National Guard; by members of the police force during and since the Empire; by the Mayors, and their assistants, who played no small part in events; by members of the International Society, in its better days; by intelligent citizens, bankers, "able editors"; by most of those, in short, worth listening to, always excepting the Communists themselves, who are heard, when heard at all, at second-hand. Out of the mouths of so many competent witnesses the truth must sometimes escape. It is more likely to come from a Frenchman's mouth than from his pen, and is therefore more likely to be found in a volume of testimony taken down by stenographers, than in the elaborate works with which the actors in the melodramatic tragedy of 1870–71 have pursued the public. Faith can, at least, be given to witnesses where their evidence goes against themselves or against a government of which they formed part; and it is with the aid of such witnesses that I shall show upon what grounds is based my belief that — whatever might or might not have happened under other circumstances — what did happen is directly attributable to the government which succeeded the Empire, — if the thing instituted by the gentlemen who profited by Sedan can be called a government.

With the fall of Napoleon, the principle of cohesion among the opponents of the established order of things disappeared. The conspirators, whether would-be Terrorists, or would-be Socialists, were weakened in numbers, crippled in resources, and forced to echo the patriotic cry of *Lutte à outrance*. The Blanquist organ sought subscribers under the popular title of "The Country in Danger"; the International Society was for weeks without an organ, and its leading members complained * to each other that the siege had scattered their forces, that the treasury was empty, and that complete reorganization was the prerequisite to effective action.

The members of the "Government of National Defence" labored, it is true, under some disadvantages. Most of them had earned their places by criticism, in season and out of sea-

* Les séances officielles de l'Internationale à Paris pendant le siège et pendant la Commune. Lachaud, Paris, 1872.

son, of the powers that were, in respect to acts necessary to the existence of authority, as well as to those incident to the Imperial policy. Having in their several spheres condemned the Empire in all its works and ways and men, they were unable to seek support in what was left of it, and were expected to satisfy the complaints to which they had given voice, to abolish what they had criticised, to establish what they had demanded, in the name of the people. An opposition, which for twenty years had known neither the sweets nor the responsibilities of power, suddenly found itself in charge of Paris and of France, at a moment demanding genius and character of the highest order.

However defective the origin of the new "government," however unfortunate the fact that its members had so long been critics, not administrators, they were in presence of a great occasion, which marked a plain path of duty for them. "There was needed," says M. Leblord, Attorney-General during the siege, "an imposing personality, which had faith in resistance, and that faith was wanting. The population should have been inspired, put under fire, formed into a powerful army, instead of being abandoned to all the perils and dangers of a corrupted city. The city should have been kept in constant communication with its government, told of the difficulties and perils of the situation, and at the same time encouraged to confront them."

Others — M. Vacherot, a Mayor during the siege, for one — insist that Paris should have been treated as a garrisoned town; that the least useful third of the population and all the civilian members of the government should have been sent into the provinces; that martial law should have been enforced, and all newspapers and assemblages violating its rules suppressed; and that food should have been dealt out from the beginning in prevision of the end.

Whichever view be preferred, it is clear that men assuming to constitute a government were bound, by one method or another, to govern, and that men styling themselves the "Government of National Defence" were bound to make the national defence their business at the beginning and until the end, and to subordinate everything else to that, especially political

and personal animosities and aspirations. Their only excuse for taking the helm was that they knew how to steer. Had they termed themselves at the outset what General Trochu terms them in his testimony before the committee, a "government of moral force," or what Colonel Montaigu, Chief of Staff to the National Guard during the siege, terms them, a "government of opinion," or what Mayor Vacherot terms them, one of *laisser-passer*, *laisser-faire*, they would not have been accepted as pilots at such a crisis: Paris might better have at once delivered her sword and purse to King William; might better have demanded a general from the Jacobins, or a ruler from the Socialists, than have prolonged a resistance, fatally ineffectual and fatally followed by the Commune. Yet such language fitly describes the phantoms that sat in the high places of Paris for five months.

"There was a moment, in my opinion," testifies General Le Flô, Minister of War during the siege, "in which it would have been possible, if not easy, to force the enemy's lines. At any time a dangerous operation, it would on several occasions have presented chances of success. No serious attempt to do this being made, great discontent was produced in the National Guard of Paris, which believed that the hostile lines could have been forced with facility, and which was disgusted by all the military events of the siege. We were, in fact, invariably beaten. I do not know of one *sortie* in which we obtained a substantial advantage."

"Sometimes," testifies M. Cresson (Prefect of Police after October 31)," we were three weeks without news from without": while, according to the testimony of General Trochu, "During the whole siege, and particularly toward the close, hundreds of persons were in constant communication with the enemy, who knew as well as I did everything that took place in Paris. Every day and every night news and newspapers were carried, especially by women, to the Prussians; at all of whose headquarters this *odious* commerce was eagerly encouraged, and regular supplies were received. Among the companies of *franc-tireurs* and other irregular soldiers on the outskirts of Paris, some excellent and devoted, others detestable and given to pillage, how many had communication with the enemy! And

of the newspapers which the Prussians received daily, some from ignorance or folly, others systematically and in order to injure the defence, made known what we were doing! Warnings, the severest measures, appeals to patriotism, were alike ineffectual. Thus, we had constructed at Hautes Bruyères an important work, of which the principal dispositions were modern. The newspapers did not fail to publish all the details with the utmost minuteness."

A Member of the Committee. — "Why did you not order the men who made these revelations to be shot?"

Trochu. — "Ah, yes: that is the great argument, I know, but it is worthless. To shoot, one must be master. Authority must have a sanction other than moral force (the only one at my disposal), — the sanction of brute force, always present and in activity, and that I did not possess. During the whole siege but one man, a marine caught in the act of deserting with arms and baggage to the enemy, was shot. To save the lives of the ten thousand police agents of the Empire, we were obliged to send them to the outposts, where they did good service" (as soldiers, not as they might more usefully have been employed as detectives). "There was no longer a police in Paris."

The guardians of order having been thus disposed of, the guardians of disorder were invited to take their places. The first act of M. de Kératry, who took charge of the Prefecture of Police on the 4th of September, was to order the release of Cluseret; his second act, to instal in his bureau Antoine Dubost, an editor of the *Marseillaise*, and Raoul Rigault, the "delegate to the Ex-prefecture" under the Commune. The latter became chief of the political service, and introduced into the Prefecture the *élite* of the clubs, of the International, of the "Free-Thinker" newspaper. All these gentry remained until October 31st, and a goodly number until March 18th, when they took office under the Commune. After these acts it was certainly in character for Kératry to write the letter which "newspapers of all parties interpreted to mean that the Prefecture of Police was dead." *

Kératry was succeeded by M. Edmond Adam, who continued

* Deposition of M. Mouton, head of a bureau in the Prefecture.

in charge of the remains of the Prefecture from October 10th to November 3d. Guided, doubtless, by Rigault, still chief of the political service, Adam saw "Bonapartist intrigues" in every bush (but could never lay hands upon them), and saw nothing else. "There were no administrative investigations," he testifies; "they were impossible. The National Guard did police duty for itself, after a fashion, and expelled from its ranks all who were expelled"; retaining, however, "beside five or six thousand Blanquists" (or Jacobin conspirators), a large number of convicts, — four or five thousand, according to Adam; double that number in General Trochu's opinion; thirty-five thousand, if we may believe Colonel Montaigu. Knowing these facts, Adam persisted in his fruitless chase of the Imperial eagle until the 31st of October, when the vultures and harpies, who were roosting in the Prefecture, almost succeeded in capturing it and its chief.

Thus during the first two months of the "government of opinion," Paris was even worse off than General Trochu admits. Not content with having "no police," Prefects Log the First and Log the Second opened a preparatory school for Prefect Stork.

These same months witnessed the formation of the National Guard, under circumstances thus set forth in the testimony of General Trochu: "The population, naturally and legitimately excited, demanded arms. Some people believe that it would have been possible to refuse, or at least to furnish arms gradually and to picked men. I should like to have seen those who think so at work. A National Guard of forty thousand men, essentially conservative, organized under the Empire, had to be transformed, without loss of time and in the midst of immense difficulties, not to speak of perils, into a force of two hundred and fifty thousand. How was it possible to arm, clothe, and equip so many soldiers except through the intervention of the Mayors, since the staff, zealous and devoted as it was, did not suffice for the task? The Mayors you know. They had been selected by the Minister of the Interior, M. Gambetta, with the advice of the Mayor of Paris, M. Etienne Arago, and his aids, M. Floquet and others. These men were generally partisans. There were

exceptions; but, as a whole, they could offer no guaranties of order. If arms had been refused to those who demanded them, they would have been seized sooner or later. What! your country is invaded, you call the people to arms, and they respond to your appeal! — is it then that you can dream of distributing guns as in barracks, and of making inquiries as to character, and that, too, in Paris besieged?"

This is not the whole story. The worst men, as a rule, got the worst officers. Among the *chefs de bataillon* were Blanqui, Assi, Brunel, Eudes, Vallès, Varlin, Protot, and others equally notorious in the history of the Commune. Five battalions chose Gustave Flourens, who asked General Trochu to let him retain the command of them all. "Trochu," testifies Colonel Montaigu, "not seeing how to rid himself of this importunate solicitor, who knew nothing — I do not speak of his personal courage — about military affairs except through books, named him Major of the Rampart, and left him in command of the five battalions. This led me to remind General Trochu of the history of Lamartine and Blanqui, the famous lightning-rod of 1848."

The troops of Major Flourens were presented with banners on the part of the government by M. Jules Ferry, but refused to march unless furnished with *chassepots*. These the "government" gave them without a murmur, while the good citizens who formed the National Guard in the Faubourgs St. Honoré and St. Germain were provided with inferior weapons. At last the Major led his men outside of the walls; but "on their return," testifies M. Cresson, subsequently Prefect of Police, "they shouted, after taking their brandy, 'It is not for us to march out; our business is in Paris, not against the Prussians.'" And to this business they kept, until enabled by the civil war, on the first day of which Flourens bravely fell, to use their *chassepots* against their countrymen.

The treatment of Flourens was not exceptional. In the words of M. Ossude, whose duty it was to clothe, pay, and arm a number of battalions, "The passages of the Hôtel de Ville presented during the siege a strange spectacle. Chiefs were there, whose election I could never comprehend, half clothed, with shirts unbuttoned, loudly demanding arms and uniforms, which they promptly received, while deserving men went with-

out. Nothing was ever refused to those who came from Belleville, La Villette, or Montmartre. The pay-roll was fictitious, captains frequently drawing pay for fifteen hundred men when they were unable to muster eight hundred."

Good citizens, who thankfully accepted any arms they could get, returned unused cartridges; bad citizens hoarded theirs for the time that was coming. Good and bad alike, in or out of active service, were paid thirty sous each, and their wives, right-handed or left-handed, half that amount. Rations not being supplied, and spirits being cheaper and more accessible than food, alcoholization became almost as common as it was under the Commune. Many, who contracted no worse habits than those of idleness, were ready to follow any leaders who would pay them for marching about the streets.

The "government of moral force" which could, after this fashion, equip and pay the citizen soldiers, proved utterly incompetent to discipline them or to lead them to battle. So far from making an army out of material no worse than the ordinary stuff of war, it did not use the best battalions. It allowed patriotic ardor to exhale in empty bravado, and sham patriotic ardor to be used by demagogues: and it fed both the pure and the impure flame with bulletins of victories that had not been gained, of movements that had not been and were not to be executed, of alliances that there was no reasonable expectation of concluding.

"The military operations," says General Le Flô, whose testimony on these points is confirmed by numerous competent witnesses, "had left an extremely painful impression upon the Parisians, and especially upon the National Guard, which numbered 250,000 men more or less disposed to fight, and certainly manifesting a great desire to do so. I believe that the National Guard might have been employed more seriously and to better purpose, that it would have made excellent material of war, and that therefore its non-employment was a great mistake. I know that an attempt to employ it was finally made, but this was done with a bad grace and in a manner hardly serious, almost derisive. For example, in some of our *sorties*, fifty, sixty, eighty battalions were held in reserve, and never fired a shot. In a political point of view this was a blunder, in a mili-

tary point of view a still greater one. In this way was accumulated a stock of hatred in the ranks of the National Guard." The same witness affirms that Trochu would have employed the Guard but for the opposition of General Ducrot. Since, however, Ducrot was but a subaltern, while Trochu was President of the "government," the responsibility must rest upon him and his colleagues.

Up to October 31st, "the National Guard," testifies Prefect Adam, "and the population of Paris, were favorable to the Government of National Defence. On that day the news that 'Le Bourget' was a defeat, not the victory officially announced; that Metz had surrendered; and that an armistice was in contemplation, emboldened Blanqui and Flourens to attempt the *coup de main* which put them in possession of the Hotel de Ville and of the majority of the government." The fact that a single battalion would have been sufficient to prevent a catastrophe equally disgraceful and ridiculous, shows how completely these 4th of September babes in the wood relied upon "moral force" for their own protection as well as for the preservation of public order, if not also for the overthrow of the German "barbarians." This time the captured government was delivered, partly by a fraction of the National Guard, whose hostility to Blanqui and Flourens made them fly to the rescue; partly by a column of *Mobiles* from Brittany, who, not understanding French, could not be tampered with; partly by an undignified back-stairs retreat; and partly by a compromise to which the Mayor of Paris (Arago), the Minister of Justice (Dorian), and perhaps also Prefect Adam, were parties.

Had the insurgents been stronger, or had they put forth more energy, they might have thrown their captives into prison, and perhaps succeeded in keeping them there; but it is not probable that they could have hoisted their true colors even then. On this point Jules Favre is a trustworthy witness. "I observed nothing threatening," says he, "till October 31st, and then nothing indicative of a settled plan. I passed the night in listening to the insurgents. The scene was curiously picturesque, but unimportant from a social or political point of view. Nobody was preoccupied by a system or an idea. A political conspiracy may have existed at this time better organized than

I thought, but in my opinion it had no social color. I believe that the conspiracy of that day aimed at the overthrow of the 'Government of National Defence,' as being powerless, inert, and incapable of fulfilling its mission, which was to defend the country and establish a republic. . . . . *At this time, in my judgment, the general causes to which the revolution of March 18th is attributable were developed.*"

This "picturesque scene" led the "Government of the National Defence" to submit the question of its right to exist to the people of Paris, who sustained it by an overwhelming majority.

The next day Paris chose twenty Mayors for its twenty wards, and the third day sixty Assistant Mayors. The character of these Mayors is pronounced by General Trochu "much better" than that of Gambetta's appointees, — a humiliating admission in view of the fact that among the elected were Delescluze, the old Jacobin, the master spirit of the Commune in its last and most desperate days; Ranvier, who served in the Committee of Public Safety, and conducted its assassinations; and Mottu, now in prison for fraudulent bankruptcy.

"The Mayors of Paris," testifies M. Choppin (who held a confidential position in the police from this time to February 10th, and was at its head during the ensuing month), "though legally functionaries of limited powers, being only officers *de l'état civil*" (that is, concerned with the registration of births, marriages, and deaths), "and presidents of bureaus of charity, believed themselves good at everything, and issued orders right and left. M. Bonvalet, formerly keeper of an eating-house, made a body of laws, and issued many orders beginning thus: 'Having consulted our council of legislation.' M. Mottu did the same. M. Bonvalet decreed obligatory instruction, and sent his National Guards to arrest boys and girls who would not go to school. M. Mottu tore crucifixes from the ambulances, and forbade priests to visit the sick. Both were governed by their assistants, who were members of the International, and exercised great influence," as did assistant Dereure, also of the International, in Montmartre.

Other Mayors used their authority to better purpose, but "all of us," testifies M. Corbon, "finally became each in his own

ward a complete government. The action of the central power was not felt even in matters connected with the defence of the city. Obliged to provide for everything, and, above all, to hide the short-comings of the government from the eyes of the people, we necessarily became political functionaries. . . . . The Assistant Mayors were universally worse than their chiefs, because chosen on the third day of the elections, when voters were tired, and few went to the polls except those who, like the participants in the affair of October 31st, had a selfish purpose to serve." The assistants thus chosen cast three votes in the Municipal Council to the Mayor's one.

The Mayors elected on the 31st of October had the further disadvantage of inheriting from their predecessors committees of vigilance, of armament, of equipment, of science, of hygiene, of education. At a loss what to do with these self-constituted powers, Mayors Vacherot and Dubail asked advice of the *soi-disant* government. "Don't provoke them," was the answer.

The night of October 31st led to one change for the better. M. Adam was succeeded in the Prefecture of Police by a man. "My appointment," testifies M. Cresson, "is to-day [July 4, 1871] an enigma to me. Chance made me Prefect of Police." He was to have dined October 31st with M. Picard, Minister of Finance, who had just escaped from the insurgents, leaving his colleagues in their hands. Cresson's activity in carrying out Picard's orders for the protection of public buildings, and in rallying the National Guard, commended him to the "government," which had at last discovered the necessity of a police. "As soon as I learned that it was proposed to make me Prefect, I protested, insisting that the place did not suit my character, tastes, or profession (the law), that I had a wife and four children, that there would be cutting of throats sooner or later, and that the appointment was a sentence of death. I was told it was a duty not to be declined under existing circumstances. Finally I consented, on condition that I might recall to Paris twelve hundred policemen, arm them with *chassepots*, and reconstitute the force which I considered necessary to the existence of society. I called together the men in the Prefecture on whom I could depend, — MM. Ansart, Marseille, Lecour, Baube, — all relics of the Imperial administration.

I selected twenty-two commissaries of police, of whom twenty belonged to the old force, and I proceeded to make arrests."

By means of the secret service, which M. Cresson re-established, he was enabled to keep an eye on the clubs, the National Guard, meetings, public and private, and secret societies. In the latter part of November he denounced the International as the association most to be dreaded; whereupon M. Jules Ferry declared that the International "had no political power, designs, or intentions; that it was composed of honest men, whom he personally knew, and whose advocate he had been." This declaration, coupled with the refusal of the government to apply the law of 1819, repressing press offences, even to "obscene engravings masked under a political form," led M. Cresson to take his hat, with the indignant remark, "I see you have no need of a Prefect of Police, — I resign." Permission having finally been granted to execute the law of 1819, and Jules Favre uniting with General Trochu to urge him to remain, he consented.

M. Cresson's intimacy with Jules Favre and Picard, and his "real veneration," to use his own expression, for the patriotic sentiments and the energy of General Trochu, give his testimony the greater weight where it is against the government he faithfully tried to serve. During the three months he remained in office, he compassed the arrest of a large number of those who subsequently became leaders of the insurrection, but was unable to secure the trial of one until the end of the siege, when almost all were acquitted. Félix Pyat, literary assassin, and Delescluze, professional conspirator, had friends at court who begged the Prefect to pity the sorrows of these "poor old men." A plan for Pyat's release was devised, that all but succeeded; leave to arrest Delescluze was refused until the fifth application; and Rigault, who had at length been chased from the bureau of political service, could never be taken, being under the protection of "one of these gentlemen," as a cautious witness puts it. Others were let out of prison on their parole for a day or two at a time; Ranvier, for example, who went from his cell to a Belleville club, where he said, "They have not the courage to shoot us: when our time comes we shall have the courage. We will shoot them!" And he kept his word.

The necessary powers to arrest the leaders of the International were at last granted, but not until the opportunity was gone. Time after time, M. Cresson asked permission to enforce martial law, to shut the clubs, and to stop revolutionary publications. Authority was denied him until January 22d, two days before the armistice; the uniform answer to his requests being "that he had done his duty, but that the government could not give orders which it was impossible to execute." Impossible in December, because during September and October there had been no police, because Belleville had become a citadel which an agent of the law entered at the peril of his life, and because the twenty wards had at least twenty independent rulers. "The Prefecture of Police," says M. Choppin, "was an instrument of information rather than of action. Its bad organization was one of the principal causes of the insurrection." If, as happened in these latter days, a newspaper was suppressed, a worse one sprang from its ashes. If a commissary of police ordered the dissolution of a public meeting, he had no force wherewith to execute his order. Criminals were safer in the streets than officers of justice, whose melancholy duty it was to follow, step by step, day by day, and night by night, those who afterwards constituted the army of insurrection. In the performance of their duties to public order, morals, decency, cleanliness, health, so far from being aided by the courts or the "government," they were "constantly shackled by them."

Whatever advantages the "government" of September 4th may have gained after October 31st in the popular sanction, the improved character of its subordinates, and the superior energy of the police, it still failed to perform the duties of a government. Persistent feebleness was still its characteristic; persistent falsehood its policy, its substitute for victory.

Upon a people whose patriotic hopes had been poisoned for five months with falsehoods, spoken, printed, acted; which had governed itself as well as a society without governors can reasonably be expected to do, and had cheerfully made sacrifices to what it believed to be the country's cause, upon a scale and with a unanimity difficult to parallel in history; whose naturally sensitive nerves were strained, whose naturally quick pulse was kept at fever heat, by bad living,

in which adulterated wine bore a large proportion to food, by isolation from all subjects of thought but one, by constant excitement, and by an atmosphere literally filled with gunpowder; whose faith in the powers that pretended to be had borne severe tests with wonderful patience and hopefulness; upon a people, which had been armed, but not used, not allowed to show of what stuff it was made, fell, like a thunderbolt, the announcement that all was over; that the long winter had been a long deception, and that sufferings and privations had only served to make the terms imposed by the conqueror more severe, and the humiliation of France complete. Is it wonderful that the "Government of National Defence" became a National Offence?

"I should place," says Jules Ferry, "among the determining causes of the insurrection, the madness of the siege; that is, a state of mind brought about by a change to habits and a life radically different from the habits, the life, the conduct of our modern society. Five months, during which labor was intermitted and minds were turned toward the war, ended in an immense deception, the entire population falling from the height of the most prodigious illusions ever conceived into a reality which it was unfortunately impossible to disclose to it in advance, — this is what I call the madness of the siege; and I maintain that with the exception of those who possessed by virtue of their position in the government a more exact knowledge of affairs, every Parisian suffered from this mania."

Two provisions of the preliminary treaty aggravated the situation: that providing for the disarmament of the regular troops, and the non-disarmament of the National Guard; and that permitting the Prussians to enter Paris. The latter excited so powerfully the public feeling, that M. Thiers considers it "one of the principal causes of the insurrection. I do not say," he adds, "that without this circumstance the movement would not have occurred, but I maintain that the entrance of the Prussians gave it an extraordinary impulse."

Opinions differ as to whether it would have been possible after the capitulation to disarm the National Guard, with the aid of the soldiers of the line, who would in that case, under the alternative presented by the Germans, have remained under

arms. If impossible, it was rendered so by the inefficiency of the authorities. Had the National Guard been in the habit of receiving regular rations, the exchange of a musket for a day's provisions might have been managed. Such would have been Bismarck's course, had the matter been left to him.

Whatever may have been the perils of the alternative course, those of that adopted were serious. "We were authorized by the terms of the capitulation," says General Le Flô, "to preserve a division of twelve thousand men. I made it fifteen thousand strong by joining to a brigade of infantry a numerous artillery and a regiment of cavalry. General Vinoy remained at the head of these troops. The *Mobiles* and the rest of the army had been disarmed. The troops were permitted — and this was the greatest fault of the capitulation — to remain in Paris. . . . . The soldiers lodged in the houses of the inhabitants, with whom they took their soup and passed the evening. It was easy to see that the spirit of the soldier would be perverted. General Vinoy with his fifteen thousand men could not provide against necessities which he had not created."

The situation, to meet which General Vinoy had such insignificant means, grew worse every day. Discharged soldiers of the line swelled the ranks of disorder. Irregular bodies, which had waged a predatory warfare in the district between the hostile lines during the siege; red-shirted, beplumed ruffians, who had covered questionable deeds in Burgundy under the name of Garibaldi; agents of the International Association; socialists of every shade, and adapters of Utopian theories to selfish purposes; soldiers of fortune like Cluseret and La Cecilia, the off-scourings of civilization, jail-birds and revolutionists of all countries,— flocked to the city, which had been abandoned even by "moral force," and furnished contingents to the National Guard.

On the other hand, not less than 140,000 citizens belonging to the better classes left Paris within a fortnight after the armistice. Colonel Montagu testifies that until this exodus he had hoped to keep the National Guard under orders. Believing this to be thenceforward, impossible, he resigned from the staff, and induced General Clément Thomas to throw up the command, — examples speedily followed by the best officers.

The natural consequences followed. "A few days after the

armistice," says Jules Favre, "I started at one A.M. from Versailles for Paris. I found no boat at Sèvres: all our posts were withdrawn. The Prussians guarded themselves till the last moment, as if the war were still raging: we, two days after the signature of the armistice, guarded ourselves no longer. On my way, I saw, at intervals of twenty minutes, almost up to the fortifications, a Prussian sentinel; but there was not a single French sentinel on the walls of Paris, — not one! Everybody had gone home. The National Guard was dissolved, and ready to serve anybody who would take possession. This ought to be a lesson to us. It is not in the nature of society not to be governed. The National Guard required chiefs, and it found them. General Aurelle de Paladines was sent too late; he did not know Paris; he had not the neces sary instruments in his hands; and I would defy Catinat or Turenne to command an army which had no officers. The general could only hold discussions with the Mayors, who deceived him as much as they could."

The lesson learned by Jules Favre on that night journey, six months too late for service, was familiar to the men who took charge of the National Guard, when thus left to itself. During the interval between the departure of General Thomas and the arrival of General Paladines, the Central Committee — composed of delegates named in some districts by the Family Council existing in each battalion for social and benevolent purposes, in others by the committees of vigilance and armament already described; "composed," in the language of M. Ansart, chief of the municipal police, "of all the elements existing in the ranks" — had ample time to confirm and extend its authority. Possessing no clearly determined political physiognomy, it served as a flag, representing the federation of the National Guard, around which rallied discontented parties, however diverse their opinions and interests."

The Central Committee appeared openly on the scene before the entry of the Prussians into Paris. Its hand is visible in seizures of cannon and cartridges, insults offered to officers of the line, and mutinies fomented among the soldiers; in manifestations under the red flag at the Place de la Bastille; in isolated acts of cruelty and pillage; in the menacing tone of

newspapers and clubs, as well as in the misconduct of the National Guard. Jacobins and Socialists stood aside for a time, or guided, without seeming to guide, these obscure individuals, who were blindly obeyed, and by whose instrumentality the revolution accomplished itself.

The testimony of General Vinoy, including his journal from January 22d, when he took command of the troops, till March 18th, and that of MM. Cresson and Choppin, enable one to follow the insurrection, district by district. They show how skilfully its leaders threw the responsibility of civil war on their opponents, managing matters somewhat after the fashion adopted by the Southern leaders during the latter months of Mr. Buchanan's Presidency; how anxious, on the other hand, many of the "friends of order" were to avoid the "effusion of blood"; and how little encouragement to stand firm men of sterner stuff received from Bordeaux during these trying weeks, — facts to be taken into consideration by those who blame anybody for passively accepting the revolutionary rule.

The National Assembly, far from taking measures to improve matters at Paris, made them worse. Its monarchical tendencies alienated good republicans, who had no sympathy with the revolutionary chieftains. Its enforced haste to do the will of the enemy, by ratifying a humiliating treaty, was indignantly contrasted by the Parisians with its failure to grant municipal liberties, its refusal to sit in the metropolis, its inability to forget partisanship in patriotism.

Tenants and debtors, who were staggering under burdens thrown upon them by the war, received no assistance from the Assembly. "At the end of the siege," testifies M. Bethmont, "everybody was, so to speak, in bankruptcy; nobody could pay his rent. . . . . The laws passed by the Assembly left in the condition of bankruptcy all those who, by position, habit, or instinct, are men of order, so that, when the 18th of March arrived, it was impossible to hope that the shop-keepers would take arms against disorder." "Many of the small manufacturers," says M. Choppin, "who work in their chambers alone, or with one or two men, suffered much during the siege, lived on their small savings, and were ruined, because they would not have recourse to public charity. As National Guards, they re-

ceived thirty sous a day, but that sum was not enough to support them and their families. When they found themselves in face of rents and of debts that they were unable to pay, they joined the insurgents, not thinking it worth their while to defend themselves."

Through various channels Thiers learned enough about Paris to render him uneasy, to decide him in favor of Versailles as the seat of government, and to induce the adoption of a plan which might test the feeling of both troops and population. Several attempts amicably to get possession of certain cannon held by the National Guard having miscarried, through want of tact on the one side, or want of good faith on the other, it was finally decided to seize them on the morning of the memorable 18th of March.

The causes of failure are given in the testimony of General Le Flô. "The troops possessed themselves of the heights of Montmartre at about six o'clock, and had nothing more to do but to carry away the pieces. Unhappily the horses and gun-carriages did not arrive till eight o'clock, by which hour the population were awake. Had the horses arrived at six, the troops would have been able to retire with the cannon without serious inconvenience. Other causes of failure were the lack of precision in the orders given, and the grave fault of leaving in the barracks the *sacs*" (with the food and extra clothing they contained).

"The soldiers," pursues General Le Flô, "having taken possession of the heights and the cannon, waited for the horses. During this period the population streamed out of the houses. Women, children, and old people approached the soldiers, crying, 'Long live the line! we will not fight each other, we are brothers.' Gradually the crowd closed in, and our men were surrounded. They were supplied with plenty to drink, and presently their arms were taken away, they opposing slight resistance. The trick, as Ledru Rollin said with reference to a similar occasion, was executed with great rapidity."

The failure of this expedition sealed the fate of Paris. The scene at Montmartre was reproduced at Belleville and elsewhere; and it became evident, by six o'clock in the evening, that no reliance could be placed on the troops. Hours before, Thiers

had gone to Versailles, after ordering the evacuation of Paris. This step was opposed by MM. Jules Favre, Picard, Jules Simon and others, on political grounds, but the military officers had but one opinion. "I agreed," says General Le Flô, "that from a political point of view the evacuation would have grave inconveniences, but I looked at the military question, and my fixed conviction was, that if we remained twenty-four hours longer in Paris, we should be unable to control a single regiment."

The decision to evacuate the city was probably wise, but it was carried out with undignified precipitation. Three regiments and six batteries were forgotten; all the forts were abandoned except Mont Valérien, and that narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the Commune, in which case the insurgents might have prevailed.

Henceforward the national authority was unrepresented in the national capital. The only civil authorities remaining were the Mayors, with their assistants, who were too numerous and too divided in opinion for efficient action. Thiers and Picard had given them general powers, and had, at their instance, appointed Colonel Langlois, and on his refusal, Admiral Saisset, commander of the National Guard. Idle ceremony! The Guard was under orders already; and Saisset, after issuing several contradictory proclamations, and vainly trying to stop the demonstration of the "friends of order," which resulted in the massacre of the Place Vendôme, retired to Versailles. For eight days negotiations went on between the Central Committee and the Mayors, of whom some were in secret league with the Committee, some heartily in sympathy with Versailles, and some halting between two opinions. Several agreements were made, fixing the time for municipal elections. Each agreement was broken by the Central Committee, which finally imposed what several witnesses call the "Capitulation of the Mayors," whereby those who signed it surrendered Paris to the insurgents.

Is not the statement justified, that, upon the men who formed themselves on the 4th of September into what they complacently termed a "government," presses a heavy responsibility for the insurrection of March 18th? If Jacobins and Socialists sowed the seed, it was these men who watered it, and gave it increase. It was their fault that the teeth of the dragon of

1793 started up as armed men; and it was they who put money into the purse, and rallied thousands under the banner of the International. Without faith in themselves or their cause, they could not be expected to inspire others with faith; but it was unnecessary for them to lie as they did, to save their lives at the cost of honor, or to demand sacrifices which they knew to be useless. The evil that they did lived after them, in the demoralization of the National Guard and of the regular army, in the blunders of the National Assembly, in the pusillanimity of the Mayors, whose capitulation they should have signed, since it was their work.

A. S. Hill.

Art. V. — Björnstjerne Björnson as a Dramatist.

"In the childhood of time," says the Danish poet Hauch, "the bard always came after the hero, and Mnemosyne, Memory, as the ancient Greeks have expressed it, was the mother of the Muses." In other words, the age of great political events is not the age of song; but in the calm that follows the storm, the poet will lift up his voice and will be sure to be heard. In the beginning of this century Norway's political greatness had long been a thing of the past. The lurid sun of St. Olaf's, Haken Hakenson's, and the Viking age had set in bloody splendor, and the nation slept like a bear in his winter den. And like the bear it may be said to have "sucked its paw," to have fed on the great memories of its heroic past, gloomily regardless of the dreary emptiness of the present. But it could not long remain thus. When the war-shouts of Napoleon's armies and the general rising of European nations after his downfall had roused the Norseman from his slumber, and awakened him to a keen consciousness of the unworthiness of his present condition, he felt again the old Viking blood flowing in his veins; he rubbed his drowsy eyes, stretched his athletic frame, and with one bold, well-directed blow crushed the shackles of foreign despotism. On the 17th of May, 1814, delegates from all the districts of Norway met at Eidsvald, wrought out a new constitution, declared themselves a

free and independent nation, and pledged their hands and their hearts to the preservation of the liberty which they had regained. A few months later (November 4, 1814) they entered upon a voluntary union with their brother-land, Sweden, and elected Bernadotte (Carl XIV. Johan) their king, having first received his oath to respect the laws, rights, and liberty of their country. The other European nations were fortunately too busy with their own affairs to trouble themselves about the doings of the Norwegians, and the Constitution of 1814 remains inviolate until this day.

Now, then, was the time to look for the great poet; and there was also a general expectation at that time that something truly great was soon to appear. But the general state of social culture was as yet so low, and society itself such a chaos of unassimilated and irreconcilable elements, that it must be deemed a fortunate circumstance that some twenty years elapsed before this great phenomenon did make its appearance. But even then the political questions were the all-absorbing topics of the day, and the poet, who should embody the poetical genius of the age, would necessarily have to assume the colors of the one or the other of the political factions. And both Henrik Wergeland and his great opponent, J. S. C. Welhaven (although the latter repudiated the idea), were so thoroughly imbued with the principles of political partisanship, that hardly the half of their lifetime sufficed to deliver them from the unnatural shackles which embarrassed them, and to develop the full and harmonious proportions of their naturally great geniuses. Wergeland was by nature a radical, and moreover so intoxicated with the new and world-wide idea of liberty, that instead of becoming the poet of his own age and nation, he lost himself in vague, half-symbolic visions of the future, and in a strangely erratic life came wellnigh forfeiting the splendid gifts with which Providence had endowed him. Welhaven, on the other hand, represented the very opposite extreme of social and poetical limitation. While Wergeland enthusiastically hugged to his breast (both literally and metaphorically speaking) every man who could boast a drop of the Viking blood in his veins, Welhaven fastidiously wrinkled his nose at the ill-odor and vulgar ways of the democratic plebeian. While the former,

conscious only of the vastness of his power, hurled forth with thundering magnificence his shapeless, heaven-reaching visions, the latter, like a cool-headed, clear-sighted critic, weighed, modelled, and remodelled his phrase, and carefully measured the æsthetic value of his thoughts, both as they mutually affected each other and in their relation to the grand *ensemble* of the poem. The result in both cases may be easily imagined. Wergeland's bequest to posterity, consisting of lyrics, epics, dramas, and prose sketches, is a huge and strangely chaotic mass, grand indeed, and still aglow with the fiery conception that gave it life, but withal vague, cloudy, and uncomfortable, like the world of Genesis before the hand of the Creator had separated the dry land from the sea. Welhaven's lyrics, as well as his critical writings, have long held the first rank among the classics of his nation; the very fact that he knew so well the nature of his gifts, and never for a moment overstepped the proper limits of his genius, has enabled him to achieve a high degree of perfection within his own peculiar province. He is a living proof of Goethe's famous utterance: "In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister."

The romantic poetry won a comparatively easy victory in Germany, and with champions like Goethe, Schiller, Tieck, Lessing, and Novalis, what power could be strong enough to arrest its progress? Not so in the Scandinavian countries. There the forces were more equally divided, and the battle consequently was a far severer one. In Sweden the French classical Academists had to sustain a grievous fight against the romantic "Phosphorism" (as this movement was styled after its journal the "Phosphorus"), which at length in the person of Peter Amadeus Atterbom ascended the throne of poetical supremacy. In Denmark the fierce feud between Baggesen and Oehlenschläger also ended with the deposition of the former as well as the school he represented, and the latter for half a century reigned supreme in the literary republic of the North, and in the cathedral of Lund, June 23, 1829, even formally received the laurel crown from the hands of his great brother poet, Esaias Tegnér. In both these cases the struggle was between an established and a rising school, between clear and well-defined, but diametrically opposed, principles; in Norway, however, there was

hardly any old school to depose; and the great public, feeling its inability to pronounce upon the literary questions at issue, attached an undue importance to the political creeds of the combatants, and allowed their political sentiments to decide their preference of one or the other of the contending poets. Soon all the academical youth of the country stood armed on the two opposing sides, and with the impetuosity peculiar to their race longed to have matters arranged and settled by a real battle, not with quills, but with bare fists and honest blows. Such a battle was actually fought in 1836 at the appearance of one of Wergeland's dramas, *Campbellune*, on the stage of the Christiania Theatre, and resulted in the utter defeat of Welhaven's partisans. It was, as every one will admit, a highly original method of testing poetical merit, and can only be accounted for by the afore-mentioned fact, that the public saw in these two young men the mouthpieces of the two political parties rather than the founders of opposing schools within the national literature.

We have dwelt at some length upon the political situation in Norway previous to Björnson's appearance, that the reader may be enabled to view him in his relation to the time in which and for which he worked, and thereby gain a clearer idea of the importance of the work he has done and is still doing.

Björnstjerne Björnson was born December 8, 1832, in the parish of Ovikne, a wildly picturesque region among the mountains of Dovre. If it be true that a glowing patriotism is more naturally fostered under the solemn shadow of the mountains than in the sunshine of the blooming plains, we cannot wonder that this decided "Norseism," which so early distinguished Björnson as a writer, has ever remained the most prominent characteristic of his whole public and private career. Björnson is a Norseman to the core, and even if he had never attained the high rank he now holds as a poet and dramatist, his journalistic and political character would have stamped him as a typical Norseman. While Björnson was yet a child, his father, who was a clergyman, removed to Romsdal, a valley in the northern part of Norway, which deserved its fame among tourists and artists for the picturesque contrasts between the boldness of sculpture in its mountain forms and the loveliness

of its cool transparent fjords. When twelve years of age, our poet was sent to the State Gymnasium at Molde, a small town situated on the Atlantic shore, not far from his father's parish. We cannot forbear here to relate an anecdote, which we have from one who was at that time on terms of acquaintance with him. It may seem trifling; yet as, to the best of our knowledge, it has never before appeared in print, and since accounts of that period of the poet's life are scarce, we think we need make no excuse for telling it. One day, during his school life, Björnson entered the house of a merchant whose family he was in the habit of visiting. Seeing the portrait of the poet Wergeland on the wall over the sofa, he stopped before it and stood viewing it long and earnestly. On being asked what he was thinking about, he pointed to the portrait and answered, that the time would surely come when he too should be "hung up" like him. If this incident is authentic, Björnson cannot, even at that early age, have been so destitute of ambition as most of his biographers have asserted. It cannot be doubted, however, that his progress in classic lore was anything but satisfactory. His *naïveté* and unsophisticated straightforwardness made him the common butt of the jests and witticisms of the school, and the discouraging reports of his teachers induced his parents to think seriously of breaking off his unprofitable studies and sending him to sea. But fortunately this design was thwarted, and for several years more he had to endure the monotonous life of the Gymnasium; which, however, made him appreciate the more the glorious liberty of his vacations, when he could roam at his ease through the lonely wilds of Romsdal's mountains, catch trout in the freshets, and dream away the sunny summer days on the fjord. His exuberance of animal spirits at this time manifested itself in the most extraordinary manner; he found a rare amusement in turning summersaults on everything which came in his way, and not unfrequently exercised his revolutionary spirit on the tables, chairs, and other furniture of his father's parsonage. No wonder his mother thought that the sea was his proper calling.

Having finished his preparatory studies, Björnson started for Christiania, where he passed the examination required for admission to the University. But his head was now so full of

literary projects, that he could find no time to avail himself of the privileges to which this examination entitled him. His first drama, *Valborg*, was accepted by the directors of the stage, and procured for its author a free ticket to all theatrical representations; and through the opportunity he thus gained of acquainting himself with the requirements of the drama, he was soon convinced of the immaturity of his production, and of his own accord withdrew it, without awaiting the verdict of the public. His continued visits to the theatre soon enabled him to see the unworthy condition of the national stage of the capital; and with more patriotic zeal than critical judgment, in a series of newspaper articles, he boldly attacked the Danish rule as anti-national in its origin and tendencies. This attack provoked an equally bitter reply; and little by little, as the combat progressed, the theatre-going public, which included nearly three fourths of the whole population, began to organize into two hostile camps, and some eager enthusiasts among the collegians were already preparing to *conserere manus*. But the more peaceable citizens of Christiania had probably no desire to see the shocking scenes of 1836 * renewed, and after some light skirmishing, some of which was of a pugilistic character, order was again restored. The quarrel was dropped, but not forgotten; it was destined to bear a rich literary harvest in years to come.

Then came the great University reunion of 1856. The Norwegian and Danish students and graduates, as well as undergraduates, set out on a grand expedition to meet their Swedish brethren at Upsala. Here Björnson caught the first glimpse of a greater and freer life than moved within the narrow horizon of Norway's capital. This gay and careless student life, this cheerful abandonment of all the artificial shackles which burden one's feet in their daily walks through a half-aristocratic society, the temporary freedom which allows one without offence to toast the prince and hug a count to his bosom, — all this had its influence upon Björnson's sensitive nature; it filled his soul with a happy intoxication, and with confidence in his own strength and work. And having once tasted a life like

* The fight between the partisans of Wergeland and Welhaven.

this, he could not return to what he had left behind him. The following winter he therefore betook himself to Copenhagen, where he spent about half a year of great literary activity. The beautiful tale *Synnöve Solbakken*, and the grand dramas *Mellem Slagene* (Between the Battles) and *Halte Hulda* (Limping Hulda) owe their existence to the awakening influences of the Upsala expedition and the subsequent sunny life in Copenhagen, where the good-natured Danes willingly granted him the recognition which, at this stage of his literary life, was one of the first conditions of growth.

On his return to Norway he published *Synnöve Solbakken;* first in an illustrated weekly, which he temporarily edited, and the following year in book form. The tale, short and simple as it was, attracted general attention, both as being the first successful effort to introduce the primitive life of the Norse peasantry into the world of fiction, and because it revealed a great and rich poetic soul, of a cast altogether grand and strikingly original. There was, moreover, a certain nervous strength in the narrative; which, whatever might be said of its provincialisms and occasional obscurity of expression, seemed to indicate an immense reserve power; and the artless simplicity of the style betokened the author's perfect confidence in the intelligence of his readers, — a feature which never fails to bring its own reward with a sincere and enlightened public. In Denmark, where the book was reprinted, it was received with even greater and more decided favor; and, indeed, the sterling qualities of Björnson's writings have always appealed in a forcible manner to the æsthetic sense of the Danes, and have prepared him a series of triumphs altogether unprecedented, since the days of Oehlenschläger, in the literary annals of Scandinavia.

In the following year (1858) appeared the tale *Arne*, — of all the author's work, perhaps, the one best known to the English-speaking public, — and the two dramas, *Halte Hulda* and *Mellem Slagene*, all distinguished by the same transcendent merits which had already secured Björnson so high a rank among contemporaneous men of letters. It may be worthy of notice, that he here followed Shakespeare's example in violating sacred Aristotelean unities of time and place, and he even limits the number of acts in one case to three, and in another

to two. The untraditional shape of Björnson's dramas gave little trouble to Scandinavian critics, and did not subject them to the harsh treatment which probably they would have met with at the hands of the French and German members of that powerful brotherhood.

The later events of Björnson's life may be briefly told. Immediately following the publication of his dramas came his appointment to the "artistic directorship" of the national stage in Bergen, — which position he held for about two years. Here at last he found an opportunity for carrying into effect his peculiar ideas as to the character of the national drama, and, as the future proved, gave no small impulse to the development of the histrionic art in Norway. The Bergen theatre had come into existence some ten or twelve years before Björnson assumed the leadership of its stage, through the persevering efforts and noble generosity of Ole Bull; who cordially shared our author's enthusiasm for everything that was truly "Norse." It has ever since done excellent service, especially as a recruiting school from which the Christiania theatres might constantly supply their vacancies, and thus gradually bring about the change in favor of nationalization, which never could have been accomplished through any sudden revolutionary stratagem. It is Bergen which has the honor of having first discovered the great tragic heroine Mrs. Gundersen, the inimitable Mrs. Wolf, and the famous comedian, Johannes Brun, — all of whom now adorn the stage of the capital.

From Bergen Björnson was called to the editorship of *Aftenbladet*, the second political journal of Norway; but having soon become convinced that journalism was not his *forte*, again relinquished this position, and in the spring of 1860 started for Italy. Previous to his departure, however, he published, through the famous house Gyldendal, in Copenhagen, a volume entitled *Smaastykker* (Sketches); of which, "A Happy Boy," and the masterly tale "The Father," are familiar to American readers. One of these sketches, *Ei Faarleg Friing* (A Dangerous Wooing), was written in the popular dialect of his native valley. The year of his return (1862) may be said to mark an epoch in the literary history of the Scandinavian races; for after the publication of the grand drama "King

Sverre" and the wonderful trilogy "Sigurd Slembe," the subjects of which were taken from Snorre Sturlason's "Sagas of the Kings of Norway," the national drama was no longer a mere vague ideal or an imaginary promise of the future, but a grand and powerful reality, which even the most reluctant of critics were forced to recognize. Björnson now assumed the leadership of the Christiania theatre; and, as a reward for his great services to Norwegian literature, the *Storthing*, or Parliament, granted him an annual "Poet's salary." Since then he has held an undisputed rank as the greatest poet of Scandinavia. His works have been issued in numerous editions in the capitals of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark; translations have appeared in English, German, and French; and his dramas have been the chief attraction of the theatres all over the Scandinavian kingdoms. Of late years he has been engaged in editing the political and literary paper, *Folkebladet* (The People's Journal), and has from time to time delighted the public with poetical productions bearing the stamp of his powerful genius. In the drama "Mary Stuart in Scotland" he has for the first time chosen a foreign subject for his treatment, and has perhaps "Norsified" it more than the kinship of Norsemen and Scotch Highlanders would naturally justify; the play enjoyed the rare fortune of being set to music by the Norwegian composer, Richard Norderaak (who died in the following year), — a circumstance to which undoubtedly it partly owed its success. In "The Fishermaiden" the author drew largely on the fund of experience he had gained as artistic director of the two principal theatres of the land; and rumor says that the motive of the tale was suggested by the life of a certain well-known actress, at present the favorite of the Christiania public. If the rumor be true, the reader need no more be disappointed at the abrupt ending of "The Fishermaiden"; for "the curtain rose" over a life full of triumphs, worthy of the genuineness of Petra's artistic nature. *De Nygifte* (After the Wedding) is a short dramatic sketch full of truth and pathos, dealing with social life at the present day. The last work we have seen from Björnson's pen is the epic poem *Arnljot Gelline* (published 1870), describing the life, conversion, and death of a Norse warrior of the old Viking breed. Like Tegnér's *Frithof*

Saga, and Kristofer Janson's *Sigmund Bresteson*, it is written in cantos of different form and metre, and is characterized by a certain rude and honest strength, which, we suppose, would be more readily appreciated by the original Norsemen than by those who know the spirit of the Sagas only from cursory extracts and translations. The poet is here liable to criticism for the liberties he takes with his verse, often breaking off in the middle of a stanza, and introducing his rhymes, as it seems, very much at random; moreover his fondness for compressed vigor often makes his poetic similes extremely obscure. A Danish reviewer, noticing this fault, very justly remarks that Björnson's images seem to be one step removed from the pantomime. A complete edition of his poems has lately been issued by the house Gyldendal, in Copenhagen.

We have seen that Björnson's works comprise almost all the more important branches of literary art; but as it is more especially his dramas whose influence has made itself so widely felt among his own nation, we propose in the present article to subject these to a critical examination. As a specimen, we have chosen *Halte Hulda* (Limping Hulda), which, although belonging to an early period of the author's life, is marked with all the characteristics of his style, and moreover possesses the advantage of being intelligible even to those who have never had a peep into the mysteries of the old Sagas. The action is laid in the thirteenth century, — when the political power of Norway was in steady decline; when the *Asa* faith had long been supplanted by a nominal Christianity; while the old pagan customs, and the old notions of revenge, manliness, and honor still held as powerful a sway over the minds of the Norsemen as in the days when the law of the *Althing* and the fixed rites of religion provided for the emergencies thence arising. The time, then, nearly coincides with that of *Njal's Saga;* with which, indeed, *Halte Hulda* has many traits in common, — of course with due allowance for the natural differences between a drama and an historical tale.

A dramatic as well as a tragical situation always involves a conflict; it is the individual asserting his freedom as opposed to some greater power beyond and above him. In the ancient Greek dramas, this Destiny is an external and arbitrary power,

which the hero only recognizes because he is forced to do so, while his moral nature may silently rebel against it. But how infinitely more powerful or how much more *tragic* * does not the situation become where this limiting power, this Destiny — or perhaps *Necessity* is the better word — is no longer an interference from without, but is found in man's own moral consciousness. This circumstance Björnson has fully appreciated; it is the corner-stone in this as in many of his other dramas. Aslak, the father of the murdered Gudlejk, is old, and shrinks from the duty of vengeance, which his own conscience enforces. He knows that Eyolf Finson, the slayer of his son, is the greatest warrior in the king's body-guard, and that death is certain if he attacks him. Therefore when his sister, Halgerda, throws the red cloak of the avenger about his shoulders, he says, "O Jesus Lord, methinks that there thou laid'st my shroud upon me."

But the old pagan idea, which still clings to him, declares him a villain if he flees from the terrible duty. And he struggles, strikes, and is slain.

Numerous second-rate dramatists in Germany have attempted to transplant the Greek notion of Destiny upon Christian ground, and the result has been dramatic monstrosities like Zacharius Werner's "The Twenty-fourth of February," and Dr. Müllner's "King Yngurd"; where the whole machinery turns upon some inevitable doom, attached to a certain day of a certain month, or some mysterious curse attendant upon some slight and insignificant action. The poor success of these scribblers has induced Carlyle to reject the idea of destiny as altogether inapplicable in the Christian drama; † and as understood by Æschylus and Sophocles it may no longer appeal to the æsthetic sense of the age, while in the wider signification of moral *Necessity* it is the very essence of dramatic composition.

We have said that Christianity has essentially changed the

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* Schegel observes: "We are accustomed to give to all terrible and sorrowful events the appellation of *tragic*, ... though a melancholy conclusion is by no means indispensably necessary" (in a tragedy).

† "German Playwrights," Carlyle's Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, Phillips, Sampson, & Co., Boston, 1855.

attitude of the hero; that the tragical Necessity, instead of being, as with the Greeks, an arbitrary and inexorable Fate, has taken up its abode in his own heart, as a part of his being, an all-governing law for his thoughts and actions. But the age of the old Norse Sagas, lying, as it were, midway between Christianity and paganism, has established a peculiar code of its own. The old loyalty to Odin and Thor has vanished, but Christ the White has not yet taken their place; he is looked upon as a powerful helper rather than as a stern master; not as the unrelenting judge of good and evil, but as a mild, protecting Deity, who might easily be conciliated to further the warrior's ambitious designs. The code of morality for centuries remained that of the old heathen age. If the law did not enforce vengeance, society practically outlawed the man who neglected to whet his sword at his kinsman's death. The hero's chief end and aim was glory and an honorable name among men; and a bloody death seemed to him far preferable to a life of dishonor. And, through long habit and tradition, this regard for society and "honor among men" became so deeply ingrafted in the Norseman's mind, that it became a part of himself, and amounted to nothing less than an "inward necessity," which thus with him occupied a place very similar to that of religious duty with the Christian. The reader of Njala and Trereyinga Saga will readily convince himself of this; and without a right understanding of the state of society at that time, many of the finest scenes in *Halte Hulda* will lose their tragical import. The plot is indeed in itself grand, and as such appeals alike to the savant and the unlearned; and its passionate outbursts of grief, hatred, and love are such as will find a response in every human breast. At the same time a more thorough acquaintance with the customs and moral conceptions of the age will reveal many an exquisite touch of coloring and many a delicately sculptured figure with fine tintings and half-tintings of character, which require more than a cursory reading to yield their full measure of enjoyment. Then there is a certain rich flavor of antiquity, a fleeting, luminous haze, which ever agreeably puzzles the mind, and, without obscuring its horizon, keeps the curiosity ever alert.

The *dramatis personæ* are few, and the complications of the

plot not hard to unravel. It is characteristic of the author that he never depends upon complexity of intrigue for effect; he never shrinks from great psychological problems, but scorns to resort to mere ingenious intricacies. Hulda, the heroine, is the widow of Gudlejk Aslakson, who has been slain only a few days ago by the king's warrior, Eyolf Finson. There is a mystery about her, a strange, fatal charm, which is thus described by Halgerda, the murdered man's kinswoman: —

> "When yet a child, a weird old Finnish dame,
> Who saw her sitting from the dance afar,
> Weeping full sore, because her foot was lame,
> And that she could not mingle in the dance,
> Thus spake to her: 'Weep not, that thou art lame;
> For in return thou shalt a visage have,
> Which shall be death to him who looks
> Too long upon it.' — Sooth she spoke the truth."

In Aslak's race, where she has been fostered, five valorous men have gazed too long upon this visage, and in every case the prophecy has come true; not that she slew them: no, to her the one was no better than the other; but the fatal charm of her beauty inflamed the one against the other; the rejected wooer naturally believed his rival more successful; and through jealousy and hatred the brother became the brother's death. At last she is forced to marry Gudlejk; but ere the year is past she meets Eyolf Finson of the king's body-guard. No word is exchanged, only their eyes meet, the charm works, and Gudlejk's fate is decided. But that look is no less fatal to Hulda's peace than it is to Eyolf's. All the great dormant powers of her nature are awakened to life, and she feels herself suddenly a woman, loving and beloved. And this new love, the first and only one of her joyless life, whispers its alluring tale of happiness in her ear, and, inspired with tenfold strength, she rises to crush every obstacle which obstructs her way.

At the opening of the first act the stage represents an old Norwegian *skaal*, or hall, the long smoky rafters overhead, the broad hearth of stone in the middle of the floor, and the burnished shields and weapons adorning the walls. Halgerda, Gudlejk's kinswoman, and Thordis, a young girl of seventeen summers, who, like Hulda, has been fostered in her house, occupy the foreground; both sewing on a red mantle, destined

for Gudlejk's avenger. Halgerda tries to turn the conversation on the murdered man, but Thordis shrinks from the thought of blood, and uses every device to dispel the gloom which broods over her mind. She speaks of her lover, Gunnar, — of his manliness and beauty, and of the joy she felt at being borne across the brook on his strong arm. Halgerda answers: —

. . . . Ah, if to me
A valorous swain his troth had pledged —

THORDIS.

What then?

HALGERDA.

Full well I know what prize I then should bid him.

THORDIS.

A trail of blood thy thought!

HALGERDA.

Perchance because
A bloody house it was from whence it rose.

THORDIS.

Always the vision dread!

HALGERDA.

And dost thou think
That Gudlejk seemeth fair, as there he lies?

THORDIS.

Halgerda, peace! No longer can I bear
Thy ugly talk.

HALGERDA.

Aha!

THORDIS.

Methinks I now perceive
Thy race from Iceland came.

HALGERDA.

And I perceive
That thine is not that race.

THORDIS.

May God be praised!

In the characters of Halgerda and Thordis, we note the author's fine sense of the picturesque, and his skill in truly dramatic characterization. What could more powerfully relieve the revengeful gloom of the former's mind than the

fresh, half-shrinking happiness of a young maid's new-born love? It is not a mere rude contrast, such as every mechanical scribbler could readily have invented, nor an often-repeated antithesis, which wearies more than it delights, but a vigorous and truthful delineation of two typical characters, which, although old as the world, gain a fresh charm in the peculiar coloring of the old Norse Sagas, and in their relation to that age which the Sagas depict. The Danish poet, Hauch, whom we have already quoted, observes, that the women of the Sagas, when once in sympathy with the spirit of the age, soon surpass the men in fierceness and bloodthirstiness; they spur their sense of honor, and ever urge them on to deeds of violence and vengeance. Their very seclusion and the innate reserve of their nature, if once broken, seem to foster an increased bitterness and vehemence, which know no bounds and shun no obstacle to the fulfilment of their desire. Halgerda's namesake, in Njal's Saga, and Njal's wife, Bergthora, give sufficient evidence of this. Where, on the other hand, happiness and love preserve the natural sweetness of her character, the old Norse woman takes the very opposite part, tempering the wrath of her husband, soothing his passions, and surrounding him with all those gentle influences which gradually alienate him from his native barbarism. She is sprightly, roguish, and tender like Thordis; and like Thordis scatters an enlivening ray of sunshine upon her gloomy surroundings.

In the second scene Halgerda throws the blood-red mantle around her brother Aslak's shoulders; and when he hesitates to undertake the duty it imposes upon him, she bids him sleep in the room where his son was murdered. He goes, and Halgerda and Thordis are again alone.

HALGERDA.

At midnight hour, they say,
The house is haunted.

THORDIS.

Hear us, snow-white Christ!
And be Thou with us.

HALGERDA.

Oft, methinks, I heard,
That never Aslak found the man who stood,
When once his sword began to play around him.

THORDIS (*frightened*).

Now I must go. . . . .

HALGERDA.

To Gunnar?

THORDIS.

Yes.

HALGERDA.

Thou hast
A message for him? *

THORDIS (*hesitates*).

HALGERDA.

Seek'st a gift as pledge?

THORDIS.

O, be not angry . . . . though thy cause be just!
I trow . . . . nay, well I know, that such intent
Were great in sooth . . . . and of a Northland maid
Full worthy . . . . and . . . . but I . . . . although I know . . . .
I can but weep . . . . shame on the naughty tears!
Unworthy are they of my race . . . . and still
I am so frightened . . . . O, let me but go,
I am afraid!

HALGERDA (*gently*).

Be calm!

THORDIS (*on her knees*).

O, let me go!
My heart is still so faint . . . . if thou wouldst plant
So strong a purpose there, it well may sprout,
But burst the vessel; ah, so frail it is!

HALGERDA (*as before*).

Go, Thordis.

THORDIS (*rising; still frightened*).

Art thou angry?

HALGERDA.

Go, I say!

THORDIS.

I thank thee! — but . . . . art thou not angry then?

HALGERDA.

If thou wilst go, hie thee, ere Hulda comes.

---

* It may not be clear from the passage quoted, that Halgerda wishes Thordis to demand of her lover that he shall take vengeance upon Gudlejk's slayer, and that she shall make this the condition of her love.

THORDIS (*drawing nearer*).

Yes, I shall go; but thou must tell me first
If thou forgivest me and art not angry.
For scarce a fortnight old is yet our bliss, —
Too young for plans like thine, it gayly leaps
With song and sport around the birchen grove,
It gathers flowerets and snatches kisses,
It puts up snares, and hears the song of birds,
Recounteth legends, plays at hide-and-seek
Where roguish shrubs have closed the copse above us.

HALGERDA (*embracing her with warmth*).

O sunny soul, I know thee once again!
(*Earnestly.*)
O, that he might reward thee for thy faith!

THORDIS.

In every little nut I offer thee
A worm straightway thou findest.

HALGERDA.

Ah, my child!
Perchance because I found . . . . well, mind not me —
Be happy! — Go! — To-night she comes full early!

FOURTH SCENE.

HALGERDA and THORDIS. HULDA (*enters slowly as in deep thought*).

THORDIS (*to* HALGERDA).

Of late, methinks, I hardly see her limping.

HALGERDA (*to* THORDIS).

Nay, not as heretofore. She will not own it.
At every step she takes she chokes a scream
Of wildest pain; for so it hurts to keep
The infirm ankle straight, lest it should yield.

In the subsequent brief conversation between Hulda and Halgerda, the former's power becomes strangely manifest. Halgerda rebels in her heart against her commands, but is silent and obeys. She leaves, and steals into the room, where Aslak, her brother, sleeps. The following soliloquy of Hulda's, a part of which we translate, is the exulting cry of a strong and lofty nature, — a nature hitherto shackled, lone, and subdued, but now for the first time free to gaze with fearless eye upon the life that is dawning upon it. She is waiting for her

lover, Eyolf Finson; with whom, since her husband's death, she has had several interviews, although until then they had been strangers.

HULDA.

He never comes till I have quenched the candle.
(*Blows out the candle, and walks up toward the foreground.*)
Of late was all the world so small, so narrow,
That scarce one of all my silent wishes
Found room in it, — but at that time, in sooth,
It still had room for all these men and women.
Now like a vision, in a moment's time —
O miracle! — so wide and large 't is grown,
Nay, so immeasurable, that my soul
Is quenchéd in the very thought to grasp it.
And now — now can the great wide earth but hold
An only one — and all the rest, they stand
And bar his entrance .... (*Speaking low.*) Methinks, erewhile I had
A word for each of them, an ear to listen
To their whisper. (*With rising energy.*) But if now at once
The voice of each into an ocean's roar
Together flowed, I had no ear to hear it.
(*Tenderly.*) O wonderful! yon silent wood, yon mount
Which dreams within its cloud, has gained a tongue;
Yon fruit-encumbered green, whose voice is bound,
Full steeped in rapture at its own sweet bliss,
It mildly speaks to me .... and I do listen.
(*Takes a seat, slowly.*)
'T was here I sat, — and as I sat the darkness
Came with its whisper to me; full warily
It wrapped my bosom close, — (*pensively*), and people, manor-house,
And all the past with muffled, anxious cries
Did perish in it. (*With rising energy.*) Here once more I sat.
Oh! then of joy a beacon in my mind
Was lit, — a pure and radiant one, that grew
And higher rose, and leapt like wildest flame,
And earth and sky encompassed! But I clasped
Hard o'er my breast my hands, — and I was silent.
— And full and heavy with this load of joy,
Of light and shimmer weary, could my eye
No longer choke the tears.... I wept my fill, —
As ne'er before in four-and-twenty years.
(*Weeping; leaning backwards; tenderly.*)
Come now, my Eyolf! Come! why dost thou linger?
Already in the pine-copse coos the black grouse,
And from the tarn the mist its silvery mantle

Is slowly trailing; through the evening air
It softly glideth, — to a lair more distant.
Erelong each flower it lightly grazed will stand
With dewy cheek, and gladdened think upon
The dreamy vision fair which floated o'er it.

. . . . .

I see thee, Eyolf; see the wanton locks
Which hasten laughingly in lusty concourse
Adown thy neck; I see thy valiant arm, —
Oft writs of death it traced, — but me it bids
A loving cradle!

Eyolf now arrives, but is at first gloomy and distracted; but Hulda's devotion and caresses dispel his doubts, and he proposes to flee with her to Iceland, where there is a home for homeless love. During their interview Halgerda's voice is heard from the chamber, rousing her brother, Aslak, from his sleep. Soon Aslak appears on the stage, arrayed in the red mantle of the avenger; he challenges Eyolf to fight, and is slain. The following scene in its weird power and truthfulness reminds us not a little of an episode in Hawthorne's "Marble Faun." It is Miriam's and Donatello's walk from the Tarpeian rock after the death of the monk, when the common participation in the crime awakens a feeling of strength in both, and draws them more closely to each other. Hulda has not in words encouraged Eyolf to slay her husband and his father, but in her eye he read what prompted him to the deed. And feeling for the moment his estrangement from all the rest of mankind, he clings more closely to her who is the cause of both his happiness and his misery. In the foregoing acts an allusion has been made to Svanhildé, one of the queen's maids of honor, who will figure more prominently in the following acts.

The second act opens with an interview in the forest between Thordis and Gunnar, her lover. They have a little quarrel, because Gunnar says that he wants to be married very soon; Thordis begins to cry, and he very dexterously changes the subject. The queen and her maids of honor come wandering through the forest, and after them the brothers of the murdered Gudlejk, Thrond and Arne Aslakson, — the latter wearing the avenger's mantle.

THROND.

That cloak is heavy, Arne Aslakson.

ARNE.

Heavier the words she spoke, who gave it,
Throng, my brother.

In the sixth scene the queen proposes to play at fairies, — a game whose object it is to bring unhappy lovers together. Her maids form a long fairy chain, and with song and play they dance through the forest, weaving their charmed circles around Svanhildé, who they know is suffering, because Eyolf, her early lover, has deserted her. At last they bring Eyolf on the stage, and a third person, an unknown veiled woman, to witness their pledge of troth. The fairies again retire, and the three principal actors are left alone. The song of the fairies, with its lightly tripping metres, as well as the colloquy between Eyolf and Svanhildé, are full of lyrical passages, whose delicate petals with their fleeting fragrance will hardly bear the reverential touch of the translator. Eyolf, being thus unexpectedly confronted with his early love, first seeks to avoid her, and rises to go; but the unknown witness bids him speak. He touches upon mere commonplace topics, but the young girl's innocence and truthfulness sting him to the quick; the memories of his early happiness throng his mind, and half imperceptibly he glides over upon the very subject he is striving to avoid. In the fresh light of the morning, and in Svanhildé's presence, the power which binds him to Hulda, and the all-consuming fervor of her love, appear as dark as the night which has been the sole witness of their meetings.

. . . . I know a place
Where there is gloom and night; I also know
Where day abides. The sword . . . . it loves the night;
But gladsome song . . . . it is the gift of day . . . .
Read me that riddle?

SVANHILDÉ.

Thou canst do it better.

EYOLF.

To choose; O, but to choose . . . .

SVANHILDÉ.

Is not so hard.

EYOLF.

To him, whose mind was never forced to choose.
Where deepest gorge doth separate two lands,
Then he who longeth for the thither side
Must risk the leap! And that thou think'st is easy.

SVANHILDÉ.

Thy words affright me, Eyolf.

EYOLF.

Come, Svanhildé,
Look mildly on me — thus! Methinks we twain
Once played together.

SVANHILDÉ.

Yes, from our childhood up.

EYOLF.

And with the friar read.

SVANHILDÉ.

For many years.

EYOLF.

Full lustily we trod the dance.

SVANHILDÉ.

At Yule-tide.

EYOLF.

But when I swung the sword, I stood alone.

SVANHILDÉ.

Oft I stood by and watched thee.

EYOLF.

Thou stood'st afar
The day I Kollijam chased; he rated me
A stripling.

SVANHILDÉ.

Alas! then thou didst roam afar
On foreign warfare.

EYOLF (*wildly*).

Then I saw thee not.

SVANHILDÉ (*shrinking from him*).

But, Eyolf!

EYOLF.

Hush, be not afraid, but come!
The bear will seek his den, for thee he feareth, —
O swan-white bird, with spring upon thy pinions,

Swim to my shore, though steep and rough it be,
One spot it has full low, — with smooth, soft grass, —
Thou know'st the spot, — Svanhildé, thou hast found it.

SVANHILDÉ.

Hail, be our meeting in the early morrow!

EYOLF (*clasping her hand*).

Here on thy snow-white hand, where goes the blood
So fountain-clear, and pure as in the birch-grove
The song of birds, let it my Bible be,
On it I swear an oath.

SVANHILDÉ.

Thou swearest, Eyolf?

EYOLF.

An oath I swear, and little do I heed
The raven's cry, which flutters through our Eden.

The lovers then depart, having first appointed a renezdvous for the next evening on the hill near the king's dancing-hall. No one doubts, of course, that the veiled witness is none other than Hulda. At first she seems so stunned by the suddenness of the shock that she can hardly persuade herself of its reality; and the wild, confused rambling of her thoughts conveys perhaps as vivid a sense of her suffering as would a more passionate outbreak of grief and reproach. The effect of the scene, however, is, to our thinking, somewhat lessened by the fact that the poet, evidently believing that the congruity of a metrical utterance is not favorable to the exhibition of the wildest vehemence of emotion, has broken off his verse and made his heroine hurl forth her disconnected phrases (at least as far as the form is concerned) in plain prose. It may be hazardous to criticise this tendency, which we trace in many of Björnson's dramas, as similar instances abound in Shakespeare and other dramatic poets. But as far as we can judge, it is the more commonplace scenes, where no great passions are brought into play, which Shakespeare deems unworthy of the elevation of metre, while where he aims at peculiar sublimity the sympathetic throb of the rhythm is deemed only the more essential. In the stormy scene on the heath in "King Lear," it is the fool whose sentiments are fitly clothed in prose, while the king vents his frenzy in rhythmical utterances. A break in

the verse, or a sudden change of rhythm, often conveys a vivid sense of the newness of the thought or a startling suddenness of impulse, while a complete abandonment of the metrical form, as it were, puts the mind out of time and lowers it into a corresponding region of prose. We will quote a few passages of Hulda's soliloquy to give the reader a chance to judge for himself: —

HULDA.

(*Stands for a while immovable, turns and looks at the water; cries out.*) The water! (*Rushes toward it, stops, and turns again.*) No, not thus — not yet! . . . . Whither am I going? . . . . Anywhere! (*Shrieks, runs, and pauses again.*) But where is the water? Ah — on this side! But it must not be on this side! For I — must go forward — straight forward! — Alas, my foot! I must not limp — no, not limp. Thus! Thus! — It pains me not — no, not at all! (*Sings.*)

I saw a white dove tremble
On the dark expanse of thunder;
From the earth the storm-wind hurled her,
While it tore the waves asunder.
I heard no scream or wailing,
No sound I heard her utter;
For she could rise no longer,
She could but sink and flutter.

Now I must homeward go. So much I have to accomplish. — It was that cloak I needs must finish . . . . for to-night . . . . when on our journey we shall start. . . . . Ah, but in sooth, that journey . . . . it will perchance not come to pass. . . . . Methinks it is the wrong way I am treading . . . . It is not hitherward, my homeward way . . . . and . . . . I must hasten, for perchance there may be some one that 's waiting for me. . . . . Or, how fares it with me. . . . . Ah, there is none who waiteth for me. (*Shrieks.*) Eyolf!

In the next scene Arne and Trond, the brothers of her murdered husband, appear, and in a singularly weird and disconnected dialogue she plots with them the death of her lover, Eyolf Finson. At evening, if according to his promise he should come, they agree to surround the house with their men and assail him. And not a Norseman, and least of all Eyolf Finson, would break his promise.

The third act opens with another interview between Thordis and Gunnar. They find the house empty, a weird gloom seems to brood over the place, and they are filled with strange forebodings. Thordis makes her lover promise to remain at the

door till midnight, and if Eyolf Finson should enter, to speak one word in his ear; and that word is — Svanhildé. Then Hulda comes and finds Thordis alone in the hall. She asks her who the man was who just departed. Thordis answers it was Gunnar, her lover.

HULDA.

Thy — ah! (*Drawing nearer.*) Then thou
Art strong, that thou canst bear to love, Thordis, also. . . . .

THORDIS.

In sooth, I knew not that it strength required.

HULDA.

Then — but a game, a play of troth — go, Thordis!
Nay, tarry, do not leave me yet. — But speak . . . .
What was it thou didst say? Has he deceived thee?

THORDIS.

Who? Gunnar? No!

HULDA.

Nay, that I did not mean . . . .
He seems so strong and fair.

THORDIS.

O yes!

HULDA.

And didst thou
Not miss him unto death, until he came?

THORDIS.

What meanest thou?

HULDA.

I mean, that in thy dream
Thou saw'st him oft, ere thou his face hadst seen.
Since then each word, each look thy hunger filled.

THORDIS (*wondering*).

Saw him before?

HULDA.

Dost not perceive? I mean,
That ere he knew as yet that thou wast born,
Thy life was passed in hungry yearnings for him, —
Meanwhile for others thou didst ever work
With face half turned, glancing to the door,
If he should come. In every trifling thing
Thou soughtest his approval, didst adorn
Thy flowing tresses with the hidden hope
That he should deem thee fair. With him,
Who yet beheld thy thought, if not thy deed,

Thou found'st a guerdon for thy suffering.
And when at parties maids and lusty lads
The dance-croft trod, whilst thou sat'st lone, unbidden,
The butt of pity and of silent council,
Brief, sidelong glances, but of evil import;
Then thou didst dance with him, and, wild, you hurled
Aside each couple, and the dancing-floor
Grew large and larger, and the tones, they rose,—
Took fire, and, flame-like, leapt toward the roof.

. . . . .

Go not, Thordis,—the night is drear and long. . . . .
Doth he to-night expect thee, Thordis?

THORDIS.

No.

HULDA.

Then thou canst be at ease! Sit down . . . . and tell me,—
How didst thou learn to love? . . . . Speak freely, Thordis.

THORDIS (*frightened*).

We played together,—wellnigh children both.

HULDA.

Thus early thou didst find him?

THORDIS.

To the farm
He often came and oft we saw each other.
One day at length he brought his skees,* to slide,
And asked if I would stand behind.

HULDA.

Thou didst yield?

THORDIS.

Of course. And so we slid.

HULDA.

Adown the hillside?

THORDIS.

So steep it was, and like the wind we flew!
I screamed,—and hugged him fast, and begged
For heaven's sake, that he should stay his speed.
But nay, he could not; and adown it went,

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* *Skees* are a peculiar kind of snow-shoes, worn in Norway. They are from six to eight feet long, about the width of the foot, and the front end pointed and bent upward. On the under side they are smoothly polished, so as to glide easily over the snow. On the middle of each *skee* there is a band for the foot.

Adown the hillsides all, 'mid trees and mounds,
The snow it whirled and filled our mouths and ears,
And took our breath away, — it went and went
Right down upon the sea.

HULDA.

Upon the sea?
Ye rushed into the sea?

THORDIS.

Nay, then we fell;
And thereby both were saved.

HULDA.

Well, — and then?

THORDIS.

Then up he sprang and asked me quick, if I
Durst trust myself once more to such a brave
And gallant steersman; whereto I made answer,
Yea, if he only runs not in the sea.

HULDA.

And then?

THORDIS.

Well, then there 's nothing more.

HULDA.

No more?
Ye sware not?

THORDIS.

No.

HULDA.

Have never talked about it?

THORDIS.

No.

HULDA.

Come, Thordis, come; I would but kiss thee, Thordis.

Scenes like this are, to our thinking, well worthy of a great poet. The more evanescent charm of the verses — that which depends as much upon the sound of the line as on its meaning — may be but imperfectly rendered in the translation; but enough remains for the reader to discern the finely conceived contrast between the gloomy depth of Hulda's passion and the sunny cheerfulness of a love like that of innocent Thordis. At length Eyolf comes, Gunnar's admonition proves unavailing, he enters, the doors are locked, and he is once more in Hulda's power. The avengers, knowing full well the strength of Eyolf's arm, dare not meet him face to face, but prefer to burn him in their

own mansion rather than to shirk their duty. Eyolf has evidently come to give Hulda an explanation, and to bid her a last farewell. His sense of manliness rebels against the terrible power she has gained over him, while at the same time it forbids him to flee from her like a cowardly deceiver. But no sooner is he within the reach of her eye than his purpose dies within him, his old love returns with redoubled strength, and he can but curse his own weakness, while his tongue is powerless to speak the last decisive word.

Thou hast allured me, Hulda, — thrust me away!
Ah! I could curse thee, I could weep for thee.
Two paces from thee — is like twenty miles.
Here, here at thy right side
I flutter, hoodwinked by thy morbid love.
. . . . .
Erewhile on board my ship, which rode at anchor,
I stood, and saw her heave on the deep wave,
And shake in wantonness her bounden sails.
Then thought I, 'T is the young hope of my life
Here in the darksome bay of Hustad vik.
Lo, the night wanes, and rife with wind the air, —
Come, let us dare, and it will bear us over!
Let men but wait and let them weep up yonder,
Let in his chasuble the bishop swoon,
Let them but call me villain, befoul my name
With broken pledges, — every act of mine, —
But out I 'll start!
True will I be, and free unfold my sail!
. . . . .
Come thou black, pale, strong-bosomed Hulda,
Come, my Valkyrie, — come, board my bark;
Straight it shall lift its wing, and dart away
Where ravens soar aloft o'er hungry war-cries.
Then I shall happy be, — to naught I 'll list!
I will obey at last what speaks within me.
(*Strikes his breast.*)
This is the Saga of my heritage,
Its runes I now must read, or I shall perish.

HULDA.

O worthy thou of love, — of death still worthy.
. . . . .
If thou a hundred years hadst yet to live,
Thou couldst not comprehend the love I bore thee

For all I 've thought this day, — for all I 've suffered
A life were small reward, — and therefore, Eyolf . . . .

EYOLF (*pauses*).

Ah! in thy silence I do read thy thought.

HULDA (*cries out*).

O, tear thee from me, if thou hast the strength!
For in thy mighty breast I something found
Which upward lifted me, — I knew not whither.
And fast I clutched it, — by the lofty heavens
None so could clutch as I. Canst thou not lift me?
Then there is danger that I drag thee under.

Now the flames from without begin to flap about the light-holes, the fire crackles, the smoke fills the hall, and Eyolf cries out,

"It chokes me, Hulda; whence this smoke and fire?"

And Hulda answers,

"'T is but the flame of my strong love for thee."

Then the doors fly open, and there stands Arne clad in the avenger's blood-red mantle. "Now, Hulda, thou must come!" shouts he. But Hulda rushes into Eyolf's arms, the fire breaks in upon the stage, and amid the falling timbers and the wild shouts of the avengers the curtain drops.

We well remember the day when this drama was first enacted in the national theatre of Christiania, and it would be hard to forget the storm of applause which greeted its most impressive scenes, and especially its final grand catastrophe. When the curtain dropped the storm broke loose in real earnest, the greater part of the audience as with one impulse rose to their feet and with frantic shouts called for the author; and when he finally appeared on the stage, the enthusiasm knew no bounds. The collegians from the upper balconies screamed until they were hoarse, and even the grave citizens in the parquet shared in the general clamor. We therefore do not hesitate in drawing the conclusion, that *Halte Hulda*, whatever may be its faults, must have touched a sympathetic chord in the Norsemen's hearts, and this is indeed in itself no small merit. Among its many beautiful details we will but mention a few which could not but strike home to every man born and bred among the mountains of Norway. Take, for instance, the

little love-adventure of Thordis, and her naïve answer to Gunnar's doubtful declaration. It certainly recalled to many a prosaic old "Philistine" the joyful days when he himself as a happy lover darted down over the glittering surface of the snow with his fair-haired maiden standing behind him on his *skees*, clutching him fast, and with mock fright bidding him stop his headlong speed. Then Hulda's grave musings in the pine-forest, the airy play of the young maidens in the birch-grove, and the bodeful mystery of the old legends, — how could a Norseman see and listen to all this without having his heart stirred, and feeling the warm current rush more rapidly through his veins? It was like a fresh whiff of the forest, a sudden glimmering vista of mountain and glaciers amid the din and bustle of city life.

It has been remarked, and not without justice, that Eyolf, with his wavering and apparent duplicity, can hardly enlist our fullest sympathy as a hero. But it is this very wavering, this vagueness of purpose, which in the drama is made a mainspring of action, which involves him in such hopeless complications, and in the end draws the inevitable doom down upon his head. And the author has never for a moment lost sight of this; Hulda clearly expresses it, when she says, —

> "Again to meditate thou pausest, Eyolf?
> It is this meditation which hath murdered thee."

Hulda's character is indeed grand in its conception, and its development is forcibly marked in the progressive action of the drama. In its general aspect, as a nature of grand possibilities, hitherto cramped and subdued, but suddenly by the vivifying spark of love waked to a consciousness of its own power, it is not altogether a novelty to the world of fiction; but in her peculiar relation to the age and the society in which she is placed, that is, in her peculiar Norse aspect, Hulda is without a predecessor. And the same may be said of almost every character which Björnson's art has brought into being. Gunnar, Eyolf, and Thordis may be met with even to-day in every parish and fjord-valley in Norway; and although their faces seem so perfectly familiar, the fact still remains, that it is to Björnson they owe the prominent places they now hold within the national literature. And here, we think, lies the true greatness

of Björnson as a poet. For wellnigh a century Norway has been clamoring for a national literature, and every new author who appeared since the year 1814 has hastened to exhibit the *national* colors and to emblazon the beloved word upon his phylactery. Henrik Wergeland, as we have seen, spanned the earth and the sky, rose to heaven and descended to hell, all in search of his own precious nationality; and failing to find it, at last contented himself with declaiming upon the greatness of what he did but imperfectly understand, and which for want of a better phrase was called "the ancient, sea-engirdled Norway." Welhaven's voice had a truly national ring when he sang the praises of mountain, valley, and fjord; but Björnson saw in the rugged Norwegian peasant the true type of the national greatness, and pressing his ear close to the nation's heart he heard the throbs of its hidden emotions. And when he raised his voice and sang, every Norseman felt as if the voice were his own, as if the words had welled forth from his own inmost soul. Therefore in Björnstjerne Björnson has Norway found her national poet.

HJALMAR HJORTH BOYESEN.

ART. VI. — THE RATIONALE OF THE OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

IN Burke's "Celebrated Trials of the Aristocracy," it is related that when the young Lord Altham was a slave near Philadelphia, and was running away from his master, he fell in with a man and woman riding upon the same horse. The young lady had been forced to marry somebody against her will, and the pair of lovers, taking with them some money which was not their own, were hurrying away from an angry father and a deserted husband. They invited Altham to partake of their meal by the roadside; and while they were eating their pursuers came upon them and they were taken to Chester. The young woman and her lover were tried for theft and hanged. A hundred and fifty years ago this happened just outside of Philadelphia, quite as a matter of course, which reads oddly

to persons who have heard of Mrs. Fair's lectures. Gilly Williams writes to George Selwyn: "I called yesterday on my Lady (Townshend), and she is going to have an execution of her own. Draper, the butler, has turned out the d—dest thief in the world. She says she finds several hundred pounds unpaid which he ought to have discharged. He has fled for the same, but Mr. Fielding and his myrmidons are after him; and, her ladyship not being very compassionate, he must go to the gallows." From this it would appear that ladies of that day might discuss over the breakfast-table the *pros* and *cons* of the hanging of an old butler who had run away with some money.

There is one thing, at least, which this age has learned to do: it can pity. The change which has come over us, by whatever adjective it may be described, is none the less a fact which it is necessary to accept, and with which it is idle to expostulate. It may be asked, now, what has the sentimental as distinguished from the experimental opposition to capital punishment to say for itself. It is plain that hanging is "impossible." We need not call it a "relic of the dark ages"; it is simply *passé*. As a means of punishment in good working order, it has been rendered impracticable. Society cannot be kept up to it; the public is generally very glad to sneak out or to cheat itself out of an execution, if it can. But every now and then, say once in two years, murders occur very rapidly, the newspapers become vehement and the governors inexorable. At such a time any man under sentence of death will be likely to suffer; but the public attention will soon be diverted, the pendulum will swing back. A permanent reform in the direction of rigor and thoroughness, however much it may be desired, is simply out of the question. We must either stop executions at once, or go on hanging in our slack, inefficient manner, until the executions stop themselves. The opponents of the death penalty, knowing it to be "impossible" and useless, and necessarily slovenly and capricious in its administration, have a right to take its horribleness into account as a reason for its immediate discontinuance. The great mass of people, the country through, I suppose, hold the question in abeyance; most men who have strong opinions upon the subject are op-

posed to executions. And yet we go on hanging people in this absent-minded, mechanical manner, because we seem to find no appropriate place to stop. We condone the few executions that take place with the reflection that these are to be the last of them. But this does not make it a bit better for the men who are hanged. On the contrary, it must be particularly trying to be executed under the present state of things. An intelligent culprit must reflect bitterly that all this altered public sentiment goes for naught. The compunctions of the sheriff and the sympathy of the newspaper reporters rather aggravate the case. No man can do more than die, nor could have done any more in the days before Sir Samuel Romilly. He is to be put to death just like any old-time malefactor who never dreamed of such luxuries as the public petitions for his reprieve, the condolence of the clergy, and the tears of the sheriff. I do not intend in this paper to consider the question of the expediency of hanging. There are half a dozen facts one may count on one's fingers which go far towards proving its retention unnecessary. A great empire like Russia does without it; commonwealths like Michigan and Wisconsin have abolished it, and do not return to it; while its abolition has succeeded in many places, I have yet to hear of a case in which it has been tried and failed; if we try it and fail, twenty-four hours' legislation will put us back where we are. These points I merely name in passing; my object is to show that hanging is a very extraordinary and terrible thing. I do not oppose it, let me here remark, because it is terrible; but I say that because it is terrible we should see to it that there is some terrible necessity for it. I wish to remind the reader how strange a thing it is to be hanged. I wish to point out a few of the accidents of capital executions, and to describe and examine some impressions that control our own thinking about them.

One is struck by the caprice and inequality seen everywhere in the administration of the capital sentence. I have referred to the fact that the public mind is not very lofty and solemn in its thinking upon this subject. I have said that it continues to hang because it has not definitely decided not to hang, and that it administers this awful punishment in an "absent-minded and mechanical" manner. It would seem

the height of levity and sacrilege to lay hands in such a frame of mind upon the mysteries of death and the future state. It would be especially dreadful for men to bring into this thing the shiftlessness, haste, and triviality they exhibit in their ordinary concerns. However they may feel towards the general question, they must at least act with circumspection and firmness. Putting aside graver matters for the present, let us see whether capital punishment is administered with that dignity and equality we should expect.

The mere fact that a man who is hanged in one part of the country should escape in another seems indecorous. In some States, Wisconsin and Michigan, for instance, there is no capital punishment. A man is hanged in New Jersey for killing his mistress's paramour; while a person in Michigan who might murder and horribly mangle a whole congregation, pastor, Sunday-school, and infant class, would get off with imprisonment for life. This is a mere accidental difference in State laws, but there are other social differences which are more radical and necessary. The farther you go west the harder it is to condemn a murderer to death. Capital punishment exists by law both in Leavenworth and in Boston. Yet in many cases where the same crime has been committed, the convicted man would suffer in Boston and escape in Leavenworth.

Then, again, culprits are hanged at certain times who would not be hanged at others. When murder has been very general and people are angry or alarmed, the criminal will have less chance of escape than when the community is unconscious of insecurity. When two men are to suffer at the same time in the same State, the likelihood of commutation of the sentence of either by the governor is slight. Both Twitchell and Eaton, who were convicted of murder a few years since in Philadelphia, would perhaps have escaped death, had their crimes fallen at different times. Both were convicted on circumstantial evidence. Twitchell's murder was an exceptionally brutal one, but he was defended by a very able, influential, and indefatigable man. Eaton's guilt was not so great nor so clear. The governor was one of those imitators of Brutus who think it an impressive and distinguished thing to hang some-

body. He would not have dared to reprieve both, though he might not have hanged Eaton had Eaton been alone. But as he was pressed very energetically in Twitchell's behalf, it was the natural, though unconscious, concession to that gentleman's friends to hang Eaton.

Again, much would depend upon the mere accident of a governor's personal character, whether he was a clear-headed, firm man, or a soft, weak man, or an obstinate, conceited, heartless man. There is no doubt that popularity will be considered by governors in this as in other matters. Pardons are supposed to be unpopular, and governors, with that sensibility to indefinite alarm common to office-holders, are often afraid to interfere. An executive who was a candidate for re-election would be less apt to commute a sentence of death than one who had no intention of taking office again. Just before an election he would be particularly careful not to confront what was or what he would think to be an offended public sentiment. Here the reader may think me inconsistent. I say that pardons may make governors unpopular, and yet I say that most people are opposed to capital punishment. This apparent contradiction is explained by the fact that people feel very differently towards hanged and unhanged criminals. We do not clearly enough perceive that criminals must either be hanged or not hanged, — that there is no middle course. We would like some arrangement by which both things could be done. Accordingly, when a murderer is reprieved, our nerves are not shocked by the spectacle of his execution, while we may satisfy our sense of justice by blaming and ridiculing the governor who reprieves him. It is true, also, that we dislike the mere idea of any mitigation of penalty for a convicted murderer. Were there no hanging, there would be no idea of mitigation when a criminal was sent to the penitentiary for life. It would be satisfactory to know that the culprit had suffered all the punishment we had it in our power to inflict. As the case stands at present, governors are wise in thinking that too many commutations of the death penalty will make them unpopular and ridiculous. The question of personal popularity will enter into the consideration of the act, along with the questions of justice and public policy.

It will not do to say that the governor is a mere executive machine, that his function is not a judicial one, and that his only business is to see the sentence of the law properly carried out. Practically, he is the umpire who has the culprit's life hanging upon the thread of his predispositions and his policies. There are cases in which he could decide at once, but very often it would happen that much could be said on both sides; and when the mind is thus evenly balanced, we know how the slightest impulse or half-perception will turn it one way or another. I know of a case in which a governor, a half-educated man, was at a watering-place when compelled to come to a decision upon the fate of two persons under sentence of death. One was a boy of seventeen. The hotel formed itself into a kind of executive council, and the question was discussed in the walks, on the promenade, and at the dances. Some of the ladies warmly advocated reprieve; while others, strange to say, took strong grounds on the other side. The mother of the boy came to see the governor, — an old woman, who got in everybody's way and sat about red and swollen. His Excellency was in great perplexity. He finally decided upon hanging. From what an eye-witness told me of the proceedings, I think his decision would have had quite as much intrinsic value had he tossed a copper and left the result to the chance of heads and tails.

There is yet a grosser inequality than any of these. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that social position makes a difference. A man cannot easily be hanged who has a very good position in the community. It has been done in one or two cases, but the circumstances were peculiar. The causes of this immunity of the respectable people are twofold: first, a lack of thoroughness and tenacious adherence to principle among our people; secondly, the inability of the immense comfortable middle class of the country to bring distinctly before them the sufferings of the very low. That young ladies who go to tea-parties and have accomplishments should lose a brother or father in such a way seems very dreadful. We do not so easily conceive the miseries of people who live in uncarpeted hovels. Another explanation is to be found in the *inertia* of an impression which once gets into the mind. That a man is

fortunate is a reason with us why he should continue to be so; that he is unsuccessful is also a reason why he should continue to be so.

Republicans as we are, I believe there is no country where respectability claims so many immunities, and has them so instinctively accorded, as in America. If a man of wealth and respectability is put in the penitentiary, it is very difficult to keep him there; not only because of the pressure brought to bear for his pardon, but because of the wide-spread commiseration his family receives from the public. To hang such a person would be next to impossible. If he committed some very exceptional crime, he might be hanged; but for the same offence for which many a Hans and Patrick would suffer he would go free. Yet the root of this is not so much to be found in any particular respect for "good circumstances," as in our peculiar ability to pity. And we pity the lawyers and clergymen, and the well-to-do people of middle life, more than the Wares and the Eatons, because we know more about them, and have a more vivid notion of the sufferings such a death would entail upon them and their friends.

Another inequality is in the method of administering punishment. Some people are much better hanged than others. This may seem to be a fine point, but I am not so sure there is nothing in it. Men have always laid great stress upon the manner of execution. There must be as much difference between good and bad hanging as between most entirely distinct ways of inflicting the death penalty. A man who dies at once is certainly more fortunate than one who is compelled to suffer through some minutes of strangulation. In England, not more than a year ago, a culprit who had not the good luck to be one of Calcraft's patients, had his head torn entirely off. The hanging all over England is done by Calcraft, who goes about the country from place to place, wherever his services are needed. But in America the distances are too great for such an officer to get over; and in remote localities they have to rely upon the best amateur talent the neighborhood can improvise. Hanging in our cities, I suppose, is pretty well done; in the country it is often very badly done. This seems to constitute an advantage for the urban over the rural malefactor.

But the gravest inequality, the essential radical injustice, of hanging has yet to be stated. The punishment draws a circle of infamy and terror about the sufferer which is factitious, conventional, and untrue. As men stand before God, does anybody think judge and jury, counsel, sheriff, and culprit, have their proper places? I now remember a hanging which took place years ago in an American town. A very weak young fellow was accused of a murder and, on circumstantial evidence, convicted. There was but little doubt of his guilt. The district attorney, a man of notorious character, had made up his mind to hang him (as perhaps all district attorneys should), and had carried his point. This lawyer was very generally charged with peculation and bribery, and some other sins to which society is more lenient, for the reason that in their enjoyment the sinner hurts nobody but himself. I do not know that these charges were true, nor is it important that they should be; for we all know that persons occupying good positions may very well be guilty of such things. The prosecutor who was loudly applauded by the press for his vigilant attention to the public weal, not content with securing the murderer's conviction, seemed disposed to act as undertaker, and actually went with him upon the scaffold to see him hanged. To witness the last miserable hours which his own ability and energy had brought upon this wretch, the custodian of the public morals may, for all I know, have come straight from some brothel where he had spent the night. The body of the young murderer was handed to his sisters, while the district attorney went back to dine in the bosom of his family.

It is well that the reader should remind himself of how strange a thing it is to put a man to death. If one's gardener were going to be hanged, he would discover that he had all his lifetime been very ignorant of hanging. The sufferings of the gardener and of his wife and children would put the thing in quite a new light to him. He has, of course, known that men are hanged, and has read from time to time accounts of the executions in the newspapers; but he has never with his mental or bodily eyes really seen an execution. He does not, then, know what it is to be hanged. Immemorial custom and tradition have deprived him of the sense of how strange a

thing it is to put a perfectly well man to death. Darius once asked some Athenians, who were living at his court, what they thought of the practice of sons eating their dead fathers. The Athenians said they could conceive of nothing worse than to eat their dead fathers. He then asked some Scythians, who were there also, what they thought upon this point. They said they could conceive nothing worse than not to eat their dead fathers. We can get used to anything. That which coincides with the experience we accept without looking into, no matter how terrible: things comparatively trivial which cross rather than coincide with the experience shock us much more. Men are often shot, and nobody is very much surprised at the shooting of Ferré. He was not killed at the first fire, and the *coup de grace* had to be given him with a pistol. This again does not much surprise us, as the proceeding is not at all a rare one. But no sooner had he fallen, whirling round and tumbling upon his face, than two dogs, who had been running about the ground, sprang upon his body, and had to be torn off and driven away. This does shock us, and yet reason must tell us that it is a far more terrible thing that a perfectly well man should be deliberately put to death, than that dogs should spring upon and tear his dead body. For this very reason, then, of the terribleness of what is strange and unusual, it would be impossible to change the present method of punishment to something less severe. We might put men to death by a cloth of chloroform over the face. The reader, I am sure, recoils at the suggestion. What is the reason? Surely the punishment would be infinitely milder than suffocation or neck-breaking. One man may say that for that very reason he should reject it. Another may say that it would not suit the Saxon temper, that it savors more of the feline and insidious Latins. But in point of fact we recoil from its horribleness. It is more horrible to us than hanging, because its strangeness arrests our attention and forces upon our imagination the nature and the impressive incidents of the act.

But it may be said that the argument from imagination works both ways. If we do not know what it is to be hanged, neither do we know what it is to be murdered. If we are about to punish a garroter we must bring to our minds the suf-

ferings and sensations of his victim. On a dark night when the fellow's hand is at your throat and you get a near view of his hateful countenance, you may be sure you will think the gallows too good for him. The spot looks very different the next morning when you come to visit it in broad, secure daylight, and the incurious passer-by will regard the event as quite trivial. I see in the paper that a man has been murdered. The fact makes no impression upon me, represents nothing to my mind, but it would mean a great deal more to the man's brother. He would be a better judge of what murder is than I, because he would better understand its consequences. He knows the history of the life that has been destroyed. He knows what opportunities, what felicities, have been extinguished. He appreciates better the sufferings entailed upon the dead man's family and friends. He is therefore a better judge of the crime of murder than I. But, it will be answered, society already knows the terrible results of the murder, for it hangs the murderer; let us now understand the horribleness of hanging, and see if it be not in excess of what justice may demand. If we can discover no other punishment which is, in our apprehension, severe enough, it will make no difference in the result. Our principle is that we are not to punish guilt, but to prevent crime.

It may be said, too, that if we do not understand hanging, neither do we understand imprisonment or any other kind of punishment. No doubt, if we undertook to try any of these, we should find them very different from what they seemed from the outside. But it must be a very perverse man who refuses to see that the death penalty differs from any other sort of punishment. The incarcerated sufferer can tell his own story; we can look through the bars and see him. But who knows the last agony of the death struggle? Who knows its *real* duration in the opinion of him who is the last judge? Who can conceive decapitation? Who can understand strangulation? Who knows through what a universe of misery flashes or struggles the soul of the sufferer? When we put a man to death we simply take advantage of that power which we hold in common with the beasts of the forests, with the insensible stone, with the earthquake and the hurricane and the forces of

nature itself, — the power to inflict suffering utterly beyond our ken and understanding. I have sometimes thought of a court-martial of gorillas, that in the depths of Central Africa might sit in judgment upon Dr. Livingstone, and it seems to me that such a tribunal would in some respects resemble a modern court of justice. The judge and jury, indeed, are not gorillas, neither is the culprit Dr. Livingstone. But one most essential feature the two things would have in common, — ignorance of what they are about to do. Do the gorillas know the effect of their deed in that far-away English home, the sympathy of Christendom, and the innumerable obituaries in all the newspapers? But is our ignorance and foolhardiness any the less when we presume to lay our hands upon the awful mysteries of death and immortality?

Some very superior people would no doubt think this a contemptible way of approaching the subject. "The London Spectator," a few days before Margaret Waters's execution, in a very offhand manner advised Mr. Bruce to pay no attention whatever to the petitions for her reprieve. The "Spectator" admired itself, and thought it fine that such decision of character and practical adherence to theory should exist in a journal otherwise so humane, liberal, and enlightened. On the evening of the day of the execution, a letter appeared in "The Echo" from a man who had witnessed the woman's death, and who signed himself, "One who up to this morning believed in capital punishment." This man excited the profound contempt of the "Spectator." "His opinions must have been very poorly grounded, if the realization of Margaret's sufferings caused him to change them," was the drift of its criticism. But the man was right enough, or he could have been, had he retorted that he did not believe there was anything in the present condition of society to render necessary the horrible act he had witnessed. He saw Margaret Waters, leaning upon Calcraft's arm, enter the gate of the court-yard; saw her standing upon the trap-door, her lips moving while the chaplain prayed; and then, when the moment came, saw the whole machine "fly all to pieces" and the woman suspended in the air. He thinks we had better dispense with this kind of thing, and the "Spectator" ridicules him for his weakness. Yet half a dozen reflec-

tions like the following would have made his method of thought sound, even according to the standard of the "Spectator." If murders are many, it proves that hanging does not prevent them; if murders are few, there is no need of resorting to such extreme means in dealing with them. We have no experience which shows that murders increase when hanging is abolished. We have the histories of states and empires that have done away with it, and do not return to it. Its enemies are practical; its friends, *a priori* and theoretical. The thing itself is very horrible, and the time has come to try if we cannot do without it. Moreover, we can devise some very unpleasant things for malefactors, if we but tax our ingenuity a little. Society makes it hard enough for some of us, by merely minding its own business and letting us alone. What could it not do, if it set itself to work to make things disagreeable. At the worst, if our experiment fails, we can go back to hanging or burning or anything else. Trust the Anglo-Saxon to take care of himself; he has done it heretofore, and he will continue to do it!

I have made use in this paper of what may appear to be a kind of bravado. In writing upon this subject one is impelled to tell the bare truth with a certain recklessness, — to describe the scenes and incidents of the gallows as nakedly as possible and with very few expressions of sympathy or horror. I have not repressed this impulse, because I have thought it might be the best way to quicken the imagination of the reader to the realities of hanging. I would state, however, that any man who is hanged, just at present, calls for our sincere commiseration and sympathy. Had he been born twenty years later into the world, or had his crime fallen twenty years later in life, he would not have been hanged. His especial misery consists in the fact that he came so near not being hanged. I look upon him as the unhappy victim of one of the levities of Fate, than which she has no moods more terrible.

The immediate abolition of capital punishment by the legislature of any Eastern State is hardly to be expected. I have said that some imagination is needed to possess a clear idea of what it is to be hanged; legislators have no more of that quality than most other people. The few sensitive enough to know the realities of hanging have not the self-confidence to

act upon their impressions and to proclaim their opinions in apathetic or indistinct moments. Such persons, besides, are not simultaneous in their impressions. Where one sensitive legislator reads the morning's account of yesterday's execution, and feels what an unpleasant thing it is to be hanged, he is quieted by the apathy of persons who are not sensitive, or, if sensitive, are not just then in their sensitive moods. It must be said, too, that legislators should, as a rule, follow in the wake of popular thought, and the public has not yet distinctly expressed its will that hanging is to be abolished. There are certainly some other things to be done more imperative than the abolition of the death penalty. But still, I believe, if some venturous legislator should carry through a bill to do away with it, the public would generally acquiesce, and the act would be even more popular than it would seem to be. If such a measure is passed now, instead of next year, a neck or two will be saved thereby; if now, instead of ten years hence, quite a dozen of them; which dozen necks will, I believe, if sacrificed, contribute in no respect to the welfare and stability of the Commonwealth.

E. S. Nadal.

Art. VII. — Mixed Populations of North Carolina.

It has been the fashion in this country to deplore the want of individuality in the characteristics of different parts of our land; it has been said so often, that belief has readily followed, that we are wearers of a social uniform, and our land the region of interminable monotonies. The good people over the water, who live on the ragged edge of the great Asiatic continent, have been accustomed to reiterate these opinions with a persistence which has led to their adoption in this country. There is no doubt a massiveness in the grouping of the feature lines of America, which, to the eye which has had its habit formed on the sharp contrasts of Europe, may give the impression of uniformity. Those who have not the judgment to perceive that each of these majestic individualities we call continents must be judged by separate canons of criticism, who cannot see that

they are no more to be measured together than are two different arts or the civilizations of two different times, may go on regretting that our America, with its noble symmetries, wants the picturesque surprises which characterize Europe, that land of physical accidents. But those who would fit themselves to appreciate and enjoy their own land should learn at once to look at it in the spirit which it itself arouses. The traveller who would journey through the southern part of the United States should be possessed of this independence of judgment, if he means to get all the satisfaction that can be obtained. From the Potomac to the Rio Grande his course may be laid through a region of vast plains, rarely diversified by considerable hills; but, to replace those agents of diversification, he will find noble rivers and forests more picturesque than those of any other level country without the bounds of the tropics.

Leaving Washington by the Alexandria and Manassas road, we come at once upon the most historical of our American ground. The Long Bridge across the Potomac carries us over the road down which for five long years was poured the tide of life destined to be offered up as a sacrifice to our ideal of national unity. For a little while we find our road within the line of Washington defences, and the marks of war are limited to the lines of decaying earthworks or the shabby relics of old barracks and hospitals, shorn of the neatness and whitewash which once redeemed them, and given over to the squalor of negro cabin life. However much the character of Southern life may change in its new conditions, it will be half a century or more before the outward garb of the old life disappears. The traveller who has the least perception in such matters cannot fail to see that in passing from the North to the South he leaves behind him the civilization of one type, and enters upon another having quite a different basis. The house, the chief element in the machinery of civilization, changes its character as soon as one passes the line dividing the two regions. One sees at once that the home is arranged for two different races, a superior and an inferior. A part of it is designed to provide the merest necessities of shelter for the lower, and the rest is distinctively the habitation of the superior race. However much the latter part may rise in character with the taste or

means of the owner, the cabin part remains the same. The uniformity of one part, and that often the larger portion of the home, gives to the dwellings in the South a much greater uniformity of aspect than in the northern part of the United States. Whether scattered as isolated farm-houses along the road, or grouped in the sad, decaying looking town of Alexandria, these homes show always the mark of the society of a double race, and are even more widely different from those of the North than are those of two far separated European peoples. Beyond Alexandria, we enter upon the field of the most complete desolation which the war effected. Generally, the destruction done by modern wars is quickly repaired. The visible property of a country is generally a small part of its wealth, and its destruction, while it may impoverish, does not absolutely crush its people. The fields are the richer for a year of fallow, and the husbandman comes eagerly to his work again. But here the destruction was utter. The fenceless fields have been claimed by the forests again, so long were they left to waste. Those of the people who survived the accidents of five years of war wandered away too far to return at its end. Scarcely the tenth part of the ravaged fields which lie between Alexandria and Gordonsville have come under the plough again. The natives say that the climate has changed since the war; that it is drier, and therefore the soil less fruitful. For some reason or other, the tide of Northern emigration which set this way so strongly for the first years of peace seems to have slackened. It is hard to believe that this soil will not repay culture; it has most of the characteristics of the light sandy fields of New Jersey, which were profitless while treated with contemptuous half-culture, but have proved fertile under a better system.

Soon after leaving Manassas Junction, the long, violet hills of the Blue Ridge begin to rise on the right. Though none of the mountains are more than fifteen hundred feet above the plain, their effect is very beautiful. Though we may be well enough satisfied with the scene, made up of the broad undulating plain, merging by gentle degrees into the sweeping hills beyond, we may enhance the pleasure by the reflection that here our race has done the most to prove its willingness to

die for abstract principles, — that highest proof of the true manliness of a people. It needs some such reflections to reconcile one to the desolate appearance of this region. It is indeed an American campagna. The ruins one sees at frequent intervals seem as fitting to the whole scene as do the grander works which break the monotony in the desolation about Rome. The air here is far richer in color than in the region farther to the north ; so that the skies have more of an Italian hue than those which deck most American landscapes. It wants nothing but the level life, if such it may be called, to give this plain, those mountains, and the sky the stamp of Italy.

The negroes seem to increase as one goes away from the cities. There is always a superabundance of them in the social congestions called cities ; they having a magical attraction for all those who would get the most life for the least labor. It is only when one is far enough away from the towns to be somewhat beyond the reach of their influence, that we find the laboring population of the country where it belongs. Around Gordonsville, a point where two railroads cross, there is a gathering of this people, who seem to live off of the little they can get from the charge of travel at that point ; some twenty women, picturesquely shabby, peddle luncheon of roast chicken and pancake. This traffic, which, if it is profitable in proportion to the din made by its followers must be good indeed, seems to be limited to this railway crossing. A friend of mine, who was with the Rebel army of Virginia through the war, says that after the country had been foraged over for years, the negro and chicken were still always to be found at Gordonsville.

The traveller looks in vain for any evidence of a growing ill-feeling between the white and black races. It was Christmas-time, and the negroes were gathered in large crowds about every little hamlet ; always boisterous, sometimes drunken. These assemblages would have provoked trouble, if there had been any latent irritation existing. But in a journey of some weeks I heard not one harsh word used towards the many noisy fellows who were demanding Christmas gifts, or otherwise making themselves nuisances. Nor, on the other hand,

did I see any disposition on the part of the negro to make himself disagreeable, by thrusting himself into positions where his presence would be unwelcome. The conductors on the railroad told me that they rarely took any other than their own cars on the trains, though there was no compulsion about the arrangement. The roads have been wise enough to arrange the matter by allowing a considerable reduction of fare to those who ride in the cars set apart for them.

My road led me to visit the extensive coal mines in the vicinity of Richmond, Virginia, where I had the satisfaction of learning how the negroes worked in large gangs, in an employment demanding a certain fortitude and constancy of labor. I found the only working mine, of the many which were in operation at Coalfield before the war, under the charge of an intelligent German gentleman, from the mining school of Freiberg, who had lived for about twenty years in the South, and had seen the character of the work done by the negroes during the existence of slavery. Since the war he had spent some time in the North, under circumstances which gave him an opportunity of learning something of the quality of the labor used there. His opinion seemed to be that the negro worked very nearly as well now as he had ever done, and that their work would compare favorably with that done by the average miner in other parts of this country, though he did not seem to think that they were as good as European workmen in the same position. The most difficult matter seemed to be to get them to abandon the long Christmas holiday. A few years of liberty has reconciled them so far to the loss of their saturnalia, that they had agreed to put up with a single day of "Christmasing," on condition that their wages should not be reduced, in place of the fortnight of unpaid and unprofitable riot they have generally indulged in. Any deficiency in skill and force on the part of these negroes is probably more than compensated by the absence of strikes and their accompanying disturbances. The relation between the negroes and the whites in this part of Virginia seems quite satisfactory to both races. While I was with Mr. H—— there came in two members of the school committee of the precinct, seeking to make some arrangement to have coal furnished for their schools. It came

out in their conversation that the school committee was composed of two white men and one black man, and that the school had been divided into white and black, sharing equally the educational fund. One of the members of the board was as fine a specimen of sturdy manhood as I ever had the pleasure of looking upon. About sixty years old, he had preserved in a surprising way the lines of youth. His body showed something of the marks of hard labor, and his head and beard were gray, but his step was light, and he carried his erect and giant form with all the ease of a gymnast. It was a body to make one feel confident of the future of our race in this region. His mind seemed about as young as his body; and though there was an evident want of schooling, there was no lack of native wit. Though singularly free from the usual Americanisms, his language was strongly, one might say richly, tinctured with the local color of the region. As soon as one comes in contact with the mountains in this part of the country, the man begins to improve. These big men seem to spring naturally from the soil of the Alleghany and its associated mountains. The conditions found there are, on the whole, the most favorable for the development of a powerful race. A climate of few extremes, though variable enough to produce active habits, and inviting to a life in the open air; a soil fruitful of good food, bearing beneath it a rich store of those elements of mineral wealth best suited to give the basis of a real prosperity. It wants only a good government and good social conditions to become the garden of the continent.

From these coal regions, on the outskirts of the mountains, my route took me over the long, sloping plains which lead from the low table lands of the upper part of the James River down to the swamps of the seaboard region of North Carolina. There is a great change for the worse as one passes from this upland region towards the shore. The land sinks down first to monotonous plains, then to the swamp regions, and the people go down with equal pace with the soil. There is much, however, to interest the traveller, who has an eye for local color, in the swamp region of Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. The shores of these great sounds have had a singu-

lar physical history. It has been only a little while, geologically, since this part of the continent came out of the waters; so recently, indeed, that the land still preserves the contour given it while it lay beneath the sea. It is to be presumed, however, that the ocean is not satisfied with its work, for the land is again sinking with a rapidity which leads us to expect that on the geological morrow, say five thousand years hence, these swamps and savannas will be again beneath the waters. The great sand reefs which form the promontory of Cape Hatteras shut out the tide from the vast lagoon-like bays they enclose. The waters of the streams freshen these enclosed seas and spread far and wide along their bankless borders, giving a monotony of cypress swamps, from which project long, low islands which bear forests of the Southern pine. This tree is the sole basis of the little commercial life which has ever existed here. It has been to the inhabitants of this region what the cocoanut-palm is to the people of the Pacific islands. While standing in the forest, it is the source of the turpentine and resin, the staple products of this region; when it has survived its usefulness as source of these products, its noble trunk is used to make the most enduring of pine lumber, or is converted into tar and pitch. The tree is far handsomer than our Northern species; it stands up among the smaller common pines which surround it a real monarch of the forest. Even in its decay it is handsome; its branches have a more varied and hardy architecture than is usual in our cone-bearing trees; an isolated group lined against the sky recalls the stately stone-pines of Italy. It has the rare merit among trees of being more beautiful in its decay than in its vigor, and this capacity for making a grand ruin is of great value in this region, so monotonous and wanting in the picturesque. The old turpentine orchards, as they are called, gradually die under the sapping process of their exploitation, and their grand ruins gather an always heavier and heavier mantle of the lugubrious trailing moss, as if in mourning for their decay.

The roadside shows little to mark the approach to Newbern, the seaboard capital of North Carolina. There is none of the evidence of an overflow of wealth, shown in better kept plantations, better roads, and other signs of civilization; we

come almost at once from the forest, where the clearings are comparatively bare, to the outskirts of the town. There is not much to please the eye in the place, except here and there traces of taste in the older buildings, which have a certain un-American air about them. The number of the buildings which look over a century old shows that this was one of the points of colonization on our shore, and the difference between them and the old buildings in our Northern seaboard towns indicates that the colonists were of another race than our own. It seems that the town was founded, as one might suspect from the name, by a colony of Swiss. During the religious persecutions of the close of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, England gave harborage to many thousand Swiss and Germans. These homeless men afforded excellent material for the government and the great land companies to use in stocking the plantations in the New World. It is well worth our while to turn to the records of that time to get an idea of the conditions under which this colonization was brought about. There is very little evidence as to the character of the people who constituted the German colonists. They seem to have been under the guidance of Christopher, Baron de Graffenried, and Louis Mechell, and to have blindly obeyed the lead of these men. Their leaders were paid to transport them to America at the rate of five pounds ten shillings for each of the six hundred and fifty persons in the hundred families constituting the colony. The leaders were to give to each family two hundred and fifty acres of land, to be held by the colonists for five years without payment, and afterwards at a rental of two pence per acre. They were also bound to provide the people with food for three years, furnish them with "two cows, two calves, two sows with their several last litters or number of pigs, with male of each of the said kind of cattle," all of which was to have been repaid to the venturers. Soon after the settlement of these people, their chief man, De Graffenried, returned to Europe, leaving them without any title to their property. The colony continued to exist, if it did not flourish, for many years, and to this day some of the families of Eastern North Carolina show by their names that the stock has not quite died out. But it is evident that they could not have found favora-

ble conditions here; they have not increased with anything like the rapidity of the colonists on other points on the coast, nor have they shown any such capacity for founding a state as others of their race and faith have done. There was also a large amount of Swiss immigration on this shore. Under the same speculative De Graffenried a colony from the neighborhood of Berne founded the town of Newbern, occupying exclusively the neighboring country. Their numbers are doubtful, but there is reason to believe that the colony had about fifteen hundred people. Besides these large settlements, this country also received many hundred Huguenot colonists. It is difficult to determine the relative numbers of the different nationalities who first peopled this region, but there can be little doubt that this part of the State had a very great preponderance of Germans and French, and was essentially a colony of these races. Though these people were doubtless of the lower classes, there seems to be warrant enough in their willingness to expatriate themselves for the cause of religion to justify our believing that they were sturdy citizens, fit seed for a State. Those who came from the Palatinate had been harried by the French for many years, and the recipients of alms in England for a long time; some demoralization may have come from the shiftless life during these years, but they were from the same source as the German colonists of Pennsylvania, and had had the same history.

It is not to be doubted that the original material of the colonization here was of a character fairly to test the suitability of the conditions for the development of a State. Under favorable circumstances we should have had a numerous population and a rapid accumulation of wealth; the facts are that the increase of number has been surprisingly slow, the whites in some of the counties having hardly doubled in a century. The German, Swiss, and French colonists seem to have been to a great extent supplanted by the people of English stock, whom they at first outnumbered. There are still marks of the descent left in some of the names common in Eastern North Carolina. Many of these still show, despite the anglicizing process they have undergone, a descent from well-known French and German names. The languages have been

completely driven away. Sometimes one hears among the many local idioms of this region something which must have come from a patois like "Pennsylvania Dutch," but even these traces are not clearly marked. I could see nothing German in the faces, as one can still in Pennsylvania; the lean, fever-smitten face of the people had nothing Teutonic in it. Once or twice a face and figure characteristically French came under my observation, reminding one of the aspect of the habitans of Canada; sometimes a volubility of utterance which contrasted with the prevailing taciturnity of the people seemed to indicate the presence of Gallic blood.

There were certainly some influences at work here calculated to lower the *morale* of the early colonists. Large numbers of criminals were exported to the Carolinas during the first century after their foundation. The shallow waters of the network of inlets of this shore became thronged with pirates and maurauders. To add to this, the land was long held as the property of a company who gave bad law and worse governors to the colonists they had planted, like vegetables, in the rich swamps of Pamlico Sound. The utter want of any sustaining idealism, such as held up the Quaker or the Puritan settlements, in these North Carolina plantations, may account for much; but it is impossible to look at the physical condition of this people without the conviction that it has not been the sole sustaining influence. Were it not for some other difficulties the inexhaustible fertility of these swamp-farms must have given an immense population, if it did not create an ideal State.

While much can be attributed to the miasmatic curses of this country, which though great do not seem wholly insufferable, more can be laid to the charge of bad food and careless habits of living. It may be that these two are chargeable to the assemblage of influences which we term climate. Entering at random the home of any of the farming class of this country, we find ourselves at once in contact with conditions calculated to insure degeneration; and in a region where the commonest prudence would dictate the selection of the highest points of land, where there might be a chance of escaping miasmatic poisions, the house is almost always on the low ground, with a good lot of swamp by the door; the bedrooms are but

little elevated above the ground. The food is poor; sweet potatoes and bacon are the staples; the latter is consumed in large quantities, — it seems indeed to be preferred to more savory food. Wheaten flour is rarely used among the lower classes; the food is calculated to produce a habit of body conducive to the febrile diseases which ravage this country, but which might disappear under a more satisfactory system of life. The most unsatisfactory feature in the physical condition of the people is that acclimation does not seem to have been accomplished during the five generations of life here. The people still die in large numbers from the congestive intermittents which rage every year. That much of the bad effect of this region on the bodies of the people depends upon remediable causes is, I think, shown by the immunity from disease exhibited by many of the persons who have come to this country from the North since the war. They seem in many cases to have escaped the diseases from which most of the people suffer.

The observer who finds so little result from the two centuries of existence of man in this region, who sees so much to fear for the results of coming years upon the race if subjected to the same conditions, may well feel thankful that the fate of America did not depend upon colonies planted on this part of our shore. Among the things that might have been, let us suppose the Mayflower had been driven to the shores of Carolina, and found a place for its colonists on the ground which received the "poor Palatines" which were so passively planted by De Graffenried, nearly a century later. Would the Puritan have fared better here and reared a braver State than the Palatines and Huguenots have done? Or would these insidious influences of climate have reduced them to the intellectual and physical poverty to which they seem to have brought this people? It may be a reasonable cause for congratulation that the good ship which bore the seed of New England did not find other winds which might have swept her to those shores, lest they should have fallen on worse ground than the stony fields where they have grown so well.

No one has attempted to trace with care the history of these settlements in Eastern North Carolina, yet it is one of the richest fields which our country affords for such a work. The

original material was varied and picturesque. Germans from the valley of the Neckar, Swiss from the Alps of Berne, and Huguenots from France, gave a more varied character to the people than could have been found in any of the other colonies of America. Whoever will trace for us the history of these peoples during the century following their immigration, and who will show the reason why this good seed and good soil has given no harvest, will do much to reveal to us the future of our race over a large part of the American continent. It is to be feared that the materials for such a history have been lost. Nothing indicates more clearly the want of culture over the greater part of our country than the lack of interest in the history of the generations which did the work of pioneering. In a part of the West, New England influences have aroused a certain interest in the immediate past, but over the whole South and Southwest little effort has been made to record the history of the settlement of the country.

It is interesting to observe the perfect blending of the English, German, German Swiss, and French colonists in this region. Though no considerable advance has been made since this people came together, they have, nevertheless, mingled in the most perfect way. No such absolute obliteration of race lines has taken place in other parts of our country where people with diverse languages and customs came together. This would seem to indicate the action of some powerful conditions of environment tending to replace the original characteristics by suddenly reduced conditions. But if we turn from our own kindred people, the descendants of the German, Swiss, and French immigrants, to the Africans, who came here about the same time or a little earlier, and seek to find in them evidence of the action of these modifying influences, we seek in vain. The negro of this region is the same vigorous creature he is throughout the South. One looks in vain for any marks to separate him from his kindred in other regions. The white men about him are apparently smaller than the average men under the same isothermal; their sallow complexion and lank forms betray the influence of some adverse influences, either in the climate or habits; but the full-blooded negroes are not perceptibly different from those of Virginia or Kentucky, or other parts of the

South. This inflexibility of the African is, to the eye of any one accustomed to observe such facts, a very striking feature. Although general assertions concerning the condition of a people, based upon anything except precise statistics, are apt to be dangerous, we may venture the opinion that the negroes of the South give many evidences of being a far less elastic race than our own. The variation in size among individuals in any community seems rather less than among the whites. Gigantic negroes are rare, as are also dwarfs. If we take the negroes in different regions, the geographical variations of size are seen to be small compared with those of the dominant race. Some difference in moral and intellectual character is to be observed between those regions where the supply of imported slaves was kept up until a late stage in our history and those where the race is as many generations from the foreign source as our own; but in his physical features the negro has varied little from his African ancestors, and varies little when subjected to the diverse influences of climate on this continent. The negro has changed less in his movement from one hemisphere to another, from tropical to local conditions, from the indolence of savage life to the toil of slavery, than has the European in his migration from one side of the Atlantic to the other.

How comes it that the negro is so fixed in his physical character, and the white man so variable? There are several forcible explanations of this, though it is far from certain that any one is the true cause. As a general rule, among animals the higher members of any group seem to be more variable in character than the lower, and offer less resistance to those agents, whatever they may be, which lead towards change or destruction. It would seem, however, that the two races are scarcely far enough apart to refer this difference to this law, if it may be so called, of the animal kingdom. Again, it may be reasoned that just as the most highly developed breeds are those which are the most difficult to retain in their best shape, so those races of men which are the most civilized are those the most dependent upon the conditions of environment for their maintenance. It may also be claimed, with a good show of reason, that the variability of our own race may be an acquired capacity, caused by the frequent changes of conditions to which it has been sub-

jected during several thousand years of continued migrations, as well as the constant change of seasons in the western region where it has been developed, while the fixed traits of the African may be due to the uniform conditions of its home in the continent of least variation, where for many thousand years their lives knew little change. The intense race individuality of the negro is the source of certain advantages and detriments in his new home: on the one hand, it makes him better fitted to withstand the strain which climate puts upon him; on the other, it can hardly be denied that the resistance to change which his body shows is shared by his mind, and that his intellectual advance will necessarily be slow, even under the most favorable conditions.

There can be no doubt that the negro is succeeding better in the North than many of those who knew him best dared to suppose. The condition of the race in Eastern North Carolina is, on the whole, encouraging. They are working more and stealing less than ever before, if the testimony of competent witnesses may be believed. They keep their contracts as well as any ignorant race is likely to do, and are truer to marriage obligations than it was to have been feared they would be. There can be no doubt that they are learning the severe lessons which make the citizen. It is to be regretted that their wages are so inadequately low; fifteen dollars per month for the year, and no rations, is said to be the ordinary wage of an able-bodied man. He may eke out a miserable subsistence on this, but civilization cannot grow on such wages. Unfortunately, even at this rate, with the imperfect agriculture, the farmer can barely live himself and pay his laborers. The absolute want of variety of pursuits is the great curse of this region, as of most of the South. There are no manufactures; even the agriculture represents a single crop; the laborer has steady employment for no more than half the year, and so leads an irregular life. The possibility of any hopeful future here for either race rests upon the question of whether subsistence can have a more varied foundation.

The most cheerful feature of this community is the comparative freedom from crime against the person. My informant, a person who had been the radical sheriff for two years, an edu-

cated New-Englander and a Republican, and so fairly competent as a witness, told me that since the close of the war Crown County, with an average population of about twenty thousand, had had but six homicides. Of these none were clear cases of murder, and none traceable to class feelings or race prejudices. The negroes have not separated themselves from the whites, making negro districts, as at other points. The relations between the races is no difficult question here. There have been no Ku-Klux outrages in this county, though they have occurred in the county to the west. Travelling is as safe here as in Massachusetts, no highway robbery has ever occurred. That a large community like this, wherein live many Northern men, where the irritations leading to disturbances have manifestly been so many, should be so peaceful, shows clearly that there is no wide-spread and deep-rooted trouble in the relations of the two races and the diverse beliefs which it contains. There are some dozens of Northern men in the county, — a part of them adventurers in the better sense of the word, some men of small capital. On the whole, they are probably no better, no worse, than those who go to the new fields of the West. Where they were disposed to conform to the usages of Southern life in such unessential points as talking with everybody, and never expecting payments to be made very promptly, they seem to get along very well.

If the traveller will examine into the condition of the people here and in the coast region of South Carolina, he will find very striking contrasts. The problems which arise with the change in the condition of the negroes in passing from slavery to liberty are apparently far advanced towards a solution in this northern part of our shore. In the Sea Island region they seem utterly beyond such a result. In South Carolina the negroes have gathered on certain of the shore islands, forming aggregations wherein there is scarce a trace of white influence, and where every step is straight back to barbarism; in North Carolina, under very similar conditions, the association of the races is just what must be desired by all who wish to see the negro go forward with the dominant race.

There is but one explanation of this. It is found in the fact that in the Pamlico region the negroes and whites were left to

work out the problems in their own way, with no considerable outside influence; while in South Carolina governmental interference and private experiments by all sorts of reformers came in to complicate the matter. It seems to be a general rule in the South that the position of the negro in all important regards is in reverse proportion to the *help* which has been forced upon him. Where free rations, schools for which he has paid nothing, and volunteer leaders have abounded, his state is far worse than where he has been left to face his new conditions, with no other guide than his homely and healthy instincts. The schools have done good work, and are doing better, but those do the best work where the negro pays, at least in part, directly for the teaching his child receives.

There is one danger, however, before the race: their numbers are not increasing. The opinion is very general among physicians and other observant persons, that the death rate is not balanced by the births. The cotton seed is a ready substitute for ergot, and is used to an alarming extent. It is comparatively rare to see a negress looking as if she were preparing to add anything to the woes of the Malthusians. We have had it said recently that in some of the States, according to the census, the number of the negroes is as great as in 1860, *ergo* the negroes are not decreasing, — a very hasty conclusion. For the first five years of the decade the race was under pretty much its old conditions in the greater part of the South. This should have added largely to the total of 1860. Moreover, the fact that slaves were taxable property caused the returns to be always somewhat under the true number during the old conditions. It is a well-known fact that property returns are always beneath the truth. Before the war the rate of increase of the negroes was far more rapid than among the whites. The superior race did all that could be done to push the reproduction to the highest point, for therein more than half the South found the real profit of slaves.

It is useless to strive against such evils, as that above indicated, by moral influences alone. While the wages of the negroes are so small, any considerable increase in population is hardly to be desired. Until the South, through a more varied industry, develops capital more rapidly than at present, the in-

crease of the negro population in the rapid ratio of the years before the war would make it even more difficult for them to advance than at present. The greatest need the negro now has to meet is not more or better assured rights, but better wages. The ballot and spelling-book are potent instruments under certain circumstances, and in their time may do something for these unfortunate partners of our national fate, but to a man who, at his best, can earn only fifteen dollars per month, they mean nothing at all.

He who would do the best for this people, must seek to establish in the South real industrial schools, manufactories and savings banks. They are the levers which will lift this race, if it is ever to rise.

N. S. Shaler.

Art. VIII. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — *Autobiography of* Amos Kendall. Edited by his son-in-law, William Stickney. Boston: Lee and Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard, and Dillingham. 1872.

In 1834, Miss Harriet Martineau, then in Washington, wrote, "I was fortunate enough once to catch a glimpse of the invincible Amos Kendall, one of the most remarkable men in America. He is supposed to be the moving spring of the administration; the thinker, planner, and doer; but it is all in the dark. Documents are issued, the excellence of which prevents their being attributed to the persons who take the responsibility of them; a correspondence is kept up all over the country, for which no one seems answerable; work is done of goblin extent and with goblin speed, which makes men look about them with superstitious wonder; and the invisible Amos Kendall has the credit of it all. President Jackson's letters to his Cabinet are said to be Kendall's; the report on Sunday mails is attributed to Kendall; the letters sent from Washington to remote country newspapers, whence they are collected and published in the 'Globe,' as demonstrations of public opinion, are pronounced to be written by Kendall. Every mysterious paragraph in opposition newspapers relates to Kendall, and it is some relief that his now having the office of Postmaster-General affords opportunity for open attack upon this twilight personage, who is proved by the faults in the post-office administration not to be able to do quite

everything well. But he is undoubtedly a great genius." This is no exaggerated statement. For ten years his name was on every one's lips; a contemporary of Webster, Clay, and Calhoun, he occupied a share of public attention scarcely less than theirs; and yet to-day, though he has been dead barely three years, even among educated men, to not one in ten of those who are under fifty does his name convey any definite impression. Who he was, to what he owed his temporary prominence, and why he has left so slight a trace upon the memories of his countrymen, are questions to the first and last of which this Autobiography affords an answer.

Born about six months after the first inauguration of Washington, he passed his youth under the administration of Jefferson, and his early manhood amid the excitements preceding and attending the war of 1812; as the editor of a newspaper in Kentucky from the close of that war till he took office under General Jackson, he was of necessity conversant with the political struggles which marked that interesting period of our national development; while during the scenes of Jackson's administration, when in the contest over the removal of the government deposits from the Bank of the United States, Webster, Clay, and Calhoun were all arrayed against the President amid a political commotion such as this generation can hardly understand, he stood as the right-hand man of "Old Hickory," and shared with Benton and Woodbury the attacks of the Whigs. After he resigned the office of Postmaster-General and returned to his profession, his acquaintance with prominent men, acquired during a residence of forty years in Washington, should have made him familiar with the varying phases of the antislavery agitation, and have enabled him to enlarge our knowledge of its secret annals.

The history of such a life, if properly told, could not fail to be valuable, but if the reader turns to this Autobiography in the hope of finding such a history he will be disappointed. The editor has endeavored rather to show Mr. Kendall's character as a man, than to describe his career or his connection with the public affairs of his day. This is the more to be regretted, since the subject of his memoir was a person whose life is interesting solely for what he did and not for what he was. Mr. Stickney, however, as is not unnatural in one closely related to the man of whom he writes, overrates the interest which the public takes in the private character of Mr. Kendall, and, assuming a curiosity which does not exist, seeks to gratify it by the publication of matters so entirely private, that he seems almost guilty of a breach of confidence, and is often guilty of a breach of good taste in disclosing them.

There is in the biography an entire lack of perspective. The most

trifling incidents of Kendall's childhood are treated as if equally important with the most striking events of his public life. This perhaps arises from the effort of the editor to let Mr. Kendall give his career in his own words. Till he was twenty-eight years old he kept a journal; and as he had nothing very important to write about, his daily record dealt with trifles which concerned only himself and perhaps his personal friends. Afterwards, being fairly launched in active life, he had no time for a journal, and the editor, to supply the deficiency, resorts to his newspaper articles and to his private correspondence, which, while it exhibits his relations with his family, contains almost nothing of value to the public. Concerning the really important periods of his life, he seems to have written comparatively little; and hence, in a collection of his writings, which is in fact what Mr. Stickney has given us, they make but a small figure. His boyhood was not different from that of most country boys brought up under the Puritan dispensation; he received the usual education, and had the ordinary recreations. That Mr. Kendall hunted foxes and got very tired, that he found a nest of young mice, or that once, in a severe storm, "the snow blown among his hair under the rim of his hat melted there, and then running down from the hair froze, and formed dangling icicles over the ear," are not incidents which acquire a special interest from the fact that he was the hero of them; yet his journal and his correspondence are filled with such trivialities, and they are far too largely used in making up this biography.

His experiences as a student at Dartmouth College, where he was graduated in 1811, are narrated with great fulness, and the picture presented of college manners and college discipline sixty years ago would make the hair of a college officer nowadays stand on end. Fights with the villagers, arising from efforts on the part of the latter to free their cattle shut up in the college cellars, seem to have been no unusual pastime.

A temperance agitation in his Sophomore year led some young men into disgraceful excesses, which Mr. Kendall's journal describes with great minuteness, giving the names of the perpetrators. We cannot but think that the editor would have done wisely, if he felt it necessary to preserve the recollection of these scenes, at least to suppress the names, for their grandchildren will hardly read with pleasure accounts of their ancestors' follies from the pen of one who certainly did "nothing extenuate."

At this time, Mr. Kendall received an anonymous letter of abuse, which he suspected came from one of his classmates who left the college on account of his participation in some anti-temperance outrage. He

carefully preserved it till he heard, some years after, that the supposed writer was settled as a minister in a country town, when he sent it back with the following note: "I return to you the only memorial of your former folly and meanness in my possession. . . . . That you are reformed and that you may be useful and finally happy is the sincere hope of Amos Kendall." The editor, after telling us that the postage on this note was prepaid, in order, perhaps, to make more pointed the contrast between the sheep and the goat, continues: "It was believed that if Mr. B. had become a better man, this note would elicit an apology from him, but no reply was ever received." Mr. B.'s moderation in not replying hardly seems to justify Mr. Stickney's obvious inference, but the whole incident is thoroughly characteristic of his hero.

After his graduation he studied law; and, in 1814, concluding that his chance of speedy advancement would be better in the West, he went to Lexington, Kentucky, where he became a tutor in the family of Henry Clay. Mr. Clay was absent in Europe at the time as one of the commissioners to negotiate peace with Great Britain, and Mr. Kendall's journal tells us nothing of him. Of details as to his family and the society of Lexington, in which he seems to have moved freely, his journal is singularly barren. A lively interest in himself is conspicuous throughout. Thus we find, under the date of June 17, 1814, "arrived the news of the dethronement and abdication of Bonaparte. . . . . We are now left to contend single-handed against the whole power of Great Britain. . . . . But we must breast the shock and pray God to unite us and bring us off with honor. Young men are already talking here of going into the army, but it will be my last resort."

July 22d, "a requisition is made on this State for fifty-five hundred militia, to be held in readiness to march at a moment's warning. It is said they are destined for New Orleans. If they have enrolled me, as was their duty, I shall be liable to a draft, and I care but little if the lot should fall upon me. If I should manage well and return safe, it would give me a reputation which would be useful." We miss in such utterances the orthodox glow of patriotism.

Occasionally, however, we find some hint as to the state of Kentucky society. The law-abiding spirit of the community is illustrated by the proposal of a militia captain to remunerate a gentleman who had been fined for selling whiskey to his company without a license.

Perhaps Mr. Kendall's patriotic sentiments were simply a reflection of those entertained by his neighbors. The Kentucky militia, at least, were hardly alive to the possibilities of the war; for he tells us that, at one training, where about two thirds of the company appeared, some with useless muskets, some with none, all without bayonets, uniform, or

cartridge-boxes, the captain drew his men up in a hollow square, after calling the roll, and introduced a candidate for the legislature, who made them a stump speech; when he had finished, the company was marched to the whiskey-table, where they were dismissed for a time in order that some five or six other candidates might privately urge their respective claims. These important duties having been performed, a slight drill followed.

Again, he describes a regimental muster, where there was not a cartouch-box or bayonet in the regiment, and where the exercises consisted in marching half a mile, forming *en echelon* three times, and marching back again, — manœuvres which thoroughly exhausted the command, as they had to be learned by officers and men alike.

Yet when this warlike community received the news of the peace of Ghent, which rescued us from the most serious embarrassments, they refused to rejoice, because they feared the terms were dishonorable. An illumination was recommended by the more judicious, whereupon the violent young warriors of Lexington threatened to break every window that was lighted up. It is unnecessary to add that though a third of the houses in town were illuminated, not a window was injured. Mr. Kendall evidently understood the spirit of the people, for he says: "I have, I think, learnt the way to be popular in Kentucky, but do not as yet put it in practice. Drink whiskey and talk loud with the fullest confidence, and you will hardly fail of being called a clever fellow."

Becoming discouraged by his first experience, or rather the want of it, as a lawyer, he soon drifted into journalism, which became thenceforth his profession. His diary gives us a very accurate picture of a Kentucky editor's life, though possibly no exaggerated idea of its dignity. In spite of a friend's warning, he became interested in a newspaper which had already ruined two men, his part being to edit, read the proofs, keep the accounts, collect them when his travels brought him within reach of the debtors, and labor an hour a day in folding papers. He soon shared the fate of his predecessors; but not dismayed by this failure, he forthwith issued the prospectus of a new sheet, which was shortly afterwards established. Whatever he may have been in after life, at this period he was clearly no slave to party zeal. Anxious to lose no subscribers, since the existence of his paper depended upon the support of all parties, he hit upon the brilliant plan of inserting the writings of neither side, but of printing them as hand-bills to be folded in the paper, if desired; for he remarks, "My wish is to steer as clear as possible of censure on either side, for I wish not to give offence for another's benefit." Apparently this plan did not fulfil his fond expectations, for shortly after we find him complaining: "I have the most

difficult task as editor. There has been much grumbling by one and another, but none are decisively angry. I shall endeavor to keep them in this state of half mad and half pleased." The mad half seems to have been preserved most easily, for the journal soon records that his position on the questions in dispute has been mistaken, and some subscribers have threatened to discontinue. Later we learn, that unreasonable spirits, who insist on his taking a decided part in politics, still continue to find fault, while some have even stopped their papers. Whereupon, says Mr. Kendall, "Let them go, and every other man who will quarrel with an editor, if he be honest"; an observation instantly followed by, "I commenced an attack on the 'Western Monitor' some time ago, and Mr. Hunt has twice answered it, and now we have it regularly. But having great respect for each other, we find ourselves very much restricted." This attack he afterwards proposes to continue, "as well for amusement, as for the support of the Republican party"; and soon we find that it ended in personal invective and the termination of the friendship between the combatants which had hampered them so much. As Mr. Kendall grew more used to the editorial chair, these newspaper contests grew more common, and he became engaged in several hand-to-hand encounters, but always came off well. In one, his assailant was overpowered by numbers and roughly handled, having his shoulder broken, and his eyes "badly gouged" by Mr. Kendall's partner, which last result is full of pleasing suggestions as to the rules of war among Kentucky editors of the day.

"While Mr. Kendall was thus wielding his vigorous pen in the support of measures he deemed so essential to the prosperity of his adopted State," says his biographer, he was "evidently seeking one whom he could love, and whose love in return would satisfy the natural longing of his heart." A large space is accordingly devoted to extracts from his journal, relating to his "affairs of the heart." Mr. Stickney would perhaps say that no life of Mr. Kendall could give an adequate idea of his character, which should fail to point out his extreme susceptibility, but whose biography would not be voluminous were his private meditations on all his successive loves given to the world! They are highly entertaining, but there is a common prejudice which leads us to deem the particulars of love-affairs, including ante-nuptial correspondence, strictly private; and as there is nothing in Mr. Kendall's experience which makes it of especial interest even to the student of psychology, there seems no adequate reason for breaking the well-established canon. However, as Mr. Stickney says, his "was not an unreasoning love," and much of his correspondence, therefore, does not fall within the rule which makes love-letters sacred; at least, there can have been no

"unreasoning" passion in the offer of his hand and perhaps his heart, which elicited a response with such a beginning as this: "Mr. Kendall, I have perused the contents of your paper, and hope you will forgive me for having the boldness to write to you."

Mr. Kendall's journal ceases about the time that he was fairly launched as an editor. From 1816 to 1829 he continued to conduct the "Argus of Western America," at Frankfort, and the portion of his Autobiography which describes his career during that period is composed mainly of extracts from that paper. His articles against the decision of the Supreme Court in McCulloch *v.* The State of Maryland are given at length, but the question then decided is too well settled to make the discussion interesting at the present day. Contributions to the science of political economy, taken from the same source, and "Sunday reflections," are interspersed with bits of newspaper controversy which would indicate that the amenities of New York journalism are not without a parallel in the so-called golden age of the Republic. But by what steps he commended himself to the notice of General Jackson, or of what were his relations with the public men of his day, the reader is left in ignorance. We may infer, indeed, that he owed his promotion to zealous advocacy of Jackson, in the "Argus," but it is a great defect in Mr. Stickney's work that he tells us in fact nothing about this important part of Mr. Kendall's life.

His course in office was marked by a sincere disposition to correct the abuses which had grown up in the departments, and he discharged his duties with firmness and an honesty even in small matters which is too rare in the government service, where few are found with courage to disregard bad precedents at the risk of seeming too particular, and of disobliging friends who profit by the usage so sanctioned. *Communis error facit jus* is a fundamental principle in government offices.

His reputation as an administrative officer rests principally upon his success as Postmaster-General. He was called into the department when the mismanagement of his predecessor, Major Barry, had brought it into a very bad condition. He found it much in debt, its affairs in great confusion, its credit at the lowest ebb. In less than a year it was free from debt, and before he resigned the office the whole system was reformed, and the service raised to a high degree of efficiency. This result was not attained without encountering much opposition, and Mr Kendall's inflexible honesty in putting an end to the system by which contractors plundered the government, and in resisting dishonest claims, incurred for him the unrelenting hostility of those who suffered by it. To his credit be it said, that when he was compelled by ill health to resign his office, after eleven years in public employ, he left it poor and

in debt; nor was he relieved from the pressure of poverty till an interest which he acquired in Professor Morse's patents amassed for him, toward the close of his life, a comfortable fortune.

He has left a full account of the way in which the daily business of his offices was done; but of anything beside, — of the general policy of the administration, of contemporary history, or of personal reminiscences, — almost nothing. It is almost inconceivable (or would be to one who had not read General Scott's Autobiography), that a man should live as long as he did in the midst of politics, occupying a prominent office, in the confidence of the President, and in a position to know all that there was to be known in Washington, and yet leave behind no recollections of the eminent men with whom he was in constant contact, nothing which would help us to understand the time; but such seems to be the case. There is, to be sure, a chapter on the removal of the deposits, giving Mr. Kendall's connection with it, and the history of his negotiations with the State banks, but it adds little to our knowledge of the question, being largely made up of extracts from "Niles's Register," from the speeches in Congress and the newspapers. We, who have not grown up to regard the Bank of the United States as a part of the Constitution itself, can hardly understand why the removal of the deposits excited such a universal turmoil; but if the reader is curious enough to look at the printed official journal of the Senate of the United States, he will find volume after volume filled with nothing but names signed to petitions for or against this measure, — names, it was said, copied from gravestones in many cases, and amounting in all to nearly one hundred and seventy-five thousand. It is interesting, now that the whole matter is forgotten, to read the speeches of Clay and Webster and the dismal prophecies of the press in the light of subsequent events. As a specimen of gloomy prognostication, take this from Mr. Clay: "We behold the usual incidents of approaching tyranny. The land is filled with spies and informers; and detraction and denunciation are the order of the day. People, especially official incumbents in this place, no longer dare speak in the fearless tones of manly freemen, but in the cautious whispers of trembling slaves. The premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us; and if Congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy, the fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die, — ignobly die, base, mean, and abject slaves, — the scorn and contempt of mankind, unpitied, unwept, unmourned." Or this from Mr. Webster: "The present is a moment of spasm and agony. The whole social and political system is violently convulsed. This, if no relief come, must be succeeded by a lethargy which will strike dead the commerce, manufactures, and labor of the community. This, sir, I think, is the real

prospect before us." When we read these speeches and the alarming articles in the newspapers which followed them, we are forcibly reminded of the terrible consequences which were to follow the failure of impeachment. Congress did not apply the remedy demanded by Mr. Clay, just as in later times the earth refused in Mr. Boutwell's favor to forget the laws of gravitation, and by a motion which only that *savant* could imagine, project our second despot into the famous "Hole in the Sky." And yet the country seems almost as prosperous under the few fragments of the Constitution which yet survive, as it did when that instrument was fresh from the hands of its authors, before the first act of Congress was passed. The alarmists of to-day would do well to compare their prophecies with those of their predecessors, and they who despair of the Republic will perhaps find some consolation in the fact that despair has been the normal condition of some minds ever since our government was established, while thus far, certainly, there has been nothing to justify it. We may sit down contentedly, therefore, under the military despotism which our countrymen, with such surprising unanimity, have elected to suffer under for the next four years, in the confident expectation that we shall not, in our time at least, see our country less powerful and happy than it is to-day.

It is encouraging, also, to find that while civil-service reform is a comparatively new idea among us, it is not because the service never needed reforming before, but because the people never appreciated the necessity. Thus, in 1815, we find in Mr. Kendall's journal, "This day I closed a bargain with Mr. Miller, the postmaster, on the conditions which I had before offered. In consideration of his procuring me to be made his successor immediately, and the use of the small back building called the shop, back of his house, I engage to give him $180 for four years, or so long as I shall hold the office, and to resign in his favor if he shall want the office again for his own use within six years. These terms, I am convinced, would be regarded as degrading, and we mutually agreed that they should be kept secret. I, however, feel conscious of no moral wrong, and see a prospect of some profit and many conveniences, counterbalanced, perhaps, by the inconveniences attending it."

When these were the sentiments of a reformer, the idea that office is not a property but a trust had obviously small hold among the people. This office, so obtained, he sold for two hundred dollars, and the purchaser sold it for five hundred. These transfers were all effected through the agency of a member of Congress, Colonel R. M. Johnson, afterwards Vice-President, who secured from the President the appointment of the purchasers. In justice to Mr. Kendall, it should be said that he afterwards changed his views in reference to such bargains.

In fact, no abuse of the present day seems entirely original with our rogues. Mr. Kendall found the same system of "straw bids" in full operation when he became Postmaster-General that we are told exists to-day. It struck him as remarkable, that while the law required the letting of contracts to the lowest responsible bidder, the important contracts were always obtained by the same men. His eyes were soon opened by a contractor who called upon him and asked whether he intended to secure the contracts to the old and faithful contractors, as his predecessors had done; and on his saying that he could not see how it was to be done if they were underbid, explained that it was done by private understandings between the contractors and the department. The *modus operandi* being explained, he promptly put an end to the system.

Even the "Chorpenning claim" is but a servile imitation, and finds its precedent in the case of Stockton and Stokes, mail contractors, to whose credit Mr. Kendall's predecessor placed one hundred and twenty thousand dollars shortly before he resigned. As a committee of Congress had just pronounced them overpaid to the extent of one hundred thousand dollars, not including this last allowance, Mr. Kendall suspended it, and, after examination, made the suspension permanent. Pending the investigation, Mrs. Kendall was offered a carriage and pair by Mrs. Stockton, if she would induce her husband to allow the claim, but this argument had no weight with him. The contractors, nothing daunted, induced Congress, without calling for explanation or information from Mr. Kendall, to refer their claims to the Solicitor of the Treasury, who, also without asking for any evidence from the department, allowed, not only all the contractors claimed, but forty thousand dollars more. The original claim Mr. Kendall thereupon paid, but the additional award he refused to pay, until after failing to get a resolution through Congress, the contractors applied to the courts for a *mandamus*, which was issued, and Mr. Kendall thus forced to pay the balance. Not content with this, the contractors brought a suit against him for damages, and a judgment of about twelve thousand dollars was recovered against him. Pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, he was kept confined for a year to the jail limits of the District of Columbia, under this judgment, where he remained very much straitened by poverty. Finally Congress interfered for his relief and amended the law relating to imprisonment; and, public attention being aroused, passed a bill allowing his expenses and counsel fees. The decision of the Supreme Court in his favor finally terminated the persecution, but a lesson had been taught to honest government officers which apparently they have been slow to forget.

It is comforting to find that, in reference to such matters, public opinion has changed for the better since the days of Jackson.

We have forborne to criticise severely the literary merits of Mr. Stickney's book, for in his Preface he deprecates criticism, and speaks of it as a labor of love. It is not, however, in any proper sense, an autobiography; but, as we have said, merely a compilation of Mr. Kendall's writings, composed mainly of his editorial articles and his private correspondence. The editor has not, it seems to us, used his materials with judgment, but has erred both in selection and arrangement. He has given us, perhaps, what we did not want, an accurate idea of Kendall as a man; but he has not given us what we did want, and what we should naturally expect, such a picture of Kendall's time as would be a contribution to history; but for this failure, Mr. Kendall himself is perhaps responsible. The book is very amusing, but if much shorter would have been more valuable.

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2. — *Oriental and Linguistic Studies. The Veda; the Avesta; the Science of Language.* By William Dwight Whitney, Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in Yale College. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1873.

Professor Whitney's occasional pieces and reviews are always written with such care and conscientiousness that they are well worthy of republication and preservation in book form. The volume before us embraces four essays on the Vedic literature, one on the Avesta, six on the origin of language and kindred topics, and one on language in education. All, except two which were read before societies, have been published in various periodicals, most of them in these pages. The first, "The Veda," gives a clear and comprehensive description of the confused mass of literature known by that name, with a notice of some of the historical and antiquarian results of its study. The second is an account of "The Vedic Doctrine of a Future Life." The third, "Müller's History of Vedic Literature," reviews Max Müller's work and discusses the chronology of the Vedas. There are also some thoughts on the nature of the Vedic religion. The sixth, "The Avesta," gives the same kind of an account of the Persian religious monument as the first does of the Indian.

The republication of these essays is very timely. It is becoming more and more evident that the philosophy of religion is a legitimate branch of science. Even those who believe there are only two kinds of religions — good ones, divinely inspired, and bad ones, invented by

man himself in his lost condition — are beginning to see that there is a religious nature discernible in man, the development of which is worthy of being traced on the same principles as that of philosophy or civilization. A trustworthy account of the religious books of two great families is exceedingly valuable for those who have not time to read even translations of the books, to say nothing of the books themselves. And no one will deny the fitness of Professor Whitney to give such an account. Although these essays were written some years ago, and are not entirely the results of his own studies, yet his subsequent researches have apparently made no change necessary, and they are all the more valuable as being the joint work of Professor Roth and Professor Whitney. The fourth and fifth deal with the mere translation of the Veda, and are of less interest to the general reader, yet they are valuable as a guide to any who consult these books in translation. The seventh essay, "Indo-European Philology and Ethnology," really consists of two, which, it will be remembered, were originally reviews of two books of widely different aims. The books were alike in this, however, that they both attempted a feeble resistance to the science of comparative philology, and both proceeded from jealousy on the part of men whose opinions otherwise command respect. Professor Key, of University College, London, among other essays generally marked by sound sense and respectable linguistic attainments, had reprinted a querulous criticism of Sanskrit as a basis of linguistic science. Professor Oppert, of the Imperial Library at Paris, had published an opening lecture upon Sanskrit literature, in which he disparages the usefulness of Indo-European philology as a servant of ethnology, and attacks more or less directly the "ethnic coherency" of the Indo-European family. It is safe to say that, in this article, the fangs of these philologists are effectually drawn. So far as their authority would be a bugbear, or the force of their arguments an actual hinderance to linguistic science, they are rendered perfectly harmless. Professor Whitney's uniform moderation and clear-headedness make him a most excellent person to correct partisan views of this kind.

The same qualities, together with a power of sarcasm which we should hardly suspect in so clear and purely a logical mind as his, fit him peculiarly to follow Professor Müller, and pick up the loose ends which that brilliant investigator and fascinating expounder is apt to leave about his lectures on language. This, Professor Whitney does in the eighth article, which contains two reviews (one a reply to Professor Müller) of Müller's second series of lectures, done with an unsparing hand. In fact, the criticism seems, in some places, possibly too sharp and too likely to provoke animosity, rather than to correct errors.

But Professor Müller is not a man to be snuffed out by an article, nor is he such a pet of ours that we feel aggrieved at his discomfiture. The tenth article in like manner erases Dr. Bleck and the Simious theory of language. The ninth, eleventh, and twelfth, containing about one hundred pages, are the most valuable part of the whole book. There have been two views held by linguists in respect to the nature of linguistic science. Some, on the one hand, struck by the regularity of the laws of language and the advantage gained by pure inductive methods have claimed for language a place among the natural sciences. On the other hand, the psychologists, seeing the intimate connection of language with thought, have been led to identify them, and to treat linguistics as a branch of psychology. These two views, represented respectively by Schleicher and by Steinthal, ὁ σκοτεινός, Professor Whitney discusses in a masterly manner, with a view to set the study of language on a sound basis. Accordingly, in the ninth essay, with a broad and deep comprehension of the whole matter, he clears away the dead-wood and underbrush, and sets forth very clearly the present state of the question of the origin of language. He shows what has been already proved and what is the point of divergence in the differing opinions as to the relation of language and thought, and calls attention to the fundamental points to which study should be directed. One question suggested we cannot think so important as it seems to Professor Whitney, namely, whether the first impulse to expression came from without or from within, from an instinct of speech or from a want of communication which experience had caused to be felt. Why not both? Many emotions find expression in speech in the form of interjections. Thought, properly so called, would never, perhaps, have been expressed in this way apart from society and the need of communication, but this instinct or inward impulse would give material to the first attempts of the framers of speech. This idea seems to point to the settlement of the question, without implying that solitary men would ever have produced a language. The theory that language is a natural organism, having an inherent power of growth not determined by the will of man, and that its investigation should be conducted upon the principles of natural science, is refuted in the eleventh essay. Professor Whitney shows clearly that changes of meaning and changes of sound, together with the production of new words, under which processes are included all the growth of language, are determined by the will of man, and hence cannot be called the growth of an organism. The argument is sufficiently though not copiously illustrated, and is clear, and to us convincing. In like manner, the *a priori* method in the study of language is discussed in the twelfth essay, and the doctrines that the mental condi-

tion and relations of consciousness are the actual forces which produce language, and that we must acquaint ourselves with the mental culture which immediately precedes the production of language and similar conditions, if we wish to trace the origin of speech. This class of views he disposes of with the same clearness and breadth of view, with, perhaps, a little more impatience at this form of error than the other. Throughout these essays are scattered the soundest suggestions in regard to the nature of language and its relation to thought, pointing out the direction which investigation must take to find its origin with a view as far removed from the notion of miraculous origin on the one hand as from gross materialism on the other, and in full accord with the soundest views upon development. The essays cannot fail to be of service to both radical and conservative anthropologists, — and who does not anthropologize, either from a scientific or a religious point of view? The author indicates clearly his own view that the science of language is a branch of historical science, and that its methods must be historical, as with everything of which the human will is a factor. This view is undoubtedly in the main sound, and has been accepted by the best students of the subject. At the same time, there is a point of view not suggested by him which harmonizes the conflicting notions. We think the desire to classify the science with others has led to all the difficulty. To us, linguistics is not natural history, nor history, nor psychology, but the science of language; if we consider it as a whole, or if we consider it in its various phases, it is a part of each of the three. The greater part of the material and methods of the philologist is historical, no doubt. But language is a manifestation or function of man, who is an animal, and who has a right to be discussed upon the same principles as other animals. His habits and actions in general are subjects of natural history as much as those of the bee or the beaver. The constant use, too, of inductive reasoning allies language with natural history. So, also, much of the field of investigation lies outside the domain of known facts. The facts themselves are to be reconstructed. Here the process seems not like history, but like geology; although there is no palpable object of investigation, like a trap dike or a cast of a shell. On the other hand, language is indissoluble from thought. New forms of words and new meanings are the result of mental processes; changes of sound depend upon mental as well as physical habits. Hence the growth of speech is intimately connected with the growth and nature of the human mind, and so there is a psychological side to the science of language. It does not surprise us, therefore, that while Curtius with Whitney considers linguistics an historical science, Schleicher should speak of the growth of language and its laws, until, carried away by his metaphor,

he treats it as an organism and discusses the Darwinism of language, or that Steinthal should soar a little into the region of metaphysics, and say that language is thought and thought is language, and that their origin must be found by introspection, or that Müller should agree now with one and now with the other as either phase presents itself to his fertile fancy and is reflected in his lively rhetoric.

It seems to us that this view makes the erroneous views of Professor Whitney's opponents less dangerous. The closing essay is a valuable one on the use of language in education, and is one of the few that goes safely in the middle. We commend it, therefore, to extreme men of both parties, physicists and classicists.

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3. — *Keel and Saddle: A Retrospect of Forty Years of Military and Naval Service.* By Joseph W. Revere. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

Very few are the people whose experience has been so varied and interesting as that of General Revere, and fewer still are those who could have so well described their adventures as he has done. It is in books of this sort that we can more clearly see the difference between the point of view of the traveller and that of the reader. Of as much importance to the wanderer in the strange land is the question of whether or not he shall get his breakfast as it is what ruins or unknown tribes of men he shall meet that day; hence it is that in his description he is tempted to lay greater stress upon what is a matter of indifference to another person, because to himself it was of the greatest moment. It is, indeed, the common and just criticism made against diaries that they are a mere enumeration of trivialities, as most persons' experience of looking over their own arid records will confirm, because the writer trusted to his memory to bear what its importance made him feel incompetent to set down, — the unnecessary data that he recorded being more especially mere mnemonic aids. Moreover, in more important matters it is by no means easy for one who is recording the events of his life to find the true mean between the limits which are set by the curiosity of the public on the one hand and by a sort of impersonal modesty on the other. It requires great tact to interest the hearer or the reader in one's self without an undignified obtrusion which every one is quick to feel and to resent. So much being said about the difficulty of his task, it is with the greater warmth that we call attention to the great skill with which General Revere has done his work, so that no one has any other regret than that he has not told us more. As it

stands, the volume is a remarkably interesting record of a very wide and eventful experience. The author entered the United States Navy when a boy of fourteen, in the year 1828. Without any disquisition on the condition of the navy at that time, the author plunges *in medias res*, — we have at once given us the account of a cave near the Cuban shore, which had been used by the pirates he had been pursuing as a receptacle for their stolen goods. Just at nightfall his men came across a keg full of Spanish dollars. "We rolled the keg down to the camp, which I desired to reach before the approaching sunset; after which, in the tropics, there is no twilight. . . . . Sentinels having been placed around the camp, we went to sleep after supper, pleased with visions of untold wealth to be secured in the morning at the cave, which we imagined must contain the fabulous treasures of Aladdin. Shortly after midnight my dreams were interrupted by a sentinel, who reported that a fire was burning brightly at the entrance of the estuary. As this was the signal agreed upon in case our presence was required, I had no alternative but to start at once; and we manned our row-galley and sped down the creek as fast as forty pairs of vigorous arms could propel us. . . . . My lookout men reported having seen a light at sea, which we soon saw, and, boarding the vessel, found her to be his Majesty's schooner Monkey, on a cruise; and her commander handed me a despatch from the commander of the United States schooner Grampus, directing me to join him at Havana as soon after I received it as possible." So off they sailed, dividing the contents of the keg among the crew, expecting to return soon to this storehouse of treasures. A few days after their arrival the country was visited by a terrific cyclone, and when, a week later, they returned to the pirates' cave, they found its entrance had disappeared; and in spite of what every one will readily believe must have been an earnest search, they could find no trace of it, so that they returned as poor as they came. This is by no means the most interesting anecdote that the book contains, but with it the author begins his narration of a series of incidents, each of which in its turn holds the reader's attention. We have the author's experience on the west coast of Africa, where he takes command of a captured slaver and returns to land the unhappy creatures, after a dearth of water on the vessel and a mutiny caused by the sufferings of the imprisoned blacks; then his experience in the Baltic, where he sees the Czar; a story of a Siberian exile; an account of a cruise in the Mediterranean, where the writer sees Lady Hester Stanhope, Letitia, the mother of Napoleon, Ibrahim Pacha, and the Sultan; a record of his travels in Spain, in Algiers, of a cruise in the Pacific, and of his experience in California at the time of the discovery of gold; of

service in the Mexican army; and of a visit to Europe during the Italian war. The record closes soon after the second year of the war of the Rebellion. How varied such a life has been the dullest eye can see from this abbreviation of the list of his wanderings, and about it all we find a delightful record, a choice of most interesting stories and most marked examples of the author's power of holding his hand and of leaving those who read his book still hungry for more. So brief an analysis as we have made gives but a meagre notion of the merits of the book. It would be fairer to let General Revere speak for himself, as he does, for instance, in the following narration. It was upon a voyage from San Francisco to different Mexican seaports that, after a skirmish with some Indians, which we have not space to quote here, that "Sandy (a friend of the writer's, a Scotchman) and myself went ashore to the counting-house of a merchant who had accepted the draft of our consignee, in Guaymas, for thirty thousand dollars; which amount was paid in golden ounces, and taken charge of by my partner, who secured it round his waist in a handkerchief. The Mexican laws are very severe against the exportation of bullion under any circumstances, and it is necessary to smuggle it out of the country at great risk, heightened by the promise to informers of one half the forfeited amount. The officials, consequently, have sharp eyes for smugglers. Sandy determined to take the chances; and together we walked leisurely down to to the quay, past the custom-house, with its lounging officials, and entered our whale-boat and shoved off. Whether my partner had put on too bold an air as we passed this group, marching with his head in the air and regarding them defiantly, or whether his gait betrayed his secret burden, I know not; but we had scarcely got a boat's length from the quay when an inspector came running down from the custom-house, shouting to us to return. The guard, loading their pieces, followed him, under command of a sergeant.

"My partner and I exchanged glances without speaking, and instantly understood that we must keep all the advantage we had, and continue our course to the vessel."

He proposed to throw the money overboard to avoid twenty years of imprisonment that threatened to be their fate, but MacGregor, his partner, refused. The captain boarded them and made a thorough search of the vessel, — in vain, he could nowhere find the treasure. He left them under the charge of an officer, declaring that if the money were not given up he should unship the rudder and unbend the sails. "Although my partner was present during our conversation, his conduct was an enigma to me, for he never lost his *sang-froid*, and did nothing but smile at the threats of the official or my own misgivings; but when dinner was served in the cabin, after the departure of the

port-captain, his composure was accounted for. Honest Job brought his capacious iron pot into the pantry, as usual, to dip up the meal, and from its depths fished out Sandy's pongee handkerchief, containing the gold which had been so diligently sought for by the myrmidons of the customs. My partner then told me that, while coming alongside in the boat, he had caught sight of Job's ebon visage, busy near his galley-fire, and, by a gleam of inspiration, conceived the idea of hiding his treasure by popping it into the cook's kettle, which he lost no time in doing, telling Job to continue his avocation with an appearance of indifference.

"Our merriment over the successful result of his *ruse*, however, was suddenly cut short by the darkening of the cabin skylight; and, looking up, we saw the head of the officer whom Captain Horn had left on board at his departure, and who could not restrain a Spanish exclamation at the sight of the treasure lying before us.

"The situation now called for prompt measures. The angry inspector was quickly bundled into a boat and transferred to a small vessel near us; our anchor was tripped and sail made; and in less than twenty minutes we were gliding towards the entrance of the harbor. We soon gained an offing; but, as usual in this latitude, the wind fell towards night, and the next morning the high peak of Creston, marking the port, was still in sight. . . . . Just after breakfast, looking toward Mazatlan, we saw with the glass two large *balandras* (large launches) and a man-of-war's boat coming out of the harbor."

There was nothing for them to do but fight, so all preparations were made. The crew, "delighted at the prospect of a row with the 'greasers,'" was collected at quarters, the carronades were shotted, while the Mexican boats approached, and Captain Horn summoned them to surrender. "To this I answered that my vessel was at sea, more than a marine league from Creston, and consequently out of the Mexican jurisdiction; that my duty compelled me to maintain my maritime rights and those of other interested parties; that he had better give up the idea of meddling with me; and finally, to cut the matter short, that if he attempted to invade my vessel, I should treat him as a pirate. . . . . The *balandras* then separated, — one pulling ahead of the vessel to board over the bows, while the other made for the starboard gangway. . . . . Hans Petersen, the second mate, stood at his gun in the starboard waist, port-fire in hand; and when the second *balandra* was within pistol-shot, a soldier fired his piece at me, standing on the poop, the ball whistling harmlessly through the mainsail. Instantly I gave the order, 'Fire!' Bang went the carronade right into the bows of the boat! The sea was freckled with grape, and in an

instant Horn and his whole crew were struggling in the water, which was tinged with blood. The other *balandra*, which was pulling toward the bows, seeing the saucy Golondrina coming toward her 'with a bone in her mouth,' — for I had filled away with the intention of running her down, — rowed across our course to avoid collision; and we passed on, tacked, and came towards the boats on the port tack again.

"They had had enough, however, for the cry of '*Misericordia*' was raised on our approach; and, leaving them to assist the sunken boat and rescue her crew, I wore ship, and bore away for San Blas."

We make this long quotation, not so much for the purpose of setting a model of international courtesies, or of what is generally the best way of dealing with obnoxious custom-house officials, nor solely as an example of the way in which what we call inferior races are often treated by English and Americans, but as example, which would show much better than the longest list of complimentary adjectives, what are the merits of this very entertaining volume. It has not a dull page in the whole account of the writer's adventures. Of less interest are the four stories added at the end of the volume, which smack of the magazine.

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4. — *The Life of Abraham Lincoln; from his Birth to his Inauguration as President.* By WARD H. LAMON. With Illustrations. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

EVEN apart from the interest which every citizen must feel in an account of the life of one to whom the whole nation is so deeply indebted, and in addition to the feeling of respect which may possibly prompt some readers to the perusal of this volume, it should be clearly stated that no reader who takes up this biography will fail to find it much more than a very readable book. That a man should rise from the humblest origin to be the President of the United States is recognized by us all as a vaguely possible thing; the promise of such success is used half comically as a spur to indolent or down-trodden boyhood, but to read the record of a life which fulfils this career, the life of one who rose manfully through varying obstacles to this final success, is not only satisfactory to our patriotism, but is also as entertaining as a novel.

The date of Abraham Lincoln's birth is more certain than most other facts about his origin and his family. He was born on the twelfth day of February, 1809. His father was Thomas Lincoln, his mother's maiden name was Nancy Hanks. At that time, we are told, they are supposed to have been married about three years. This state-

ment has already given rise to a great deal of discussion which there is no need of reopening here; it is, at any rate, certain that Lincoln's origin was of the humblest. His father was apparently the most shiftless of men, an unskilled carpenter, a careless farmer, a wanderer over the face of the earth, but, wherever he went, taking with him his proverbial "bad luck." It was in a wretched cabin in Kentucky that Lincoln was born; his boyhood was passed in Indiana; the family living at first in a half-faced camp, "a cabin enclosed on three sides and open on the fourth. It was built, not of logs, but of poles. It was about fourteen feet square, and had no floor." After a year's residence they moved to a cabin without door, windows, or floor. "Three-legged stools served for chairs. A bedstead was made of poles stuck in the cracks of the logs in one corner of the cabin, while the other end rested in the crotch of a forked stick sunk in the earthen floor. On these were laid some boards, and on the boards a 'shake-down' of leaves covered with skins and old petticoats. The table was a huge puncheon, supported by four legs. They had a few pewter and tin dishes to eat from, but the most minute inventory of their effects makes no mention of knives or forks. Their cooking utensils were a Dutch oven and a skillet. Abraham slept in the loft, to which he ascended by means of pins driven into holes in the wall."

It was to this squalor that Thomas Lincoln brought his second wife, an early love of his, who had been left a widow, after the death of Abraham Lincoln's mother. She did all that was in her power to relieve the misery and discomfort that she saw about her, and for her Abraham Lincoln always felt a genuine love. Of his education there is but little to be said; "all his school-days added together would not make a single year." Besides the art of spelling, which formed part of the means of amusement as well as of the serious work of the school, Lincoln fell at one time to the charge of a teacher who, in addition to the ordinary rudiments, taught elegance of manners. "One of the scholars was required to retire, and re-enter as a polite gentleman is supposed to enter a drawing-room. He was received at the door by another scholar, and conducted from bench to bench, until he had been introduced to all the 'young ladies and gentlemen' in the room. Abe went through the ordeal countless times. If he took a serious view of the business, it must have put him to exquisite torture; for he was conscious that he was not a perfect type of manly beauty, with his long legs and blue shins, his small head, his great ears, and shrivelled skin." But besides these parodies of civilization, Lincoln acquired the groundwork of education, and he was moreover a huge reader, reading day and night in his spare moments, which were but few. He had to work, helping his

father and hiring himself out to his neighbors. One of them gives his testimony about Lincoln as follows. He says: "Lincoln was awful lazy. He worked for me; was always reading and thinking; used to get mad at him. He worked for me in 1829, pulling fodder. I say Abe was awful lazy; he would laugh and talk and crack jokes and tell stories all the time; did n't love work, but did dearly love his pay. . . . . Lincoln said to me one day, that his father taught him to work, but never learned him to love it."

Of the society in the neighborhood we read: "The houses were scattered far apart; but the inhabitants would travel far to a log-rolling, a house-raising, a wedding, or anything else that might be turned into a fast and furious frolic. On such occasions the young women carried their shoes in their hands, and only put them on when about to join the company. The ladies drank whiskey-toddy, while the men took it straight; and both sexes danced the livelong night, barefooted, on puncheon floors."

The fair sex wore "corn-field bonnets, scoop-shaped, flaring in front, and long though narrow behind. Shoes were the mode on entering the ball-room; but it was not at all fashionable to scuff them out by walking or dancing in them." "Four yards of linsey-woolsey, a yard in width, made a dress for any woman. The waist was short, and terminated just under the arms, whilst the skirt was long and narrow. The coats of the men were home-made; the materials jean, or linsey-woolsey. The waists were short, like the frocks of the women, and the long "claw-hammer" tail was split up to the waist. The breeches were of buckskin or jeans; the cap was of coon-skin; and the shoes of leather tanned at home." Thus Lincoln passed his youth, apparently a favorite with all for his early-formed habit of telling stories and making jokes. When about twenty he made a journey to New Orleans on a flat-boat, which was soon afterwards followed by another similar voyage.

In 1831 Lincoln went to New Salem, in the State of Illinois, a mere village, but one that by no means enjoyed rustic simplicity and quiet. The inhabitants, moreover, held out no inducements to entice strangers to their boundaries. On the contrary, they had the fashion of naturalizing new-comers, as they called it, in the following way: "They first bantered the gentleman to run a foot-race, jump, pitch the mall or wreath; and if none of these propositions seemed agreeable to him, they would request to know what he would do in case another gentleman should pull his nose, or squirt tobacco-juice in his face. If he did not seem entirely decided in his views as to what should properly be done in such a contingency, perhaps he would be nailed in a hogshead,

and rolled down New Salem Hill," or he would be ducked in the Sangamon, or kicked and cuffed by all in the village, and then turned off as unfit company. Any excuse was taken for a fight; and Lincoln, already famous for his skill and power as a wrestler, was challenged to a wrestling-match by the bully of the place, and was victorious. It is indeed curious to notice how much Lincoln was indebted to his immense physical strength for his success in life. In fact, its importance cannot well be overestimated. Not only did it give him great pre-eminence over his companions, but it also established an authority which they all felt that he would have been able to maintain, and in many cases when he saw injustice he was able to interfere for the right. He had great coolness, and his views were fair, and he was able to assume the mastery of a half-civilized mob, every man of which durst not express his opposition at the risk of a thrashing. It made him a natural leader. The same views held by a weak-bodied man would have gone for little or nothing. It was his strength of body as well as of mind that made him President. What influence the possession of this quality must have given him in so rude a society as that in which he lived can be easily seen. It was to the popularity which that helped to give him that was due his election to the command of a company in the Black Hawk war, — an honor of which he said in a brief sketch of his life, written in the year 1859, that it had given him more pleasure than any he had since received. After his return from this brief campaign, Lincoln was the defeated candidate to the House of Representatives; but ill-success only spurred him to making himself more worthy of such dignities. During his residence at New Salem, with the exception of the time that he had been off to the wars, he had been a clerk in the chief "store" of the place; now he went into business with a worthless partner, but without success, and began to read law. "He used to read law," says Henry McHenry, "in 1832 or 1833, barefooted, seated in the shade of a tree, and would grind around with the shade, just opposite Berry's grocery store, a few feet south of the door. He occasionally varied the attitude by lying flat on his back, and putting his feet up the tree."

Squire Godbey says: "The first time I ever saw Abe with a law-book in his hand, he was sitting astride Jack Baler's wood-pile, in New Salem. Says I, 'Abe, what are you studying?' 'Law,' says Abe. 'Great God Almighty!' responded I."

In 1834 he was a successful candidate for the Legislature, and here it is that his public life begins. In spite of his awkwardness, youth, and inexperience, he was successful as a speaker and in the ordinary business of legislation. In the winter of 1836–37 Lincoln took up

his abode at Springfield, and began practice as a lawyer. In 1838 began the long conflict between him and Douglas, which lasted with little leniency on either side until 1858. In 1846 he was elected to Congress from the State of Illinois. Then he took strong ground against the Mexican war. After serving his term he returned to Springfield and busied himself with the practice of his profession. We find in this life a full account of his earnest struggle with Douglas, which did so much to give him a wide reputation as an orator and as a politician. Of his nomination at the Convention in Chicago, it is unnecessary here to speak, and for the same reason we may omit here any further mention of what is still fresh in the memories of all men of over five-and-twenty.

This volume brings the account of Lincoln's life up to the time of his first inauguration, — an appropriate place for its ending, after describing his career from the squalid conditions of his boyhood to the solemn moment when he took his oath as President, when the most terrible dangers the country had ever known were threatening the nation. It is not enough to make mention merely of the interest of such a book; it is one that every American should read, as a statement of the wonderful possibilities that there are in this country. Of Lincoln's rank in the world as a statesman, the time to speak will be when the succeeding volume of his biography, which is to describe his services as President, shall have appeared; but meanwhile we recommend this volume as one that, with some revision, might be made indeed a model biography. The author has taken great pains to secure accuracy; the testimony of all sorts of persons is introduced, and often in their own words, much to the interest of the book; but there are roughnesses here and there which offend the reader, as well as gross offences against good taste. But, as we may say, it has the material of an excellent biography.

In conclusion, it may not be amiss to quote for comparison with those sordid memories of his youth, his speech on leaving Springfield for Washington in 1860.

"Friends, — No one who has never been placed in a like position can understand my feelings at this hour, nor the oppressive sadness I feel at this parting. For more than a quarter of a century I have lived among you, and during all the time I have received nothing but kindness at your hands. Here I have lived from my youth, until now I am an old man. Here the most sacred ties of earth were assumed. Here all my children were born; and here one of them lies buried. To you, dear friends, I owe all that I have, all that I am. *All the strange, checkered past seems to crowd now upon my mind.* To-day I leave you. I go to assume a task more difficult than that which devolved upon Washington. Unless the great God, who assisted him,

shall be with and aid me, I must fail; but if the same omniscient mind and almighty arm that directed and protected him shall guide and support me, I shall not fail, — I shall succeed. Let us all pray that the God of our fathers may not forsake us now. To him I commend you all. Permit me to ask that, with equal security and faith, you will invoke his wisdom and guidance for me. With these few words I must leave you: for how long I know not. Friends, one and all, I must now bid you an affectionate farewell."

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5 — *Art Education, Scholastic and Industrial.* By Walter Smith, State Director of Art Education, Massachusetts. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

Mr. Walter Smith's book on Art Education contains twelve chapters and an Appendix. Six of the chapters, which, however, make hardly more than a quarter part of the whole book, contain the substance of the lectures delivered by Mr. Smith a year ago at the Institute of Technology. They were nominally addressed to persons engaged in the pursuit of industrial art, but in form and structure they have nothing to distinguish them from lectures upon similar topics intended for the general public. They treat successively of Ornamental Design, Surface Decoration, Ornament in Relief, Architectural Enrichments, and Symbolism in Art, with a concluding chapter of recapitulation entitled Prospect and Retrospect. These papers are intelligently though rather loosely written, with occasional passages of vigorous good sense, and not infrequent lapses into a free-and-easy gait, which considerably injures their tone. The views advanced are those now most generally accepted in regard both to the theory and the practice of decorative art, though the language in which they are presented betrays too plainly the controlling influence which Mr. Ruskin and even such minor prophets as Mr. Eastlake have had in giving them form. Altogether, although they are not unprofitable reading for a public but little familiar even with the commonplaces of criticism, and are tolerably free from objectionable matter, they cannot be regarded as a valuable contribution to the literature of art.

The other six chapters, composing by far the largest part of the book, have a substantive value, and constitute probably the most important treatise upon the special branch of education to which they relate that has yet appeared either in this country or in England. We doubt whether any Continental writer has given the various methods and appliances of art education so full and fair consideration, or brought

to their discussion a more thorough knowledge, an ampler experience, or a more generous and intelligent appreciation than these pages exhibit. In style and manner these chapters differ from the rest of the book as the work of a practical man who is thoroughly master of his subject, and who writes from the fulness of his own knowledge, differs from the same man's semi-literary, pseudo-philosophical attempts to develop its nature and relations. They are vigorously and simply written, with here and there great felicity of thought and expression, and with none of the dogmatism and rude assertion which in the more speculative chapters is sometimes so distasteful. The style is that of an able and practised writer, although it every now and then flounders into extraordinary confusions both of logic and of grammar. But these are trifles. Of these six chapters, one discusses the methods of teaching drawing in day schools, especially the public schools; three are devoted to schools of art proper, that is to say, evening schools of industrial art; one gives a detailed account of the processes of casting in plaster both natural objects and objects of art. The last, the first in the volume, is given to a general view of the question of public art education, both here and abroad, explaining the English system, and giving in detail the steps which in Massachusetts have led to the establishment, by authority of the General Court, not only of courses of drawing in all the public schools, but of real schools of art, free evening classes in industrial drawing in twenty-three of the principal towns of the Commonwealth.

The three chapters relating to such schools, discuss in the most minute and practical way every detail of their construction, arrangement, and management, the conduct of the instruction, and the various methods by which the study of art may be approached.

In a matter which is everywhere still very much a matter of experiment, and in regard to which we are in this country almost absolutely without experience, it would be unreasonable to express too confident an opinion as to the reasonableness of the conclusions at which Mr. Smith arrives, and as to the course of procedure which, on the whole, he conceives to be best for the day and evening schools under his charge. It is only since the Exhibition of 1851 that in England, and since that of 1862 that in France, any comprehensive scheme of art education has been undertaken. The Exhibition of 1867 may in like manner be said to have inspired the Boston gentlemen then in Paris with the conviction that similar steps must presently be taken in this country. The French manufacturers had, of course, long before that, had their schools of special design, more or less under the patronage of the municipalities, not only in Paris, but at Metz, Toulouse, Mulhouse, Lyons, and other cities; and the *Loi Guizot* as early as the year 1833

added both music and drawing to the list of studies in the public schools. But so little was the importance of drawing understood at that time, even in France, that the law was in this particular suffered to become a dead letter, and in the early days of the Republic, in a spirit strangely hostile to popular instruction, it was formally abrogated. It was not until the Exhibition of 1862, which showed at once the comparative retrogression of French industrial art, and the enormous progress made in England since the establishment of the government schools, that the petitions and remonstrances of the manufacturers and their workmen brought the Imperial government to its senses, and provoked the law of March 31, 1865, which, under the enlightened administration of M. Duruy, brought drawing, together with other special branches of *secondary instruction*, under the patronage of the state.

Already, in 1863, the city of Paris had organized a commission to inquire into the subject; in accordance with whose recommendations, the private schools already existing were taken under municipal patronage and new schools established. The regulations reported by the commission were taken almost word for word from the English rules. The system of drawing pursued in these schools is indeed quite different from that taught at South Kensington, the "modelling" of form in light and shade, by the use of charcoal or crayons, being introduced at an early period of study, while in England the student is trained a long time in drawing outlines with the pencil before "shading" is attempted, and even then a hard point is preferred to the *stump*. But this difference, as Mr. Smith points out, is sufficiently accounted for by the fact that a system of outline work, if less stimulating to the artistic sense, requiring rather precision and accuracy than delicacy of feeling, is for that very reason more within the reach of an inartistic race and more easily administered by inartistic instructors. Moreover, it is easier taught in classes than is light and shade, being capable of very satisfactory treatment by means of the blackboard. It was necessity, then, rather than choice, which, in the absence of properly trained teachers, led the English authorities into this system of procedure, — a system which, except in children's schools, they are now slowly replacing by an approach to the French methods. The same conditions now exist in the United States which controlled the English policy twenty years ago. We need a system capable of being successfully applied to large classes at the hands of instructors but a step further advanced in the arts than their pupils. It seems to us then that in organizing a system of art education for our Massachusetts schools, day and evening, not only is Mr. Smith abundantly justified in adopting the main features of the South Kensington system, already extensively imitated on the

Continent, but that in the particular point under discussion, in regard to which his policy is likely to provoke remark, he is right in giving, for the present at least, a greater prominence to "line" work than will by and by prove necessary or desirable. We should, at any rate, be disposed to await with patience the result of Mr. Smith's experiment, because, having great experience in its practical working, he is more likely to make a success with the English system than with even a better scheme with which he was less familiar. He has long been known, moreover, as being of all Englishmen the most persistent advocate of the French methods of work. It is in great part by the influence of his writings and of his example that the South Kensington rules have been relaxed, and the gradual approximation to French methods, of which we have spoken, has taken place in the English schools. If the great apostle of the continental methods of drawing still finds it best in this country to begin by following the English procedure, we may safely trust the issue to his judgment.

It is to be desired, however, that in the practice of the generous selecticism in these particulars, by which Mr. Smith hopes to find "a system elastic enough to embrace every process that experience may perfect," the range of study should extend beyond the narrow and somewhat conventional limits of European art. Every object presents itself to the eye as a spot of color, of a certain shape and size, the hue being modified in one part and another by the different exposure of the different parts to the light. In the complete representation of any object these three elements — the outline, the color, and the "modelling," or light and shade — must be present; and if this is not in contemplation, and only a partial and, so far, conventional representation is to be attempted, there would seem to be no question as to which element should be given up. The outline, of course, must be retained, but we can certainly convey a more full and just idea of the object to be represented by giving its color and letting the modelling go, than by carefully delineating all the intricacies of its surface, at the sacrifice of what is in most things their most striking and characteristic feature, — the particular hue which distinguishes them. It is indeed, as we have said, merely as a spot of color that an object first presents itself to the eye; and in most lights, in almost all in-door positions, the modelling of strongly colored surfaces — as, for instance, upon most natural flowers — is so unimportant as to be almost imperceptible. In a work avowedly imperfect, moreover, it is certainly most reasonable to dispense first with that element which involves the great outlay of labor, and it is clear that the sacrifice of the light and shade involves the greatest saving with the least loss. In spite, however, of these ob-

vious considerations, the steady current of European opinion and practice, for the last four hundred years, has been the other way. Color has been the first thing to be abandoned, and the delicate modulation of light and shade the thing most highly prized, — the mastery of those exquisite and subtle effects the skill most in repute. During all this time, along with paintings which combine all three elements, and mere outline drawings which at the extreme limit of conventional treatment exhibit only one, works in black and white, executed in pencil or chalk, with the burin or with the needle, have been the principal form of pictorial art. The alternative method, employing outline and flat color, without shade, has been almost unknown.

But elsewhere it is not so. The instinct, or tradition, or convenience of other races has led them to adopt the other alternative, — to neglect altogether the faint and, to their mind, superficial gradations of light and shade, but to retain with eager fidelity all the subtle, delicate, ever-varying, and ever-characteristic phenomena of local hue. The whole decorative and pictorial art of Japan, for instance, is constructed upon this system, as may be seen to admiration in the infinite variety of the fans which are now so common. It would seem that the Japanese no more entertain the idea of light and shade, or of shadow even, as things to be put into a drawing, and no more miss them, than we miss the color from an etching or pencil sketch.

It is obvious enough that each system possesses advantages which the other lacks, and it is not worth while to ask which, in the absence of the other, would in the long run be most conducive to the highest culture, so long as we are, potentially, in possession of both. The Oriental method, as it comes to us, seems exactly to meet Mr. Smith's definition of "a new process which experience has perfected," and it would seem to be full of promise as an element of our new and improved scheme — this latest and best system — of American art education. If, as seems likely to be the case, it proves impracticable here, as it has proved impracticable elsewhere, to introduce the subject of light and shade during the earlier stages of study, so that pupil and teacher are alike exposed to the danger of getting fagged and disgusted over the dry and mechanical part of their work long before they reach the more stimulating and artistic part, may it not be possible, by letting them add color to their outlines, to lift them at once to the plane of real achievement, to put within their reach results that will make them proud and happy, and send them along their road with the spring and bound that come from conspicuous and unmistakable success? However it might be in a school of fine art, it would seem at least that in a course of training for the industrial arts such a

method of study could not fail of the happiest effect. For in the decorative arts color is the main element, and practical acquaintance with its management can hardly be begun too soon. It is also, so to speak, beyond all others, an eminently artistic element, — one whose use would tend, it would seem, more than any one thing, to stimulate and develop what genius of artistic power might be at hand, — special capacities which, on the other hand, a too long continued course of black and white might in many cases stifle and destroy.

The illustrations of Mr. Smith's book are most of them pertinent and interesting, but they are so executed as not to enhance its beauty. The style of lettering on most of the architectural drawings combines with their imperfect execution to render a good part of the descriptive inscriptions quite unintelligible.

The Appendix, which covers fifty pages, is mostly taken up with statistical information elsewhere difficult to obtain, in regard to the equipment of art schools, with lists of the most approved models and casts, giving their cost and the cost of their transportation to this country. It cannot but be of the greatest practical value to all persons engaged in these undertakings.

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6. — *Memoir of Roger Brooke Taney, LL. D., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.* By Samuel Tyler, LL. D., of the Maryland Bar. Baltimore: Published by John Murphy & Co., 182 Baltimore Street. 1872.

It was the fortune of Chief Justice Taney on two conspicuous occasions to incur the bitter hate of a powerful political party. His course in accepting the control of the Treasury Department at the request of General Jackson, for the sole purpose of recovering the government deposits from the Bank of the United States after Mr. Duane's refusal to do so, exposed him to charges of subserviency to the President most difficult for an honorable man to bear; and his nomination to the vacancy left by the death of Marshall, coming so soon after this service, was regarded as the thirty pieces of silver which rewarded his baseness, and encountered the fiercest opposition in the Senate. Taking his seat under these circumstances, he had succeeded in living down the accusations against him, and even his opponents had learned to recognize his fitness for his place, when the Dred Scott decision came, at a time when party lines were sharply drawn on the question of slavery, to decide that question against the party of freedom, whose triumph seemed almost assured. Amid the storm of indignation which this decision aroused

among the Republicans, whose great purpose was declared unconstitutional, the circumstances of his original appointment were recalled, and the forgotten charges against him repeated by men who did not care to understand the merits of the controversy in which they originated, but were willing to believe anything that tended to shake the authority of the court which had volunteered to decide against them. As a consequence, his true character and motives have been lost under a cloud of misrepresentation, and his death was hailed by many as a deliverance from a magistrate whose obstinate longevity seemed merely an evidence of his spite. He lived, they thought, simply to keep a Republican from succeeding to his power, and they doubtless fancied that his sharpest pang in death arose from disappointment at finding his strength unequal to his malice. He has been regarded as a man who was originally appointed to his place, not from any fitness for its duties, but simply because General Jackson had found him a "pliant instrument" (to use Mr. Webster's phrase), and wished to repay his servility, and whom the Democratic party found an equally subservient ally, whenever a decision of the Supreme Court was necessary to stamp with authority their political principles, — a judge, in short, who was appointed as a politician, and who felt it his duty to serve in that capacity. It was eminently desirable, therefore, that his biography should be written, not only to exhibit his character in its true light before his countrymen, but also to increase the authority of the tribunal over which he presided, which has suffered in public esteem from the unmerited aspersions cast upon its chief.

Mr. Tyler, however, has given us a panegyric, not a biography. In his desire to relieve the memory of Chief Justice Taney from undeserved obloquy, he has fallen into the opposite error of indiscriminate eulogy. In his vocabulary are none but superlatives. Assuming as a motto for his book, "*Qui nihil in vita nisi laudardum, aut fecit, aut dixit, aut sensit,*" he has sought to prove it literally true. For example, when Mr. Taney was appointed Chief Justice, he tells us that he was called to preside over "the most august tribunal ever established among men," and proceeds: "No man ever realized more entirely the grandeur of high judicial functions and felt more profoundly its responsibilities, and never did a man bring to the discharge of duty a more sublime moral courage. As to his qualifications as a lawyer for the office, they were the most complete. He had not only mastered every branch of legal learning in every form of judicial tribunal, from the highest to the lowest, but he was extraordinarily familiar with practice in every species of court. No matter from what court, whether on the law or the equity side, a record came up on writ of error or appeal, he could

see at once its full import, and his long and diversified experience as a practising lawyer in courts of original jurisdiction had made him as familiar with rules of practice as the most experienced clerk of a court. He was marshalled to his place by a divine tactic" ("and heaven it knoweth what that may mean") "for the good of his country, if ever a public functionary was, just as his great predecessor had been." Such language reminds us of Leicester's prayer in "The Critic," and for exhaustive compliment may be recommended as a model. The same exaggeration runs through the whole book. The judges before whom Mr. Taney practised, his associates and opponents at the bar, and his political friends, are all pre-eminent for ability and virtue; and how his political opponents fare at the hands of the author may be inferred from his placing Hamilton among the disciples of Machiavelli, and making the second Adams "happy in his power of mischief," while Mr. Seward's policy of governing the country "by sectional animosities," and Max Müller's "fanatical spleen against negro slavery" alike come in for his condemnation. History has but one side for Mr. Tyler, and he states that without qualification. He is a painter who knows only black and white, and his pictures are innocent of shading.

Still this fault does not seriously impair the value of his work. It is suppression and falsification which make a biography untrustworthy. The author's exaggeration is too patent to deceive, and defeats itself. He has given us the means of forming our own opinion about Mr. Taney, and we are not obliged to accept his conclusions, though we cannot quarrel with his admiration for the late Chief Justice. The volume opens with a fragment of autobiography written in 1854, which carries us as far as Mr. Taney's twenty-fifth year, at which age he began the practice of law at Frederick, Maryland. This, with the few letters which Mr. Tyler has been able to secure, to a student of character would be the most valuable part of the work, and from them he could hardly fail to get an accurate understanding of the man. They show us the Chief Justice as he was, — a man of great simplicity and elevation of character, of perfectly honest purpose, and of unyielding firmness, who never shrank from what he considered his duty, or suffered unworthy considerations to affect his judgment; "a loyal, just, and upright gentleman," in the best sense; in many respects a great man, but, though an able lawyer and an admirable judge, lacking the intellectual breadth which is a necessary element of greatness. The absence of all pettiness in his nature is very striking; he seems singularly magnanimous and unselfish, and it is refreshing to read his life in these days of furious money-getting.

We cannot refrain from quoting the following little note, written on

the forty-sixth anniversary of his marriage, it seems so entirely characteristic: —

"WASHINGTON, January 7, 1852.

"I cannot, my dearest wife, suffer the 7th of January to pass without renewing to you the pledges of love which I made to you on the 7th of January, forty-six years ago; and although I am sensible that in that long period I have done many things that I ought not to have done, and have left undone many things that I ought to have done, yet in constant affection to you I have never wavered, — never being insensible how much I owe to you, — and now pledge to you again a love as true and sincere as that I offered you on the 7th of January, 1806, and shall ever be your affectionate husband, "R. B. TANEY.

"MRS. ANNE TANEY."

A lawyer of Frederick used to tell an anecdote which illustrates his high sense of honor. Soon after the narrator began to practise, he was employed in an ejectment cause in which Mr. Taney was opposing counsel; and when the case was called for trial and he was asked by the court if he was ready, he answered yes. Whereupon Mr. Taney told him in a whisper that his locations were all wrong; and that if he went to trial, he must lose his case, whether the right was with him or not. The young man had his case continued. Such a letter and such a story are worth pages of eulogy.

In no respect has the Chief Justice been more misrepresented than in reference to his position on the slavery question. Many suppose that in the Dred Scott case he decided that the negro had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. This sentence in his opinion, taken out of its connection, has been quoted as if those words were used to express his own view of the negro's true position in the scale of creation, rather than as a statement of an opinion once common, but which he says "it is difficult at this day to realize." His own opinion we find expressed in his argument for Mr. Gruber, and that his expressions were sincere is shown by the fact that he emancipated the slaves which he inherited from his father, and continued to aid them afterwards. Mr. Gruber was a Pennsylvania minister, who, having preached an antislavery sermon at a camp-meeting, was indicted for an attempt to incite a slave insurrection. Mr. Taney defended him, and in arguing his right to speak of slavery as he thought, said: "It is a subject of national concern, and may at all times be freely discussed. . . . . A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to endure the evil of slavery for a time. It was imposed upon us by another nation, while we were yet in a state of colonial vassalage. It cannot

be easily or suddenly removed. Yet, while it continues, it is a blot on our national character, and every real lover of freedom confidently hopes that it will be effectually, though it must be gradually, wiped away, and earnestly looks for the means by which this necessary object may be best attained." These were Mr. Taney's views in 1819, and his opinion in the Dred Scott case will be searched in vain for a word inconsistent with them. They were the views of the best men among the founders of our government, and of the most enlightened statesmen who succeeded them; they were the views of Mr. Lincoln himself when he was elected President by the Republican party. With the objects of that party the Chief Justice was in hearty though unconscious sympathy. That he did not readily accept the means by which they proposed to accomplish these objects is not surprising. A Roman Catholic in religion, a lawyer by profession, inclined from early political association as well as from the habit of his mind to construe the Constitution strictly, at a time of life when man's conservative instincts are strongest, it is not strange that he refused to abandon the views of constitutional law which he had spent his life in learning and expounding, for the purpose of adopting new interpretations which had gained currency in the heat of party strife among men who had ceased to venerate a Constitution which they had always heard invoked to protect slavery. Nor can we wonder that, with his stricter ideas, he seemed to men who were bent on its destruction like a defender of the institution, which he too wished to see destroyed, only not at the expense of the Constitution. And now that the object of both has been accomplished in a way which neither could foresee, we may hope that his countrymen will do justice to his motives, and respect the courage which enabled him, in the discharge of what he felt to be his duty, to bear the odium of seeming to side with a wrong which he hated.

Of Mr. Taney's judicial career there is little for a biographer to say. Mr. Tyler tells us that his opinions "for apposite learning, wise legal discrimination, calm judicial spirit, and perspicuity and finish of language are unsurpassed by those of any judge who has ever administered law in a court founded on the common law of England." No one but a lawyer can dispute this estimate, and a lawyer is more likely to form his own opinion of Chief Justice Taney's merits as a judge from reading his opinions himself, than to adopt Mr. Tyler's judgment. In treating this branch of his subject he has undertaken to discuss only his opinions on constitutional questions, dismissing the others with the temperate statement already quoted. He takes the cases up in succession simply to state what was decided in each, and to make them the

pegs on which to hang the praises of his hero. He forgets, however, that these opinions, where they are recognized as law, were the opinions of the court, and hardly gives the eminent men who were Taney's associates credit for their share in the court's decisions, even in cases where the opinion was written by one of them. For instance, he speaks of the decision in the case of the Genesee Chief, as if it were his exclusively. "This decision alone," he says, "is sufficient to place the Chief Justice among the greatest of judicial characters." It "illustrates in an especial manner the liberal wisdom of the Chief Justice." Yet the Supreme Court only adopted here doctrines which Judge Story had taught as law at Cambridge twenty years before. Other decisions, which to Mr. Tyler prove the "marvellous power of analysis which enabled him to discern the exact boundary in all the mutual relations of Federal and State sovereignty and jurisdiction," did not meet with equal approval from critics at least as competent. They made Chancellor Kent say, "I have lost my confidence and hopes in the constitutional guardianship and protection of the Supreme Court," and almost drove Judge Story from the bench. A few months before his death, the latter wrote in reference to them: "The doctrines of the Constitution so vital to the country, which in former times received the support of the whole court, no longer maintain their ascendency. I am the last member now living of the old court, and I cannot consent to remain where I can no longer hope to see those doctrines recognized and enforced. For the future I must be in a dead minority of the court, with the painful alternative of either expressing an open dissent from the opinions of the court, or by silence seeming to acquiesce in them." With these feelings he had determined to resign, but died before he carried his purpose into execution.

As we have said, our author's history of the Chief Justice's judicial career is made up of digested decisions, and complimentary remarks thereon of his own. He gives us only that which every one who has access to the reports may get for himself. There is not wanting, however, the most valuable testimony to Mr. Taney's greatness as a judge in the less conspicuous but by no means less important part of his duties on the bench. We refer to the speech of Mr. B. R. Curtis, made from experience as his associate, at the meeting of the Boston bar after his death. He said: "It is certainly true, and I am happy to be able to bear direct testimony to it, that the surpassing ability of the Chief Justice, and all his great qualities of character and mind, were more fully and constantly exhibited in the consultation-room, while presiding over and assisting the deliberations of his brethren, than the public knew, or can ever justly appreciate. There his dignity, his love of

order, his gentleness, his caution, his accuracy, his discrimination, were of incalculable importance. The real intrinsic character of the tribunal was greatly influenced by them, and always for the better." Alluding to the fact that he wrote comparatively but few opinions, he says: "He was as absolutely free from the slightest trace of vanity and self-conceit as any man I ever knew. He was aware that many of his associates were ambitious of doing this conspicuous part of their joint labor. The preservation of the harmony of the members of the court, and of their good-will to himself, was always in his mind. And I have not the least doubt that these considerations often influenced him to request others to prepare opinions which he could and otherwise would have written."

Such praise from such a source, while it justifies in part Mr. Tyler's panegyrics, might well have superseded them, and it is on such opinions that the reputation of Chief Justice Taney may safely rest. Our author tells us that his "book is designed not only to be a memoir of Chief Justice Taney, but also to show the working of the Federal government." The fulfilment of this design has certainly increased the size of his volume, but it may be questioned whether it has enhanced its value. He justifies himself for uniting his treatise on our constitutional history with the work announced in his title by this course of reasoning: "As Mr. Taney will be seen occupying high posts in the Federal government at important political crises, it is necessary to take a view of the nature and the working of the Federal government in order to judge of the wisdom and patriotism of his conduct in those positions." Mr. Taney's conduct, as an officer of the Federal government, must be judged by his view of the Federal Constitution, and his judgment of the tendency in the working of the government; and whether his view of the Constitution, and his judgment of the tendency in the working of the government, be true or not, can only be tested by the history of the country down to the present time. In order to judge of the nature of the Federal government, we must recur to its origin." Here certainly is a foundation broad enough to sustain a work equal to Mr. Bancroft's, and we can only admire Mr. Tyler's moderation in limiting his to one volume. His view makes Mr. Taney's life only an episode in his own biography, and obliterates the distinction between biography and history. Chief Justice Marshall on one occasion interrupted a prolix lawyer in a tedious statement of elemental principles with the remark, "Mr. A., there are some things which the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States are presumed to know." We wish that some friend had reminded Mr. Tyler of this story while he was writing his sketch of

our history; for that the Constitution was framed by a convention of delegates at Philadelphia in 1787, that it went into operation on the 4th of March, 1789, and that General Washington was the first President, are facts for a knowledge of which he might fairly have given his readers credit. Nor does it seem necessary to quote all the provisions of the Constitution which relate to the judicial power, "in order to show the services which Mr. Taney rendered to his country as Chief Justice." This quotation Mr. Tyler has given, and that not as a quotation, but as a condensed statement of his own, altering some of the original phraseology to make it harmonize with his context, leaving the rest in glaring contrast with the general construction of his page; and so carelessly that by condensing the two last clauses of the second section in article third, he has given the courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases "between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different citizens." Mr. Tyler's views of history are what might be expected from a man who starts with the fundamental proposition that the Cavaliers settled the Southern States, and reaches the conclusion that the antislavery party "was not moved by any regard for the welfare of the negro race, but by hostility to the Southern States." His logic is illustrated by his attempt to argue that the question between the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States was a question of political power, rather than of hostility to slavery, from the fact that while the New England States were opposing the admission of Missouri, some of their citizens were engaged in the slave-trade, and Judge Story was charging grand juries throughout his circuit to indict them. Such opinions and such reasoning naturally lead him to conclude his review of the circumstances which led to the Rebellion with the remark that "no publicist, judging by the practices of nations, can doubt that, in the forum of political ethics, the slave States were justified in their course; and every publicist knows that it is not the party which fires the first shot that is responsible for the war, but the party which makes war necessary." When, however, he adduces as evidence of the revolutionary policy which governed the Republican party, that, "contrary to unbroken usage," they nominated both candidates, Lincoln and Hamlin, from the same side of Mason and Dixon's line, he should have remembered Jackson and Calhoun.

It is only fair to say, however, that while Mr. Tyler's opinions, both of law and history, are colored by his evident sympathy with the slavery party, they are expressed without bitterness. Indeed, he treats the prominent opponents of his views, such as Clay, Adams, and Linclon, with every disposition, apparently, to do them justice, and the reader will be glad to miss the personal misrepresentation and detraction which we

have grown to expect in the writings of those who hold his ideas. In this respect he has done what the man whose life he writes would have desired. Mr. Seward is an exception. In Mr. Tyler's view he was a bad man, who sought by encouraging sectional animosities to win the Presidency. Even Mr. Seward's admirers, if they will recall his speech on the admission of Kansas, and the indecent attack which he there made on the Supreme Court, and especially on the Chief Justice on account of the Dred Scott decision, will not wonder that any of Mr. Taney's friends should conceive a prejudice against him. Still, however, it is to be regretted that one holding such opinions should be in a position to influence others. Mr. Tyler is a professor in the Columbia Law School at Washington, and we fear that his pupils will imbibe his views without sharing his moderation, and that he and others like him throughout the South are educating the next generation in such a manner as will keep alive the embers of the civil war and defer the establishment of really cordial relations between the North and the South for many years.

The Dred Scott decision affords him opportunity for a long disquisition, devoted particularly to the assertion of Mr. Justice Curtis, that "slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by municipal law," which he terms "one of the most extraordinary aberrations from a great fundamental principle of public law to be found in the history of judicial administration." He proves to his own satisfaction, by quotations from Plato, Cicero, and Justinian, that it was created by the law of nations, because it was an old principle of international law that the victor in battle had a right to enslave his prisoners. As well prove that murder is justifiable by the laws of nations, because he had a right to kill them. That a man of intelligence should to-day argue from this obsolete principle that negro slavery, or the right to enslave a man because he is black, was a creation of international law, without seeing that, if it was, it was abolished, with the principle, centuries before the United States was thought of, or if not, that it is lawful in this country to-day because nothing but municipal law has abolished it, and nothing but the power which makes can unmake, is sufficiently strange, but it would be idle seriously to attack such a position. The Dred Scott decision has been overruled by the war, and the questions therein discussed have passed into history. Mr. Tyler might safely have left its defence to rest on the opinion of the Chief Justice, which he pronounces "the most comprehensive and best reasoned politico-judicial opinion ever pronounced by any tribunal." He certainly has not strengthened it. Some years ago one of the ablest judges who took part in the decision was asked by a lawyer precisely

what the court decided. He replied, "If you ask me what the Supreme Court of the United States decided in the case of Dred Scott, I answer, I don't know." Our author thinks he does, but as his opinion on the point is of interest only to the legal antiquary, we forbear to disturb his confidence.

On the whole, Mr. Tyler is to be thanked for his book. We lay it down with a feeling almost of affection for the man whose life he has written, and are glad to think that the highest judicial position in our country was filled so many years by a man whose public and private life alike afford so admirable an example to the profession of which he was the head. The story of such a life is elevating and encouraging, and we can pardon the author much bad logic and much political heresy for the pleasure and profit we have got from its perusal.

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7. — *Man in the Past, Present, and Future. A Popular Account of the Results of Recent Scientific Research as regards the Origin, Position, and Prospects of the Human Race.* From the German of Dr. L. Büchner, by W. S. Dallas, F. L. S. London, 1872.

The words "materialist" and "atheist" have been so long employed as death-dealing epithets in the hands of hard-hitting theological controversialists, that it seems hardly kind in us to begin the notice of a meritorious book by saying that it is the work of a materialist and an atheist. We are reassured, however, by the reflection that these are just the titles which the author himself delights in claiming. Dr. Büchner would regard it as a slur upon his mental fitness for philosophizing if we were to refuse him the title of atheist; and "materialism" is the name of that which is as dear to him as "liberty" was dear to the followers of Danton and Mirabeau. Accordingly, in applying these terms to Dr. Büchner, they become divested of their old opprobriousness, and are enabled to discharge the proper function of descriptive epithets by serving as abstract symbols for certain closely allied modes of thinking. Considered in this purely philosophical way, an "atheist" is one to whom the time-honored notion of Deity has become a meaningless and empty notion; and a "materialist" is one who regards the story of the universe as completely and satisfactorily told when it is wholly told in terms of matter and motion, without reference to any ultimate underlying Existence, of which matter and motion are only the phenomenal manifestations. To Dr. Büchner's mind the criticism of the various historic conceptions of godhood has not only stripped these conceptions of their

anthropomorphic vestments, but has left them destitute of any validity or solid content whatever; and in similar wise he is satisfied with describing the operations of nature, alike in the physical and psychical worlds, as merely the redistributions of matter and motion, without seeking to answer the inquiry as to what matter and motion are, or how they can be supposed to exist as such at all, save in reference to the mind by which they are cognized.

Starting, then, upon this twofold basis, — that the notion of God is a figment, and that matter in motion is the only real existence, — Dr. Büchner seeks in the present work to interpret the facts disclosed by scientific induction concerning the origin of man, his psychical nature, his history, and his destiny as a denizen of the earth. With reference to these topics Dr. Büchner is a follower of Mr. Darwin, especially of Mr. Darwin as amended by Professor Haeckel. His book, considered on its scientific merits only, and without regard to its philosophic bearings, is a popular exposition of the Darwinian theory as applied to the origin of the human race. Regarded simply as a scientific exposition, conducted on these fundamental principles, there is in the book little which calls for criticism. Dr. Büchner has studied the Darwinian theory very thoroughly, and his statements in illustration of it are for the most part very accurate, showing, so far as this portion of the work is concerned, the evidences of a truly scientific spirit. He is as lucid, moreover, as Taine or Haeckel, and nothing is wanting to one's entire enjoyment of his book, save that modesty in the presence of the limitless workings of nature which Dr. Büchner does not possess any more than Taine or Haeckel.

But from the scientific point of view it is not necessary for us to discuss Dr. Büchner's book, as it is not an original scientific treatise, but only a lucid exposition of the speculations and discoveries of other students of nature. When we have described it as in the main lucid and accurate, we have given it all the praise which as a scientific exposition it can legitimately claim to have earned. When we consider it as a contribution to philosophy, when we ask the question whether it can be of any use to us in solving the great problem of our relations to the universe in which we live and move and have our being, we must set down quite another verdict. As an exposition of Darwinism, the work, though by no means all that could be desired, is still an admirable work. But as a vindication of the atheistic and materialistic way of explaining the universe, it is an utter failure. To suppose that the establishment of the Darwinian theory of man's origin is equivalent to the vindication of materialism and atheism, is a mistake of Dr. Büchner's which would be very absurd were it not so

very serious. Mr. Darwin's theory only supposes that a certain aggregate of phenomena now existing has had for its antecedent a certain other and different aggregate of phenomena. The entire victory of this theory will only — like the previous victory of Newton's theory over the doctrine of guiding angels, espoused even by Kepler — assure us that in the entire series of phenomenal manifestations, of which the world is made up, there is no miraculous break, no conjuring, no freak of the magician. And to this conclusion all modern scientific inquiry has long been leading us. It needed no Dr. Büchner to tell us this. All this, however, cannot stir us one inch toward the philosophic doctrine of which Dr. Büchner is the advocate. Dr. Büchner shares with the theologians whom he combats the error of supposing that godhood cannot be manifested in a regular series of phenomena, but only in fortuitous miraculous surprises. When he has proved that mankind was originated through the ordinary processes of paternity from some lower form of life, he thinks he has overturned the belief in God, whereas he has really only overturned a crude and barbarous conception of the way in which God acts. And so when it is shown that all the phenomena of the world are but material phenomena, our author thinks that the ground-theorem of materialism is forever established; quite forgetting that what we call material phenomena are, after all said and done, nothing but expressions for certain changes occurring in a complicated series of psychical states.

In short, no matter how far the scientific interpretation of nature may be carried, it can reveal to us only the fact that the workings of the ultimate Existence of which Nature is the phenomenal expression are different from what they were supposed to be by uninstructed thinkers of former times. And no matter how far we may carry the interpretation of natural phenomena in terms of matter and motion, we cannot escape the conclusion that matter and motion, as phenomenal manifestations, can have no genuine existence save as the correlatives of a cognizing mind. To treat of the universe of phenomena without the noumenon God is nonsense; and likewise to treat of matter (a congeries of attributes) without reference to the mind in whose cognizance alone can attributes have any existence, is also nonsense. However praiseworthy, therefore, Dr. Büchner's book may be as an exposition of a particular set of scientific doctrines, we think it can have but small value as a contribution to philosophy. Its author is one of those men who see very distinctly what they really see, but who in reality see but a very little way before them.

8. — *Hints on Household Taste in Furniture, Upholstery, and other Details.* By Charles L. Eastlake. Edited by Charles C. Perkins. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1870.

The popularity of Mr. Eastlake's book is an indication of the prevailing interest in art, of which well-attended drawing-schools and projected art museums are the other tokens. The chief part of the book is devoted to special hints on the designing of household furniture; but the general principles which it is the main object of the book to enforce are those which underlie all good decorative design. Such with others are the following propositions: that a design of an object should indicate its use, and that its shape and mode of treatment should be that best suited to the material employed; that the evidence of human handiwork is always more valuable in decoration than mere elaboration and finish; that decoration should not attempt to imitate natural forms, but to typify them.

From such principles as his starting-point, he wages a hardy war on shaded designs in carpets or wall-papers, on wooden scroll-work and "applied" mouldings, on concealed hinges and locks, on varnish, cut glass, rococo jewelry, the rounded corners of custom-made furniture, and the construction of dining-tables, and every one will acknowledge the force of his faultfinding. It is done in an interesting fashion which all can appreciate, and the book well deserves its success.

The book has, however, its faults, and above all else it is unfortunate, that while the author's own designs fairly illustrate the excellent text, they are in themselves far from comely. Mr. Eastlake's furniture looks barbarous and uncouth, and one might expect the aspect of his hall-table and bookcase, cabinet and chest of drawers, to undo all the force of his text. Curiously enough, however (and this is no compliment to our native designers of furniture), things have taken a course that Mr. Eastlake probably little intended. These very designs have been executed over and over again, and one maker from the neighborhood of Boston stated the other day that he had repeatedly executed all the designs in the book, — a fact which indicates more zeal for improvement than knowledge of the best means of obtaining it. Any one who feels tempted to appropriate Mr. Eastlake's designs would, in our opinion, do better by consulting a volume of designs for furniture of a similar character by Mr. Talbert, lately published in London. But both gentlemen intended their books as hints only, and not as working drawings; their illustrations were mere indications of what might be done, not models for universal use.

Mr. Eastlake's designs are all Gothic or grotesque, while furniture

not only may be, but in this country *must* be, designed in many styles, and it can and ought to be reasonably framed and put together in any one of them. There are those among us, for instance, who think nothing more homely and comfortable than were the dwelling-houses of fifty or a hundred years ago, with their heavy mahogany furniture, and secretaries inlaid with brass, and tile fireplaces and four-posters, and stairways with twisted posts and balusters, and delicate wooden decoration in cornice and finish. These bear no resemblance to Mr. Eastlake's designs, yet all is refined, delicate, comfortable, and well built, and adapted to its uses. The man who admires this may never admire Mr. Eastlake's designs, but the same principles — and this is the good of the book — can guide them both.

As Mr. Eastlake very justly says, it would be undesirable and impossible to reject in manufacture the mechanical appliances of modern times, but the book is by no means written in this spirit. It is well to appreciate in art the evidence of human handiwork; that India rugs are, in point of design, better than modern carpets; that wrought metal work shows the thoughts of the artist more than does cast work, or that water-colors can never be imitated by chromo-lithography: but only a few can have "hand" work, and the rest of us may as well accept the fact. Modern houses must be made attractive, if at all, by showing how machine work and furniture made by wholesale may be tasteful; how screws and cast-iron and veneered doors and mill-planed mouldings may be properly used. These modern inventions would have been prized by mediæval workmen, and it is absurd in this age for searchers after truth to long for mortices and tenons, where a screw is cheaper, quicker, and stiffer; or for solid oak to be cracked and checked by furnace heat, when veneering will avoid it; or for hand labor in framing ordinary cheap furniture, which a factory will turn out at a quarter of the cost. The author really does explain what should guide the use of these methods, but he always speaks of them with regret and disgust, and he never shows by illustration how such work is to be done.

Foreign travel, with visits to foreign galleries, have given a large class of our people the beginning of an art education. It is to be hoped that the trustees of art museums will see that the amusement of this class is not their best object. No art interest can take a strong ground here until the mass of the people, and above all the artisans, feel it. In Munich there has lately been formed a National Museum, representing the art workmanship of the country in all ages. After South Kensington, it is the most interesting gallery of art labor in Europe; and as it represents the growth of one country, it is in that respect the more interesting of the two. These galleries ought to form the models for the early years

of our museums. Casts of statuary, copies of ancient and masterly modern pictures, are of unspeakable value as models; but more of the pupils of purely fine art go abroad, or have access to books and photographs; while the decorators, cabinet-makers, carpenters, iron-workers, designers in stuffs, stone-carvers, and the like, ought to be shown what artisans in good ages have done in just such work. If we start with teaching this class, we shall be doing the best work. The training to which this book points the way will do much for us, and we cannot close without recommending it to all who are interested in this good work, whether privately or publicly.

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9. — *Songs from the Old Dramatists.* Collected and edited by Abby Sage Richardson. New York: Published by Hurd and Houghton. Cambridge: The Riverside Press. 1873.

One must be grateful for a little volume like this of Mrs. Richardson's, which gives the public what few would be able ever to find for themselves, and fewer still would be able to put their hands on without more exertion than one cares to give when in a mood for the enjoyment of poetry. Her collection is more than tolerably complete; there is not a poem in it which does not deserve a place in an anthology of this sort, and there are few songs of the dramatists omitted which any one will miss. There is one from Thomas Nash's "Will Somer's Last Will and Testament," beginning, —

> "Adieu, farewell earth's bliss,
> This world uncertain is:
> Fond are life's lustful joys,
> Death proves them all but toys.
> None from his darts can fly:
> I am sick; I must die.
> Lord, have mercy on us!"

which we should have been glad to have seen in the volume, especially on account of the third stanza, which runs as follows: —

> "Beauty is but a flower,
> Which wrinkles will devour:
> Brightness falls from the air;
> Queens have died young and fair;
> Dust hath closed Helen's eye;
> I am sick; I must die.
> Lord, have mercy on us!"

But, of course, in a collection made from so broad a field, it is impossible that every song which every one likes should find admittance. We do not wish to find fault, but rather to congratulate the editor on the taste she has shown in her selection. The readers will be few who do not find in this volume a great many new and welcome poems. And this is natural enough; the vast region of English literature which most of us take for granted as very fine, without testing it for ourselves, contains not only so much in quantity, but also so much that offends the taste of a more refined generation, that the task of examination and choosing necessarily falls upon some few persons, whose exertions are able to show us the beauty that lies in what we have readily neglected. Novelty is so dangerous a rival to real merit, as if the proper appreciation of poetry consisted in nothing more than being able to apply to it the just word of criticism, that we can hardly overestimate the work of a book that distracts the public from an excessive curiosity about inferior work which is only new, and recalls it to poems of such real simplicity and beauty as this collection holds; as, for instance, "The Aged Courtier," on page 100, —

> "His golden locks time hath to silver turned;
> O time too swift! O swiftness never ceasing!"

which is merely one of many.

Besides these more important qualities, an effort has been made to render the book attractive to the reader by attention to the printing and by the aid of illustrations. These are four in number, and were drawn by Mr. John La Farge. His deservedly high reputation as an artist, and the evident desire on the part of the publishers to raise this volume above the very mediocre level of most American illustrated books, call for more than a brief mention of his designs. They are all noticeable for their imaginative beauty. There is the first one introductory to the pastoral songs and songs of nature, in which a shepherd is leaning over the top of a cliff, his pipe idle in his hands, while he listens to the song of a mermaid in the sea beneath; then the illustration to the songs of fairies and spirits, in which a fairy is rising from a lake covered with water-lilies. But in the first one there are faults of detail, such as the monstrous size of the youth's hand; moreover, the illustration to the songs of feeling and thought is incomplete; but the merits of the designs demand admiration, if they do not disarm criticism. Perhaps the most striking, as they stand, is that of the songs of sorrow, a fantastic picture representing with great feeling a young girl bowed with grief, with a side view of a troubled sea. The engraving, too, is deserving of great praise; it has been done with the greatest care and skill. It is only fair that the credit which is due should be given to the engraver,

Mr. Henry Marsh. As to the printing from the engraving, something very different should be said; the vagueness in the last of the illustrations, the mistiness in the face and figure of the rising fairy, and the uncertainty in the water, is due to the fact that the engravings were printed on unsuitable paper. The same cause has injured them all, with great unfairness to both artist and engraver, and much to the detriment of what would otherwise have been the best illustrated book that had ever appeared in this country. As it is, the book is still valuable and interesting; but it is only to be regretted that it should have been allowed to come so near being better and then so nearly spoiled. The printing is neatly and carefully done. The iron-work tracery of the cover strikes us as in singularly bad taste, for it is much more appropriate to the chill graveyard fence than to the Christmas gift-book; nor do we set any store by the "ornamental designs" and vignette.

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10. — *Oriental Religions and their Relation to Universal Religion. India.* By Samuel Johnson. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

One of the last discovered of the sciences, that of linguistics, brings for a reward to its students a wider view of the early history of man, and of the most interesting side of man, than does any other of the sciences. Whether all geologists would agree to this statement is perhaps uncertain, but at any rate one cannot be too grateful for the opportunity the study of linguistics has given us to trace the growth of the religious nature of man from remote periods down to the present day. The students of Sanskrit find that for their very text-books they must use the theological treatises and the hymnals of the language as the storehouse of verbs and constructions which go so far towards explaining the old puzzles of Greek and Latin grammar. We find a complete collection of religious books, running back to an uncertain antiquity before the Christian era, and an almost unbroken series down to the present time. We have the very prayers of our early forefathers, the expression of the same wonder which animates their descendants, — a full record of the religious feeling of one race of men. But the reading of this record is where students differ. It is no easy task to put ourselves into the mind of our next-door neighbor, to see the world as he does, to satisfy ourselves with his solutions, and there is always danger of our reading more into the memorials of the past, — a past which it is so difficult for us to comprehend, — than was ever intended by those who composed them.

This is a fault from which Mr. Johnson cannot be said to be wholly

free. His book is written to represent the religions of India, Brahmanism and Buddhism, as well as the earlier Aryan religion, as divisions of a universal religion of which Christianity is one part as well as any other. That the proper way of discussing this question, like all others, is one of freedom from bias, of course, needs no discussion. To begin comparing any other religion with Christianity, with the assumption of the self-evidence of the inferiority of the uninspired religion to that which we claim to be inspired, is a sort of discussion that every one would readily condemn if it were done, *mutatis mutandis*, by ignorant pagans; but there is the same objection to starting with any hypothesis, especially when the facts treated are still so unsettled. Mr. Johnson seeks impartiality with rare earnestness, but it seems to us that the world stands much more in need of exact information about the true nature of these early religions, than of a comparison between them and others, with the result, more or less wide-spread, of magnifying their merits and diminishing their faults. Not that it should be thought that Mr. Johnson has sacrificed facts to the expression of his views; on the contrary, he has collected a very great number of interesting details from very many authorities. These authorities, however, are not of equal repute. Pictet, for instance, is a man whose statements should be accepted only with the utmost caution. He cared much more for an entertaining and apparently complete expression of his opinions than for rigid, irrefutable accuracy. It is much to the credit, be it said by the way, of the original workers in this field, that a scholar who, like Mr. Johnson, works at second-hand, should find so much material which he can employ, and that there should be so little that cannot be used with safety. There has been a great deal of wild writing when attempts have been made to theorize about the facts, but the collections of facts have been made with great zeal and care.

While we would warmly recommend Mr. Johnson's book as bearing evidence of generally careful compilation and of much original thought, there are certain points which we think well deserve discussion. We doubt the accuracy of Mr. Johnson's estimate of the Aryas; not that we should care to have them drawn as howling savages, but one finds it hard to believe that they were such lofty choppers of logic and masters of philosophy as the author represents them. If so, the human race has sadly degenerated. If these simple hewers of wood and drawers of water "distinguished clearly the principle of spiritual existence," there is indeed truth in the poets' dreams of a golden age. Mr. Johnson refers to the theory of "solar myths," saying that they were "more or less intimately related to natural phenomena, though proceeding primarily from moral and spiritual experiences in their

makers,"— a vague sentence, the meaning of which it is by no means easy to catch. Here it seems to us that the author puts into the early Aryan mind the experience and light of the present day in regard of physical and, perhaps, spiritual phenomena. His Aryan is a nineteenth-century Aryan, who has read the Bible, the history of the Church, his Voltaire, and his Strauss, as well as the latest scientific books, and forms a fine-drawn theology which shall not strongly offend any of his instructors. Not that we would deny the strong religious yearning of the Vedic hymns, but we would incline to deny the existence, at that early time, of a philosophy which is so nearly one of satiety. Of great value is the author's account of Brahminism; he here, as everywhere, has carefully studied his subject, has accumulated much material from very arid sources, and for his care and appreciation he deserves great praise. To many the impression will occur that he overpraises the Hindu religion, that he regards the race with too lenient eyes, that in his zeal to do it justice he is blind to many of the faults of its systems; but we are all ready to forgive much to an author who is enthusiastic in his work.

He treats well of Buddhism; we cannot, however, agree with him in supporting Bunsen's interpretation of *nirvâna* as meaning "inward peace"; it seems more likely that, if the Buddhists had intended to give it that meaning, they would have done so, there is no reason for their not doing it, it would have been perfectly simple; whereas, on the other hand, half of the trouble about defining *nirvâna* might come from its very obscurity, from a vain attempt to separate it from annihilation. To the mind of the Buddhist, believing that all was bad, annihilation would have been the only sure relief from perpetual misery. Existence was subject to pain and sorrow; to escape from existence was his only aim, and that escape annihilation could bring him. That then, as now, the physical dread of dying was mistaken for horror of annihilation is probably true; and may it not have been to get around the one, while securing the other, that the real meaning was left purposely obscure? This we would suggest with all timidity.

As we have said, we recommend this book as perhaps invaluable for all who cannot of themselves make a thorough study of the original authorities; it should be read by those who care to see how general are those feelings, how universal are the forms of their expression at all times and in all places. The Hindu mind, with its hair-splitting subtlety, its apathetic intellectual seriousness, its unpractical logic, will always be a puzzle to us of the European branch; but it will always be an interesting study, and for this Mr. Johnson's book will be found an admirable aid.

11. — *The Ancient Stone Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great Britain.* By JOHN EVANS, F. R. S., F. S. A. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1872. Large octavo, 640 pages, 476 wood-engravings, large plate.

THIS work, which has been expected with eagerness for some time, is now before us; and after having examined it, we feel entitled to characterize it as a monument of minute knowledge and careful industry. The author gives much more than he promises. He describes not only in the most comprehensive manner the ancient stone implements, weapons, and ornaments of Great Britain, but also points out their analogies to kindred objects found in all parts of the world, either in the shape of relics of antiquity, or of weapons and tools still in use among uncultivated races, whose conditions of existence resemble more or less those of the primeval inhabitants of Europe. The numerous references occupying the foot of the pages indicate a most extensive reading; indeed, the author appears to be acquainted with everything, written in any language, that has the remotest bearing upon his subject. As may be expected, the references to North America, where the stone age hardly can be said to have expired, are frequent, and render the book so much more valuable to the American reader. Although in a work of this description, which is made up of simple facts, observations, and deductions, very little room is given for a display of elegant style, the author has admirably succeeded in presenting his subject in an attractive manner, and, at the same time, in saying much in few words. There is nothing superfluous, nor is there anything omitted necessary to convey a full meaning. This course was absolutely needed; for, if the author had indulged in lengthy phraseology, he would have failed in offering such an array of facts in a volume of little more than six hundred pages. Another feature about the work worthy of particular commendation is the great cautiousness of the author in reference to the destination of the relics he describes. Some archæologists feel themselves bound to explain the use of almost every antique object mentioned by them, however weak the arguments may be upon which they base their deductions. Certain prehistoric manufactures unmistakably bear in their shape the explanation of their use, and may be classified accordingly; yet there are others — and their number is not small — to which a definite use thus far cannot be assigned with any degree of safety, and this being the case, a plain admission of wanting knowledge is far preferable to strained interpretations. Mr. Evans is perfectly free of that ultra-speculative tendency: he is positive where he has a right to be, and doubts where doubt is prudent.

Any one who has paid some attention to the progress of prehistoric

archæology in Europe is aware that the stone age is there divided into two epochs representing two great phases in the development of man, namely, the palæolithic and the neolithic periods. The first of these comprises the rude weapons and tools of flint made and used by man while he coexisted with the mammoth, the woolly-haired rhinoceros, urus, cave-bear, cave-lion, and other now extinct animals. These implements, the oldest known products of human art, are merely chipped, not ground, because man was not yet sufficiently skilled to render them more serviceable by providing them with smooth edges. The so-called "drift implements" and most of those found in the caves inhabited by prehistoric savages belong to this class. The neolithic period, as the name implies, embraces a more advanced stage of human progress, represented by well-chipped flint instruments, polished celts, axes, pottery, etc. This period preceded, and, to a certain extent, survived, the beginning of the age of bronze. We were at first somewhat surprised to find in the present work the neolithic implements described, contrary to the usual rule, *before* those of the palæolithic type. The author himself evidently expected objections to his arrangement, and therefore took pains to meet them promptly by arguments which, it must be admitted, are well calculated to reconcile the critical reader to his plan. "My reasons," he says (p. 425), "for thus reversing what might seem to be the natural arrangement of my subject, and ascending instead of descending the stream of time, I have already to some extent assigned. I need only now repeat that our sole chronology for measuring the antiquity of such objects is by a retrogressive scale from the present time, and not by a progression of years from any remote given epoch; and that though we have evidence of the vast antiquity of the class of implements which I am about to describe (cave and drift implements), and may at the present moment regard them as the earliest known works of man, yet we should gravely err were we for a moment to presume on the impossibility of still earlier relics being discovered. Had they been taken first in order, it might have been thought that some countenance was given to a belief that we had in these implements the first efforts of human skill, and were able to trace the progressive development of the industrial arts from the very cradle of our race. Such is by no means the case."

Our remarks concerning the contents of the volume necessarily must be short; for were we only to enumerate minutely, according to chapters, the various matters discussed by the author, we should far exceed the limits allotted to this notice. Having started by presenting a general view of the ages of stone, bronze, and iron, he passes over to the manufacture of flint implements (dwelling particularly on the methods employed by the aborigines of North America), and then enumerates

the different experiments made by archæologists to find out in what manner drilling in stone may have been effected. These subjects are treated with perfect completeness and precision, and cannot fail to be of the highest interest to all students of prehistoric archæology. The next five chapters are devoted to the numerous kinds of celts (rough-hewn, partly or entirely polished), picks, chisels, and gauges. Next in order are the perforated axes, grooved and perforated hammers, hammer-stones, grinding-stones and whet-stones, embracing four chapters. The author has taken unusual pains in describing the various classes of neolithic flint articles, including flakes and cores, scrapers, borers, drills, awls, trimmed flukes, knives, and, lastly, arrow and javelin heads. The last-named class, distinguished by the great variety of its types, of course, is treated with all due care. The flint implements extend over six chapters, including one in which the "fabricators," or flint tools used in working flint, are described. The remaining four chapters, treating of slingstones and balls, bracers, articles of bone and stag's horn, spindle-whorls, disks, weights, ornaments, amulets, etc., conclude that part of the work which has the manufactures of the neolithic type for its subject.

The second division of the book, entitled "Implements of the Palæolithic Type," contains only four chapters, but these represent *par excellence* the scientific portion of the work; for here the author combines the experiences of archæological and geological investigation, in order to discuss the important question of the antiquity of man. We become acquainted with the interesting facts resulting from cave-researches in England, and likewise learn many details concerning French caves. The remarkable manufactures of flint and bone, as well as the osseous remains of extinct mammalia, associated with them in the caves, are enumerated and described, and the circumstances of their discovery and their geological relations duly recorded. The English ossiferous caves thus treated are Kent's Cavern, Brixham Cave, the Wookey Hyena Den, the Gower Caves, and King Arthur's Cave; but much reference is also made, for the sake of comparison, to the caves of Dordogne, in Southern France, so well described in the "Reliquiæ Aquitanicæ," by Lartet and Christy. From the caves the author passes over to the river drifts, giving a full account of their contents, manufactures, as well as bones belonging to animals of a bygone fauna. The last chapter, relating to the "Antiquity of the River Drift," in itself is a geological essay of great merit.

Though certain types of the palæolithic epoch bear a resemblance to the manufactures of the later neolithic period, the former are generally of a different, more primitive character, giving evidence that the savage men, who made and used them, stood extremely low in the scale of

human development. When we consider that these people were surrounded by numerous animals distinguished either by tremendous size, or rapacity combined with great strength (as in the case of the cave-bear and cave-lion), it becomes almost a matter of marvel how they succeeded in holding their own against such odds, armed as they were — during the drift period at least — only with rudely worked oval or pointed flints, probably shafted to serve as hatchets and spears.

Having thus indicated, certainly in a very cursory way, the contents of the volume, we have to say something about the numerous engravings representing the described objects. They certainly compare favorably with the best efforts of this kind ever offered to the public, either in this country or abroad. The articles, in general, are drawn in natural or in half-size, and mostly in two views, to which a cross-section is often added. The drawings of the flint articles, particularly, cannot fail to satisfy the most fastidious connoisseur: they are, indeed, so well executed that every crack and fracture becomes distinctly visible, and even the chalky crust covering the unchipped portions can be plainly distinguished.

To the American reader, who is acquainted with the stone implements of our Indian predecessors, it must be a matter of great interest to notice the remarkable analogy existing between the simple manufactures of the prehistoric Europeans and those of the natives of this country. In fact, to many, if not most, of the types represented in Mr. Evans's work counterparts are found here; and not few of the drawings of flint flakes, scrapers, arrowheads, celts, chisels, hammer-stones, etc. might have been executed after American originals. Yet, this resemblance cannot be a matter of surprise. The exigencies of external circumstances have regulated the progress of human development, compelling, as it were, the populations of different parts of the world to act, independently of each other, in a similar manner, provided there was a sufficient similarity in their conditions of life. The same wants led to the same means for satisfying them, and hence the correspondence in the simple articles employed in domestic life, in war, or in hunting.

Mr. Evans's work, we are confident, will find many readers in the United States, not only among those who make archæology their special study, but also among the educated classes in general. The great popularity which the writings of Sir Charles Lyell, Sir John Lubbock, Nilsson, and others have acquired in this country demonstrates that literary productions relating to the primitive condition and the gradual development of the human race find more and more favor with our public. A like success may be anticipated for Mr. Evans's work, which, to say the least, is equal to the best of its kind published in our time.

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ART. I. — *Gesammelte Schriften.* Von RICHARD WAGNER. 4 Bde. Leipzig. 1872.

THE history of art has never witnessed a more bitter and protracted strife of opinion than now reigns in the musical world. There have been great epochs of reform in art, as in politics and religion, and the various schools of ancient and modern times represent the widely diverging types of style that follow the ever-changing current of civilized life; yet it would be difficult to find any parallel to the present musical struggle, with respect to the acrimony and intolerance displayed by the disputants, the universality of the discussion, and the importance which the movement has for the future: for the new school aims at the very foundations of musical art as it has been established in the minds of Europeans for more than two centuries.

The history of music, as of the other fine arts, teaches us that, notwithstanding the constant action and reaction in the ideals and styles of artistic representation, there are certain fundamental principles which cannot be subjected to change and fashion without violating natural laws; thus the building must conform to the law of statics, the painting to the law of perspective, and the poem to the rules of prosody.

The maxims of art are not contradictory and destructive, but cumulative. If we believe in human progress, as men

mount upward, a higher revelation of beauty and truth will be manifested in all forms of art. Hidden principles will come to light; the emotional power of music will be more profoundly expressed and felt, and poetry will give utterance to loftier flights of thought and imagination. Nevertheless, not every so-called revolution or reform is a sign of progress. Art may have, as it has had, its vagaries and wanderings from the right path; and a new departure from the noblest models, instead of bringing us nearer to Parnassus, may lead into the wilderness.

The present revolutionary epoch in German music may be considered as the outgrowth of the political Revolution of 1848; for at that significant moment, Richard Wagner, who took an active part in the movement, published his first polemical writings, which were destined to cause a greater commotion in the musical world than even his music, except perhaps his very recent operas. The political movement of 1848 may have been a necessary link in the chain of modern development; yet the Utopia which the ardent and sanguine democrats imagined they descried in the distance, on drawing nearer, proved to be the spiked helmet of Bismarck. Whether the musical revolution will prove equally delusive has not yet been fully decided. Year by year the war of opinion has grown more fierce and general, and finally has divided the musical world into two hostile camps; and though there are many rational and moderate-minded people who have not espoused the cause of either party, and would fain cry to the combatants, "Hold, enough!" still the contest must go on until the principal actors on the scene have passed away. Any arguments, therefore, which might be presented on this subject, though based on a thorough examination and criticism of the theories and music of this new epoch, would weigh but little with its most determined friends or foes; the following review will be addressed to less prejudiced readers, who may desire to gain some intimacy with the subject, and to whom a brief analysis and criticism of the theories and music of Wagner, Liszt, and Berlioz may be acceptable.

Richard Wagner, the most prominent figure in this group of musicians, was born at Leipsic in 1813. His early youth was spent under the influence of different artistic impressions,

without showing a strong inclination for any particular art. In this respect his childhood stood in marked contrast to that of the great masters, or even of musicians of ordinary ability, who have generally evinced a decided aptitude and inclination for music in early life. We read in Wagner's Autobiography that his piano teacher declared that nothing good would ever come of him in music. "He was right," admits Wagner, "for I could never learn to play the piano well. I was writing dramas, when, at the age of fifteen years, I learned to know Beethoven's symphonies; this decided my exclusive passion for the study of music, which had acted powerfully on my organization ever since I first heard the opera of 'Der Freischütz.'" Henceforth, in spite of the determined opposition of his relatives, he devoted himself to music; but not so much to thorough drill under his teachers as to independent efforts. The fruits of this period were an overture and symphony for the orchestra, and a romantic opera entitled "The Fairies."

At the age of twenty-one years Wagner began his career as a practical music director. He was engaged successively at the theatres at Magdeburg, Königsberg, and Riga; but after a few years abandoned this occupation and went to Paris, where he hoped to gain honor and position by the production of a new opera, "Rienzi," which he had already sketched out.

But success did not attend him; he was obliged to earn his bread by arranging melodies from favorite operas for the *cornet à piston*. Perhaps the drudgery of work like this may have developed his latent hatred for all operatic melodies, which comes so fully to light in his subsequent writings.

Three years in Paris convinced Wagner that it was no place for the employment of his talents, so in 1842 he shook the dust off his feet and returned to Germany. At Dresden he succeeded in bringing "Rienzi" before the public, and the author found himself suddenly the favorite of the hour. In this opera Wagner had not broken away from the traditional style of music; and this fact, together with the pomp and display of the stage, an element which he borrowed from the French, insured the favorable reception of his work. This was speedily followed by the production of "The Flying Dutchman" and "Tannhäuser"; but neither of these operas was well received

by the public. The composer had wandered too far away from the path marked out by his predecessors. Wagner was overwhelmed for a time by this reverse. "I saw that only a few friends comprehended me," were his words. Nevertheless he set about the composition of his "Lohengrin," which was completed near the commencement of the Revolution of 1848.

Wagner, as a violent radical in politics and religion as well as in music, took an active part in the Revolution, and in consequence was obliged to flee from the country. In his exile he first published his peculiar ideas on art and politics. They did not attract immediate notice, however, and it was not until Liszt had published an able analysis and eulogy of "Tannhäuser" and "Lohengrin," and these operas had been performed at Weimar, that public attention was fixed on Wagner. His name and works soon became universally known, either to be honored and admired, questioned or criticised by the more wary, or despised and execrated by still another class of the inharmonious devotees of music. Wagner's subsequent history is so well known, that we may pass on to the consideration of his theories as set forth in his writings, and to the brief examination of the chief characteristics of his dramatic music.

The modest aim of Wagner's writings is a complete revolution in art, society, politics, and religion. The general features of this scheme were announced in his first pamphlet, "Art and Revolution." The theory was developed as a whole in a succeeding pamphlet, "The Future Work of Art," and its special discussion and application to poetry and music formed the subject of a third pamphlet, "Opera and Drama."

In "Art and Revolution" the author draws a picture of modern civilization the reverse of flattering, for he says it is founded on hypocrisy. He draws a parallel between the artistic life of the ancient Greeks and that of the present age, to the total denial, of course, of the existence of true art in modern times. Ancient art was the expression of national life; our art and literature are matters of luxury. He maintains that the development of genuine art is incompatible with Christian belief and consciousness. The past two thousand

years belong to philosophy, and not to art. "Christianity," he declares, "justifies an ignominious and miserable existence of man upon earth, out of the wonderful love of God, who has created him, not for a joyful life on earth, as the æsthetic Greeks erroneously believed, but has imprisoned him here, as it were, in a loathsome dungeon, in order that after his death, as a reward for his self-abasement, he shall have prepared for him an endless state of unoccupied and indolent glory."

"The Christian cannot turn to nature or the senses, for is not sensuous beauty to him a vision of the Devil?" Therefore Christianity is incapable of true art, which in Wagner's eyes is the highest activity of man in harmony with himself, as a sensuous being, and with nature.

"Hypocrisy," he continues, "is the most prominent feature, — nay, the true physiognomy of all the Christian centuries up to the present day; and this vice stands out more and more glaringly and shamelessly as mankind, out of an unconquerable, inward source, and in spite of Christianity, refreshes and reinvigorates itself and moves onward to the true solution of the problem of life." Moreover, he asserts that the industry of modern nations is perverted, being a worse enemy to art than the Church. "Art has been betrayed into the hands of the god of the modern world, the high-born god of five per cent."

"Modern art draws its strength from money speculations; its moral object is the pursuit of wealth, its æsthetic excuse, entertainment for the victims of ennui."

"The public art of the Greeks, as it reached its apex in the tragedy, was the expression of the deepest and noblest thoughts and sentiments of the whole people; the deepest and noblest of our modern consciousness is just the reverse, the denial of our public art."

"The ancients, then, had real art, the moderns have mere *artistic handicraft.* With the fall of Greek tragedy the drama no longer embraced a union of the fine arts; but, henceforth, each art went on its own separate way, and though great and noble minds have for centuries raised their voices in the wilderness, yet we have not listened to them; we tremble before their fame, yet laugh in the presence of their art; for a great and genuine work of art could not be created by them alone;

our co-operation with them was essential. The tragedy of Æschylus and Sophocles was the work of Athens."

"Only a great revolution of mankind can prepare the ground for a new art, such as the Greeks had." This is the substance of Wagner's first pamphlet.

In his next pamphlet, "The Future Work of Art," the author is no longer destructive, but, on the contrary, eminently and ingeniously constructive. He teaches that man is his own god and stands above nature, and in his inward and outward life, as an observing and impressionable creature, corresponds perfectly to that grand and complete art which is the result of a combination of all the separate branches or modes of art. Each of the arts, poetry, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, and dancing, contributes its share to the result, in a measure corresponding to the several artistic faculties of man. Thus the emotional nature is expressed by music, the understanding by poetry, and the bodily man by dancing. The union of these three "purely human" expressions of art pre-exists in the drama, in which man represents himself, personally, in the highest degree of completeness, with the assistance of the imitative arts of painting and sculpture. Painting supplies the landscape or natural scene, in the midst of which man moves; sculpture lives in man himself, and architecture furnishes the place in which the artistic representation takes place. The object, in a word, is to reunite the various branches of art as they were united in ancient Greece, but on a higher plane and with infinitely richer materials.

In his longest writing, "The Opera and Drama," Wagner proceeds to make a special application of these principles. He reviews the opera and drama of the past with sharp, unsparing criticism. He announces his brief formula, which appears to him so self-evident that it seems as though the world would have adopted it long ago. It is as follows: "The opera was an error, since in that species of art the means of expression (music) has been made the object, while the true object of expression (the drama) has been made the means." This is the key-note of the first part of the succeeding discussion, in the course of which he draws an historical sketch of the opera as a branch of art

which has been developed in two directions: first, "in a *serious* direction, through Gluck, Mozart, Cherubini, Méhul, Spontini, and all those masters who felt the weight of responsibility which fell to music when it announced for itself alone the aim of the drama; second, in a *frivolous* direction, through all those musicians like Rossini, Meyerbeer, and others, who, impelled by the instinct of the impossibility of solving an unnatural problem, turned their backs upon it, and, thinking only of enjoying the advantages that opera has gained from its extended publicity, gave themselves up to an unmixed system of musical experimentalizing." At the close of this lengthy discussion, the author fancifully, though not altogether tastefully, compares the modern Italian opera to a courtesan, the French opera to a coquette, the new romantic German opera to a prude, Mozart's opera to a lovely and beautiful woman, — having previously stated that music is a woman. And now he stops to ask, Who is the man that shall implicitly love this woman? It is the poet. In other words, poetry and music must be equally and happily wedded, in order to constitute the ideal work of art. In the next part, Wagner examines the causes why we have had no true theatre. The English drama of Shakespeare is drawn from real life, but represents it in an incomplete form. Shakespeare did not feel the necessity of giving a representation wholly true to the surrounding scene; he therefore condensed and sifted the manifold materials of the romance, and treated them dramatically simply in the degree required for the necessities of a contracted stage and a limited plot.

Neither his, nor the Italian and French drama which seeks to reproduce the finished forms of ancient classical tragedy, but has nothing in common with modern life, nor the vacillation between these extremes that characterizes the German drama of Goethe and Schiller, fulfils the highest mission of dramatic art.

Wagner consequently would abolish the literary drama as well as the opera, and substitute for them a work of art addressed to our sensuous nature. "In the drama," are his words, "we are made wise by feeling." He wholly rejects the literary stand-point, and will have only a "direct, living art of representation." He addresses not the reason and imagina-

tion, but the totality of the senses. We must not be educated to understand a work of art, but to enjoy it.

The third part of "Opera and Drama" is devoted to a statement of the true relation of music to poetry. Wagner denounces what is commonly termed melody, or the traditional form of the *air*, that is, the rising and falling musical phrases whose motives or subdivisions are repeated in certain modified imitations, in order to establish a necessary identity or individuality in the musical thought, and preserve a unity of design, without which the æsthetic sense of proportion and beauty cannot be gratified and the emotions powerfully affected. This form of melody must be done away with, and what he calls *infinite melody*, hinted at vaguely in Beethoven's last compositions, must be substituted. The only genuine melody, he asserts, is that which arises from the heartfelt delivery of the language, — melody that does not attract any attention on its own account except as the sensuous expression of a sentiment that is clearly manifest in the language.

Such an infinite melody is, or should be, the creation of the poet; and within it exists the germ of the accompanying harmony, though unexpressed.

Through the medium of the orchestra the harmony knows no arbitrary limits. The family of keys must be made one in spirit and agreement. The independent members of the whole round of keys must be permitted to move here and there with perfect freedom.

As regards the employment of the chorus, Wagner will not give any place to *polyphony;* and the traditional style of opera chorus, as a mass of united voices, he would also dispense with. "A mass of people can never interest, but merely confuse the hearer; only distinctly distinguishable individualities can gain his attention and sympathy."

The actions and gestures of the personages of the play hold the same relation to the language of the drama as the flexible movements of the orchestra do to the melody, — as a powerful agency for enhancing the effect and meaning of the vocal part. The orchestra gives powerful expression to all the utterances of the actor, and sustains and explains him in every way. As far as the expression of emotion is concerned, the modern or-

chestra will occupy a position in the future drama similar to that held by the ancient chorus in the Greek tragedy.

It would lead us too far to enter further into the details of this remarkable theory. I have stated the principal points of the arguments that Wagner has sought to illustrate more or less completely in his operas. He did not attempt, however, to apply these principles to their full extent at the outset. He was too shrewd for this. In the operas of "Rienzi" and "The Flying Dutchman" he approached his aim only at a remote distance. In "Tannhäuser" he advanced nearer, but still retained the air, concerted pieces, and other traditional forms. He drew closer to the ultimate goal of his desires in the opera of "Lohengrin," since he selected for the first time a mythical subject: it being his creed that the myth is the beginning and end of all true poesy. As Greek art sprang from Greek mythology, so must future German art be founded on the German myths. Such is the Wagnerian logic. The characters of mythology being endowed with superhuman qualities, miracle is indispensable to the future drama; not, however, with the object of making us *believe*, but *feel* directly the inner connection of actions, without the aid of imagination or reflection.

The opera of "Tristan and Isold," which was brought out at Munich a few years since, was the first complete attainment of Wagner's ideal. Since then he has composed the Nibelungen drama, a series of four operas entitled "Rheingold," "Die Walküre," "Siegfried," and "Götter-Dämmerung." This crowning work of his life has not yet been performed, but will be offered to the public next year at Bayreuth, if the proposed Wagner festival takes place.

The "Mastersingers of Nuremberg" ought to be mentioned as a somewhat earlier work; it is Wagner's only comic opera.

We may now ask what are the counter-views and criticisms which these theories and works have evoked.

Wagner's wholesale denunciation of modern civilization, his declaration that our present religion and social and political life must be completely revolutionized before his ideal work of art can be appreciated, is so far removed from any possibility of realization, that we may dismiss the subject as the vagary of a wild dreamer. "This dream of a reform of the

world," observes Ambros, "can never be realized, because it contains irreconcilable contradictions, such as absolute freedom in single details, and conformity to law as a whole. So that Wagner is like one who would expect to see the magic castle of a *fata morgana* converted into a real architectural pile, resting on a firm foundation, and built of solid, hard stone." These "irreconcilable contradictions" distinguish Wagner's writings throughout; for they are a strange mixture of truth and error, in which the error predominates. His total and irreverent denial of the inestimable good which Christianity has done and will continue to do for humanity; his vain attempt to persuade men to return to the naturalism of earlier times, at least to a conduct of life in which nature and the senses are to be the chief guide; his arrogant attitude towards the art of mediæval and modern times, the true spirit of which he ignores when he asserts that it is not the outgrowth of Christianity and the Renaissance, and that it is not art, but artistic handicraft; these and other statements are errors which demonstrate to every rational and sober-minded reader that the author's judgment is partial and warped, and that he is to be classed with other violent agitators and enthusiasts with heated imaginations who seem out of joint with the world. Wagner's scheme of uniting all the fine arts in order to constitute a grand, comprehensive art or drama, such as the Greeks are supposed to have had, looks promising enough for the moment, but reflection does not lend wings to our faith. There is in truth nothing eminently new or original in the idea.

Music, poetry, and dancing have from time immemorial appeared conjointly in the drama, in one form or another, accompanied to some extent by the other fine arts. As regards the triple alliance of poetry, music, and dancing, the latter, which hitherto, in all the higher forms of dramatic representation, has deservedly held a subordinate place, finds itself in Wagner's *scheme* suddenly raised to an equality with the two most spiritual of arts; a position which in Wagner's *operas* it does not and cannot maintain.

As far as the place which painting, sculpture, and architecture shall occupy in the drama, the first cannot amount to anything more than mere decorative painting; and, unless

statues are placed in niches or grouped on the stage, sculpture will have to be left out of the account; for it is absurd to talk of the actors representing this art by their figures and attitudes. The very idea of sculpture is a perfect physical form and action in repose; and unless the actors are models of physical beauty, and can be grouped so as to assume attitudes perfectly statuesque, it cannot be acknowledged that plastic art has anything to do with the future drama. In the Greek tragedy this was possible. The actors wore huge masks, which, according to ancient ideas, were absolutely essential; for the fidelity of the representation was of less consequence than its beauty. "The Greeks," says Schlegel, "would with justice have considered it a make-shift to allow an actor with common, ignoble, or strongly marked individual features to represent an Apollo or Hercules; nay, this they would have esteemed an actual profanation. In the mimetic art their first idea was to exhibit their personages with heroic grandeur, a dignity more than human, and an ideal beauty; their second was character; and the last of all, passion, which had to give way in the collision."

"The entire appearance of the tragic figures it is not easy to represent to ourselves with sufficient beauty and dignity, and it will be well to keep the ancient sculpture present to the mind."

As to the share which architecture is to have in the future drama, can it do more than furnish an appropriate surrounding in which the action is to take place? Architecture requires forms that imply solidity of structure. The material thrusts itself upon our attention, and the sham show of the stage columns, arches, walls, etc. does not merit the name of architectural art.

No one can deny the intimate relation which the arts hold to each other, but it is quite another matter to accept the theory of a grand unity of all the fine arts. Even the Greeks did not combine them equally. "In the tragedy," says Schlegel, "the poetry was the chief object, and everything else was held strictly subservient to it. Their dancing and music had nothing common with ours but the name." We have neither the spirit nor object of such a drama. The modern play concerns itself chiefly with the representation of

the actions of human life, while the ancient drama had a supernatural and religious aim. Moreover, the modern way of speaking or reciting poetry is wholly unlike the ancient musical declamation, which is foreign to the genius of modern speech. Music, consequently, will henceforth be employed as an artifice introduced into the drama for its own ends. If the time ever comes in real life when men shall make love, quarrel, or die in vocal melody or declamation, as they do at present on the operatic stage, then music will cease to be an artifice; but until then it will not be introduced into the play merely to serve a subordinate place in clothing or coloring the words. Music will be kept out of the way altogether, or else made to realize its highest object, which is to express, in accordance with the principles of musical art, the various moods of feeling prompted by the conflict of the play, without laying particular stress on its essential *naturalness* in the drama. This is what Mozart accomplished more perfectly than any other master before or since his time.

Perhaps the nearest approach to a grand *ensemble* of the fine arts was afforded in the Middle Ages by the dramatic representations of the Passion of Christ, which were sometimes given within the lofty arches of the cathedrals, where painting and sculpture had their appropriate places on the walls and in the niches, and sacred poetry and music were wedded harmoniously, to express the heartfelt devotion of the worshippers. This was a grand and impressive drama, more comprehensive in its means and object than any modern dreamer has conceived, and it sprang out of the very soul of Christianity itself, — a religion incapable of the future art, according to Wagner's creed.

Every fine art is complete in itself. "A complete dramatic poem and an equally independent and artistically developed musical composition do not blend, but on the contrary *conflict* with each other, for each follows its own peculiar laws."

A great play like "Hamlet," teeming with profound thought and philosophy, or "Macbeth," with its predominance of terror and rapidity of action, must sacrifice its most characteristic scenes and passages in order to meet the requirements of the musical drama. On the other hand, if music were made subservient to the words of a poem, it would lose the very essence

of its being; it would degenerate from its present free position among the foremost arts; it would no longer be the powerful language of the emotions, but, like Greek music, would have no higher object than merely to color the declamation.

Now Wagner aims to strike a middle course. Poetry must concede pure, reflective thought and all superfluous imagery; in other words, the literary stand-point must be resigned, and *feeling* made the object of the drama, which music must enhance without enjoying any real independence of its own. It is evident that such an equal concession must rob each art of its highest prerogative, and just in the degree with which the combination of the various materials grows more manifold, so will the intellectual conception lose its clearness and force. The conception of a universal art interests us on account of its superficiality rather than its profundity. It provides a greater variety, but less warmth of inspiration; it is less artistic than abstract.

One statue like the Venus of Milo, one picture like the Dresden Madonna, one poem like Faust, or one musical composition like Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, will singly outweigh and outlive the representative drama of Wagner, as realized in his last operas, simply for the reason that each art appears to complete advantage only when it is unshackled, or left entirely free to work out its highest object by itself. The only exception is the union of music and poetry, as it has been employed traditionally in church and secular music; in this case the words, however beautiful and significant they may be as poetry, resign their prominence in order that the structural form and lyric flow of the music may not be impeded. It matters not how intimate the modern alliance of poetry with music may be, the real interest of a mass, oratorio, or opera centres in the music. Such is the case even with the wonderful text of the Mass, which has been associated with music ever since the foundation of the Church, and grew up, as it were, in a musical form. The words of Handel's "Messiah" were selected and arranged for musical treatment; and however sublime or beautiful many of the Scriptural passages may be as poetry, they necessarily take a place subordinate to the music in the mind of the listener.

Gluck and Wagner have sought to wed poetry and music in perfect equality; but the result is not satisfactory, for the reason that the movement of the feelings, through the agency of music, is far more expanded in duration than the motive supplied by the words. A dramatic text cannot content itself with a repetition of the same thought, but must proceed from one thought to another, in order to sustain the progress of the action. Now if the music follows the poem strictly, syllable after syllable, word after word, without the privilege of dwelling here and there upon the sense of a passage, it cannot fulfil its highest object, which is to express the emotional principle to the utmost; and the orchestra cannot provide for this want by the rhythmical flow and coloring of the instrumental accompaniment.

The so-called "infinite melody" is a falsity. As exemplified by Wagner in his latest operas, it is nothing more or less than a kind of accompanied *recitative* or *arioso* style.

If this is destined to take the place of the *air*, real melody must disappear. The æsthetic significance of the air, or song, is to give musical expression to a state of intense feeling called into action by some thought, sentiment, or deed; on this account it is unjustifiable to banish it from the opera. The air is indispensable as the highest means of representing a culmination in the series of emotions which are developed through the action and conflict of the play. It is the moment when the actor pours out his whole soul in the utterance of his feelings, in consequence of preceding events in the action. On similar grounds the chorus and concerted movements, when several personages appear together on the scene, are fully authorized, even though they may arrest the progress of the action for the time.

I have previously stated that melody, in order to give the sense of form and proportion to the ear and move the feelings powerfully, must conform to the laws of symmetry and design, by a certain imitative progression of the phrases. The mind, or æsthetic faculty, requires a definite musical motive or theme, which must be expanded, imitated, and varied, for the purpose of intensifying the particular mood of feeling which the motive has awakened. But the "infinite melody" frequently disre-

gards all these essentials; and though the passions may be aroused by the mere physical or sensuous play of sounds, by the accents and rhythm of the vocal part, heightened by the rich and manifold effects of orchestration, and in combination with the dramatic scene, yet the deeper moods of feeling, such as awe, solemnity, and sorrow, which the purest and noblest music alone can sway, are not touched by Wagner. What a contrast to Mozart and Beethoven, who in this respect have fulfilled the highest ideal of the art!

The dramatic music of Mozart is endowed with the greatest energy and precision of expression. In his opera airs this master has delineated character with wonderful clearness. His musical personages are living creations; "they think, feel, and act in tones," and appear as true to life as those of Shakespeare. "Every character remains true to his musical individuality in all the changes of circumstances and passion." These sharp outlines of character are determined by the musical style, by the peculiar turn of the phrases, by the tempo, rhythm, range of voice, melodic inflections, accompaniment, and other signs which combine to individualize the music, just as character itself is the sum of certain peculiar marks.

We search in vain for similar attributes in Wagner's dramatic music, though it is a mannerism with him to repeat the same phrase or passage with the same instruments whenever a personage reappears on the stage; as, for instance, in the opera of "Tannhäuser" the high chromatic violin tremolo and rhythmical figure of the wind instruments are repeated whenever Venus appears on the scene. Other characters of his operas, as, for example, Tannhäuser, The Pilgrims, Lohengrin, King Henry, Elsa, and others, are likewise announced individually by a particular motive, or rhythmical figure, which is supposed to characterize the person. This substitute for real delineation of character may be used sparingly, but when carried to an extreme it must be termed pedantic and tiresome.

There is a vast difference between slavish imitation and the adherence to certain melodic and harmonic features that establish by modified repetition the unity of form, as essential in music as in the other fine arts. This device is not original with Wagner; it may be traced back to Von Weber and other

predecessors of Wagner in the opera; but they did not exaggerate its importance.

The ground taken by Wagner, that the genuine source of the "ideal drama" must be the *myth*, will not stand the test of criticism. "The true nature of the drama," says Otto Jahn, in his able criticism of the operas of "Tannhäuser" and "Lohengrin," "demands actions that spring from moral motives, and which our modern knowledge and belief recognize as such, although the poet may have free scope allowed him as regards the events. No matter how vividly the artist may reproduce the picture of other times, though it were so vivid that we might believe ourselves transported to them, if the action and sentiments of the play do not agree with our ideas of truth and reality we feel the contradiction, and the dramatic illusion is dispelled. A conflict can never be tragic, no matter how sad and thrilling its consequences may be, if its premises are incomprehensible or absurd to our minds. It is evident that it is an exceedingly difficult task to state the motive of Lohengrin's denial of the knowledge of his name to the maiden whom he marries; for the mystery of the Graal is no longer believed; nay, it is not even well known, and it appears so foreign to our conceptions, even to the mysticism of the present day, that it is no longer available as a poetical subject, or, at the most, it can be used merely as a decorative, external subject which the poet must first endow with soul, in a measure, to render effective." Wagner has sought to invest this myth with modern significance; but he has not succeeded in overcoming the obstacle that stood in the way at the outset; and the character of Lohengrin is not made clear to our comprehension by the symbolical attributes he possesses in the mind of Wagner. The subject of "Tannhäuser," as presented by Wagner, is still less satisfactory to the cultivated mind. "A gifted poet," continues Jahn, "proud in the feeling of his strength even to insolence, and in consequence of this very poetical gift, gives himself up to sensual pleasure, and becomes so enslaved by its demoniacal fascinations that his struggles are all in vain. He makes an effort, it is true, to free himself; he musters up his moral strength and religious faith; the blessed assurance of the pure love of Elizabeth raises his

courage, but all to no purpose. At every decisive moment the uneasy demon holds him firmly in his grasp, and finally he dies without the certainty of atonement. Here certainly were the elements of a poetical, a truly tragical representation; but Wagner has dwelt on the characteristics of the lower, sensual element, while the opposite power of morality has certainly been treated hesitatingly; consequently Tannhäuser never seems like a living individuality; the struggle of opposite elements on which the tragic interest rests cannot be developed, and the true solution of the whole — his expiation — cannot take place."

"When Tannhäuser had torn himself from the arms of Venus and had recognized in Elizabeth the nature of true and pure love, yet inwardly was governed by the fascinations of Venus, at that moment the struggle of his moral and sensual nature was decided. It is true that such a struggle might be renewed and overcome with new strength by every man; still this will not hold good for the dramatic poet, whose business it is to concentrate the struggle into one decisive moment. According to the antique conception, Tannhäuser would have perished physically through his moral defeat; according to the mediæval idea, whoever tarried on the Venusberg was doomed to burn eternally in hell; the modern author, to whom these judgments are too harsh, according to the present view of the subject, should give the moral strength of the man free scope to struggle and overcome the evil which threatens him."

"After Tannhäuser's pilgrimage to Rome and failure to gain the Pope's absolution, his repentance comes to a sudden end; he knows no other refuge than to return to Venus, to whom he properly belongs. But after all this, that pure love for Elizabeth should inspire him again, through her prayers, suffering, and death, has as little poetical truth as the supplementary narration of the wonder (of the pilgrim's staff shooting forth green leaves) which was bound up with the conditions of his forgiveness by the Pope."

Wagner's crowning work — the series of four operas under the general name of the Ring of the Nibelungen — is open to similar objections; for the subject, as he has treated it, must remain, as a whole, foreign to modern taste and understanding.

The Nibelungen Song cannot be too highly prized, when considered from a literary or philological stand-point, and the Germans are justly proud of their great epic; but it is a difficult if not an impossible matter to convert its principal incidents into a permanent dramatic form for the modern stage; and this is especially the case as Wagner has conceived the subject. He has thrown over it the glamour of sensuality, the true expression, it may be, of his own subjective nature, yet not of the mythological characters in general. He has interwoven with the natural, human element of the German myth the more Northern or Scandinavian features, the preternatural world of gods, Nibelungen, Valkyrias, giants, dwarfs, and water-sprites, with their wild manners and freakish actions, in such a way that the human element is rendered unnatural, if not almost unrecognizable, and we long for a return to the society of every-day men. These ancient Northern myths seem far less in harmony with modern civilization than even the gods and demigods of Greek mythology, or the heroes of the Iliad. And who wishes to revive these personages on the modern stage? Neither will the allegorical or symbolical significance with which Wagner has sought to invest these characters suffice to convince us of the real need of such a drama. How can we accept his or any other theory as to the origin and meaning of these myths, when there reigns so complete a difference of opinion concerning them in the minds of modern scholars? It is otherwise with the supernatural element in Shakespeare's plays. The basis of his most imaginative comedies, as, for instance, "The Tempest," and "Midsummer Night's Dream," is laid in real life. The world of fairies and spirits is subordinated to the struggle and play of human passions. The rich imagination of the poet has clothed the real and natural with the air of the wonderful, without mystifying the beholder. The action and sentiments of the characters of his plays can be comprehended, because they do not appear in contradiction to the moral and social ideas of the present age. "These singing beings, are they to be men?" says Marx of Wagner's earlier operas. "These melodies, enveloped in the clang and roar of the instruments, which often drown the word or make it unintelligible, are these to be their language? The

bodily appearance of the singers, in the action of the drama, is of itself sufficient to make their singing speech a myth and an unreal sport of fantasy. What no one ever believed, what no one would have ever dared to persuade us of, or attempted to demonstrate, all that is fabulous, every impossible adventure, every storm of unjustifiable or exaggerated feelings, every description of licentiousness and voluptuous intoxication of the senses, is here unhesitatingly put forward as a representation of reality."

If the texts of Wagner's operas are open to grave criticism as dramatic subjects, they deserve severe censure with respect to their rhetoric and versification. Even Wagner's most determined admirers cannot maintain that he possesses a good literary style; for he has dispensed with this. It would be absurd to compare the words of his operas with the dramatic poetry of Goethe, Schiller, or any illustrious name of German literature. According to Wagner's intention, neither the words nor the music can be separated from the scene and action. In the portrayal of character Wagner fails to display any great originality or power. His personages generally lack those individual traits that distinguish one dramatic character from another. As a dramatic poet, therefore, Wagner cannot be classed with the great masters of the art; nor as a musician will he ever occupy an equal rank with Bach, Handel, or Beethoven. What, then, is the secret of Wagner's present popularity and ascendency?

Wagner is a consummate master of all the externals of the stage. He has made the splendid show and brilliant pomp of the theatrical spectacle an indispensable adjunct to his operas. One grand effect succeeds another in logical and natural sequence; yet nothing, apparently, is introduced for the sake of mere effect. In this respect Wagner is much the superior of Spontini, Meyerbeer, and his other predecessors of the modern French stage, who introduce magnificence and splendor into the play without any real cause, merely to dazzle and astonish the beholder. But the action and substance of the play are obscured and injured instead of enhanced by such a jumble of accessories. In Wagner's operas the rich variety and contrast of the scenes make a vivid impression upon the

spectator, because nothing appears to be superfluous, or to be introduced without the object of benefiting the play. The principal scenes of any one of his operas will illustrate this theatrical talent. Let us cite merely the written descriptions of the opening scenes in "Tannhäuser": —

"The stage represents the interior of the hill of Venus, — a wide cave, bending at the back towards the right side, where it appears to be indefinitely prolonged. In the farthest visible background a bluish lake is seen, in which naiads are bathing; on its undulating banks sirens are reclining. In the extreme foreground Venus is extended on a couch; before her, in a half-kneeling attitude, is Tannhäuser, his head sunk on her knees. The whole cave is illuminated by a rosy light. The centre of the stage is occupied by a group of dancing nymphs." This scene suddenly vanishes when Tannhäuser, in his long and desperate struggle to free himself from the fascinations of Venus, calls upon the name of the Virgin Mary, and suddenly finds himself in a beautiful, sunlit vale. "At the back is seen the Wartburg against the blue sky; through an opening in the valley the Hörselberg is seen; half-way up the ascent a path leads down into the valley from the direction of the Wartburg, where the path turns aside. In the foreground is a shrine of the Virgin on a small eminence. From the heights the sound of sheep-bells is heard; on a rocky eminence a young shepherd is reclining, playing on his pipe. The penitential chant of the Pilgrims who come from the direction of the Wartburg towards the hill path is heard. The Pilgrims pass by and disappear; their chant and the sound of the shepherd's pipe on the heights grow fainter and fainter, then die away, while Tannhäuser, on his knees, is sunk in fervent prayer. The bells are heard far away, while the sound of hunting-bugles has come nearer and nearer from the heights, and soon the landgrave and his minstrels, in hunting array, are seen to descend from a forest path."

These well-contrasted scenes are succeeded by others equally striking; and we have abundant proof in this, as in all Wagner's operas, of his masterly skill in the management of the stage, and of his fertile imagination as a decorative artist. Many of these scene-pictures are truly poetical; and it is worth while for

those who are unacquainted with his talent in this branch to read the scenic descriptions given in the editions of his works.

Wagner has displayed equal skill and originality in the treatment of the action of the play. He is true to the dramatic object in all points of detail. In a word, the action, scenic display, words, and music are combined, so as to produce a remarkable unity of effect, though not without the sacrifice of the real independence of each of the several arts thus combined. Although his later music is not formed on a vocal style, and is difficult to sing, and lacks real beauty in the absence of melody, yet it is declamatory in a powerful degree; it is true to the metrical accents of the verse, and expresses vividly the meaning of the words. In this respect he stands out prominently as a progressive master, and will exercise a decided influence on the dramatic music of the future. The orchestra in Wagner's operas not only plays an important *rôle* in heightening the dramatic expression of the vocal part, but is also employed in a decorative sense to paint the scene in tones. Wagner has exhibited a wonderful technical command of the orchestra. He has planned new and remarkable effects of instrumentation. Some of his pieces, like the Overture to "Tannhäuser," or the Vorspiel to "Lohengrin," are universally popular. Many of the themes and melodies of his earlier operas are noble, characteristic, and pleasing, though, with some notable exceptions, compared with similar compositions of the greatest masters, they appear to disadvantage and seem somewhat coarse and formal. If we compare his music composed in the *free thematic form* with similar works by recent masters like Mendelssohn or Schumann, we are struck by the want of refined beauty in the music of Wagner. This is not compensated for by a real grandeur of style.

Any roughness that may appear here and there in the music of Beethoven does not seem out of keeping with his intention; the grand outlines of form correspond perfectly with his manly character and elevated ideas. Wagner's powerful and brilliant instrumentation, — noisy and brazen at times, — and his rich effects of instrumental coloring do not impress us as the spontaneous and sincere utterance of a profound musical nature.

He wears garments that do not fit him, for they are bor-

rowed. True grandeur of style cannot be attained by force or energy alone, nor can the mere sensuous effects of instrumental combination, or the imaginative play of sounds, as illustrated by orchestral pieces of Wagner like the "Introduction to Rheingold" or the "Ride of the Valkyrias," take the place of the emotional element in music. This master may arouse our passions, gratify our musical sense, and act upon our imagination, but he rarely reaches the source of our deeper and purer emotions. His music, like that of Liszt and other masters of the present epoch, is realistic. The orchestral description of the "Ride of the Valkyrias," or Maidens of Odin, through the air, or the representation of the "Battle of the Huns," by Liszt, in which the composer follows Kaulbach's celebrated fresco on that subject, are examples of this sensational, realistic tendency of the times, which is not confined to music, but distinguishes some other forms of modern art.

The spiritual or religious element — I do not refer to the ecclesiastical style — is almost wholly wanting in the music of Wagner and his school, and on this account they have no real affinity with Beethoven, whom they are so fond of associating with the dawn of the new era. This great poet has vindicated the true spirituality of music. His sad life, the trial of faith and love, through which he passed so triumphantly, kindled an undying flame of truth and beauty in his music. A deep religious feeling and moral tone pervade his compositions. The solemn mood takes possession of us when we listen to the grand openings of the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Symphonies; and at moments the feeling of awe and grandeur reaches a sublime height, to be changed to sadness or calm happiness in the *adagio*, and to vivacity, humor, or jocoseness in the *scherzo;* and this alternation of mood may reach a climax of triumphant joy in the *finale*. In a word, all the profound and varied emotions of the artist, whether sad or joyful, humorous or gloomy, playful or grotesque, elevated or subdued, act directly and powerfully upon the eager listener, who feels conscious that he is in the presence of a great spirit.

In the present dearth of musical genius in Germany Wagner has produced, in spite of his defective theory, a theatrical and musical combination which stands out prominently before the

present generation. Whether the contemplated production of his representative work, the "Ring of the Nibelungen," will augment or diminish his future influence cannot be predicted. It may be said on the negative side of this question that his first "ideal work," "Tristan and Isold," from which airs and concerted melodies were banished, has not survived its production at Munich in 1865.

His most *musical* operas, "The Flying Dutchman," "Tannhäuser," "Lohengrin," and the "Mastersingers of Nuremberg," are popular in all the principal cities of Germany and the Netherlands, and do not fail to draw full houses. But were Wagner's theory correct and its application convincing, the older operas would appear to such a disadvantage in being performed alternately with his operas, during the past fifteen years, that they would gradually have suffered neglect and withdrawal from the stage. Such, however, is not the case. "Fidelio," "Don Juan," "Der Freischütz," and contemporaneous operas, like the "Huguenots," "L'Africaine," and "Faust," are the popular rivals of Wagner's, and never fail to draw the public. The truth is simply this: the general operatic public is not distinguished anywhere, not even in Germany, for a cultivated and discriminating taste. The audience wishes, above everything, to be amused, and this is afforded by the spectacular as much as by the musical element of Wagner's and Meyerbeer's brilliant operas.

There is no branch of music so subject to the caprices of fashion as the opera; this is proved by the fate of hundreds of once popular and now forgotten works.

Time alone will decide the question of Wagner's place in musical history, and how much truth and merit belong to his works. Meanwhile the unprejudiced critic must acknowledge that Wagner is a man of wonderful energy and talent, — at the same time one whose head and heart are not entirely right. His erroneous theory has marred all his recent music. He has tried to institute a reform or revolution through the intellect rather than by the spontaneous and gradual growth of concrete musical thoughts, the offspring of real musical genius.

Palestrina, Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven were true reformers, or progressive spirits, because they worked out their mission

slowly and almost instinctively, without cutting themselves off from tradition and historical sequence. They built on the massive foundations already laid, and did not tear down the walls, when nearly erected, to begin over again on the ruins. The future opera, or musical drama, must necessarily fulfil its highest destiny through the *musician* who recognizes the moral and spiritual significance of the art, and its inestimable worth as pure music, independent in its means and object.

It is a fatal sign of degeneracy when an art has departed so far away from true simplicity of expression as is the case with the music of this new epoch. If we compare the vocal scores of Wagner and Liszt with the scores of Handel and Mozart, we perceive how far the masters of the new school have wandered away from a good vocal method, from clearness of musical form, from the symmetry of melodic design, and simplicity and directness of expression. It is the mark of greatness with an artist to accomplish important results by simple means. This is easier of accomplishment with the other fine arts than with music, for music labors under one disadvantage; it has no external guide in nature to keep it within bounds. "The architect," says Ambros, "has to obey the laws of statics, or his building will fall to pieces. The painter must remain faithful to the forms and colors of natural objects and the law of perspective. The poet must observe the rules of grammar and syntax as they are regulated by the nature of the language; he has not to trouble himself about its historical development. But before the grammar and syntax of music could become clear and regulated many centuries must have elapsed"; and no sooner do they seem well established than bold innovators seek to overthrow them. The technics of music with Wagner, Liszt, and their adherents have become so extremely complicated, both in composition, instrumentation, and performance, that the limits must soon be reached. These differ from the technics of Bach and Beethoven — the two greatest masters of form — in this respect; they fail to convey to the musical understanding the clearness and beauty of design through the organic development of motives, without which the sense of proportion, as addressed to the ear, cannot be gratified, and the deep moods of feeling awakened in the soul of the hearer.

The play of form in Bach's music is always prominent; yet his fugues, toccatas, and fantasias abound with rich characteristics of style and expression that reach the heart as well as the head. Every note has its clear and logical meaning; in his most intricate polyphony not a tone is lost in obscurity or half-expressed utterance. In the compositions of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, the form and spiritual contents of music are equally balanced, appearing as a perfect unity; this, therefore, has been termed the *classical* period of music. Schubert, Mendelssohn, Schumann, and others adhered to the historical forms, and at the same time stamped their works with the seal of their own peculiar individuality, without contradicting the past.

Wagner, Liszt, and Berlioz have abandoned the historical forms for the sake of the poetic ideas, as they claim. Form is placed in the background, poetic fancies or feelings in the foreground.

Berlioz's idea or problem of art was to make poetry the basis of instrumental music. He was not satisfied that music should suggest or characterize in a general way a poetic thought, but sought to make it take the place of words, or paint the meaning of the words, even in points of detail. This led Paganini to observe to Berlioz, on hearing his music for the first time, "Vous commencez par où les autres ont fini." Thus in his *Symphonie Fantastique* he represents a young musician (Berlioz himself) suffering with the torments of his supposed unrequited love; and in one phase of the struggle he determines to put an end to his unhappiness by poisoning himself with opium. But the narcotic is too weak to have the desired effect, and he sinks into a sleep haunted by the most frightful visions. He dreams that he has murdered the object of his love; that he is sentenced to death, and is obliged to witness his own execution. All this, including the march to the scaffold and his decapitation, is supposed to be represented unmistakably by the orchestra. So likewise he paints in music a number of scenes from "Romeo and Juliet," "Faust," and other poems. In such dramatic tone-pictures Berlioz has aimed to make music subordinate to pure mental conceptions by means of a programme of the poetic contents. Liszt, in his Symphonic Poems, has also

tried to express poetical thoughts by music alone. He differs from Berlioz, however, in not requiring a written programme or poem for the purpose of explaining his musical ideas. The poetic intention is embodied in the music. He has selected such subjects as Tasso, Hamlet, Faust, Prometheus, The Divine Comedy, and the Battle of the Huns; but although many fine touches of imagination come to light through the brilliant instrumentation and original rhythmical effects of these compositions, as of Berlioz's, still they have not found universal acceptance and success.

Wagner has not recognized pure instrumental music beyond Beethoven, whose Choral Symphony set the art at liberty. Unlike Liszt and Berlioz, he has not sought to place music and poetry side by side, but rather to blend them completely. Instrumental music should have no independence of the drama. Neither Liszt nor Berlioz has attained a tithe of Wagner's success, for Wagner has the advantage of the eye as well as the ear. In order rightly to estimate the historical position of these masters, let us take, in conclusion, a momentary survey of the principal epochs in the development of modern music. Through the genius of the Netherland masters of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, music, for the first time in history, became an independent art; for the introduction and development of counterpoint, or music in several simultaneous voices or parts, emancipated music from strict bondage to poetry and the sacred text. The ancient unison Gregorian song was soon hidden in the maze of florid counterpoint, woven around it by able masters like Josquin, Gombert, and Orlando Lasso. The true ideal of this first great epoch of musical art was reached by Palestrina, whose compositions note the reaction in church music from extravagances in technical skill and the abuse and neglect of the sacred words to more reasonable limits. Palestrina's elevated style, chaste counterpoint, and careful treatment of the words rendered him a true reformer, or conservator, of music. He averted the threatened abolishment of counterpoint from the Church, as contemplated by the Papal government, and thus prevented what would have been a retrogression in musical art.

About the beginning of the seventeenth century another

movement was directed against mediæval counterpoint. It was not the Church that threatened it this time, but scholars, enthusiasts, and *dilettanti*. They denounced counterpoint in unsparing terms, and painted in glowing colors the splendors of Greek tragedy and music. They believed that counterpoint could not be compared with ancient music, either with respect to the simple beauty of the melody or the comprehensive clearness and rhetorical expression of the words. Their attempt was unsuccessful as far as the abandonment of counterpoint and the restoration, or the faithful imitation, of ancient dramatic music are concerned, but the founders of the musical drama or opera were instrumental in unfolding a new element in music, namely, the monodic *recitative* and *air*, and the orchestral accompaniment, which soon led to the establishment of secular music as a separate branch of the art. Original masters, like Monteverde, Carissimi, Scarlatti, now arose to reap the harvest which the Florentine *dilettanti* had prepared for them. This first epoch in modern secular music furnishes a striking example of the unsuccessful attempt of men of mere reflection and theory to establish an arbitrary equality between music and poetry at the expense of both. Scarlatti and his successors of the Neapolitan school took advantage of the materials thus placed at their disposal, and, instead of trying to carry out the original idea of the opera, developed the *air*, until the reign of beautiful and sensuous melody became absolute. The words and the play were now wholly disregarded, and everything was sacrificed to the melodious sway of the singer. It was a farce to call the opera a musical drama. During the eighteenth century the Italian opera commanded the world; but under the frivolous influence of the *castrati* of the stage, whose trills and *roulades* held the public in subjection, the opera was degraded from the position held by Scarlatti and the best of his school. Then a champion stood forth to oppose these abuses. Gluck devoted his life to a reform of the musical drama. He would not give up his ideal for the sensuous charm of melody, or the executive display of the singer, but sought to place the recitative in the foreground, to render his music declamatory, and, above all, to express vividly the sense and meaning of the words.

He believed dramatic truth to be far more important to the opera than musical beauty. His own words were, that he aspired to be a poet and painter more than a musician. Gluck, like Wagner, published his theory, or principles of art, and divided the musical world into two parties. The limitations which he theoretically and practically set on the music of the drama limited him in turn. His aim was not perfectly accomplished, but he prepared the way for a greater master, whose universal genius adopted many of Gluck's improvements without depriving music of its beauty and freedom.

Mozart was able to express the full force and truth of the diction, and to define the clear outlines of the characters of the play. He adopted the melodious style of the Italians; but while he allowed the singer his full rights, he did not rob the opera of its dramatic action. The relation of Mozart to Gluck and the Italian opera of the eighteenth century proves conclusively that the would-be reformers, or men of theories, do not live in musical history as the representatives of the epoch in which they flourished. Mozart reached the culmination of the older style of Italian opera, including Gluck's improvements, just as Palestrina fulfilled the ideal of mediæval church music.

If we turn to other branches we witness parallel cases. Sebastian Bach, in his Cantatas and Passion Music, represents the highest attainment of Protestant church music, having his forerunner in Henry Schütz in the seventeenth century. Bach also completed the older forms of instrumental music, the prelude and fugue, toccata, suite, etc., which were in vogue for over a century before his mastery of them. The new style of instrumental music developed by Emanuel Bach and Haydn reached its climax in the sonatas and symphonies of Beethoven. *In none of these instances do we find that a reform, or adoption of a new style of music, has had its commencement, development, and culmination represented by one and the same master.* Simply because this would be contrary to the law of growth. Will not this prove true of Wagner's case? He has opened a new epoch in dramatic music; but if we read the lesson of history aright, a reaction will come, as in similar instances in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Some musical genius — perhaps several — may arise to lead the opera back into

a more fruitful musical field. All that is truthful in Wagner's principles of art, and all that is worthy of imitation in his operas, will not be thrown away. But history does not stand still; and, unless this natural reaction sets in, we may live to see the former musical productiveness and pre-eminence of Germany succeeded by a period of sterility, as witnessed to-day in Italy, both in music and painting. Who knows but that the musical sceptre may pass into the hands of another and a younger people? As art-loving Americans let us hope that it will be the mission of our own country to rejuvenate the life of music; may it be vouchsafed to her to lift the veil that now shrouds the future of this beautiful art!

J. K. Paine.

Art. II. — Evolution of Self-Consciousness.

It has come to be understood, and very generally allowed, that the conception of the origin of man as an animal race, as well as of the origin of individual men within it, in accordance with the continuity of organic development maintained in the theory of evolution, does not involve any very serious difficulties, or difficulties so great as any other hypothesis of this origin would have, not excepting that of "special creation"; — if that can be properly called an hypothesis, which is, in fact, a resumption of all the difficulties of natural explanation assumed to be insuperable and summarized under a single positive name. Yet in this evolution, as in that of embryonic and infantile life, the birth of self-consciousness is still thought to be a step not following from antecedent conditions in "nature," except in an incidental manner, or so far as "natural" antecedents have prepared the way for the "supernatural" advent of the self-conscious soul.

Independently of the form of expression, and of the false sentiment which is the motive of the antithesis in this familiar conception, or independently of its mystical interest, which has given to the words "natural" and "supernatural" their commonly accepted meanings, there is a foundation of scientific

truth in the conception. For the word "evolution" conveys a false impression to the imagination, not really intended in the scientific use of it. It misleads by suggesting a continuity in the *kinds* of powers and functions in living beings, or suggesting transition by insensible steps from one *kind* to another, as well as in the *degrees* of their importance and exercise at different stages of development. The truth is, on the contrary, that new uses of old powers arise discontinuously both in the bodily and mental natures of the animal, and in its individual developments, as well as in the development of its race, according to the theory of evolution, although, at their rise, these uses are small and of the smallest importance to life. They seem merged in the powers to which they are incident, and seem also merged in the special purposes or functions in which, however, they really have no part, and which are no parts of them. Their services or functions in life, though realized only incidentally at first, and in the feeblest degree, are just as distinct as they afterwards come to appear in their fullest development. The new uses are related to older powers only as *accidents*, so far as the special services of the older powers are concerned, although, from the more general point of view of natural law, their relations to older uses have not the character of accidents, since these relations are, for the most part, determined by universal properties and laws, which are not specially related to the needs and conditions of living beings. Thus the uses of limbs for swimming, crawling, walking, leaping, climbing, and flying are distinct uses, and are related to each other only through the general mechanical principles of locomotion, through which some one, in its first exercise, may be incident to some other, though, in its full exercise and perfection of special service, it is independent of the other, or has only a common dependence with the other on more general conditions.

Many mental as well as bodily powers thus have mixed natures, or independent uses; as, for example, the powers of the voice to call and allure, to warn and repel, and its uses in music and language; or the numerous uses of the human hand in services of strength and dexterity. And, on the contrary, the same uses are, in some cases, realized by independent organs as, for example, respiration in water and in the air by gills and

lungs, or flight by means of fins, feathers, and webs. The appearance of a really new power in *nature* (using this word in the wide meaning attached to it in science), the power of flight in the first birds, for example, is only involved potentially in previous phenomena. In the same way, no act of self-consciousness, however elementary, may have been realized before man's first self-conscious act in the animal world; yet the act may have been involved potentially in pre-existing powers or causes. The derivation of this power, supposing it to have been observed by a finite angelic (not animal) intelligence, could not have been foreseen to be involved in the mental causes, on the conjunction of which it might, nevertheless, have been seen to depend. The angelic observation would have been a purely empirical one. The possibility of a subsequent analysis of these causes by the self-conscious animal himself, which would afford an explanation of their agency, by referring it to a rational combination of simpler elements in them, does not alter the case to the angelic intelligence, just as a rational explanation of flight could not be reached by such an intelligence as a consequence of known mechanical laws; since these laws are also animal conditions, or are rather more general and material ones, of which our angelic, spherical * intelligence is not supposed to have had any experience. Its observation of the conditions of animal flight would thus also be empirical; for an unembodied spirit cannot be supposed to analyze out of its general experiences the mechanical conditions of movement in animal bodies, nor, on the other hand, to be any more able than the mystic appears to be to analyze the conditions of its own intelligence out of its experiences of animal minds.

The forces and laws of molecular physics are similarly related to actual human intelligence. Sub-sensible properties and powers can only be empirically known, though they are "visualized" in the *hypotheses* of molecular movements and forces. Experimental science, as in chemistry, is full of examples of the discovery of new properties or new powers, which, so far as the conditions of their appearance were previously known, did not follow from antecedent conditions, ex-

* For an intellect complete without appendages of sense or locomotion, see Plato's "Timæus."

cept in an incidental manner, — that is, in a manner *not then foreseen* to be involved in them; and these effects became afterwards predictable from what had become known to be their antecedent conditions only by the empirical laws or rules which inductive experimentation had established. Nevertheless, the phenomena of the physical or chemical laboratory, however new or unprecedented, are very far from having the character of miracles, in the sense of supernatural events. They are still *natural* events; for, to the scientific imagination, *nature* means more than the continuance or actual repetition of the properties and productions involved in the course of ordinary events, or more than the *inheritance* and reappearance of that which appears in consequence of powers which have made it appear before. It means, in general, those kinds of effects which, though they may have appeared but once in the whole history of the world, yet appear dependent on conjunctions of causes which *would always* be followed by them. One experiment is sometimes, in some branches of science, (as a wide induction has found it to be in chemistry, for example,) sufficient to determine such a dependence, though the particular law so determined is a wholly empirical one; and the history of science has examples of such single experiments, or short series of experiments, made on general principles of experimentation, for the purpose of ascertaining empirical facts or laws, qualities, or relations, which are, nevertheless, generalized as universal ones. Certain "physical constants," so called, were so determined, and are applied in scientific inference with the same unhesitating confidence as that inspired by the familiarly exemplified and more elementary "laws of nature," or even by axioms. Scientific research implies the *potential* existence of the natures, classes, or kinds of effects which experiment brings to light through instances, and for which it also determines, in accordance with inductive methods, the previously unknown conditions of their appearance. This research implies the *latent* kinds or natures which mystical research contemplates (erroneously, in some, at least, of its meditations) under the name of "the supernatural."

To make any event or power supernatural in the mystic's regard requires, however, not merely that it shall be isolated and

unparalleled in nature, but that it shall have more than an ordinary, or merely scientific, interest to the mystic's or to the *human* mind. The distinctively human or self-conscious interest, or sentiment, of self-consciousness gives an emphasis to the contrast named "natural and supernatural," through which mysticism is led to its speculations or assumptions of correspondingly emphatic contrasts in real existences. For mysticism is a speculation interpreting as matters of fact, or real existences out of consciousness, impressions which are only determined within it by emphasis of attention or feeling. It is for the purpose of deepening still more, or to the utmost that its interest suggests, the really profound distinction between human and animal consciousness, or for the purpose of making the distinction *absolute*, for deepening this gulf into an unfathomable and impassable one, that mysticism appears to be moved to its speculations, and has imbued most philosophy and polite learning with its conceptions. Mental philosophy, or metaphysics, has, consequently, come down to us from ancient times least affected by the speculative interests and methods of modern science. Mysticism still reigns over the science of the mind, and it is *felt* to be true even where it is not comprehended in its systems. The *theory* of mysticism in general, or what is common to all theories called mystical, is very vague, and obscure even in the exclusively religious applications of the term; this vagueness has given rise to the more extended use and understanding of the term as it is here employed, which indicates little else than the generally apprehended *motive* of its speculations, or the feelings allied to all its forms of conception. These centre in the feeling of absolute worthiness in self-consciousness, as the source, and at the same time the perfection of existence and power. The naturalist's observations on the minds of men and animals are impertinences of the least possible interest to this sense of worth, very much as the geologist's observations are generally to the speculator who seeks in the earth for hidden mineral treasures.

Mysticism in mental philosophy has apparently gained, so far as it has been materially affected by such observations, a relative external strength, dependent on the real feebleness of the opposition it has generally met with from lovers of ani-

mals and from empirical observers and thinkers, in whom a generous sympathy with the manifestations of mind in animals and a disposition to do justice to them have been more conspicuous than the qualities of clearness or consistency. For, in the comparisons which they have attempted they have generally sought to break down the really well founded distinctions of human and animal intelligence, and have sought to discredit the theory of them in this way, rather than by substituting for it a rational, scientific account of what is real in them. The ultimate metaphysical mystery which denies all comparison, and pronounces man a paragon in the kinds, as well as the degrees, of his mental faculties, is, as a solution, certainly *simpler*, whatever other scientific excellence it may lack, than any solution that the difficulties of a true scientific comparison are likely to receive. It is not in a strictly empirical way that this comparison can be clearly and effectively made, but rather by a critical re-examination of the phenomena of self-consciousness in themselves, with reference to their possible evolution from powers obviously common to all animal intelligences, or with reference to their potential, though not less natural, existence in mental causes, which could not have been known to involve them before their actual manifestation, but may, nevertheless, be found to do so by an analysis of these causes into the more general conditions of mental phenomena. Mystical metaphysics should be met by scientific inquiries on its own ground, that is, dogmatically, or by theory, since it despises the facts of empirical observation, or attributes them to shallowness, misinterpretation, or errors of observation, and contents itself with its strength as a system, or its impregnable self-consistency. Only an explanation of the phenomena of human consciousness, equally clear and self-consistent with its own, and one which, though not so simple, is yet more in accordance with the facts of a wider induction, could equal it in strength. But this might still be expected as the result of an examination of mental phenomena from the wider interests of true science; since many modern sciences afford examples of this in their triumphs over equally ancient, simple, and impregnable doctrines. The history of science is full, indeed, of illustrations of the impotence, on one hand, of exceptional and isolated facts against established

theory, and of the power, on the other hand, of their organization in new theories to revolutionize beliefs. The physical doctrine of a *plenum*, the doctrines of epicycles and vortices in astronomy, the corpuscular theory of optics, that of cataclysms in geology, and that of special creations in biology, each gave way, not absolutely through its intrinsic weakness, but through the greater success of a rival theory which superseded it. A sketch only is attempted in this essay of some of the results of such an examination into the psychological conditions, or antecedents, of the phenomena of self-consciousness; an examination which does not aim at diminishing, on the one hand, the real contrasts of mental powers in men and animals, nor at avoiding difficulties, on the other, by magnifying them beyond the reach of comparison.

The terms "science" and "scientific" have come, in modern times, to have so wide a range of application and so vague a meaning that (like many other terms, not only in common speech, but also in philosophy and in various branches of learning, like the law, which have come down to us through varying usages) they would oppose great difficulties to any attempts at defining them by *genus* and difference, or otherwise than by enumerating the branches of knowledge and the facts, or relations of the facts, to which usage has affixed them as names. Precision in proper definition being then impossible, it is yet possible to give to these terms so general a meaning as to cover all the knowledge to which they are usually applied, and still to exclude much besides. As the terms thus defined coincide with what I propose to show as the character of the knowledge peculiar to men, or which distinguishes men's minds from those of other animals, I will begin with this definition. In science and in scientific facts there is implied a conscious purpose of including particular facts under general facts, and the less general under the more general ones. Science, in the modern use of the term, consists, essentially, of a knowledge of things and events either as effects of general causes, or as instances of general classes, rules, or laws; or even as isolated facts of which the class, law, rule, or cause is sought. The conscious purpose of arriving at general facts and at an adequate statement of them in language, or of bringing particular facts under

explicit general ones, determines for any knowledge a scientific character.

Many of our knowledges and judgments from experience in practical matters are not so reduced, or sought to be reduced, to explicit principles, or have not a theoretical form, since the major premises, or general principles, of our judgments are not consciously generalized by us in forms of speech. Even matters not strictly practical, or which would be merely theoretical in their bearing on conduct, if reduced to a scientific form, like many of the judgments of common-sense, for example, are not consciously referred by us to explicit principles, though derived, like science, from experience, and even from special kinds of experience, like that of a man of business, or that of a professional adept. We are often led by being conscious of a sign of anything to believe in the existence of the thing itself, either past, present, or prospective, without having any distinct and general apprehension of the connection of the sign and thing, or any recognition of the sign under the general character of a sign. Not only are the judgments of common-sense in men, both the inherited and acquired ones, devoid of heads, or major premises (such as "All men are mortal"), in deductive inference, and devoid also of distinctly remembered details of experience in the inferences of induction, but it is highly probable that this is all but exclusively the character of the knowledges and judgments of the lower animals. Language, strictly so called, which some of these animals also have, or signs *purposely used* for communication, is not only required for scientific knowledge, but a second step of generalization is needed, and is made through reflection by which this use of a sign is itself an object of attention, and the sign is recognized in its general relations to what it signifies, and to what it has signified in the past, and will signify in the future. It is highly improbable that such a knowledge of knowledge, or such a *re*cognition, belongs in any considerable, or effective, degree to even the most intelligent of the lower animals, or even to the lowest of the human race. This is what is properly meant by being "rational," or being a "rational animal." It is what I have preferred to call "scientific" knowledge; since the growing vagueness and breadth of application common to all ill-comprehended words

(like "Positivism" in recent times) have given to "scientific" the meaning probably attached at first to "rational." This knowledge comes from reflecting on what we know in the common-sense, or semi-instinctive form, or making what we know a field of renewed research, observation, and analysis in the generalization of major premises. The line of distinction between such results of reflection, or between scientific knowledge and the common-sense form of knowledge, is not simply the dividing line between the minds of men and those of other animals; but is that which divides the knowledge produced by outward attention from that which is further produced by reflective attention. The former, throughout a considerable range of the higher intelligent animals, involves veritable judgments of a complex sort. It involves combinations of minor premises leading to conclusions through implicit major premises in the enthymematic reasonings, commonly employed in inferences from signs and likelihoods, as in prognostications of the weather, or in orientations with many animals. This knowledge belongs both to men and to the animals next to men in intelligence, though in unequal degrees.

So far as logicians are correct in regarding an enthymeme as a reasoning, independently of its statement in words; or in regarding as a rational process the passing from such a sign as the human character of Socrates to the inference that he will die, through the data of experience concerning the mortality of other men, — data which are neither distinctly remembered in detail nor generalized explicitly in the formula, "all men are mortal," but are effective only in making mortality a more or less clearly understood part of the human character; that is, making it one of the attributes *suggested* by the name "man," yet not separated from the essential attributes by the contrasts of subject and attributes in real predication, — so far, I say, as this can be regarded as a reasoning, or a rational process, so far observation shows that the more intelligent dumb animals reason, or are rational. But this involves great vagueness or want of that precision in the use of signs which the antitheses of essential and accidental attributes and that of proper predication secure. There is little, or no, evidence to show that the animals which learn, to some extent, to comprehend human

speech have an analytical comprehension of real general propositions, or of propositions in which both subject and predicate are general terms and differ in meaning. A merely verbal general proposition, declaring only the equivalence of two general names, might be comprehended by such minds, if it could be made of sufficient interest to attract their attention. But this is extremely doubtful, and it would not be as a *proposition*, with its contrasts of essential and added elements of conception that this would be comprehended. It would be, in effect, only repeating in succession two general names of the same class of objects. Such minds could, doubtless, comprehend a single class of objects, or an indefinite number of resembling things by several names; that is, several signs of such a class would recall it to their thoughts, or revive a representative image of it; and they would thus be aware of the equivalence of these signs; but they would not attach precision of meaning and different degrees of generality to them, or regard one name as the name or sign of another name; as when we define a triangle to be a rectilinear figure, and a figure of three sides.

Only one degree of generality is, however, essential to inference from signs, or in enthymematic reasoning. Moreover, language in its relations to thought does not consist exclusively of spoken, or written, or imagined words, but of signs in general, and, essentially, of internal images or successions of images, which are the representative imaginations of objects and their relations; imaginations which severally stand for each and all of the particular objects or relations of a *kind*. Such are the visual imaginations called up by spoken or written concrete general names of visible objects, as "dog" or "tree"; which are vague and feeble as images, but effective as notative, directive, or guiding elements in thought. These are the internal signs of things and events, and are instruments of thought in judgment and reasoning, not only with dumb animals but also with men, in whom they are supplemented, rather than supplanted, by names. But being of feeble intensity, and little under the influence of distinct attention or control of the will, compared to actual perceptions and to the voluntary movements of utterance and gesture, their nature has been but dimly understood even by metaphysicians, who are still divided into two

schools in logic,— the conceptualists and the nominalists. The "concepts" of the former are really composed of these vague and feeble notative images, or groups of images, to which clearness and distinctness of attention are given by their associations with outward (usually vocal) signs. Hence a second degree of observation and generalization upon these images, as objects in reflective thought, cannot be readily realized independently of what would be the results of such observations, namely, their associations with outward signs. They are probably so feeble, even in the most intelligent dumb animal, that they cannot be associated with outward signs in such a manner as to make these distinctly appear as substitutes, or signs equivalent to them.

So far as images act in governing trains of thought and reasoning, they act as signs; but, with reference to the more vivid outward signs, they are, in the animal mind, merged in the things signified, like stars in the light of the sun. Hence, language, in its narrower sense, as the instrument of reflective thought, appears to depend directly on the intensity of significant, or representative, images; since the power to attend to these and intensify them still further, at the same time that an equivalent outward sign is an object of attention, would appear to depend solely on the relative intensities of the two states, or on the relations of intensity in perception and imagination, or in original and revived impressions. The direct power of attention to intensify a revived impression in imagination does not appear to be different in kind from the power of attention in perception, or in outward impressions generally. But this direct power would be obviously aided by the indirect action of attention when fixed by an outward sign, provided attention could be directed to both at the same time; as a single glance may comprehend in one field of view the moon or the brighter planets and the sun, since the moon or planet is not hidden, like the stars, by the glare of day.

As soon, then, as the progress of animal intelligence through an extension of the range in its powers of memory, or in revived impressions, together with a corresponding increase in the vividness of these impressions, has reached a certain point (a progress in itself useful, and therefore likely to be secured

in some part of nature, as one among its numerous grounds of selection, or lines of advantage), it becomes possible for such an intelligence to fix its attention on a vivid outward sign, without losing sight of, or dropping out of distinct attention, an image or revived impression; which latter would only serve, in case of its spontaneous revival in imagination, as a sign of the same thing, or the same event. Whether the vivid outward sign be a real object or event, of which the revived image is the counterpart, or whether it be a sign in a stricter meaning of the term, — that is, some action, figure, or utterance, associated either naturally or artificially with all similar objects or events, and, consequently, with the revived and representative image of them, — whatever the character of this outward sign may be, provided the representative image, or inward sign, still retains, in distinct consciousness, its power as such, then the outward sign may be consciously recognized as a substitute for the inward one, and a consciousness of simultaneous internal and external suggestion, or significance, might be realized; and the contrast of thoughts and things, at least in their power of suggesting that of which they may be coincident signs, could, for the first time, be perceptible. This would plant the germ of the distinctively human form of self-consciousness.

Previously to such a simultaneous consciousness of movements in imagination and movements in the same direction arising from perception, realized through the comparative vividness of the former, all separate and distinct consciousness of the inward sign would be eclipsed, and attention would pass on to the thought suggested by the outward sign. A similar phenomenon is frequently observed with us in successions of inward suggestions, or trains of thought. The attention often skips intermediate steps in a train, or appears to do so. At least, the memory of steps, which appear essential to its rational coherency, has ceased when we revive the train or repeat it voluntarily. This happens even when only a few moments have elapsed between the train and its repetition. Many writers deny that the omitted steps are immediately forgotten in such cases, on account of their feebleness, — as we forget immediately the details of a view which we have just seen, and remember only its salient points; and they maintain that the

missing steps are absent from consciousness, even in the original and spontaneous movements of the train; or are present only through an unconscious agency, both in the train and its revival. This being a question of memory, reference cannot be made to memory itself for the decision of it. To decide whether a thing is completely forgotten, or has never been experienced, we have no other resource than rational analogy, which, in the present case, appears to favor the theory of oblivion, rather than that of latent mental ties and actions; since oblivion is a *vera causa* sufficient to account for the difference between such revived trains and those in which no steps are missed, or could be rationally supposed to have been present. The theory of "latent mental agency" appears to confound the original spontaneous movement of the train with what appears as its representative in its voluntary revival. This revival, in some cases, really involves new conditions, and is not, therefore, to be rationally interpreted as a precisely true recollection. If repeated often, it will establish direct and strong associations of contiguity between salient steps in the train which were connected at first by feebler though still conscious steps. The complete obliteration of these is analogous, as I have said, to the loss, in primary forms of memory, of details which are present to consciousness in actual first perceptions.

If, as more frequently happens with us, the whole train, with all its steps of suggestion, is recalled in the voluntary revival of it (without any sense of missing steps), the feebler intermediate links, that in other cases are obliterated, would correspond to the feebler, though (in the more advanced animal intelligences) comparatively vivid, mental signs which have in them the germ, as I have said, of the human form of self-consciousness. The growth of this consciousness, its development from this germ, is a more direct process than the production of the germ itself, which is only incidental to previous utilities in the power of memory. Thought, henceforward, may be an object to thought in its distinct contrast, as an inward sign, with the outward and more vivid sign of that which they both suggest, or revive from memory. This contrast is heightened if the outward one is more strictly a sign; that is, is not the per-

ception of an object or event, of which the inward and representative image is a counterpart, but is of a different nature, for instance some movement or gesture or vocal utterance, or some graphic sign, associated by contiguity with the object or event, or, more properly, with its representative image. The "concept" so formed is not a thing complete in itself, but is essentially a cause, or step, in mental trains. The outward sign, the image, or inward sign, and the suggested thought, or image, form a train, like a train which might be wholly within the imagination. This train is present, in all its three constituents, to the first, or immediate, consciousness, in all degrees of intelligence; but in the revival of it, in the inferior degrees of intelligence, the middle term is obliterated, as in the trains of thought above considered. The animal has in mind only an image of the sign, previously present in perception, followed now immediately by an image of what was suggested through the obliterated mental image. But the latter, in the higher degrees of intelligence, is distinctly recalled as a middle term. In the revival of past trains, which were first produced through outward signs, the dumb animal has no consciousness of there having been present more than one of the two successive signs, which, together with the suggested image, formed the actual train in its first occurrence. The remembered outward sign is now a thought, or image, immediately suggesting or recalling that which was originally suggested by a feebler intermediate step.

In pure imaginations, not arising by actual connections through memory, the two terms are just the same with animals as in real memory; except that they are not felt to be the representatives of a former real connection. The contrast of the real and true with the imaginary and false is, then, the only general one of which such a mind could be aware in the phenomena of thought. The contrast of thought itself with perception, or with the actual outward sign and suggestion of the thought, is realized only by the revival in memory of the feeble connecting link. This effects a contrast not only between what is real and what is merely imaginary, but also between what is out of the mind and what is within it. The minute difference in the force of memory, on which this link in the chain of attention at first depended, was one of immense consequence to man.

This feeble link is the dividing region, interval, or cleft between the two more vivid images; one being more vivid as a direct recollection of an actual outward impression, and the other being more vivid, or salient, from the interest or the motives which gave it the prominence of a thought demanding attention; either as a memory of a past object or event of interest, or the image of something in the immediate future. The disappearance altogether of this feeble link would, as I have said, take from the images connected by it all contrast with any pair of steps in a train, except a consciousness of reality in the connection of these images in a previous experience.*

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* It appears, at first sight, a rash hypothesis to imagine so extensive an action of illusion as I have supposed in the revivals of memory, — a self-vouching faculty of which, in general, the testimony cannot be questioned, — since each recall asserts for itself an identity with what is recalled by it, either in past outward experiences or in previous revivals of them. But the hypothesis of uniform, or frequent, illusions in individual judgments of memory is not made in contradiction of experiences in general, including those remembered, when reduced to rational consistency. The familiar fact that no memory, even of an immediately past experience, is an adequate reproduction of everything that must have been present in it, in actual consciousness, and must have received more or less attention, is familiarly verified by repeating the remembered experiences. Memory itself thus testifies to its own fallibility. But this is not all. Illusion in an opposite direction, the more than adequate revival of some experiences, so far as vividness and apparently remembered details are concerned, affects our memories of dreams, demonstrably in some, presumably in many. What is commonly called a dream is not what is present to the imagination in sleep, but what is believed, often illusively, to have been present; and is, doubtless, in general, more vivid in memory and furnished with more numerous details, owing to the livelier action of imagination in waking moments. The liveliness of an actual dream is rather in its dominant feeling or interest than in its images.

The order of internal events, or the order of suggestion in actual dreams, is often reversed in the waking memories of them. A dream very long and full of details, as it appears in memory, and taking many words to relate, is sometimes recalled from the suggestions and trains of thought in sleep which are comprised in the impressions of a few moments. Such a dream usually ends in some startling or interesting event, which was a misinterpretation in sleep of some real outward impression, as a loud or unusual noise, or some inward sensation, like one of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, or numbness, which really stood in sleep at the beginning of the misremembered train of thought, instead of constituting its *dénouement* in a remembered series of real incidents. The remembered dream *seems* to have been an isolated series of such incidents, succeeding each other in the natural order of experience; but this appearance may well arise from the absence of any remembered indications of a contrary order; or from the absence, on one hand, of a consciousness in sleep of anything more vivid than the actual dream, and the real feebleness, on the other hand, of the dream itself in respect to everything in it except the sali-

To exemplify this somewhat abstruse analysis, let us examine what, according to it, would be the mental movements in a

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ent incident, or the dominant interest, which caused it to be remembered along with the feeble sketch of suggested incidents. Surprise at incongruities in parts of trains often constitutes this interest.

If the waking imagination really fills out this sketch, and avouches the whole without check from anything really remembered, the phenomenon would be perfectly accordant with what is known of the dealings of imagination with real experiences, and with what is to be presumed of the comparative feebleness of its powers in sleep. A remembered dream would thus be, in some cases, a twofold illusion, — an illusion in sleep arising from misinterpreted sensations, and an illusion in memory concerning what was actually the train of thoughts excited by the mistake, the train being in fact often inverted in such an apparent recollection. Savages and the insane believe their dreams to be real experiences. The civilized and sane man believes them to be true memories of illusions in sleep. A step farther in the application of the general tests of true experience would reduce some dreams to illusive memories of the illusions of sleep.

There does not appear on analysis, made in conformity to the reality of experiences in general, that there is any intrinsic difference between a memory and an imagination, the reality of the former being dependent on extrinsic relations and the outward checks of other memories. Memory, as a whole, vouches for itself, and for all its mutually consistent details, and banishes mere imaginations from its province, not as foreigners, but on account of their lawlessness, or incoherence, with the rest of its subjects, and through the exercise of what is called the judgments of experience, which are in fact mnemonic summaries of experiences (including instinctive tendencies). The imaginations of the insane are in insurrection against this authority of memory in general experience, or against what is familiarly called "reason." When sufficiently vivid, or powerful, and numerous, they usurp the powers of state, or the authority of memory and free intelligent volition. "Reason" is then said to be "dethroned."

The unreality of some dreams would thus appear to be more complete than they are in general discovered to be by mature, sane, and reflective thought, and by indirect observations upon their conditions and phenomena. The supposition of a similar illusion in the phenomena of reflection on the immediately past, or passing, impressions of the mind affords an explanation of a curious phenomenon, not uncommon in waking moments, which is referred to by many writers on psychology, namely, the phenomenon of experiencing in minute detail what appears also to be recalled as a past experience. Some writers have attempted to explain this as a veritable revival, by a passing experience, of a really past and very remote one, either in our progenitors, as some evolutionists suppose; or in a previous life, or in some state of individual existence, otherwise unremembered, as the mystic prefers to believe; a revival affected by an actual coincidence, in many minute particulars, of a present real experience with a really past one. But if a passing real experience could be supposed to be divided, so to speak, or to make a double impression in memory, — one the ordinary impression of what is immediately past, and the other a dream-like impression filled out on its immediate revival in reflection with the same details, — the supposition would be in accordance with what is really known of some dreams, and would, therefore, be more probable than the above explanations. It is possible to trust individual memories too far, even in respect to what is immediately

man, — let him be a sportsman, — and a domestic animal, — let it be his dog, — on hearing a name, — let it be the name of some game, as "fox." The general character of the phenomena in both would be the same on the actual first hearing of this word. The word would suggest a mental image of the fox, then its movements of escape from its hunters, and the thought would pass on and dwell, through the absorbing interest of it, on the hunters' movements of pursuit, or pass on even to the capture and destruction of the game. This would, doubtless, recall to the minds of the hunter and his hound one or more real and distinctly remembered incidents of the sort. Now if we suppose this train of thought to be revived (as undoubtedly it is capable of being, both in the man and the dog), it will be the same in the man's mind as on its first production; except that the name "fox" will be thought of (as an auditory, or else a vocal, image), instead of being heard; and the visual image of the fox will be recalled by it with all the succeeding parts of the repeated train. But in the dog, either the auditory image of the name will not be recalled, since the vocal image does not exist in his mind to aid the recall (his voluntary vocal powers not being capable of forming it even in the first instance); or if such an auditory image arises, the representative visual or olfactory* one will not appear in distinct consciousness. His attention will pass at once from either of these signs, but from one only to the more intense and interesting parts of the train, — to the pursuit and capture of the game, or to actually remembered incidents of the kind. Either the first or the intermediate sign will remain in oblivion.

Hence the dog's dreams, or trains of thought, when they are revivals of previous trains, or when they rise into prominent consciousness in consequence of having been passed through before, omit or skip over the steps which at first served only as suggesting and connecting signs, following now only the associations of contiguity, established in the first occurrence of

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past, as it is to trust too far a single sense in respect to what is immediately present Rational consistency, in all experiences, or in experience on the whole, is the ultimate test of reality or truth in our judgments, whether these are "intuitive," or consciously derived.

* Images in dogs are supposed to depend largely on the sense of smell.

the train, between its more prominent parts. The suggested thought eclipses by its glare the suggesting one. The interest of an image, or its power to attract attention and increased force, depends in the dog only on its vividness as a memory, or as a future purpose or event, and very little, if any, on its relations and agency as a *sign*. Images, as well as outward signs, serve, as I have said, in the dumb animals as well as in man in this capacity; but this is not *recognized* by the animal, since those parts of a train which serve only as signs are too feeble to be revived in the repeated train; and new associations of mere contiguity in the prominent parts of it take their places. All that would be recognized in the animal mind by reflection on thought as thought, or independently of its reality as a memory, an anticipation, or a purpose, would be its unreality, or merely imaginary character.

If, on the contrary, a greater intensity, arising from a greater power of simple memory, should revive the feebler parts in repeated trains of thought to the degree of attracting attention to them, and thus bringing them into a more distinct and vivid consciousness, there might arise an interest as to what they are, as to what are their relations, and where they belong, which would be able to inspire and guide an act of distinct reflection. A thought might thus be determined as a representative mental image; and such acts of reflection, inspired also by other motives more powerful than mere inquisitiveness, would by observation, analysis, and generalization (the counterparts of such outward processes in the merely animal mind) bring all such representative images, together with real memories and anticipations, into a single group, or subjective connection. The recognition of them in this connection is the knowledge of them as *my* thoughts, or *our* thoughts, or as phenomena of the mind.

When a thought, or an outward expression, acts in an animal's mind or in a man's, in the capacity of a sign, it carries forward the movements of a train, and directs attention away from itself to what it signifies or suggests; and consciousness is concentrated on the latter. But being sufficiently vivid in itself to engage distinct attention, it determines a new kind of action, and a new faculty of observation, of which the cerebral

hemispheres appear to be the organs. From the action of these, in their more essential powers in memory and imagination, the objects or materials of reflection are also derived. Reflection would thus be, not what most metaphysicians appear to regard it, a fundamentally new faculty in man, as elementary and primordial as memory itself, or the power of abstractive attention, or the function of signs and representative images in generalization; but it would be determined in its contrasts with other mental faculties by the nature of its objects. On its subjective side it would be composed of the same mental faculties — namely, memory, attention, abstraction — as those which are employed in the primary use of the senses. It would be engaged upon what these senses have furnished to memory; but would act as independently of any orders of grouping and succession presented by them, as the several senses themselves do of one another. To this extent, reflection is a distinct faculty, and though, perhaps, not peculiar to man, is in him so prominent and marked in its effects on the development of the individual mind, that it may be regarded as his most essential and elementary mental distinction in kind. For differences of degrees in causes may make differences of kinds in effects.

Motives more powerful than mere inquisitiveness about the feebler steps or *mere* thoughts of a revived train, and more efficient in concentrating attention upon them, and upon their functions as signs, or suggesting images, would spring from the social nature of the animal, from the uses of mental communication between the members of a community, and from the *desire* to communicate, which these uses would create. And just as an outward sign associated with a mental image aids by its intensity in fixing attention upon the latter, so the *uses* of such outward signs and the motives connected with their employment would add *extensive* force, or interest, to the energy of attention in the cognition of this inward sign; and hence would aid in the reference of it and its sort to the subject *ego*, — a being already known, or distinguished from other beings, as that which wills, desires, and feels. That which wills, desires, and feels is, in the more intelligent domestic animal, known by the proper name, which the animal recognizes and answers to by

its actions, and is a consciousness of its individuality. It is not known or recognized by that most generic name "I"; since phenomena common to this individual and to others, or capable of being made common through the communications of language, are not distinctly referred to the individual self by that degree of abstractive attention and precision which an habitual exercise of the faculty of reflection is required to produce. But, in the same manner, the word "world," which includes the conscious subject in its meaning, would fail to suggest anything more to such an intelligence than more concrete terms do,—such as what is around, within, and near, and distant from consciousness; or it would fail to suggest the *whole* of that which philosophers divide into *ego* and *non-ego*, the outward and inward worlds. A contrast of this whole to its parts, however divided in predication, or the antithesis of subject and attributes, in a divisible unity and its component particulars, would not be suggested to an animal mind by the word "world." The "categories," or forms and conditions of human understanding, though doubtless innate (in the naturalist's sense of the term) or inherited, are only the ways and facilities of the higher exercise of the faculty of reflection. They are, doubtless, ways and facilities that are founded on the ultimate nature of mind; yet, on this very account, are universal, though only potential, in the animal mind generally; just as the forms and conditions of *locomotion* are generally in the bodies of plants; forms and conditions founded on the ultimate natures or laws of motion, which would be exemplified in plants, if they also had the power of changing their positions, and are indeed exemplified in those forms of vegetable life that are transported, such as seeds, or can move and plant themselves, like certain spores.

The world of self-conscious intellectual activity,—the world of mind,—has, doubtless, its ultimate unconditional laws, everywhere exemplified in the actual phenomena of abstractive and reflective thought, and capable of being generalized in the reflective observations of the philosopher, and applied by him to the explanation of the phenomena of thought wherever manifested in outward expressions, whether in his fellow-men, or in the more intelligent dumb animals. Memory, in the effects

of its more powerful and vivid revivals with the more intelligent animals, and especially in the case of large-brained man, presents this new world, in which the same faculties of observation, analysis, and generalization as those employed by intelligent beings in general, ascertain the marks and classes of phenomena strictly mental, and divide them, as a whole class or *summum genus*, from those of the outward world. The distinction of subject and object becomes thus a classification through observation and analysis, instead of the intuitive distinction it is supposed to be by most metaphysicians. Intuitive to some extent, in one sense of the word, it doubtless is; that is, facilities and predispositions to associations, which are as effective as repeated experiences and observations would be, and which are inherited in the form of instincts, doubtless have much to do in bringing to pass this cognition, as well as many others, which appear to be innate, not only in the lower animals but also in man.

The very different aim of the evolutionist from that of his opponents — the latter seeking to account for the *resemblances* of mental actions in beings supposed to be radically different in their mental constitutions, while the former seeks to account for the *differences* of manifestation in fundamentally similar mental constitutions — gives, in the theory of evolution, a philosophical *rôle* to the word "instinct," and to its contrast with intelligence, much inferior to that which this contrast has had in the discussions of the mental faculties of animals. For the distinction of instinct and intelligence, though not less real and important in the classification of actions in psycho-zoölogy, and as important even as that of animal and vegetable is in general zoölogy, or the distinctions of organic and inorganic, living and dead, in the general science of life, is yet, like these, in its applications a vague and ill-defined distinction, and is most profitably studied in the subordinate classes of actions, and the special contrasts which are summarized by it. Under the naturalist's point of view, the contrasts of dead and living matters, inorganic and organic products, vegetable and animal forms and functions, automatic and sentient movements, instinctive and intelligent motives and actions are severally rough divisions of *series*, which are clearly enough contrasted in their ex-

tremities, but ill defined at their points of division. Thus, we have the long series beginning with the processes of growth, nutrition, and waste, and in movements independent of nervous connections, and continued in processes in which sensations are involved, first vaguely, as in the processes of digestion, circulation, and the general stimulative action of the nervous system; then distinctly, as in the stimulative sensations of respiration, winking, swallowing, coughing, and sneezing, more or less under general control or the action of the will. This series is continued, again, into those sensations, impulses, and consequent actions which are wholly controllable, though spontaneously arising; and thence into the motives to action which are wholly dependent on, or involved in, the immediate controlling powers of the will, — a series in which the several marks of distinction are clearly enough designated in the abstract, as the colors of the spectrum are by their names, but are not clearly separated in the concrete applications of them.

Again, we have the series of voluntary actions, beginning at the connections between perceptions, emotions, and consequent actions, which are strictly instinctive. These, though inherited, are independent of the effects of higher, and more properly voluntary, actions in the individual's progenitors, as well as in himself. When they are not simple ultimate and universal laws of mental natures, or elementary mental connections, they are combinations produced through their serviceableness to life, or by natural selection and exercise, or in the same general manner in which bodily organs, powers, and functions are produced or altered. Such connections between perceptions, emotions, and consequent actions, derived through natural selection (or even those that are ultimate laws, and determine, in a manner not peculiar to any species, the conditions and uses of serviceable actions, — these are *instinctive* connections, or powers of *instinct*, in a restricted but perfectly definite use of the word. But following immediately in the series of voluntary actions are, first, the inherited effects of habits, and next, habits properly so called, or effects produced by higher voluntary actions in the individual. *Habits* properly so called, and *dispositions*, which are the inherited effects of habits, are not different in their practical character or

modes of action from true instincts; but differ only in their origin and capacity of alteration through the higher forms of volition. The latter, or proper, volitions are connections between the occasions, or external means and conditions of an action, and the production of the action itself through the *motive of the end*, and not through emotions or by any other ties instinctively uniting them. They are joined by the foreseen ulterior effect of the action, or else through a union produced by its influence. The desirableness of what is effected by an action connects its occasions, or present means and conditions, with the action itself, and causes its production through the end felt in imagination. The influence of the end, or ulterior motive in volition, may not be a consciously recognized part of the action, or a distinctly separated step in it, and will actually cease to be the real tie when a series of repeated volitions has established a habit, or a fixed association between them and their occasions, or external conditions. This connection in habits is, as we have said, closely similar to strictly instinctive connections, and is indistinguishable from them independently of questions of origin and means of alterations.

Independently of these questions, the series of voluntary actions starting from the strictly instinctive joins to them natural dispositions, or the inherited effects of habit, and passes on to habits properly so called, thence into those in which the ulterior motives of true volitions are still operative, though not as separate parts of consciousness, and thence on to mere facilities of action, or to those actions in which such a motive is still the sole effective link, though quite faded out of distinct attention, or attended to with a feeble and intermittent consciousness. Thence it comes finally to the distinct recognition in reflective thought of an ulterior motive to an action. The ulterior motive, the end or good to be effected by an action, anticipated in imagination, joins the action to its present means and conditions in actual volitions, or else joins it in imagination with some future occurrence of them in an *intention*, or a predetermination of the will. These ulterior motives, ends, or determinations of an action through foreseen consequences of it, may be *within* the will, in the common and proper meaning of

the word, when it is spoken of as free, or unconstrained by an outward force, or necessity; or they may be *without* it, like instinctive tendencies to which the will is said to *consent* or *yield*, as well as in other cases to be *opposed*. The motives within the will, either distinctly or vaguely operative, or completely superseded by forces of habit, constitute the individual's character.

To summarize all the steps and contrasts of these series under the general heads of intelligence and instinct would be, from the evolutionist's and naturalist's point of view, only a rough classification, like that of living beings into animals and plants; and any attempts at investigating the distinctions and classes of mental natures by framing elaborate definitions of this summary contrast would be like concentrating all the energies of scientific pursuit in biology, and staking its success on the question whether the sponge be an animal or a plant. This is, in fact, the scholastic method, from which modern science is comparatively, and fortunately, set free; being contented with finding out more and more about beings that are unmistakably animals or plants, and willing to study the nature of the sponge by itself, and defer the classification of it to the end. The more ambitious scholastic method is followed in the science of psycho-zoölogy by those who seek, in an ultimate definition of this sort, to establish an impassable barrier between the minds of men and those of the lower animals, — being actuated apparently by the naïve, though generous, motive of rendering the former more respectable, or else of defending a worth in them supposed to be dependent on such a barrier. This aim would be confusing at least, if not a false one, in a strictly scientific inquiry.

Although the cognition of the subject world through the distinction in memory of the phenomena of signification from those of outward perception would be a classification spontaneously arising through inherited facilities and predispositions to associations, which are as effective as repeated experiences would be, it must still be largely aided by the voluntary character of outward signs, — vocal, gestural, and graphic, — by which all signs are brought under the control of the will, or of that most central, active personality, which is thus connected externally and actively, as well as through the memory, with

the inward signs or the representative mental images. These images are brought by this association under stronger and steadier attention; their character, as representative images or signs, is more distinctly seen in reflection, and they are not any longer merely guides in thought, blindly followed. They form, by this association, a little representative world arising to thought at will. Command of language is an important condition of the effective cognition of a sign as such. It is highly probable that the dog not only cannot utter the sound "fox," but cannot revive the sound as heard by him. The word cannot, therefore, be of aid to him in fixing his attention in reflection on the mental image of the fox as seen or smelt by him. But the latter, spontaneously arising, would be sufficient to produce a lively train of thoughts, or a vivid dream. It by no means follows from his deficiencies of vocal and auditory imagination that the dog has not, in some directions, aid from outward signs, and some small degree of reflective power, though this probably falls far short of the clear division of the two worlds realized in the cognition of "*cogito*." Thus, he has at command the outward sign of the chase, incipient movements of his limbs, such as he makes in his dreams; and this may make the mental image of the chase, with its common obstacles and incidents, distinct in his imagination, in spite of the greater interest which carries the thoughts of his dream forward to the end of the pursuit, the capture of the game. He may even make use of this sign, as he in fact does when he indicates to his master by his movements his eagerness for a walk or for the chase.

Command of signs, and, indeed, all the volitional or active powers of an animal, including attention in perception, place it in relation to outward things in marked contrast with its passive relations of sensation and inattentive or passive perception. The distinctness, or prominence, in consciousness given by an animal's attention to its perceptions, and the greater energy given by its intentions or purposes to its outward movements cannot fail to afford a ground of discrimination between these as causes, both of inward and outward events, and those outward causes which are not directly under such control, but form an independent system, or several distinct systems, of causes. This would give rise to a form of self-consciousness

more immediate and simple than the intellectual one, and is apparently realized in dumb animals. They, probably, do not have, or have only in an indistinct and ineffective form, the intellectual cognitions of *cogito* and *sum;* but having reached the cognition of a contrast in subject and object as *causes* both in inward and outward events, they have already acquired a form of subjective consciousness, or a knowledge of the *ego*. That they do not, and cannot, name it, at least by a general name, or understand it by the general name of "I" or *ego*, comes from the absence of the attributes of *ego* which constitute the intellectual self-consciousness. A dog can, nevertheless, understand the application of his own proper name to himself, both in the direct and the indirect reference of our language to his conduct or his wants; and can also understand the application to himself of the general name, — "dog." He cannot say, "I am a dog," and probably has but the faintest, if any, understanding of what the proposition would mean if he could utter it; though he probably has as much understanding, at least, as the parrot has in saying, "I am Poll." For there are, in these propositions, two words expressing the abstractest ideas that the human mind can reach. One of them, "I," is the name of one of the two *summa genera*, *ego* and *non-ego*, into which human consciousness is divisible. "I am a dog," and "Camp is a dog," would mean much the same to Camp; just as "I am a child," and "John is a child" are not clearly distinguished by John even after he has acquired considerable command of language. The other word, "am," is a form of the substantive verb expressing existence in general, but further determined to express the *present* existence of the *speaker* or *subject*. These further determinations, in tense, number, and person, are, however, the most important parts of meaning in the various forms of the substantive verb to the common and barbarous minds, from which we and the philosophical grammarian have received them. The substantive verb is, accordingly, irregular in most languages under the form of a grammatical paradigm. In this form the philosophical grammarian subordinates to the infinitive meaning of a word those determinations which, in the invention of words, were apparently regarded as leading ideas in many other cases as well as

in the substantive verb, and were expressed by words with distinct etymologies.

Not only the dog and other intelligent dumb animals, but some of the least advanced among human beings, also, are unable to arrive at a distinct abstraction of what is expressed by "to be," or "to exist." Being is concreted, or determined, to such minds down, at least, to the conception of living or acting; to a conception scarcely above what is implied in the actions of the more intelligent animals, namely, their apprehension of themselves as agents or patients with wills and feelings distinct from those of other animals, and from the forces and interests of outward nature generally. "Your dog is here, or is coming, and at your service," is a familiar expression in the actions of dogs not remarkable for intelligence. A higher degree of abstraction and generalization than the simple steps, which are sufficient, as we have seen, for inference in enthymematic reasonings to particular conclusions, would be required in reflection; and a more extensive and persistent exercise of the faculty of reflection, aided by voluntary signs or by language, than any dumb animal attains to, would be needed to arrive at the cognition of *cogito* and *sum*. This is a late acquisition with children; and it would, indeed, be surprising if the mind of a dumb animal should attain to it. But there is little ground in this for believing, with most metaphysicians, that the cognition is absolutely *sui generis*, or an ultimate and underived form of knowledge; or that it is not approached gradually, as well as realized with different degrees of clearness and precision, as the faculty of reflection becomes more and more exercised.

That a dumb animal should not know itself to be a thinking being, is hardly more surprising than that it should not be aware of the circulation of its blood and other physiological functions; or that it should not know the anatomy of its frame or that of its nervous system, or the seat of its mental faculties, or the fact that the brain is much smaller in it, in proportion to the size of its body, than in man. Its reflective observation may be as limited in respect to the phenomena of thought as the outward observation of most men is in respect to these results of scientific research. And, on the other hand, the boasted intellectual self-consciousness of man is a knowledge of a subject, not through

all its attributes and phenomena, but only through enough of them in general to determine and distinguish it from outward objects, and make it serve as the subject of further attributions or predications, as reflective observation makes them known. The abstract forms of this knowledge, the laws of logic and grammar, and the categories of the understanding, which are forms of all scientific knowledge, are all referable to the action of a *purpose* to know, and to fix knowledge by precise generalization; just as the mechanical conditions of flight are referable to the purpose to fly and to secure the requisite means. Generalization already exists, however, with particular acts of inquisitiveness in the animal mind; and there is required only the proper degree of attention to signs in order to make it act in accordance with laws which, *if they are universal and necessary laws of the mind*, are equally laws of the animal intelligence, though not actually exemplified in it; just as the laws of locomotion are not actually exemplified in the bodies of plants, but are still potential in them.

The inferior and savage races of men, whose languages do not include any abstract terms like truth, goodness, and sweetness, but only concrete ones, like true, good, and sweet, would hardly be able to form a conception, even a vague and obscure one, of the mystic's research of omniscience in the profundities of self-consciousness. They ought on this account, perhaps, to be regarded as races distinct from that of these philosophers, at least mentally, and to be classed, in spite of their powers of speech and limited vocabularies, with the dumb, but still intelligent, animals. If, however, the theory above propounded be true, this greatest of human qualities, intelligent self-consciousness, understood in its actual and proper limits, would follow as a consequence of a greater brain, a greater, or more powerful and vivid, memory and imagination, bringing to light, as it were, and into distinct consciousness, phenomena of thought which reflective observation refers to the subject, already known in the dumb animal, or distinguished as an active cause from the forces of outward nature, and from the wills of other animals. The degrees of abstraction and the successively higher and higher steps of generalization, the process which, in scientific knowledge, brings not only the particulars of experience under

general designations, but with a conscious purpose brings the less general under the more general, or gives common names not only to each and all resembling objects and relations, but also more general common names to what is denoted by these names, or groups them under higher categories, — this process brings together the several forms of self-consciousness. Willing, desiring, feeling, and lastly thinking, also, are seen in thought to belong together, or to the same subject; and by thinking they are brought under a common view and receive a common name, or several common names, to wit, "my mind," "me," "I," "my mental states."

By still further observation, comparison, and analysis on the part of philosophers, this step is seen to be the highest degree of abstraction, since nothing appears to be common to all my mental states, except their belonging together and acting on one another, along with their common independence of other existences in this mutual action. The word "I" is discovered by philosophers to be a word without meaning or determination, or to be as meaningless as the words "thing," "being," "existence," which are subjects stripped of all attributes. "I" is the bare subject of mental phenomena. The word points them out, but does not declare anything of their nature by its meaning, essence, or implied attribution, which is, in fact, no meaning at all. Hence philosophers have placed this term, or name, over against that which it is not, or in contrast with all other existences. Common language has no name for the latter, and so philosophers were compelled to call it the *non-ego*, in order to contrast these two highest categories, or *summa genera*, into which they divide all of which we are, or may be, conscious. Grammatical science, however, furnished convenient substitutes for these words. *Ego* and *non-ego* were named "subject" and "object." Yet these terms so applied do not retain any meanings. "Subject" is applicable to denote the *ego*, rather than the *non-ego*, only because it is the positive or more prominent term of the antithesis in its grammatical application, like "active and passive." Sir William Hamilton undertakes, however, to assign them meanings in psychology by representing the *object* as that which *is thought about*, and the *subject* as that which *thinks*, or *acts*, or that in which the thought or action

inheres. But this definition is given from the active subject's point of view, and not from the whole scope of the subject-attributes. We act, indeed, in volition and attentive perception on the outer world or *non-ego;* but in sensation and passive perception we are the objects influenced, governed, or acted on by this outer world. Moreover, from the point of view of the effects of thinking, both the *object* and *subject* are the subjects of attribution. We attribute qualities to external objects, and, at the same time, to their mental images, which, in their capacity as representative images, or internal signs of objects and relations, are called up and separately attended to in the human consciousness, and are, in turn, referred or attributed to the conscious subject, or to its memory and understanding.

These images, in their *individual* capacity, are not to be distinguished, even in human consciousness, from the object of perception. It is in their specific, or notative, function as signs, and as referring back to memories of like experiences, which they summarize, that they are separately and subjectively cognized. *Individually* they are divisible only into real and unreal, or into remembered and imagined combinations of particular impressions. As inward and mine they are "concepts," or thoughts directing the processes of thought, and are specially related to my will and its motives. The classification of events as inward and outward does not necessarily imply that the scientific process depends on each man's experiences of their connections alone; for the forms of language, and what is indirectly taught in learning a language, guide observation in this matter largely; and so, also, very probably, do inherited aptitudes, ties, or tendencies to combination, which have the same effect in associating the particulars of the individual's experiences as the frequent repetitions of them in himself would have, and are, indeed, by the theory of evolution, the consequences of such repeated experiences in the individual's progenitors. Such a reference of the distinction of subject and object to instinctive tendencies in our minds is not equivalent to the metaphysical doctrine that this distinction is intuitive. For this implies more than is meant by the word "instinctive" from the naturalist's point of view. It implies that the cognition is absolute; independent not only of the individual's experiences, but of all

possible previous experience, and has a certainty, reality, and cogency that no amount of experience could give to an empirical classification.

The metaphysical dogmas, for which this formula is given, deserve but a passing scientific consideration. Truths independent of all experience are not known to exist, unless we exclude from what we mean by "experience" that which we have in learning the meanings of words and in agreeing to definitions and the conventions of language; excluding these truths or identical propositions, on the ground that they depend solely, or may be considered as depending solely, on a lexical authority, from which a kind of necessity comes, independent of reality in the relations and connections of the facts denoted by the words. It is possible that laws exist absolutely universal, binding fate and infinite power as well as speech and the intelligible use of words; but it is not possible that the analytical processes of any finite intellect should discover what particular laws these are. Such an intellect may legislate with absolute freedom in the realm of definition and word-making, provided it limits itself to its autonomy, and does not demand of other intellects that they shall be governed by such laws on account of the universal applications of them in the world of common experience. It is also possible that beliefs, or convictions, may exist, believed by the mystic to be independent of all ordinary forms of particular experience, "which no amount of experience could produce"; but it is not true that there are any universal or scientific beliefs of this kind. The effects of inherited aptitudes, and of early, long-continued, and constantly repeated experiences in the individual, together with the implications of language itself, in fixing and in giving force and certainty to an idea or a belief, have, probably, not been sufficiently considered by those metaphysicians who claim a preternatural and absolute origin for certain of our cognitions; or else, perhaps, the more dogmatic among these thinkers overestimate the force and certainty of the beliefs, or mistake the *kind* of necessity they have. The essential importance, the necessity and universality in language, of pronominal words or signs, should not be mistaken for a real *a priori* necessity in the relations expressed by them. Metaphysicians should consider that *ego* and

non-ego, as real existences, are not individual phenomena, but groups with demonstrative names the least possible determined in meaning, or are the most abstract subjects of the phenomena of experience, though determined, doubtless, in their applications partly by spontaneous, instinctive, or natural and inherited tendencies to their formation.

This view of the origin of the cognition of *cogito* is equally opposed to the schemes of "idealism" and "natural realism," which divide modern schools of philosophy. According to the "idealists," the conscious subject is immediately known, at least in its phenomena, and the phenomena are intuitively known to belong to it; while the existence of anything external to the mind is an inference from the phenomena of self, or a reference of some of them to external causes. Objects are only known mediately "by their effects on *us*." Against this view the "natural realist" appeals effectively to the common-sense, or natural judgment of unsophisticated minds, and is warranted by this judgment in declaring that the object of consciousness is *just as immediately* known as the subject is. But natural realism goes beyond this judgment and holds that both the subject and object are absolutely, immediately, and equally known through their essential attributes in perception. This is more than an unlearned jury are competent to say. For if by immediacy we mean the relation which a particular *unattributed* phenomenon has to consciousness in general, we are warranted in saying that immediately, or without the step of attribution, subject and object are undistinguished in consciousness. Thus, the sensations of sound and color and taste and pleasure and pain, and the emotions of hope and fear and love and hate, *if not yet referred to their causes, or even classified as sensations and emotions*, belong to neither world exclusively. But so far as any man can remember, no such unattributed or unclassified states of consciousness are experienced. He cannot say, however, that they cannot exist, or (what is worse for the theory) be wrongly attributed or classified. All states of consciousness are, it is true, referred to one or the other, or partly to each of the two worlds; and this attribution is, in part at least, instinctive, yet not independent of all experience, since it comes either from the direct observation of our progenitors,

or, possibly, through the natural selection of them; that is, possibly through the survival of those who rightly divided the worlds, and did not often mistake a real danger for a dream or for an imagined peril, nor often mistake a dream of security for real safety. If, however, we mean by immediacy such an instinctive attribution, independent of repeated connections of attributes in their subject through the individual's own experiences, then "natural realism" is most in accordance with our view, or with such exceptions as the mistakes and corrections of dreams and hallucinations imply, and excepting the ontological or metaphysical positions that are assumed in it.

If the natural realist is not also an evolutionist (and usually he is not), then his meaning of intuitions must be that they are absolute and underived universal facts of connection in phenomena. He must suppose that distinct phenomena have stamped upon them indelible marks of their ultimate highest class, equivalents for "I" and "not-I," as the individuals of a herd of cattle are branded with the mark of their owner. Such an immutable mark would, however, render the mistakes of insanity, hallucinations, and dreams impossible, or else would refer them (as has actually been supposed *) to the mystery of the existence of evil, — a convenient disposition of philosophical puzzles. In the doctrine of evolution the meaning of the word "intuition" does not imply immutability in the connections of instinctively combined phenomena, except where such connection is an ultimate law of nature, or is the simplest causal connection, like the laws of motion, or the laws of logic (regarding logic as a science, and not merely as an art). The intuition of space in the blind might be, from this point of view, a different combination of sensibilities from that in other men, and the interpretation of sensations of hearing or sight in hallucinations as being caused by outward objects, when, in reality, they arise from disturbances or abnormal conditions of the nervous system, would not be an interpretation involving violations of ultimate laws, or suspensions in rebellious Nature of relations between cause and effect. Variations in intuitions and instinctive judgments would be as natural and explicable

* Dr. McCosh, On the Intuitions of the Mind, &c.

as errors of judgment are in the experiences of the individual man. But the doctrine of natural realism, independently of that of evolution and the implied mutability of instincts, has insurmountable difficulties.

Idealism, on the other hand, appears to contradict not the abnormal, so much as the common, phenomena of consciousness. It appears to be related to the modern sciences of physics and physiology very nearly as natural realism is to scholastic logic and ontology. Dating from the time of Descartes, it appears, in all its forms, to depend on a more exact knowledge of the bodily apparatus and outward physical causes of perception than the ancients possessed. By these researches it appeared that perception, and even sensation, is fully determined or realized in the brain only through other parts of the bodily apparatus, and through outward forces and movements like those of pressure and vibration. That the perception, or sensation, is experienced, or is seated, in the brain, was a natural and proper conclusion from these researches. That the apparent object of perception is not only distant from what thus appeared to be the seat of the perception, but that a long series of usually unknown, or unnoticed, movements intervenes between it and this apparent seat, — these facts gave great plausibility to a confused interpretation of the phenomena, namely, that the perception is first realized as a state of the conscious *ego*, and, afterwards, is referred to the outward world through the associations of general experience, as an effect produced upon us by an otherwise unknown outward cause. On similar grounds a similar misinterpretation was made of the phenomena of volition, namely, that a movement in ourselves, originally and intuitively known to be *ours*, produces an effect in the outward world at a distance from us, through the intervention of a series of usually unknown (or only indirectly known) agencies. Remote effects of the outer world on us, and our actions in producing remote effects on it, appeared to be the first or intuitive elements in our knowledge of these phenomena, all the rest being derived or inferential. This was to confound the seat of sensation or perception in the brain with its proper subjectivity, or the reference of it to the subject.

The position in the brain where the last physical condition

for the production of a sensation is situated is, no doubt, properly called the place or seat of the sensation, especially as it is through the movements of the brain with other special nervous tracts, and independently of any movements out of the nervous system, that like sensations are, or can be, revived, though these revived ones are generally feebler than those that are set in movement by outward forces. Nevertheless, this physiological seat of a sensation is no part of our direct knowledge of it. *A priori* we cannot assign it any place, nor decide that it has, or has not, a place. The place which we do assign it, in case it is outward, is the place determined by a great variety of sensations and active forms of consciousness experienced in the localization of the object to which it is referred. It is only by the association (either spontaneous and instinctive, or acquired) of this sensation with those sensations and actions that are involved in the localization of the object, that we arrive at any notion of its locality. If we do not form any such associations of it with otherwise determined localities, and if it and its kind remain after much experience unlocalized, or only vaguely localized in our bodies, it is then, *but not till then*, referred to the conscious self as a subjective phenomenon. There remains the alternative, of course, in the theory of evolution, that the negative experiences, which would thus determine the subjective character of a phenomenon, may be the experiences of our progenitors, and that our judgment of this character may be, in many cases, an instinctive one, arising from the inherited effects of these former experiences. Otherwise this judgment in the individual mind, and from its own experiences, would appear to be posterior, in point of time, to its acquaintance with the object world, since this judgment would be determined by the *absence* of any uniform connection in the phenomenon with the phenomena of locality. Instead of being, as the theories of idealism hold, first known as a phenomenon of the subject *ego*, or as an effect upon us of an hypothetical outward world, its first unattributed condition would be, by our view, one of neutrality between the two worlds.

In dissenting, therefore, from both extremes, — the theory of idealism and that of natural realism, or assenting to the latter only as qualified by the theory of evolution, — I have

supposed both theories to be dealing with the two worlds only as worlds of phenomena, without considering the metaphysical bearings and varieties of them with respect to the question of the cognition of non-phenomenal existences, on the grounds of belief in an inconceivable and metaphysical matter or spirit; for, according to the view proposed as a substitute for these extremes, subject and object are only names of the highest classes, and are not the names of inconceivable substrata of phenomena. Ontology or metaphysics would not be likely to throw much original light on the scientific evolution of self-consciousness; but it becomes itself an interesting object of study as a phase of this evolution seen in the light of science. When one comes to examine in detail the supposed cognitions of supersensible existences, and the faculty of necessary truth which is called "the reason," or else is described in its supposed results as the source of necessary beliefs or convictions, or of natural and valid hypotheses of inconceivable realities, great difficulty is experienced, on account of the abstract character of the beliefs, in distinguishing what is likely to be strictly inherited from what is early and uniformly acquired in the development of the faculty of reflection, and especially from what is imbibed through language, the principal philosophical instrument of this faculty. The languages employed by philosophers are themselves lessons in ontology, and have, in their grammatical structures, implied conceptions and beliefs common to the philosopher and to the barbarian inventors of language, as well as other implications which he takes pains to avoid. How much besides he ought to avoid, in the correction of conceptions erroneously taken from the forms of language, is a question always important to be considered in metaphysical inquiries.

The conception of *substance*, as a nature not fully involved in the contrast of essential and accidental attributes, and the connection, or coexistence, of them in our experiences, or the conception of it as also implying the real, though latent, coexistence of all attributes in an existence unknown to us, or known only in a non-phenomenal and inconceivable way, — this conception needs to be tested by an examination of the possible causes of it as an effect of the forms of language and other familiar associations, which, however natural, may still be mis-

leading. To the minds of the barbarian inventors of language, words had not precise meanings, for definition is not a barbarian accomplishment. Hence, to such minds, definite and precise attributions, as of sweetness to honey and sugar, or light to the day, to the heavenly bodies, or to fire, are strongly in contrast with the vagueness which appears to them inherent in substantive names, — inherent not as vagueness, however, but as *something else*. Such names did not clearly distinguish persons and things, for the day and the heavenly bodies were personal, and fire apparently was an animal or a spirit. Removing as much as possible of mere crudeness from such conceptions, predication would yet appear to be a reference of something distinctly known to something essentially unknown, or known only by one or a few attributes needed to distinguish it by a name, as proper names distinguish persons. The meaning of this name, and the conception of it as meaning much more, and as actually referring to unapparent powers of bringing to light attributes previously unknown, — powers manifested in an actual effect when a new attribute is added in predication, — this vague, ill-defined, and essentially hidden meaning is assimilated in grammar, and thence in philosophy, to an agent putting forth a new manifestation of itself in a real self-assertion.

The contrast of "active and passive" in the forms of verbs illustrates how the barbaric mind mounted into the higher regions of abstraction in language through concrete imaginations. The subject of a proposition, instead of being thought as that vaguely determined group of phenomena with which the predicate is found to be connected, was thought either to perform an action on an object through the transitive verb, or to be acted on by the object through the passive form, or to put forth an action absolute, expressed by the neuter verb, or to assert its past, present, or future existence absolutely, and its possession of certain properties by the substantive verb, and by the copula and predicate. This personification of the subject of a proposition, which is still manifested in the forms and terminology of grammar, is an assimilation of things to an active, or at least demonstrative, self-consciousness or personality. It had hardly reached the degree of abstraction needed for the clear intellectual self-consciousness of *cogito*.

It rather implied that things also think. The invention of substantive names for attributes, that is, abstract names, like goodness or truth, — an invention fraught with most important consequences to human knowledge, — brought at first more prominently forward the realistic tendencies which philosophers have inherited from the barbarian inventors of language. Abstract names do not appear to have been meant at first to be the direct names of attributes, or collections of attributes, as "goodness" and "humanity," but to be the names of powers (such as make things good, or make men what they are), which appear to be results of the earliest conscious or scientific analysis in the progress of the human mind, but names strongly tainted still by the barbaric conception of words as the names of active beings. Abstract words were not, however, as active or demonstrative as their savage progenitors, the concrete general substantives. They appear rather as artificers, or the agents which build up things, or make them what they are. But, by means of them, concrete general names were deprived of their powers and reduced to subjection. To have direct general names, and to have general powers, appear to be synonymous to savage and semi-barbarous mind.

I have spoken as if all this were a matter of past history, instead of being an actually present state of philosophical thought, and a present condition of some words in the minds of many modern thinkers. The misleading metaphors are, it is true, now recognized as metaphors; but their misleading character is not clearly seen to its full extent. The subjects of propositions are still made to do the work, to bear the impositions, to make known the properties and accidents expressed by their predicates, or to assert their own existence and autonomy, just so far as they are supposed to be the names of anything but the assemblages of known essential qualities or phenomena actually coexistent in our experiences; the qualities which their definitions involve, and to which other attributes are added (but from which they are not evolved) in real predication; or just so far as they are supposed to be the names of unknown and imperceptible entities. Names are directly the designations of things, not of hidden powers, or wills, in things. But it is not necessary to regard them as precisely definable, or

as connoting definite groups of qualities or the essential attributes of things, in order that they may fulfil the true functions of words; for they are still only the names of things, not of wills in things, on one hand, nor of "concepts" or thoughts in us, on the other hand. They are synonymes of "concepts," if we please to extend synonymy so as to include the whole range of the *signs* of things; but both the "concept" and its verbal synonyme may be, and generally are, *vague*. For just as in the major premises of syllogisms the subject is, in general, a co-designation of two undivided parts of a class of objects, one known directly to have, or lack, the attributes affirmed or denied in this premise, and the other part, judged by induction to be also possessed, or not possessed, of them,—a co-designation in which the conclusion of the syllogism is virtually contained, so as to make the syllogism appear to be a *petitio principii* (as it would be but for this implied induction *),—so in the simple naming of objects the names may be properly regarded as the names of groups of qualities, in which groups the qualities are partly known and partly unknown, predication in real (not verbal) propositions being the conversion of the latter into the former. But in this view of the functions of words, it is necessary, at least, to suppose enough of the known attributes of objects is involved in the meanings of their names to make the applications of the names distinct and definite. Names, with the capacity they would thus acquire, or have actually had, in spite of metaphysics, of having their meanings modified or changed, are best adapted to the functions of words in promoting the progress of knowledge. From this use of words their essences, both the apparent and the inscrutable, have disappeared altogether, except so far as the actual existence and coexistence of the known attributes of objects are implied by names, or so far as the coexistence of these with previously unknown ones is also implied by the use of names as the subjects of propositions. No inscrutable powers in words or things, nor any immutable connections among the attributes called essential, are thus imposed upon the use of words in science.

Metaphysicians, on the other hand, in nearly all that is left to

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* See Mill's Logic, Book II., chapter iii.

the peculiar domain of their inquiries, possess their problems and solutions in certain words, such as "substance," "cause," "matter," "mind," still retaining, at least with them, the barbaric characters we have examined. Matter and mind still retain, not only with metaphysicians, but also with the vulgar, designations of unknown inscrutable powers in the outward and inward worlds, or powers which, according to some, are known only to a higher form of intuition through the faculty of "Reason"; or, being really inscrutable and inconceivable by any human faculty, as others hold, they are, nevertheless, regarded as certainly existent, and attested by irresistible natural beliefs. That beliefs in beings, unknown and unknowable, are real beliefs, and are natural (though more so to some minds than to others), seems *a priori* probable on the theory of evolution, without resorting to the effects of early training and the influence of associations in language itself, by which the existence of such beliefs is accounted for by some scientific philosophers. But the authority which the theory of evolution would assign to these beliefs is that of the conceptions which barbarous and vulgar minds have formed of the functions of words, and of the natures which they designate. Inheritance of these conceptions, that is, of aptitudes or tendencies to their formation, and the continued action of the causes so admirably analyzed by Mr. Mill,* through which he proposes to account for these beliefs directly, and which have retained, especially in the metaphysical conception of "matter," the barbarian's feelings and notions about real existence as a power to produce phenomena, are sufficient to account for the existence of these beliefs and their cogency, without assigning them any force as authorities.

That some minds have inherited these beliefs, or the tendency to form them, more completely than others, accords with a distinction in the mental characters of philosophers which Professor Masson makes in his work on Recent British Philosophy, and illustrates by the philosophies of Mr. Carlyle, Sir W. Hamilton, and Mr. Mill, namely, the differences arising from the degrees in which the several thinkers were actuated by an

* See Mill's Examination of Hamilton, chapter xi.

"ontological faith," or an "ontological feeling or passion," which, according to Professor Masson, has in the history of the world amounted to "a rage of ontology," and has been the motive of wars and martyrdoms. This passion would appear, according to the theory of evolution, to be a survival of the barbarian's feelings and notions of phenomena as the outward show of hidden powers in things analogous to his own expressions, of his own will or interior activity in language and gesture. As he assigned his own name or else the name "I" to this active inward personality, and not to the group of external characters by which he was known to his fellow-barbarians; and as he also named and addressed them as indwelling spirits, so he seemed to apply his general designations of things. The traces of this way of regarding names and things, surviving in the grammatical inventions and forms of speech, which the barbarian has transmitted to us, include even the sexes of things. The metaphysical meanings of the terms "substance," "matter," "mind," "spirit," and "cause" are other traces. The metaphysical realism of abstract terms appears, in like manner, to be a trace of an original analysis of motives in the powers of things to produce their phenomena, analogous to the barbarian's analysis of motives in his own will or those of his fellows.

According to Professor Masson, Sir. W. Hamilton was strongly actuated by "the ontological passion." This would mean, according to our interpretation of it, that he had inherited, or had partly, perhaps, imbibed from his philosophical studies, the barbarian's mode of thought. This appeared in the metaphysical extension which he gave to the doctrine of natural realism, which, with him, was not merely the doctrine of the equal immediacy and the instinctive attribution of subjective and objective phenomena, but included also natural beliefs in the equal and independent, though hidden, existences of the metaphysical substrata of matter and mind. He was, nevertheless, so far influenced by modern scientific modes of thought that he claimed for these natural beliefs not at all the character of cognitions, nor did he claim determinate conception of these existences except their mutual independence. He rejected the metaphysician's invention of a faculty of "reason," cognizant of supersensible realities; and really contradicted himself in

claiming, with most modern thinkers, that knowledge of phenomena is the only possible knowledge, while he held that belief in what could not thus be known had the certainty of knowledge, and was in effect knowledge, though he did not call it knowledge.*

Another point in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy illustrates our theory on a different side. While contending for the equal immediacy of our knowledge of subject and object, he, nevertheless, held that the phenomena of the subject had a superior certainty to those of the object, on the ground that the latter could be doubted (as they were by certain idealists) without logical contradiction, while the former could not be, since to doubt the existence of the subject would be to doubt the doubt, and thus neutralize it. To say nothing of other objections to this as a criterion of subjective certainty, it is obvious that it has no cogency as applied to the metaphysical, or non-phenomenal, existence of the subject. To doubt that a doubt inheres in a non-phenomenal subject, is not to doubt the existence of the doubt itself as a phenomenon, or even as a phenomenon referable to the subject group of phenomena. In regard to the impossibility of doubting the existence of this subject group, which, as including the doubt itself, would thus neutralize it, we ought to distinguish between a doubt of a doubt as a mere phenomenon of consciousness generally, or as unattributed either to subject or object, and the doubt of the validity of the attribution of it to the subject. There can be logical contradiction only in respect to attribution, either explicit or implicit, and so far as the doubt is merely a phenomenon of which nothing is judged or known but its actual existence in consciousness, a doubt of it, though impossible, is yet not so on grounds of logical contradiction. Its actual presence would be the only proof of its presence, its actual absence the only proof of its absence. But this is equally true of all phenomena in consciousness, generally. If in reflection we examine whether a color of any sort is present, we have inquired, not merely about the bare existence of a phenomenon of which the phenomenon itself could alone assure us, but about its classes, whether it is a color or not, and

* See Mill's Examination of Hamilton, chapter v.

what sort of a color; and we should attribute it, if present, to the object world, or the object group of phenomena by the very same sort, if not with the same degree, of necessity which determines the attribution of a doubt to the subject-consciousness. If now, having attributed the color or the doubt to its proper world, we should call in question the existence of this world, we should contradict ourselves; and this would be the case equally whether the attribution was made to the outward world, as of the color, or to the inward world, as of the doubt.

There may be different kinds of reflective doubt about either phenomenon. We should not ordinarily be able to question seriously whether the doubt belonged to the class "doubts," its resemblance to others of the class being a relation of phenomena universal and too clear to be dismissed from attention; and the color would call up its class with equal cogency, as well as the class of surfaces or spaces in which it appears always inherent. But we might doubt, nevertheless, seriously and rationally, whether a doubt had arisen from rational considerations in our minds, or from a disease of the nervous system, from hypochondriasis, or low spirits. So also in regard to the color and the forms in which it appears embodied, we may reasonably question whether the appearance has arisen from causes really external, or from disease, as in hallucinations.

There remains one other source of misunderstanding about the comparative certainty of "I think," and of that which I think about. The attributions contained in the latter may be particular, empirical, and unfamiliar, or based on a very limited experience, and on *this account* may be uncertain; while the very general and highest attribution of the thought to myself will be most certain. The superior certainty of the clause "I think" over that which I think about disappears, however, as soon as the latter is made an attribution of equal simplicity, generality, and breadth in my experience; as when I say, "I think that there is an outer world," or, "I think that beings beside me exist." "To think that I think," is not more properly the formula of consciousness in general than "To think that a being not-I is thought about." It is not even the complete formula of *self*-consciousness, which, as we have seen, has several forms not necessarily coeval. To think that I will,

that I desire, that I feel, is, as we have seen, to refer these several forms of consciousness to the thinking subject; or, more properly, to refer willing, desiring, feeling, and thinking all to the same subject "I"; which is related to the latter attribute more especially, merely because the name "I" is given only in and through the recognition of this attribute in the cognition of *cogito*. To infer the existence of the subject from the single attribute of thinking would be to unfold only in part its existence and nature; though it would note that attribute of the subject through the recognition of which in reflection its name was determined and connected with its other attributes.

The latter, namely, our volitions, desires, and feelings, are in general so obscure in respect to the particular causes which precede them and are ulterior to their immediate determination or production, that introspective observation in reflection can penetrate only a little way, and is commonly quite unable to trace them back to remote causes in our characters, organizations, and circumstances. Hence, the conception of the causes of our own inward volitions, or our desires and intentions, as being of an inscrutable, non-phenomenal nature, would naturally arise. But this conception would probably be made much more prominent in the unreflective barbarian's mind, by his association of it with the obscurity to him of the inward, or personal, causes of outward actions and expressions in others. Darkness is seen where light is looked for and does not appear. Causes are missed where research is made without success. We are conscious of minds in other men and in other animals only through their outward expressions. The inward causes are not apparent or directly known to us as phenomena; and though the inference of their existence is not in all cases, even with men, made through analogy, or from an observation of their connections with similar outward actions and expressions in ourselves, but is grounded, doubtless, in many cases on an instinctive connection between these expressions in others and *feelings*, at least, in ourselves, yet we do not think of them as really inscrutable in their natures, but only as imperceptible to our outward senses. They have their representatives in the phenomena of our own imaginations.

These would be but vaguely conceived, however, in many cases. Even reverence in the barbarian's mind might prevent him, as an obedient subject, from attempting to fathom or reproduce in his own imagination the thoughts and intentions of his majesty the king. Reverence is not, however, in any case, an unreflective or thoughtless feeling. It would not be like the feelings of the sheep, which, not being able to comprehend through its own experience the savage feelings of the wolf, would only interpret his threatening movements as something fearful, or would connect in an instinctive judgment these outward movements only with anticipated painful consequences. Reverence in the loyal barbarian subject would not go so far as to make his king appear a mere automaton, as the wolf might seem to the sheep. The commands of his king, or of his deity, would be to him rather the voice of a wisdom and authority inscrutable, the outward manifestation of a mysterious *power*, the type of metaphysical causation. Accordingly, we find that a capacity for strong, unappropriated feelings of loyalty and reverence, demanding an object for their satisfaction, have also descended to those thinkers who have inherited "the ontological passion" from their barbarian ancestors. It would, therefore, appear most probable, that the metaphysician's invincible belief in the conception of the will as a mysterious power behind the inward phenomena of volition, and as incapable of analysis into the determinations of character, organization, and circumstances, arises also from inherited feelings about the wills of other men rather than from attentive observation of the phenomena of his own.

Science and scientific studies have led a portion of the human race a long way aside from the guidance of these inherited intellectual instincts, and have also appeared able to conquer these in many minds to which in youth they seemed invincible. Positivists, unlike poets, become — are not born — such thinkers. The conception of the causes of phenomena, with which these studies render them familiar, had small beginnings in the least noble occupations and necessities of life, and in the need of knowing the future and judging of it from present signs. From this grew up gradually a knowledge of natural phenomena, and phenomena of mind also, both in their out-

ward and combined orders or laws and in their intimate and elementary successions, or the "laws of nature." The latter are involved in the relation of effects to their "physical" causes, so called because metaphysicians have discovered that they are not the same sort of powers as those which the invincible instincts look for as ultimate and absolute in nature. But this is not a new or modern meaning of the word "cause." It was always its practical, common-sense, every-day meaning; — in the relations of means to ends; in rational explanations and anticipations of natural events; in the familiar processes and observations of common human life; in short, in the relations of phenomena to phenomena, as apparent causes and effects. This meaning was not well defined, it is true; nor is it now easily made clear, save by examples; yet it is by examples, rather than by a distinct abstraction of what is common to them, that the use of many other words, capable of clear definition, is determined in common language. The relations of invariable succession in phenomena do not, except in ultimate laws where the phenomena are simple or elementary, define the relation of phenomenal cause and effect; for, as it has been observed, night follows day, and day follows night invariably, yet neither is the cause of the other. These relations belong to the *genus* of natural successions. The relation of cause and effect is a *species* of this *genus*. It means an *unconditional*, invariable succession; *independence* of other orders of succession, or of all orders not involved in it.

The day illuminates objects; the night obscures them; the sun and fires warm them; the clouds shed rain upon them; the savage animal attacks and hurts others: these facts involve natural orders, in which relations of cause and effect are apparent, and are indicated in the antitheses of their terms as the subjects and objects of transitive propositions. But these relations are only indicated; they are not explicitly set forth. Metaphysics undertakes their explication by referring the illumination, obscurity, warmth, rain, and hurt to *powers* in the day, the sun and fires, the clouds, and the animal. Modern metaphysics would not go so far as to maintain, in the light of science, that the powers in these examples are inscru-

table, or incapable of further analysis. Nevertheless, when the analysis is made, and the vision of objects, for example, is understood to arise from the incidence of the light of the sun on the air and on objects, and thence from reflections on all surfaces of objects, and thence again from diffused reflections falling partly on our eyes, and so on to the full realization of vision in the brain, all according to determinate laws of succession, — an analysis which sets forth those *elementary* invariable orders, or *ultimate* and independent laws of succession in phenomena, to which, in their independent combinations, science refers the relations of cause and effect, — when this analysis has been made, then metaphysics interposes, and from its ancient habits of thought ascribes to the elementary antecedent a *power* to produce the elementary consequent. Or when the effect, as in vision, follows from the ultimate properties and elementary laws of great numbers of beings and arrangements, — the sun, the medium of light, the air, the illuminated objects, the eye, its nerves and the brain, — and follows through a long series of steps, however rapid, from the earliest to the latest essential antecedent, metaphysics still regards the whole process, with the elementary powers involved, as explicated only in its *outward* features. There is still the mystery inherent in the being of each elementary antecedent, of its power to produce its elementary consequent; and these mysterious powers, combined and referred to the most conspicuous essential conditions of the effect (like the existence of the sun and the eye), make in the whole a mystery as great as if science had never inquired into the process.

Metaphysics demands, in the interest of mystery, *why* an elementary antecedent is followed by its elementary consequent. But this question does not arise in it from that inquisitiveness which inspires scientific research. It is asked to show that it cannot be answered, and hence that all science rests on mystery. It is asked from the feelings that in the barbarian or the child forbid or check inquiry. But, being a question, it is open to answer; or it makes legitimate, at least, the counter-question, When can a question be properly asked? or, What is the purpose of asking a question? Is it not to discover the causes, classes, laws, or rules that determine

the existence, properties, or production of a thing or event? And when these are discovered, is there any further occasion for inquiry, except in the interest of feelings which would have checked inquiry at the outset? The feelings of loyalty and reverence, instinctive in our natures, and of the utmost value in the history of our race, as the mediums of co-operation, discipline, and instruction, are instincts more powerful in some minds than in others, and, like all instincts, demand their proper satisfaction. From the will, or our active powers, they demand devotion; from the intellect, submission to authority and mystery. But, like all instincts, they may demand too much; too much for their proper satisfaction, and even for their most energetic and useful service to the race, or to the worth in it of the individual man. But whether it is possible for any one to have too much loyalty, reverence, love, or devotion, is a question which the metaphysical spirit and mode of thought suggest. For in the mystic's mind these feelings have set themselves up as absolute excellences, as money sets itself up in the mind of the miser. And it is clear that, under these absolute forms, it is difficult to deny the demand. It is only in respect to *what is* reverenced, loved, or worshipped, or *what* claims our allegiance, that questions of how much of them is due can be rationally asked.

To demand the submission of the intellect to the mystery of the simplest and most elementary relations of cause and effect in phenomena, or the restraint of its inquisitiveness on reaching an ultimate law of nature, is asking too much, in that it is a superfluous demand. The intellect in itself has no disposition to go any further, and, on the other hand, no impulse to kneel before its completed triumph. The highest generality, or universality, in the elements or connections of elements in phenomena, is the utmost reach both in the power and the desire of the scientific intellect. Explanation cannot go, and does not rationally seek to go, beyond such facts. The invention of *noumena* to account for ultimate and universal properties and relations in phenomena arises from no other necessity than the action of a desire urged beyond the normal promptings of its power. To demand of the scientific intellect that it shall pause in the interest of mystery at the movements of a falling body or at the laws of these movements, is a misappropriation

of the quality of mystery. For mystery still has its uses; and, in its useful action, is an ally of inquisitiveness, inciting and guiding it, giving it steadiness and seriousness, opposing only its waywardness and idleness. It fixes attention, even inquisitive attention, on its objects, and in its active form of wonder "is a highly philosophical affection." So also devotion, independently of its intrinsic worth in the mystic's regard, has its uses; and these determine its rational measure, or how much of it is due to any object. In its active forms of usefulness and duty, it is an ally of freedom in action, opposing it only in what would limit it still more, or injuriously and on the whole.

The metaphysical modes of thought and feeling foster, on the other hand, the sentiments of mystery and devotion in their passive forms, and as attitudes of the intellect and will, rather than as their inciting and guiding motives. These attitudes, which are symbolized in the forms of religious worship, were no doubt needed to fix the attention of the barbarian, as they are still required to fix the attention of the child upon serious contemplations and purposes. Obedience and absolute submission are, at one stage of intellectual and moral development, both in a race and in the individual, required as the conditions of discipline for effecting the more directly serviceable and freer action of the mind and character under the guidance of rational loyalty and reverence. The metaphysical modes of thought and feeling retain these early habits in relations in which they have ceased to be serviceable to the race, or to the useful development of the individual, especially when in the mystic's regard obedience has acquired an intrinsic worth, and submission has become a beatitude. The scientific habit of thought, though emancipated from any such outward supports and constraints, is yet not wanting in earnestness of purpose and serious interests, and is not without the motives of devotion and mystery, or their active guidance in the directions of usefulness and duty, and in the investigations of truth. It does not stand in awe before the unknown, as if life itself depended on a mysterious and capricious will in it, for awe is habitual only with the barbarian, and is a useful motive only in that severe instruction which offsets the savage wants, insecurities,

and necessities of his life, or constrains the thoughtless by a present fear against evils really greater than what is feared, though less obvious to their imaginations.

Nevertheless, the whole nature of the modern civilized man includes both these conflicting tendencies in speculation, the metaphysical and scientific; the disposition to regard the phenomena of nature as they appeared naturally and serviceably in the primitive use of language and reflection, and the disposition of the Positivist to a wholly different interpretation of them. This conflict exists, however, only where either disposition invades the proper province of the other; where both strive for supremacy in the search for a clearer knowledge of these phenomena, or where both seek to satisfy the more primitive and instinctive tendencies of the mind. In the forms of ontological and phenomenological, or metaphysical and positive philosophies, this conflict is unavoidable and endless. Deathless warriors, irreconcilable and alternately victorious, according to the nature of the ground, or to advantages of position, continually renew their conflicts along the line of development in each individual mind and character. A contrast of tendencies analogous to this, which involves, however, no necessary conflict, is shown in the opposition of science and poetry; one contemplating in understanding and in fixed positive beliefs the phenomena which the other contemplates through firmly established and instinctive tendencies, and through interests, which for want of a better name to note their motive power, or influence in the will, are also sometimes called beliefs. Disputes about the nature of what is called "belief," as to what it is, as well as to what are the true grounds or causes of it, would, if the meanings of the word were better discriminated in common usage, be settled by the lexicographer; for it is really an ambiguous term. Convictions of half-truths, or intimations of truth, coupled with deep feeling, and impressed by the rhythms and alliterations of words, are obviously different from those connections which logic and evidence are calculated to establish in the mind.

The poet inherits in his mental and moral nature, or organic memory, and in his dispositions of feeling and imagination, the instinctive thoughts and feelings which we have supposed habit-

ual and useful in the outward life of the barbarian. In the melody of his verses he revives the habits which were acquired, it is believed, in the development of his race, long before any words were spoken, or were needed to express its imaginations, and when its emotions found utterance in the music of inarticulate tones. The poet's productions are thus, in part, reproductions, refined or combined in the attractive forms of art, of what was felt and thought before language and science existed; or they are restorations of language to a primeval use, and to periods in the history of his race in which his progenitors uttered their feelings, as of gallantry, defiance, joy, grief, exultation, sorrow, fear, anger, or love, and their light, serious, or violent moods, in modulated tones, harsh or musical; or later, in unconscious figures of speech, expressed without reflection or intention of communicating truth. For, as it has been said, it is essential to eloquence to be heard, but poetry is expression to be only overheard. In supposing this noble savage ancestry for the poet, and for those who overhear in him, with a strange delight and interest, a charm of naturalness and of novelty combined by the magic of his art, it is not necessary to conclude that all savage natures are noble, or have in them the germs of the poet's inspiration. It is more probable that most of the races which have remained in a savage state have retained a more primitive condition, in many respects, than that of civilized men, because they lacked some qualities possessed by the noble savage which have advanced him to the civilized state, and because they have been isolated from the effects of such qualities either to improve or exterminate them. The noble savage is not, at any rate, now to be found. Weeding out the more stupid and brutal varieties has, doubtless, been the more effective method of nature in the culture of the nobler qualities of men, at least in a state of nature which was one of warfare.

It is a common misconception of the theory of evolution to suppose that any one of contemporary races, or species derived from a common origin, fully represents the characters of these progenitors, or that they are not all more or less divergent forms of an original race; the ape, for example, as well as the man, from a more remote stock, or the present savage man, as well as the civilized one, from a more recent common

origin. Original differences within a race are, indeed, the conditions of such divergences, or separations of a race into several; and original superiorities, though slight at first and accidental, were thus the conditions of the survival of those who possessed them and of their descendants, and the extinction of others from their struggles in warfare, in gallantry, and for subsistence. The secondary distinctions of sex, or contrasts in the personal attractions, in the forms, movements, aspects, voices, and even in some mental dispositions of men and women, are, on the whole, greatest in the races which have accomplished most, not merely in science and the useful arts, but more especially in the arts of sculpture, painting, music, and poetry. And this in the theory of evolution is not an accidental conjunction, but a connection through a common origin. Love is still the theme of poets, and his words are measured by laws of rhythm, which in a primeval race served in vocal music, with other charms, to allure in the contests of gallantry. There would, doubtless, have arisen from these rivalries a sort of self-attention,* or an outward self-consciousness, which, together with the consciousness of themselves as causes distinct from the wills or agencies of other beings, and as having feelings, or passive powers, and desires, or latent volitions, not shared by others, served in the case of the primitive men as bases of reference in their first attention to the phenomena of thought in their minds, when these became sufficiently vivid to engage attention in the revival of trains of images through acts of reflection. The consummate self-consciousness, expressed by "I think," needed for its genesis only the power of attending to the phenomena of thought as signs of other thoughts, or of images revived from memory, with a reference of them to a subject; that is, to a something possessing other attributes, or to a group of coexistent phenomena. The most distinct attention to this being, or subject, of volitions, desires, feelings, outward expressions, and thoughts required a name for the subject, as other names were required for the most distinct attention to the several phenomena themselves.

This view of the origin of self-consciousness is by no means necessarily involved in the much more certain and clearly ap-

* See Darwin's Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Theory of Blushing, chapter xiii.

parent agency of natural selection in the process of development. For natural selection is not essentially concerned in the *first* production of any form, structure, power, or habit, but only in perpetuating and improving those which have arisen from any cause whatever. Its agency is the same in preserving and increasing a serviceable and heritable feature in any form of life, whether this service be incidental to some other already existing and useful power which is turned to account in some new direction, or be the unique and isolated service of some newly and arbitrarily implanted nature. Whether the powers of memory and abstractive attention, already existing and useful in outward perceptions common to men and others of the more intelligent animals, were capable in their higher degrees and under favorable circumstances (such as the gestural and vocal powers of primeval man afforded them) of being turned to a new service in the power of reflection, aided by language, or were supplemented by a really new, unique, and inexplicable power, in either case, the agency of natural selection would have been the same in preserving, and also in improving, the new faculty (provided this faculty was capable of improvement by degrees, and was not perfect from the first). The origin of that which through service to life has been preserved, is to this process arbitrary, indifferent, accidental (in the logical sense of this word), or non-essential. This origin has no part in the process, and is of importance with reference to it only in determining how much it has to do to complete the work of creation. For if a faculty has small beginnings, and rises to great importance in the development of a race through natural selection, then the process becomes an essential one. But if men were put in possession of the faculties which so pre-eminently distinguish them by a sudden, discontinuous, arbitrary cause or action, or without reference to what they were before, except so far as their former faculties were adapted to the service of the new ones, then selection might only act to preserve or maintain at their highest level faculties so implanted. Even the effects of constant, direct use, habit, or long-continued exercise might be sufficient to account for all improvements in a faculty. The latter means of improvement must, indeed, on either hypothesis, have been very influential in increasing the

range of the old powers of memory, attention, and vocal utterance through their new use.

The outward physical aids of reflective thought, in the articulating powers of the voice, do not appear to have been firmly implanted, with the new faculty of self-consciousness, among the instincts of human nature; and this, at first sight, might seem to afford an argument against the acquisition by a natural process of any form of instinct, since vocal language has probably existed as long as any useful or effective exercise of reflection in men. That the faculty which uses the voice in language should be inherited, while its chief instrument is still the result of external training in an art, or that language should be "half instinct and half art," would, indeed, on second thought, be a paradox on any other hypothesis but that of natural selection. For this is an economical process, and effects no more than what is needed. If the instinctive part in language is sufficient to prompt the invention and the exercise of the art,* then the inheritance of instinctive powers of articulation would be superfluous, and would not be effected by selection; but would only come in the form of inherited effects of habit, — the form in which the different degrees of aptitude for the education of the voice appear to exist in different races of men. Natural selection would not effect anything, indeed, for men which art and intelligence could, and really do, effect, — such as clothing their backs in cold climates with hair or fur, — since this would be quite superfluous under the furs of other animals with which art has already clothed them. The more instinctive language of gestures appears also to have only indirect relations to real serviceableness, or to the grounds of natural selection, and to depend on the inherited effects of habit, and on universal principles of mental and physiological action.†

The language of gestures may, however, have been sufficient for the realization of the faculty of self-consciousness in all that the metaphysician regards as essential to it. The primitive man might, by pointing to himself in a meditative attitude, have

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* In the origin of the languages of civilized peoples, the distinction between powers of tradition, or *external inheritance*, and proper invention in art becomes a very important one, as will be shown farther on, p. 301.

† See Darwin's Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.

expressed in effect to himself and others the "I think," which was to be, in the regard of many of his remote descendants, the distinguishing mark, the outward emblem, of his essential separation from his nearest kindred and progenitors, his metaphysical distinction from all other animals. This consciousness and expression would more naturally have been a source of proud satisfaction to the primitive men themselves, just as children among us glory most in their first imperfect command of their unfolding powers, or even in accomplishments of a unique and individual character when first acquired. To the civilized man of the present time, there is more to be proud of in the immeasurable consequences of this faculty, and in what was evolved through the continued subsequent exercise of it, especially through its outward artificial instruments in language, — consequences not involved in the bare faculty itself. As being the pre-requisite condition of these uses and inventions, it would, if of an ultimate and underived nature, be worthy the distinction, which, in case it is referable to latent natures in pre-existing faculties, must be accorded to them in their higher degrees. And if these faculties are common to all the more intelligent animals, and are, by superior degrees only, made capable of higher functions, or effects of a new and different kind (as longer fins enable a fish to fly), then the main qualitative distinction of the human race is to be sought for in these effects, and chiefly in the invention and use of artificial language.

This invention was, doubtless, at first made by men from social motives, for the purpose of making known to one another, by means of arbitrarily associated and voluntary signs, the wishes, thoughts, or intentions clearly determined upon in their imaginations. Even now, children invent words, or, rather, attribute meanings to the sounds they can command, when they are unable to enunciate the words of the mother tongue which they desire for the purposes of communication. It is, perhaps, improper to speak of this stage of language as determined by conscious invention through a recognized motive, and for a *purpose* (in the subjective sense of this word). It is enough for a purpose (in its objective sense) to be served, or for a service to be done, by such arbitrary associations between internal and external language, or thought and speech, however these ties may, in the

first instance, be brought about. The intention and the invention become, however, conscious acts in reflection when the secondary motives to the use of language begin to exert influence, and perhaps before the latter have begun to be reflectively known, or recognized, and are still acting as they would in a merely animal mind. These motives are the needs and desires (or, rather, the use and importance), of making our thoughts clearer to ourselves, and not merely communicating them to others. Uncertainty, or perplexity from failures of memory or understanding, render the mnemonic uses of vivid external and voluntary signs the agents of important services to reflective thought, when these signs are already possessed, to some extent, for the purposes of communication. These two uses of language, — the social, and the meditative or mnemonic, — carried to only a slight development, would afford the means of recognizing their own values; and the character of the inventions of which languages would be seen to consist. Invention in its true sense, as a reflective process, would then act with more energy in extending the range of language.

Command of language is a much more efficient command of thought in reflective processes than that which is implied in the simplest form of self-consciousness. It involves a command of memory to a certain degree. Already a mental power, usually accounted a simple one, and certainly not involved in "I think," or only in its outward consequences, has been developed in the power of the will over thought. Voluntary memory, or reminiscence, is especially aided by command of language. This is a tentative process, essentially similar to that of a search for a lost or missing external object. Trials are made in it to revive a missing mental image, or train of images, by means of words; and, on the other hand, to revive a missing name by means of mental images, or even by other words. It is not certain that this power is an exclusively human one, as is generally believed, except in respect to the high degree of proficiency attained by men in its use. It does not appear impossible that an intelligent dog may be aided by its attention, purposely directed to spontaneous memories, in recalling a missing fact, such as the locality of a buried bone.

In the earlier developments of language, and while it is still

most subject to the caprices and facilities of individual wills (as in the nursery), the character of it as an invention, or system of inventions, is, doubtless, more clearly apparent than it afterwards becomes, when a third function of language rises into prominence. Traditions, by means of language, and customs, fixed by its conservative power, tend, in turn, to give fixity to the conventions of speech; and the customs and associations of language itself begin to prescribe rules for its inventions, or to set limits to their arbitrary adoption. Individual wills lose their power to decree changes in language; and, indeed, at no time are individual wills unlimited agents in this process. Consent given on grounds not always consciously determining it, but common to the many minds which adopt proposals or obey decrees in the inventions of words, is always essential to the establishment or alteration of a language. But as soon as a language has become too extensive to be the possible invention of any single mind, and is mainly a tradition, it must appear to the barbarian's imagination to have a will of its own; or, rather, sounds and meanings must appear naturally bound together, and to be the fixed names and expressions of wills in things. And later, when complex grammatical forms and abstract substantive names have found their way into languages, they must appear like the very laws and properties of nature itself, which nothing but magical powers could alter; though magic, with its power over the will, might still be equal to the miracle. Without this power not even a sovereign's will could oppose the authority of language in its own domain. Even magic had failed when an emperor could not alter the gender of a noun. Education had become the imperial power, and schoolmasters were its prime ministers.

From this point in the development of language, its separations into the *varieties* of dialects, the divergences of these into *species*, or distinct languages, and the affinities of them as grouped by the glossologist into *genera* of languages present precise parallels to the developments and relations in the organic world which the theory of natural selection supposes. It has been objected* to the completeness of these parallels

* See article on Schleicher and the Physical Theory of Language, in Professor W. D. Whitney's Oriental and Linguistic Studies.

that the process of development in languages is still under the control of men's wills. Though an individual will may have but little influence on it, yet the general consent to a proposed change is still a voluntary action, or is composed of voluntary actions on the part of the many, and hence is essentially different from the choice in natural selection, when acting within its proper province. To this objection it may be replied, that a general consent to a change, or even an assent to the reasons for it, does not really constitute a voluntary act in respect to the whole language itself; since it does not involve in itself any intention on the part of the many to change the language. Moreover, the conscious intention of effecting a change on the part of the individual author, or speaker, is not the agent by which the change is effected; or is only an incidental cause, no more essential to the process than the causes which produce variations are to the process of natural selection in species. Let the causes of variations be what they may, — miracles even; yet all the conditions of selection are fulfilled, provided the variations can be developed by selection, or will more readily occur in the selected successors of the forms in which they first appear in useful degrees. These conditions do not include the prime causes of variations, but only the causes which facilitate the action of them through inheritance, and ultimately make their action normal or regular.

So, also, the reasons or motives which in general are not consciously perceived, recognized, or assented to (but none the less determine the consent of the many to changes in language) are the real causes of the selection, or the choice of usages in words. Let the cause of a *proposed* change in language be what it may — an act of free will, a caprice, or inspiration even — provided there is something in the proposition calculated to gain the consent of the many, — such as ease of enunciation, the authority of an influential speaker or writer, distinctness from other words already appropriated to other meanings, the influence of vague analogies in relations of sound and sense (accidental at first, but tending to establish fixed roots in etymology, or even to create instinctive connections of sound and sense), — such motives or reasons, common to the many, and not their consenting wills, are the causes of choice and

change in the usages of speech. Moreover, these motives are not usually recognized by the many, but act instinctively. Hence, there is no intention in the many, either individually or collectively, to change even a single usage, — much less a whole language. The laws or constitution of the language, as it exists, appear, even to the reflecting few, to be unchanged; and the proposed change appears to be justified by these laws, as corrections or extensions of previous usages.

The case is parallel to the developments of legal usages, or principles of judicial decisions. The judge cannot rightfully change the laws that govern his judgments; and the just judge does not consciously do so. Nevertheless, legal usages change from age to age. Laws, in their practical effects, are ameliorated by courts as well as by legislatures. No new principles are consciously introduced; but interpretations of old ones (and combinations, under more precise and qualified statements) are made, which disregard old decisions, seemingly by new and better definitions of that which in its nature is unalterable, but really, in their practical effects, by alterations, at least in the proximate grounds of decision; so that nothing is really unalterable in law, except the intention to do justice under universally applicable principles of decision, and the instinctive judgments of so-called natural law.

In like manner, there is nothing unalterable in the traditions of a language, except the instinctive motives to its acquisition and use, and some instinctive connections of sense and sound. *Intention* — so far as it is operative in the many who determine what a language is, or what is proper to any language — is chiefly concerned in *not* changing it; that is, in conforming to what is regarded by them as established usage. That usages come in under the form of good and established ones, while in fact they are new, though good inventions, is not due to the intention of the speakers who adopt them. The intention of those who consciously adopt new forms or meanings in words is to conform to what appears legitimate; or it is to fill out or improve usages in accordance with existing analogies, and not to alter the essential features in a language. But unconsciously they are also governed by tendencies in themselves and others, — vague feelings of fitness and other grounds of choice which are

outside of the actual traditions of speech; and, though a choice may be made in their minds between an old and a really new usage, it is commonly meant as a truly conservative choice, and from the intention of not altering the language in its essence, or not following what is regarded as a deviation from correct usage. The actual and continuous changes, completely transforming languages, which their history shows, are not, then, due to the intentions of those who speak, or have spoken, them, and cannot, in any sense, be attributed to the agency of their wills, if, as is commonly the case, their intentions are just the reverse. For the same wills cannot act from contradictory intentions, both to conserve and to change a language on the whole.

It becomes an interesting question, therefore, when in general anything can be properly said to be effected by the will of man. Man is an agent in producing many effects, both in nature and in himself, which appear to have no different general character from that of effects produced by other animals, even the lowest in the animal series, or by plants, or even by inorganic forces. Man, by transporting and depositing materials, in making, for example, the shell-mounds of the stone age, or the works of modern architecture and engineering, or in commerce and agriculture, is a geological agent; like the polyps which build the coral reefs, and lay the foundations of islands, or make extensions to mainlands; or like the vegetation from which the coal-beds were deposited; or like winds, rains, rivers, and the currents of the ocean; and his agency is not in any way different in its general character, and with reference to its geological effects, from that of unconscious beings. In relation to these effects his agency is, in fact, unconscious, or at least *unintended*. Moreover, in regard to internal effects, his agency in modifying his own mind and character through influences external to himself, under which he comes accidentally, and without intention; many effects upon his emotions and sentiments from impressive incidents, or the general surroundings of the life with which he has become associated through his own agency, — these, as unintended effects, are the same in general character as if his own agency had not been concerned in them, — as if he had been without choice in his pursuits and surroundings.

Mingled with these unintended effects upon himself, there are, of course, others, either actually or virtually intended, and, therefore, his own effects. If, for example, in conformity with surrounding fashions of dress, he should choose to clothe himself, and should select some one from the existing varieties in these fashions, or should even add, *consciously*, a new feature to them from his individual taste in dress, in each case he would be acting from intention, and the choice would be his own. But so far as he has thus affected the proportions among these varieties, or tends further to affect them by his example, the action is not his own volition, unless we include *within* the will's agency what is properly said to act either *through* or *upon* the will; namely, that which, by an undistinguished influence, guides taste and choice in himself and the others who follow unconsciously his example. Those influences of example and instinctive, or even educated, tastes, which are not raised by distinct attention into conscious motives, would not be allowed by the metaphysician to be parts in the will's action. It would not be *within* but *through* its action that these influences would produce their unintended effects. According to the less definite and precise *physical* theory of the will's action, these effects might be regarded as voluntary; but then the choice would not be different in its character from that effected through other kinds of physical agency. On neither theory, therefore, can unintended effects, or the effects of unrecognized causes acting through the will, be regarded as different in their character from the general results of selection in nature. On the physical theory of the will, man's agency is merged in that of nature generally; but according to the metaphysician's more definite understanding of voluntary actions, which is also that of common usage, *intention* would appear to be the mark by which to determine whether anything is the effect of the will of man, except in an accidental or non-essential manner.

An apparently serious objection to this test arises, however, in reference to another mark of voluntary action, and of the efficacy of the will. The mark of *responsibility* (the subject of moral or legal discipline, the liability to blame or punishment) is justly regarded as the mark of free human agency.

But the limits set by this mark are beyond what is actually *intended* in our actions. We are often held responsible, and properly, for more than we intend, or for what we *ought* to have intended. The absence of intention (namely, the intention of doing differently) renders us liable to blame, when it is involved in the absence of the more general intention of doing right, or of doing what the discipline of responsibility has commanded or implied in its commands. Carelessness, or want of forethought, cannot be said to involve intention in any case, but in many cases it is blameworthy or punishable ; since in such cases moral discipline presupposes or presumes intention, or else seeks, as in the case of children, by punishment to turn attention upon moral principles, and upon what is implied in them, whether given in instincts, examples, precepts, or commandments. But this extension of the sphere of personal agency and accountability to relations in which effects upon will and character are sought to be produced by moral and legal discipline, its extension beyond what the will itself produces in its direct action, has nothing to do with strictly scientific or theoretical inquiries concerning effects, in which neither the foreseeing nor the obedient will can be an agent or factor, but of which the intellect is rather the recorder, or mere accountant.

If the question concerning the origin of languages were, Who are responsible for their existence and progressive changes, or ought to be credited for improvements, or blamed for deficiencies in them? or if the question were, How men might or should be made better inventors, or apter followers of the best inventions, — there would then be some pertinency in insisting on the agency of man in their developments, — an agency which, in fact, like his agency in geology, is incidental to his real volitions, and is neither involved in what he intends nor in what he could be made to intend by discipline. So far as human intentions have had anything to do with changes in the traditions of language, they have, as we have said, been exerted in resisting them. Hence the traditions of language, with all the knowledge, histories, arts, and sciences involved and embodied in them, are developments incidental, it is true, to the existence and exercise of self-consciousness,

and of free or intelligent wills, yet are developments around and outside of them, so to speak, and were added to them rather than evolved from them. These developments were added through their exercise and serviceableness as powers which stand to the more primitive ones of self-conscious thought and volition in relations similar to those we have seen to exist between the latter and the still more primitive powers of mind in memory and attention.

These relations come, first, from turning an old power to a new account; or making a new use of it, when the power, developed for other uses, acquires the requisite energy (as when the fins of a fish become fitted for flying); or when the revivals of memory become vivid enough to make connecting thoughts in a train distinct and apparent, as mere signs, to a reflective attention. Secondly, the new use increases the old power by its exercise and serviceableness (as flying and its value to life make the fins of the fish still longer), or as the exercise and importance to life of reflective thought make the revivals of memory still more vivid, and enlarge its organ, the brain. Traditions of language, or established artifices of expression, are related to new uses in a power, now in turn become sufficiently energetic, which at first was only the power of associating the sounds of words with thoughts, and thence with their objects, and which was incidental to the distinct recognition of thoughts as signs, or suggestions, of other thoughts. Developed by exercise and its serviceableness to life to the point, not only of making readily and employing temporarily such arbitrary associations, but also of fixing them and transmitting them as a more or less permanent language, or system of signs, this power acquired, or was turned to, a use involving immeasurable consequences and values.

To choose arbitrarily for preservation and transmission one out of many arbitrary associations of sounds with a meaning could not have been a rational or intelligent act of free will, but ought rather to be attributed to chance, lot, or fate; or to *will*, in the narrower sense of the word in which one man is said to have more than another, or to be more wilful; that is, persistent in his caprices. To make by decree any action permanent and regular which in itself is transient or accidental

requires *will*, it is true, in one sense, or *sticking to a point, merely because it has been assumed;* as some children do in imposing their inventions upon their associates. This degree of arbitrariness appears necessary to the step in the use of signs which made them traditions of language, permanent enough to be the roots of a continued growth in it, — a growth which must, however, have determined more and more the selections of new words, and new uses in old ones, through motives common to the many speakers of a language; such as common fancies, instinctive tendencies, facilities, allegiance to authority, and associations in general — the vague as well as distinct ones — which were common to many speakers. These causes would act instinctively, or unconsciously, as well as by design. Tyranny in the growth of language, or the agency of arbitrary wills, persisting in their caprices, must have disappeared at an early date, or must have become insignificant in its effects upon the whole of any established language. Intentional choice would henceforward have the *design* generally of conserving or restoring a supposed good usage; though along with unintended preferences, instinctively followed, it would, doubtless, have the effect of slowly changing the usages of language on the whole. A happy suggestion of change would be adopted, if adopted consciously, with reference to its supposed conformity to the *genius* of the language, or to its will, rather than to the will of an individual dictator; and the influence of a speaker would depend on the supposition that he knew best how to use the language correctly, or was intimate with its genius. But suggestions of change would be more likely to be adopted unconsciously.

History can trace languages back only, of course, to the earliest times of their representations in phonetic writings or inscriptions; as palæontology can trace organic species back only to the earliest preservation of them as fossils in the rocks. In neither case do we probably go back to periods in which forms were subject to sudden or capricious variations. Natural selection would, therefore, define the most prominent action of the causes of change in both of them. But just as governments in all their forms depend on the fixedness and force of traditions, and as traditions gained this force through the wills

of those in the past who established them by arbitrary decrees, and induced in others those habits of respect and obedience which now preserve them, so in language there was, doubtless, a time when *will* was the chief agent in its formation and preservation. But it was Will in its narrower sense, which does not include all that is commonly meant by volitional action. The latter involves, it is true, persistence in some elements, — a persistence in memory and thought of consciously recognized motives, principles, purposes, or intentions. Volition is an action through memory, and not merely from a present stimulus, and is accompanied, when free or rational, by the recognition in thought of the motive, the proximate cause of the action, the reasons for it, or the immediate and present tendency to it, which is referred back in turn, but is not analyzed, nor usually capable of being analyzed introspectively into still more remote antecedents in our histories, inherited disposition, characters, and present circumstances. Those causes which are even too feeble to be introspectively recognized are not, of course, the source whence the force or energy of will is derived; but independently of their *directive* agency, this force is indistinguishable from that of pure spontaneity or vital energy. In like manner, the force of water in a system of river-courses is not determined by its beds and banks, but is none the less guided by them. This water-force in the first instance, and from time to time, alters its courses, but normally flows within predetermined courses; as the energy of will flows normally within the directive, but alterable, courses of character and circumstances. The really recognized motives in ordinary volition generally include more than the impulse or satisfaction of adhering to an assumed position, or to a purpose, for the will's sake, as in mere will, or wilfulness (which is an overflow, so to speak, of energy, directed only by its own inertia, though often useful in altering character, or the courses of volition, both in the will itself and in the wills of others). The habit of conscious persistence, involved in will, but most conspicuous in self-will, was, together with its correlatives, respect and obedience, doubtless serviceable to the rulers of primeval men, the authors of human government; and was, doubtless, developed through this serviceableness before it was turned to new uses

in the institution of arbitrary customs and traditions. It thus illustrates anew the general principle shown in the several previous steps of this progress, namely, the turning of an old power to a new account, or making a new use of it, when the power has acquired the requisite energy; and the subsequent further increase of the power through serviceableness and exercise in its new function.

This power in the wills of the political, military, and religious leaders of men must soon, after producing the apotheosis of the more influential among them, have been converted into the sacred force of tradition; that is, into the *fas* or commands of languages themselves, and of other arbitrary customs. Henceforth and throughout all the periods included in the researches of comparative philology in which written remains of languages are to be found, it is probable that no man has consciously committed, or had the power to commit, the sin of intentionally altering their traditions, except for reasons common to many speakers and afforded by the traditions themselves.

CHAUNCEY WRIGHT.

ART. III. — *Théâtre de Théophile Gautier: Mystères, Comédies, et Ballets.* Paris: Charpentier. 1872.

THERE recently died in Paris a man of genius whom his eulogists all made haste to proclaim a true poet. Many of them, indeed, spoke of Théophile Gautier as a great poet, and one, we remember, mentioned his last little volume, *Tableaux de Siége*, as the crowning glory of the resistance to the Prussians. Gautier was indeed a poet and a strongly representative one, — a French poet in his limitations even more than in his gifts; and he remains an interesting example of how, even when the former are surprisingly great, a happy application of the latter may produce the most delightful works. Completeness, on his own scale, is to our mind the idea he most readily suggests. Such as his finished task now presents him, he is almost sole of his kind. He has had imitators who have imitated everything but his spontaneity and his temper; and as they have

therefore failed to equal him, we doubt that the literature of our day presents so naturally perfect a genius. We say this with no desire to transfer Gautier to a higher pedestal than he has fairly earned, — a poor service; for the pedestal sometimes sadly dwarfs the figure. His great merit was that he understood himself so perfectly and handled himself so skilfully. Even more than Alfred de Musset (with whom the speech had a shade of mock-modesty), he might have said that, if his glass was not large, he could the easier raise it to his lips. As an artist, he never knew an hour's weakness nor failed to strike the note which should truly render his idea. He was, indeed, of literary artists the most accomplished. He was not of the Academy, but he completes not unworthily the picturesque group, gaining relief from isolation, of those eminent few — Molière, Pascal, Balzac, Béranger, George Sand — who have come near making it the supreme literary honor in France not to be numbered among the Forty. There are a host of reasons why we should not compare Gautier with such a poet as Browning, and yet several why we should. If we do, with all proper reservation, we may wonder whether we are the richer, or, at all events, the better entertained, as a poet's readers should, before all things, be, by the clear, undiluted strain of Gautier's minor key, or by the vast, grossly commingled volume of utterance of the author of "Men and Women." This, perhaps, is an idle question; and the artificer of *Émaux et Camées* was presumably of opinion that it is idle at all times to point a moral. But if there are sermons in stones, there are profitable reflections to be made even on Théophile Gautier; notably this one, — that a man's supreme use in the world is to master his intellectual instrument, and play it in perfection.

There is, perhaps, scant apparent logic in treating a closed career more tenderly than an open one; but we suspect it belongs to the finer essence of good criticism to do so, and, at any rate, we find our judgment of the author of the *Voyage en Espagne* and the *Capitaine Fracasse* turning altogether to unprotesting kindness. We had a vague consciousness of lurking objections; but on calling them to appear, they gave no answer. Gautier's death, indeed, in the nature of things could not but be touching, and dispose one to large allowances. The world he

left was the sum of the universe for him, and upon any other his writings throw but the dimmest light, — project, indeed, that contrasted darkness which surrounds the object of a luminous surface. The beauty and variety of our present earth and the insatiability of our earthly temperament were his theme, and we doubt that they have ever been placed in a more flattering light. He brought to his task a sort of pagan *bonhommie* which makes most of the descriptive and pictorial poets seem, by contrast, a group of shivering ascetics or muddled metaphysicians. He excels them by his magnificent good temper and the unquestioning serenity of his enjoyment of the great spectacle of nature and art. His style, certainly, is one of the latest fruits of time; but his mental attitude before the universe has an almost Homeric simplicity. His world was all material, and its outlying darkness hardly more suggestive, morally, than a velvet canopy studded with silver nails. To close his eyes and turn his back on it must have seemed to him the end of all things; death, for him, must have been as the sullen dropping of a stone into a well. His faculty of visual discrimination was extraordinary. His observation was so penetrating and his descriptive instinct so unerring, that one might have fancied grave Nature, in a fit of coquetry, or tired of receiving but half-justice, had determined to construct a genius with senses of a finer strain than the mass of the human family. Gautier, as an observer, often reminds us of those classic old *habitués* of the opera who listen with a subtler sense than their neighbors, and register with a murmured *brava* the undistinguishable shades of merit in a *prima donna's* execution. He was for many years a diligent theatrical critic, faithful to his post in all dramatic weathers, so that one has only to extend the image a little to conceive him as always in a *fauteuil d'orchestre* before the general stage, watching a lamplit performance, — flaring gas in one case, the influence of his radiant fancy in the other. "Descriptive" writing, to our English taste, suggests nothing very enticing, — a respectable sort of padding, at best, but a few degrees removed in ponderosity from downright moralizing. The prejudice, we admit, is a wholesome one, and the limits of verbal portraiture of all sorts should be jealously guarded. But there is no better proof of Gautier's talent than that he should have

triumphantly reformed this venerable abuse, and in the best sense, made one of the heaviest kinds of writing one of the lightest. Of his process and his success we could give an adequate idea only by a long series of citations, which we lack the opportunity to collect. The reader would conclude with us, we think, that Gautier is an inimitable model. He would never find himself condemned to that thankless task of pulling the cart up hill, — retouching the picture, — which is fatal to the charm of most descriptions. The author's manner is so light and true, so really creative, his fancy so alert, his taste so happy, his humor so genial that he makes illusion almost as contagious as laughter; the image, the object, the scene stand arrested by his phrase with the wholesome glow of truth overtaken. Gautier's native gift of expression was extremely rich, and he cultivated and polished it with a diligence which may serve to give the needed balance of gravity to his literary character. He enriched his picturesque vocabulary from the most recondite sources; we doubt if any was ever so comprehensive. His favorite reading, we have somewhere seen, was the dictionary; he loved words for themselves, — for their look, their aroma, their color, their fantastic intimations. He kept a supply of the choicest constantly at hand, and introduced them at effective points. In this respect he was a sort of immeasurably lighter-handed Rabelais, whom, indeed, he resembled in that sensuous exuberance of temperament which his countrymen are fond of calling peculiarly "Gaulois." He had an almost Rabelaisian relish for enumerations, lists, and catalogues, — a sort of grotesque delight in quantity. We need hardly remind the reader that these are not the tokens of a man of thought: Gautier was none. In the way of moral expression his phrase would have halted sadly; and when occasionally he emits a reflection, he is a very Philistine of Philistines. In his various records of travel, we remember, he never takes his seat in a railway train without making a neat little speech on the marvels of steam and the diffusion of civilization. If it were not in a Parisian *feuilleton*, it might proceed from Mr. Barlow, and be addressed to Harry Sandford and Tommy Merton. These genial commonplaces are Gautier's only tributes to philosophy. It seems as absurd to us as that very puerile performance itself

that the philosophic pretensions of the famous preface to *Mademoiselle de Maupin* should have provoked any other retort than a laugh. Gautier was incapable of looking, for an appreciable duration of time, at any other than the superficial, the picturesque face of a question. If you find him glancing closer, you may be sure, with all respect, that the phenomenon will last just as long as a terrier will stand on his hind-legs.

To raise on such a basis so large a structure was possible only to a Frenchman, and to a Frenchman inordinately endowed with the national sense of form and relish for artistic statement. Gautier's structure is composed of many pieces. He began, in his early youth, with *Mademoiselle de Maupin*. It has seemed to us rather a painful exhibition of the prurience of the human mind, that, in most of the recent notices of the author's death (those, at least, published in England and America), this work alone should have been selected as the critic's text. It is Gautier's one disagreeable performance: how it came to be written it is of small profit at this time to inquire. In certain lights the book is almost ludicrously innocent, and we are at a loss what to think of those critics who either hailed or denounced it as a serious profession of faith. With faith of any sort Gautier strikes us as slenderly furnished. Even his æsthetic principles are held with a good-humored laxity which allows him, for instance, to say in a hundred places the most delightfully sympathetic and pictorial things about the romantic or Shakespearian drama, and yet to describe a pedantically classical revival of the *Antigone* at Munich with the most ungrudging relish. The only very distinct statement of intellectual belief that we remember in his pages is the singularly perfect little poem which closes the collection of chiselled and polished verses called *Émaux et Camées*. It is a charming example of Gautier at his best, and we shall be pardoned for quoting it.

"L'ART.

" Oui, l'œuvre sort plus belle
D'une forme au travail
Rebelle,
Vers, marbre, onyx, émail.

Point de contraintes fausses !
Mais que pour marcher droit
Tu chausses,
Muse, un cothurne étroit.

Fi du rhythme commode,
Comme un soulier trop grand,
Du mode
Que tout pied quitte et prend !

Statuaire, repousse
L'argile que pétrit
Le pouce,
Quand flotte ailleurs l'esprit ;

Lutte avec le carrare,
Avec le paros dur
Et rare,
Gardiens du contour pur ;

Emprunte à Syracuse
Son bronze où fermement
S'accuse
Le trait fier et charmant ;

D'une main délicate
Poursuis dans un filon
D'agate
Le profil d'Apollon.

Peintre, fuis l'aquarelle,
Et fixe la couleur
Trop frêle
Au four de l'émailleur ;

Fais les sirènes bleues,
Tordant de cent façons
Leurs queues,
Les monstres des blasons ;

Dans son nimbe trilobe
La Vierge et son Jésus,
Le globe
Avec la croix dessus.

Tout passe. — L'art robuste
Seul a l'éternité.
Le buste
Survit à la cité.

Et la médaille austère
Que trouve un laboreur
Sous terre
Révèle un empereur.

Les dieux eux-mêmes meurent,
Mais les vers souverains
Demeurent
Plus forts que les airains.

Sculpte, lime, cisèle;
Que ton rêve flottant
Se scelle
Dans le bloc résistant!

These admirable verses seem to us to be almost tinged with intellectual passion. It is a case of an æsthetic, an almost technical, conviction, glowing with a kind of moral fervor. They vividly reflect, in our opinion, the great simplicity of the author's mind. We doubt whether life often addressed him a more puzzling question than the one he has so gracefully answered here. He had, of course, his likes and dislikes; and, as the poet of the luxuries of life, he naturally preferred those paternal governments which pay heavy subventions to opera-houses, order palace-frescos by the half-mile, and maintain various picturesque sinecures. He was sensuously a conservative; although, after all, as an observer and describer, he was the frankest of democrats. He had a glance for everything, and a phrase for everything on the broad earth, and all that he asked of an object, as a source of inspiration, was that it should have length, breadth, and color. Much of Gautier's poetry is of the same period as *Mademoiselle de Maupin*, and some of it of the same quality; notably the frantically picturesque legend of *Albertus*, written in the author's twenty-first year, and full of the germs of his later flexibility of diction. *Émaux et Camées*, the second volume of his collected verses, contains, evidently, his poetic bequest. In this chosen series every poem is a masterpiece; it has received the author's latest and fondest care; all, as the title indicates, is goldsmiths' work. In Gautier's estimation, evidently, these exquisite little pieces are the finest distillation of his talent; not one of them but ought to have outweighed a dozen Academic blackballs. Gautier's best verse is neither

sentimental, satirical, narrative, nor even lyrical. It is always pictorial and plastic, — a matter of images, "effects," and color. Even when the motive is an idea, — of course, a slender one, — the image absorbs and swallows it, and the poem becomes a piece of rhythmic imitation. What is this delightful little sonnet — the *Pot de Fleurs* — but a piece of self-amused imagery?

"Parfois un enfant trouve une petite graine,
Et tout d'abord, charmé de ses vives couleurs,
Pour la planter, il prend un pot de porcelaine
Orné de dragons bleus et de bizarres fleurs.

"Il s'en va. La racine en couleuvres s'allonge,
Sort de terre, fleurit et devient arbrisseau;
Chaque jour, plus avant, son pied chevelu plonge
Tant qu'il fasse éclater le ventre du vaisseau.

"L'enfant revient; surpris, il voit la plante grasse
Sur les débris du pot brandir ses verts poignards;
Il la veut arracher, mais la tige est tenace;
Il s'obstine, et ses doigts s'ensanglantent aux dards.

"Ainsi germa l'amour dans mon âme surprise;
Je croyais ne semer qu'une fleur de printemps:
C'est un grand aloès dont la racine brise
Le pot de porcelaine aux dessins éclatants."

We may almost fancy that the whole sonnet was written for the sake of the charming line we have marked, — a bit of Keats Gallicized. Gautier's first and richest poetry, however, is to be found in his prose, — the precious, artistic prose which for forty years he lavished in newspaper *feuilletons* and light periodicals. Here the vivid, plastic image is his natural, constant formula; he scatters pictures as a fine singer *roulades;* every paragraph is the germ of a sonnet, every sentence a vignette. "It is pure *Lacrima-Christi*," as Sainte-Beuve says, "*qu'on vous verse au coin d'une borne.*" The twenty-five volumes or so into which this long daily labor has been gathered — *feuilletons* and sketches, novels and tales, records of travel, reports of "damned" plays and unsold pictures — form a vast treasury of literary illustration. When Gautier, according to present promise, begins to be remembered mainly as the author of an indecent novel

whose title is circulated in the interest of virtue, needy poets may deck their wares for the market with unmissed flowers of description from his blooming plantations. He has commemorated every phase and mood and attribute of nature, and every achievement and possibility of art; and you have only to turn his pages long enough to find the perfect presentment of your own comparatively dim and unshaped vision.

Early in life he began to travel, — to travel far for a Frenchman, — and, of course, to publish his impressions. They relate altogether to the *look* of the countries he visited, — to landscape, art-collections, street-scenery, and costume. On the "institutions" of foreign lands he is altogether silent. His delightful vividness on his chosen points is elsewhere unapproached, and his *Voyage en Espagne*, his *Constantinople*, his *Italia*, and his *Voyage en Russie* seem to us his most substantial literary titles. No other compositions of the same kind begin to give one, in one's chair, under the lamp, the same sense of standing under new skies, among strange scenes. With Gautier's readers the imagination travels in earnest, and makes journeys more profitable, in some respects, than those we really undertake. He has the broad-eyed, universal, almost *naïf* gaze at things of a rustic at a fair, and yet he discriminates them with a shrewdness peculiarly his own. We renew, over his pages, those happiest hours of youth, when we have strolled forth into a foreign town, still sprinkled with the dust of travel, and lost ourselves deliciously in the fathomless sense of local differences and mystery. Gautier had a passion for material detail, and he vivifies, illuminates, and interprets it, woos it into relief, resolves it into pictures with a joyous ingenuity which makes him the prince of *ciceroni*. His *Voyage en Espagne* is, in this respect, a masterpiece and model. It glows, from beginning to end, with an overcharged verisimilitude in which we seem to behold some intenser essence of Spain, — of her light and color and climate, her expression and personality. All this borrows a crowning vivacity from the author's genial unpretentiousness, his almost vainglorious triviality. A "high standard" is an excellent thing: but we sometimes fancy it takes away more than it gives, and that an untamed natural faculty of enjoying at a venture is a better

conductor of æsthetic light and heat. Gautier's superbly appreciative temperament makes him, at the least, as solid an observer as the representative German doctor in spectacles, bristling with critical premises. It is signally suggestive to compare his lusty tribute to San Moïse at Venice, in his *Italia*, with Ruskin's stern dismissal of it in his *Stones of Venice*, — Ruskin so painfully unable to see the "joke" of it, and Gautier, possibly, so unable to see anything but the joke. We may, in strictness, agree with Ruskin, but we envy Gautier. It was to be expected of such a genius that he should enjoy the East; and Gautier professed a peculiar devotion to it. He was fond of pretending that he was a real Oriental, come astray into our Western world. He has described Eastern scenery and manners, Eastern effects of all kinds, with incomparable *gusto;* and, on reading the *libretti* to the three or four *ballets* included in the volume whose title precedes our notice, we wonder whether his natural attitude was not to recline in the perfumed dusk of a Turkish divan, puffing a *chibouque*, and forecasting the successive episodes of a Mohammedan immortality. This pretension, however, did him injustice: and such a book as the *Voyage en Russie;* such chapters as his various notes on the Low Countries, their landscape and their painters; such a sketch, indeed, as his wonderful *humoristique* history of a week in London, in his *Caprices et Zigzags*, — prove abundantly that he had more than one string to his bow. He shot equally far with the others. Each of his chapters of travel has a perfect tone of its own, and that unity of effect which is the secret of the rarest artists. The *Voyage en Espagne* is a masterly mixture of hot lights and warm shadows; the *Constantinople* is an immense verbal Decamps, as one may say; and the *Voyage en Russie*, compounded of effects taken from the opposite end of the scale, is illumined with the cold blue light of the North. Gautier's volumes abound in records of the most unadventurous excursions, — light sketches of a feuilletonist's holidays. His fancy found its account in the commonest things as well as the rarest, — in Callot as well as in Paul Veronese, — and these immediate notes are admirable in their multicolored reflections of the perpetual entertainment of Nature. Gautier found Nature supremely entertaining; this

seems to us the shortest description of him. She had no barren places for him, for he rendered her poverty with a *brio* which made it as picturesque as her wealth. He professed always to care for nothing but beauty. "*Fortunio*," he says, in the preface to this grotesquely meretricious production, "is a hymn to Beauty, Wealth, and Happiness, — the only three divinities we recognize. It celebrates gold, marble, and purple." But, in fact, he was too curious an artist not to enjoy ugliness very nearly as much, and he drew some of his most striking effects from it. We recommend to the reader the account of a stroll among the slaughter-houses and the asylums of lost dogs and cats in the Paris *banlieue*, in the *Caprices et Zigzags;* his elaborate pictures, several times repeated, of Spanish bull-fights (which show to what lengths *l'art pour l'art* can carry the kindliest tempered of men), and a dozen painful passages in his *Tableaux de Siége*. This little volume, the author's last, is a culminating example of his skill. It is a common saying with light *littérateurs*, that, to describe a thing, you must not know it too well. Gautier knew Paris — picturesque Paris — with a forty years' knowledge; yet he has here achieved the remarkable feat of suppressing the sense of familiarity, and winning back, for the sake of inspiration, a certain freshness of impression. The book was written in evil days; but nothing from Gautier's hand is pleasanter; and the silvery strain of his beautiful rhetoric, after so long a season of thunderous bulletins and proclamations, suggests the high, clear note of some venerable nightingale after a summer storm. Deprived of his customary occupation, he became a forced observer of those obvious things which vision commonly overlooks, and discovered that they, too, had their poetry, and that, if you only look at it closely, everything is remunerative. He found poetry in the poor, rawboned lions and tigers of the Jardin des Plantes; in the hungry dogs in the street, hungrily-eyed; in a trip on the circular railway, and on the penny steamers on the Seine; in that delicacy of vanished seasons, a pat of fresh butter in Chevet's window. Beneath his touch these phenomena acquire the finely detailed relief of the accessories and distances in a print of Albert Dürer's: we remember no better example of the magic of style. But the happiest performance in the book

is a series of chapters on Versailles, when the whirligig of time had again made its splendid vacancy an active spot in the world's consciousness. No one should go there now without Gautier's volume in his pocket; he has rendered the prodigious expression of park and palace with the broadest strokes. It was Gautier's good fortune that his autumn was as sound as his summer, and his last writing second to none before it. The current of diction in this last volume is as full and clear as in the *Voyage en Espagne*.

Gautier's stories and novels belong, for the most part, to his prime; he reached his climax as a story-teller ten years ago, with *Le Capitaine Fracasse*. His productions in this line are not numerous, for dramatic invention with him was evidently not abundant. As was to be supposed, the human interest in his tales is inferior to the picturesque. They remind us of those small cabinet paintings of the contemporary French school, replete with archæological details as to costume and furniture, which hang under glass in immense gilt frames, and form the delight of connoisseurs. Gautier's figures are altogether pictorial; he cared for nothing, and knew nothing in men and women but the epidermis. With this, indeed, he was marvellously acquainted, and he organized in its service a phraseology as puzzlingly various as the array of pots and brushes of a *coiffeur*. His attitude towards the human creature is, in a sublimated degree, that of a barber or tailor. He anoints and arranges and dresses it to perfection; but he deals only in stuffs and colors. His fable is often pretty enough; but one imagines it always written in what is called a studio light, — on the corner of a table littered with brushes and frippery. The young woman before the easel, engaged at forty sous a sitting to take off her dress and let down her hair, is obviously the model for the heroine. His stories are always the measure of an intellectual need to express an ideal of the exquisite in personal beauty and in costume, combined with that of a certain serene and full-blown sensuality in conduct, and accompanied with gorgeous visions of upholstery and architecture. Nothing classifies Gautier better, both as to the individual and the national quality of his genius, than the perfect frankness of his treatment of the

human body. We of English speech pass (with the French) for prudish on this point; and certain it is that there is a limit to the freedom with which one can comfortably discourse of hair and skin, and teeth and nails, even to praise them. The French, on the other hand, discuss this physical texture as complacently as we discuss that of our trousers and boots. The Parisians profess, we believe, to have certain tendencies in common with the old Athenians; this unshrinking contemplation of our physical surfaces might be claimed as one of them. Practically, however, it gives one a very different impression from the large Greek taste for personal beauty; for the French type, being as meagre as the Greek was ample, has been filled out with the idea of "grace," which, by implying that the subject is conscious, makes modesty immediately desirable and the absence of it vicious. Gautier, in this respect, is the most eloquent of our modern Athenians, and pays scantiest tribute to our English scruples and blushes. Flesh and blood, noses and bosoms, arms and legs were a delight to him, and it was his mission to expatiate on them. For any one who has glanced at the dusky background of Parisian life, with its sallow tones and close odors, among which no Athenian sky makes a blue *repoussoir* either for statues or mortals, there is something almost touchingly heroic in Gautier's fixed conception of sublime good looks. He invents unprecedented attributes, and it is nothing to say of his people that they are too good to live. In *Une Nuit de Cléopâtre*, the hero, inflamed with a hopeless passion for the Egyptian queen, has been pursuing her barge in a little skiff, and rowing so fast, under an Egyptian sun, that he has overtaken her fifty oarsmen. "He was a beautiful young man of twenty, with hair so black that it seemed blue, a skin blond as gold, and proportions so perfect that he might have been taken for a bronze of Lysippus. Although he had been rowing some time, he betrayed no fatigue, and *had not on his brow a single drop of sweat.*" Gautier's heroines are always endowed with transparent finger-tips. These, however, are his idler touches. His real imaginative power is shown in his masterly evocation of localities, and in the thick-coming fancies which minister to his inexhaustible conception of that pictorial "setting" of human life which

interested him so much more than human life itself. In the *Capitaine Fracasse*, the *Roman de la Momie*, *Le Roi Candaule*, *Une Nuit de Cléopâtre*, and *Aria Marcella* he revels in his passion for scenic properties and backgrounds. His science, in so far as it is archæological, is occasionally at fault, we suspect, and his facts slightly fantastic; but it all sounds very fine, and his admirable pictorial instinct makes everything pass. He reconstructs the fabulous splendors of old Egypt with a magnificent audacity of detail, and rivals John Martin, of *mezzotinto* fame, in the energy with which he depicts the light of torches washing the black basalt of palace-stairs. If the portrait is here and there inaccurate, so much the worse for the original. The works we have just mentioned proceed altogether by pictures. No reader of the *Roman de la Momie* will have forgotten the portentous image of the great Pharaoh, who sits, like a soulless idol, upon his palace-roof, and watches his messengers swim across the Nile and come and lie on their faces (some of them dying) at his feet. Such a picture as the following, from *Une Nuit de Cléopâtre*, may be rather irresponsible archæology, but it is admirable imagery: —

"Le spectacle changeait à chaque instant; tantôt c'était de gigantesques propylées qui venaient mirer au fleuve leurs murailles en talus, plaquées de larges panneaux de figures bizarres; des pylônes aux chapiteaux évasés, des rampes côtoyées de grands sphinx accroupis, coiffés du bonnet à barbe cannelée, et croisant sous leurs mamelles aiguës leurs pattes de basalte noir; des palais démesurés, faisant saillir sur l'horizon les lignes horizontales et sévères de leur entablement, où le globe emblématique ouvrait les ailes mystérieuses comme un aigle à l'envergure démesurée; des temples aux colonnes énormes, grosses comme des tours, où se détachait sur un fond d'éclatante blancheur des processions des figures hieroglyphiques; toutes les prodigiosités de cette architecture de Titans; tantôt des passages d'une aridité désolante; des collines formées par des petits éclats de pierre provenant des fouilles et des constructions, miettes de cette gigantesque débauche de granit qui dura plus de trente siècles; des montagnes exfoliées de chaleur, déchiquetées et zébrées de rayures noires, semblables aux cautérizations d'une incendie; des terres bossus et difformes, accroupis comme le creocéphale des tombeaux, et découpant au bord du ciel leur attitude contrefaite; des marnes verdâtres, des ochres roux, des tufs d'un blanc farineux, et, de temps à autre, quelque escarpement de marbre couleur rose-sèche, où bâillaient les bouches noires des carrières."

If, as an illustration, we could transfuse the essence of one of Gautier's best performances into this colorless report, we should choose the *Capitaine Fracasse*. In this delightful work Gautier surpassed himself, and produced the model of picturesque romances. The story was published, we believe, some twenty-five years after it was announced, — and announced because the author had taken a fancy to the title and proposed to write "up" to it. We cannot say how much of the long interval was occupied with this endeavor; but certainly the *Capitaine Fracasse* is as good as if a quarter of a century had been given to it. Besides being his most ambitious work, it bears more marks of leisure and meditation than its companions. Meissonier might have written it, if, with the same talent and a good deal more geniality, he had chosen to use the pen rather than the brush. The subject is just such a one as Gautier was born to appreciate, — a subject of which the expression resides in pictures almost as much as that of "Don Quixote." It is borrowed, indeed, but as great talents borrow, — for a use which brings the original into fashion again, when the case is possible. Scarron's *Roman Comique*, which furnished Gautier with his starting-point, is as barren to the eye as Gil Blas itself, besides being a much coarser piece of humor. The sort of memory one retains of the *Capitaine Fracasse* is hard to express, save by some almost physical analogy. We remember the perusal of most good novels as an intellectual pleasure, — a pleasure which varies in degree, but is, as far as it goes, an affair of the mind. The hours spent over the *Capitaine Fracasse* seem to have been an affair of the senses, of personal experience, of observation and contact, as illusory as those of a peculiarly arid dream. The novel presents the adventures of a company of strolling players of Louis XIII.'s time, — their vicissitudes collective and individual, their miseries and gayeties, their loves and squabbles, and their final apportionment of worldly comfort, — very much in that symmetrical fashion in which they have so often stood forth to receive it at the fall of the curtain. It is a fairy-tale of Bohemia, a triumph of the *picaresque*. In this case, by a special extension of his power, the author has made the dramatic interest as lively as the pictorial, and lodged good human hearts beneath the wonderfully-painted, rusty doublets

and tarnished satins of his maskers. The great charm of the book is its sort of combined geniality of feeling and coloring, which leaves one in doubt whether the author is the most joyous of painters or the cleverest of poets. It is a masterpiece of good-humor, — a good-humor sustained by the artist's indefatigable relish for his theme. In artistic "bits," of course, the book abounds; it is a delightful gallery of portraits. The models, with their paint and pomatum, their broken plumes and threadbare velvet, their false finery and their real hunger, their playhouse manners and morals are certainly not very choice company; but the author handles them with an affectionate, sympathetic jocosity of which we so speedily feel the influence that, long before we have finished, we seem to have drunk with them one and all out of the playhouse goblet, to the confusion of respectability and life before the scenes. If we incline to look for deeper meaning, we can fancy the work in the last analysis an expression of that brotherly sympathy with the social position of the comedian which Gautier was too much what the French call an *homme de théâtre* not to entertain as an almost poetic sentiment. The *Capitaine Fracasse*, however, is one of those works so thickly overcrowded by its merits that definition and discrimination are not only difficult but rude. And beyond and above its definable merits, its cunningly wrought figures and richly shadowed scenes, it has that large, inexpressible charm which belongs only to rare masterpieces. It ranks, in our opinion, with the greatest works of imagination produced in our day.

Of Gautier as a critic there is not much to say that we have not said of him as a traveller and story-teller. Rigid critic he was none; it was not in his nature to bring himself to fix a standard. The things he liked he spoke well of; of the things he disliked, a little less well. His brother critics, who would have preferred to count on him to substantiate their severities, found him unpardonably "genial." We imagine that, in the long run, he held a course nearer the truth than theirs, and did better service. His irresistible need for the positive in art, for something describable, — phrasable, as we may say, — often led him to fancy merit where it was not, but more often, probably, to detect it where it lurked. He was a constructive com-

mentator; and if the work taken as his text is often below his praise, the latter, with its magical grasp of the idea, may serve as a sort of generous lesson. His work as a critic is most abundant, and has been but partially collected. For many years he reported elaborately on the annual *Salon* and produced a weekly review of the theatre. His accounts of the *Salon*, which have yet to be republished, form, probably, the best history — if also the least didactic — of modern French art. When pictures and statues have passed out of sight, it is rather meagre entertainment to peruse amendments to their middle distance and to the finer points in their anatomy. Gautier's pages preserve what was best in them, — the attempt, the image, the vision. His *critiques* illustrate more pointedly, perhaps, than his poems and tales, his native incapacity to moralize. Occasionally, we think, a promising subject comes near being sacrificed to it. We were lately struck, in reading the delightful *Correspondance* of Henri Regnault, whose herald-in-chief Gautier constituted himself, with the latter's fatally shallow conception of the duties of an æsthetic guide, philosopher, and friend. Gautier, possibly, claimed no such office; but, at any rate, he spoke with authority; and the splendid, unmeasured flattery which he pours out on the young painter gives us something of the discomfort with which we should see an old man plying a young lad with strong wine. Regnault, fortunately, had a strong head; but the attitude, in Gautier, is none the less immoral. He repaints the young man's pictures, verbally, with almost superior power, and repeats and consecrates their more ominous eccentricities in his glowing rhetoric. To assure a youth of genius, by sound of trumpet, that his genius is infallible, is, doubtless, good *camaraderie*, but, from a high point of view, it is poor æsthetics.

The first half of Gautier's theatrical *feuilletons* have been gathered into six volumes, under the ambitious title — a device, evidently, of the publishers rather than the author — of *L'Histoire de l'Art Dramatique en France*. In the theatre, as at the *Salon*, he is the most good-natured of critics, and enjoys far less picking a feeble drama to pieces than sketching fine scenery and good acting. The book, however, is an excellent one; its

tone is so easy, its judgments so happy and unpedantic, its good taste so pervasive, its spirit so wholesomely artistic. But we confess that what has most struck us, in turning it over, has been the active part played by the stage in France during these forty years, its incalculable fertility, and its insatiable absorption of talent and ingenuity. Buried authors and actors are packed away in Gautier's pages as on the shelves of an immense mausoleum; and if, here and there, they exhibit the decorative touch of the embalmer, the spectacle is, on the whole, little less lugubrious. It takes away one's breath to think of the vast consumption of witticisms involved in the development of civilization. Gautier's volumes seem an enormous monument to the shadowy swarm of jokes extinct and plots defunct, — dim-featured ghosts, still haunting the lawless circumference of literature, in pious confidence that the transmigration of souls will introduce them to the foot-lights again. Gautier's dealings with the theatre were altogether those of a spectator; for the little comedies collected in the volume which forms the text of our remarks are not of the sort approved by managers. They are matters of color, not of structure, and masterpieces of style rather than of "effect." The best of them, the *Tricorne Enchanté*, *Bastonnade en un Acte et en Vers*, *Mêlée d'un Couplet*, has been represented since the author's death, but, we believe, with only partial success. The piece is a *pastiche*, suggested by various sources, — Molière, Goldoni, the old prints of the types of the conventional Italian farce. The style is a marvel of humorous ingenuity, and exhales a delightful aroma of the grotesque stage-world of jealous guardians and light-fingered valets, saucy waiting-maids and modest *ingénues*. The verse occasionally emulates Molière with the happiest vivacity. Géronte, having lost his valet, determines to serve himself.

"Quel est donc le fossé, quelle est donc la muraille
Où gît, cuvant son vin, cette brave canaille?
O Champagne! es-tu mort? As-tu pris pour cercueil
Un tonneau défoncé de brie ou d'argenteuil?
Modèle des valets, perle des domestiques,
Qui passais en vertu les esclaves antiques,
Que le ciel avait fait uniquement pour moi, —
Par qui te remplacer, comment vivre sans toi?

— Parbleu ! Si j'essayais de me servir moi-même ?
Ce serait la façon de trancher le problème.
Je me commanderais et je m'obéirais.
Je m'aurais sous la main, et quand je me voudrais,
Je n'aurais pas besoin de me pendre aux sonnettes.
Nul ne sait mieux que moi que j'ai des mœurs honnêtes,
Que je me suis toujours conduit loyalement.
Ainsi donc je m'accepte avec empressement.
Ah, Messieurs les blondins, si celui-là me trompe,
Vous le pourrez aller crier à son de trompe :
J'empocherai votre or, et me le remettrai :
Vos billets pleins de musc, c'est moi qui les lirai.
D'ailleurs, je prends demain, qu'on me loue ou me blâme,
Mademoiselle Inez, ma pupille, pour femme.
Elle me soignera dans mes quintes de toux,
Et près d'elle couché, je me rirai de vous,
Les Amadis transis, les coureurs de fortune,
Gelant sous le balcon par un beau clair de lune !
Et, quand j'apercevrai mon coquin de neveu,
De deux ou trois seaux d'eau j'arroserai son feu ! "

The little piece called *Une Larme du Diable*, to which the author has affixed the half-apologetic qualification of *Mystère*, is one of his cleverest and most characteristic performances. None illustrates better, perhaps, what we have called the simplicity of his mind, — the way in which he conceived the most exalted ideas as picturesque, and picturesque only. *Une Larme du Diable* is a light *pastiche* of a mediæval miracle-play, just as the *Tricorne Enchanté* is an imitation of a seventeenth-century farce. The scene is alternately in heaven and on earth. *Satanas* is the hero, and *le Bon Dieu* and *Christus*, grotesquely associated with Othello and Desdemona, are among the minor characters. *Christus* himself, conversing in heaven, manifests a taste for the picturesque. "*Ce matin je me suis déguisé en mendiant, je leur* (the two heroines) *ai demandé l'aumône ; elles ont déposé dans ma main lépreuse, chacune à leur tour, une grosse pièce de cuivre, toute glacée de vert-de-gris.*" These copper coins, glazed with verdigris, are a sort of symbol of the drama, — a drama in which the celestial mind has a turn for *bric-à-brac*. Shrewdly fantastic as is the whole composition, it is a capital example of the weakness of an imagination dependent wholly upon the senses. That Gautier's fancy should have prompted him to write *Une Larme du Diable*, is up to a

certain point to its credit; that it should have carried him through the task suggests unutterable things as to his profundity. He had evidently no associations with divine images which it cost him a moment's hesitation to violate; and one may say of him that he was incapable of blasphemy, because he was incapable of respect. He is compounded of consistent levity. These are strange things to find one's self saying of a poet, and they bring us back to our first remark, — that our author's really splendid development is inexorably circumscribed. Infinite are the combinations of our faculties. Some of us are awkward writers and yearning moralists; others are masters of a perfect style which has never reflected a spiritual spark. Gautier's disposition served him to the end, and enabled him to have a literary heritage perfect of its kind. He could look every day at a group of beggars sunning themselves on the Spanish Steps at Rome, against their golden wall of mouldering travertine, and see nothing but the fine brownness of their rags and their flesh-tints, — see it and enjoy it forever, without an hour's disenchantment, without a chance of one of those irresistible revulsions of mood in which the "mellowest" rags are but filth, and filth is poverty, and poverty a haunting shadow, and picturesque squalor a mockery. His unfaltering robustness of vision — of appetite, one may say — made him not only strong but enviable.

HENRY JAMES JR.

ART. IV. — THE INDIAN QUESTION.

ON the 30th of March, 1871, Congress declared that "hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power, with whom the United States may contract by treaty."

Brave words these would have seemed to good William Penn, treating with the Lenni Lenape, under the spreading elm at Kensington; or even to doughty Miles Standish, ready as that worthy ever was to march against the heathen who troubled

his Israel. Heathen they were in the eyes of the good people of Plymouth Colony, but nations of heathen, without question, as truly as were the Amalekites, the Jebusites, or the Hittites to the infant colony at Shiloh. It would have been deemed the tallest kind of "tall talk,"* in the councils of Jamestown, Providence, and Annapolis, to express disdain for the proffered hand of Indian friendship, or even to object to payment of some small tribute, in beads or powder, to these native lords of the continent. In 1637, when Captain John Mason marched against Sassacus, at the head of ninety men, he had with him half the fighting force of the Connecticut Colony. In 1653 a wall was built across Manhattan Island to keep out the savages; though when we say that the line of defence just covered the present course of Wall Street, which derives its name from that circumstance, our readers may not fail to wonder whether the savages were not the rather kept in by it. In 1675, when the New England colonies had grown comparatively strong, they mustered for their war against Philip one thousand men, of whom Massachusetts furnished five hundred and twenty-seven, Plymouth one hundred and fifty-eight, and Connecticut three hundred and fifteen.

To men peering out from block-houses, or crouching behind walls awaiting the terrific yell of an Indian attack, it was not likely to occur that they might compromise their dignity by treating on equal terms with an enemy tenfold as numerous as themselves. Nor were the statesmen of that early heroic age likely to give themselves trouble about the character and standing, among the nations of the earth, of confederacies that could bring five thousand warriors into the field. And so the feeble colonies struggled on through those days of gloom and fear, deprecating the anger of the savages as they might, and circumventing their wiles when they could; played off one chieftain against another; made contribution of malice and powder to every intestine feud among the natives; bought off tribes without much scruple as to the ultimate fulfilment of their bargains; postponed the evil day by every expedient, knowing that time was on their side; and when they had, in

* This phrase is so distinctly of Indian origin that the readers of the North American will surely pardon its use in an article on the Indian question.

spite of all, to fight, fought as men who know that they will not themselves be spared; planned ambuscades and massacres; fired Indian camps, and shot the inmates as they leaped from their blazing wigwams; studied and mastered all the arts of forced warfare; and beat the savages with their own weapons, as men of the higher race will always do when forced by circumstances to such a contest. Captains who had been trained in the antiquated tactics and the solemn, ponderous nonsense of European campaigns before the days of Frederick and Napoleon, learned to be more stealthy and subtile than the tiger-cat as it creeps upon its prey and crouches for its spring. University men and society men, deeply read and delicately nurtured, in this struggle for life became more cunning than the painted savage that was called the Fox, outran the Running Elk, outclimbed the Mountain Goat, and in the deadly grapple, deep in primeval forests, broke the ribs of the Grizzly Bear with a hug that was learned in Cornwall or Yorkshire.

Nor, during the early part of the eighteenth century, when all danger of a war of extermination had passed from the apprehension of the most timid, when the colonies had become in a degree compacted, and the line of white occupation had been made continuous from Massachusetts to Georgia; nor, later still, when the colonies had become States, and the representatives of the new nation of the Western world were received in all the courts of Europe, — was the policy abandoned of treating with the Indian tribes as parties having equal powers of initiative, and equal rights in negotiation. In nearly four hundred treaties, confirmed by the Senate as are treaties with foreign powers, our government recognized Indian tribes as nations with whom the United States might contract without derogating from its sovereignty. Among the negotiators of Indian treaties we find, — besides three successful soldiers, who subsequently became Presidents of the United States, Jackson, Harrison, and Taylor, — statesmen like Henry Knox, Timothy Pickering, Lewis Cass, and John C. Calhoun. Nor were the subjects of negotiation unworthy the best diplomatic efforts of such men as these. The writer recollects but five treaties of the United States with foreign powers which contain a larger money consideration than the treaty of New Echota with the Cherokees in 1835.

The treaties made with Indian tribes have, of course, been mainly treaties of cession. Most of our readers will be surprised to learn the extent of lands east of the Mississippi which are embraced in sales to the United States; being no less than the entire States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi, with considerable portions of Tennessee, Michigan, and Wisconsin.* And these treaties were not a mere form to amuse and quiet savages, a half-compassionate, half-contemptuous humoring of unruly children. The United

* The cessions of territory embraced in the present States of Florida (Seminole and Florida Indians), Alabama (Creeks and Cherokees), Mississippi (Choctaws and Chickasaws), Georgia (Creeks and Cherokees), and Tennessee (Chickasaws and Cherokees), were made at dates between 1801 and 1835. The cessions of territory to the north were made by confederacies bearing much more formidable titles, though in reality far inferior in numbers and powers to the Southern tribes. A few examples will suffice, the names of existing towns and cities being used to indicate the cessions, rather than the metes and bounds by which they were described in the treaties.

Ohio. — In 1795, the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pottawatomies, Miamies, Eel-Rivers, Weas, Kickapoos, Piankeshaws, and Kaskaskias being greatly moved thereunto by the words of Anthony Wayne, commonly called Mad Anthony, Major-General in the army of the United States, ceded Columbus, Cincinnati, Dayton, Zanesville, Chillicothe, Portsmouth, Marietta, Thompson, Canton, Steubenville, Hamilton, and other towns and cities too numerous to mention. Of the high contracting parties to this treaty, the Ottawas, Kickapoos, and Pottawatomies are now citizens of the United States; the Eel-Rivers muster on pay-day nineteen men, women, and children; the Weas, Kaskaskias, and Piankeshaws together number three or four score; the Delawares, Shawnees, and Miamies have practically lost their identity by being merged with other tribes; the Chippewas alone remain respectable and formidable.

In 1805, the Wyandots, Ottawas, Chippewas, Mansees, Delawares, Shawnees, and Pottawatomies ceded Cleveland, Sandusky, Norwalk, Oberlin, and Akron; and in 1817, the same confederacy ceded Toledo and Fremont.

Indiana.—In 1803, the Delawares, Shawnees, Pottawatomies, Miamies, Eel Rivers, Weas, Kickapoos, Piankeshaws, and Kaskaskias ceded Washington, Princeton, and Vincennes. In 1804, the Piankeshaws ceded Rockport and Evansville. In 1805, the Delawares, Pottawatomies, Miamies, Eel-Rivers, and Weas ceded Madison, Jeffersonville, New Albany, Paoli, and Seymour. In 1809, the Delawares, Pottawatomies, Miamies, and Eel-Rivers ceded Sullivan, Terre Haute, Richmond, Centreville, and Connersville. In 1818, the Miamies ceded Indianapolis, Greencastle, Shelbyville, Franklin, Crawfordsville, Lafayette, Logansport, Peru, Wabash, Huntington, and Fort Wayne; and in 1826, the same tribe ceded Valparaiso, La Porte, South Bend, and Kendallsville. The same year the Pottawatomies ceded Columbia.

Illinois. — In 1805, the Piankeshaws ceded Olney and Effingham. In 1816, the Ottawas, Chippewas, and Pottawatomies ceded, without the reservation of one corner-lot, Joliet and Chicago; in 1829, the same Indians, with much better judgment, ceded Galena; and in 1833, Waukegan. In 1819, the Kickapoos ceded Paris and Champaign.

States were not then grown so great that they could afford to value lightly the free relinquishment of the soil by the native owners of it. At the time most of the treaties with tribes east of the Mississippi were concluded, not only did the right remain in the Indians, but enough of power to make it as much a diplomatic triumph to obtain a cession on favorable terms, as it would be to negotiate a successful treaty with one of the states of Central America to-day. The United States were clearly the stronger party in every such case; but the Indians were, in the great body of instances, still so formidable, that to wrest their lands from them by pure, brutal violence would have required an exertion of strength which the government was ill prepared to make. So that, while it is true that the Indians were generally made ready to negotiate by the use of military force and by the pressure of white settlements, it is not true that the considerations and privileges accorded them in these treaties were a gift out of good-nature.

So much for the power of the Indians when they made these treaties. Their right to these lands is quite as well established historically. In the early history of the Western world, the principle was fully recognized that, while sovereignty rested, not with the Indians, but with the civilized power claiming by virtue of discovery, the Indians were the rightful occupants, with a just and perfect claim to retain possession and enjoy the use until they should be disposed voluntarily to part with it. Great Britain, Holland, France, and Spain, the four powers claiming sovereignty by virtue of discovery within the present territory of the United States, conceded no less than this to the natives; while France, in the cession of the Province of Louisiana, expressly reserved the rights allowed the Indians by its own treaties and articles, "until, by mutual consent of the United States and the said tribes or nations, other suitable articles shall have been agreed upon."

"Such being the right of the Indians to the soil, the United States for more than eighty-five years pursued a uniform course of extinguishing the Indian title only with the consent of those Indian tribes which were recognized as having claim by reason of occupancy: such consent being expressed in treaties, to the formation of which both parties approached as having equal rights of initiative, and equal rights in nego-

tiation. These treaties were made from time to time (not less than 372 being embraced in the General Statutes of the United States) as the pressure of white settlements or the fear or the experience of Indian hostilities made the demand for the removal of one tribe after another urgent or imperative. *Except only in the case of the Indians in Minnesota, after the outbreak of* 1862, *the United States government has never extinguished an Indian title as by right of conquest;* and in this latter case the government provided the Indians another reservation, besides giving them the proceeds of the sales of the lands vacated by them in Minnesota, — so scrupulously, up to that time, had the right of the Indians to the soil been respected, at least in form. It is not to be denied that wrong was often done in fact to tribes in the negotiation of treaties of cession. The Indians were not infrequently overborne or deceived by the agents of the government in these transactions; sometimes, too, unquestionably, powerful tribes were permitted to cede lands to which weaker tribes had a better claim; but, formally at least, the United States accepted the cession successively of all lands to which Indian tribes could show color of title, which are embraced in the limits of any of the present States of the Union, except California and Nevada." — *Report on Indian Affairs*, 1872, pp. 83, 84.

In 1871, however, the insolence of conscious strength and the growing jealousy of the House of Representatives towards the prerogative arrogated by the Senate of determining, in connection with the executive, all questions of Indian right and title, and of committing the United States incidentally to pecuniary obligations limited only by its own discretion, for which the House should be bound to make provision without inquiry, led to the adoption, after several severe parliamentary struggles, of the declaration which stands at the head of this paper.

In abruptly terminating thus the long series of Indian treaties, and forever closing the only course of procedure known for the adjustment of difficulties, and even for the administration of ordinary business, with Indian tribes, Congress provided no substitute, and up to the present time has neglected to prescribe the methods by which, after the abrogation of the national character of the Indians, either their internal matters or their relations with the general government are to be regulated. The Indian Intercourse Act of 1834, though still nominally in force, is so largely predicated upon the tribal constitution, and assumes so uniformly the national sufficiency of the tribe, that all the

life and virtue are taken out of it by the Act of 1871 just cited; and the country is, in effect, left without rule or prescription for the government of Indian affairs. It is sufferance, not law, which enables the Indian Office to-day to administer its charge. While the Act of 1871 strikes down at a blow the hereditary authority of the chiefs, no legislation has invested Indian agents with magisterial powers, or provided for the assembling of the Indian *demos*. There is at this time no semblance of authority for the punishment of any crime which one Indian may commit against another, nor any mode of procedure, recognized by treaty or statute, for the regulation of matters between the government and the several tribes. So far as the law is concerned, complete anarchy exists in Indian affairs; and nothing but the singular homogeneity of Indian communities, and the almost unaccountable spontaneity and unanimity of public sentiment within them, has thus far prevented the attention of Congress and the country being called most painfully to the unpardonable negligence of the national legislature in failing to provide a substitute for the time-honored policy which was destroyed by the Act of 1871.

In treating the Indian question of the present day, the temptation is strongly felt to dwell upon the history of Indian tribes and upon the physical and moral characteristics of this singular race. Yet if way be once given to this inclination, not only will the time and space necessary for a discussion of the present and the future of the Indian tribes be sacrificed, but the attention of the reader will be so overwhelmed with the multitude of names and incidents that he will be embarrassed rather than assisted in his understanding of the subject to be treated. The value, for our purpose, of facts and incidents in Indian history is not at all according to their value historically or romantically. Indeed, such has been the fatality to the aborigines of contact with the whites that, it may almost be said, the importance to-day of tribes is inversely as their importance in the annals of the country. Among the greatest figures of the past are those of bands and confederacies that have utterly disappeared from the continent, happy that their long, savage independence and their brief, fierce resistance to the encroachments of the pale-face were not to be succeeded by a dreary period of sub-

mission, humiliation, and dependence. Other tribes, that but a few generations ago shook the infant colonies with terror, or even dared to stand across the path of the Republic, and for a time flung a shadow as of eclipse over its destiny, are now represented upon the annuity or feeding lists of the United States by a few score of diseased wretches, who hang about the settlements, begging and stealing where they can, and quarrelling like dogs over the entrails of the beeves that are slaughtered for them. Still other tribes, once warlike and powerful, have, by a fortunate turn of character and circumstance, become so rich and respectable as not only to deprive them of all romantic interest, but practically to take them out of the scope of the Indian question. Other tribes, still having among them men whose grandfathers besieged Detroit under Pontiac, are now resolved into citizens of the United States, eligible for the Chief Justiceship or the Presidency.

Such considerations as we have here briefly sketched suffice to show the inexpediency of entering upon Indian history, *qua* history, as an introduction to the discussion of the Indian problems of to-day. Equally obdurate must one be with seductions of Indian ethnology, except so far only as it may serve to assist and simplify the classification of the present Indian population, to refer tribes and bands to recognized groups or families, for the better and briefer characterization of their qualities and affinities.

Even stronger yet is the temptation to enter upon the analysis and portraiture of the original and native character of the North American Indian. Voluptuary and stoic; swept by gusts of fury too terrible to be witnessed, yet imperturbable beyond all men, under the ordinary excitements and accidents of life; garrulous, yet impenetrable; curious, yet himself reserved; proud and mean, alike beyond compare; superior to torture and the presence of certain death, yet, by the standards of all other peoples, a coward in battle; capable of magnanimous actions which, when uncovered of all romance, are worthy of the best days of Roman virtue, yet more cunning, false, and cruel than the Bengalee, — this copper-colored sphinx, this riddle unread of men equally fascinates and foils the inquirer.

This, however, is the Indian of history. The Indian for

whom the government is called to provide subsistence and instruction presents no such psychological difficulties. Curious compound and strange self-contradiction as the red man is in his native character, in his traditional pursuits, and amid the surroundings of his own wild life, yet when broken down by the military power of the whites, thrown out of his familiar relations, his stupendous conceit, with its glamour of savage pomp and glory, rudely dispelled, his occupation gone, himself a beggar, the red man becomes the most commonplace person imaginable, of very simple nature, limited aspirations, and enormous appetites.*

The Indian question naturally divides itself into two: What shall be done with the Indian as an obstacle to the national progress? What shall be done with him when, and so far as, he ceases to oppose or obstruct the extension of railways and settlements? It is because these two parts of the question have not been separately regarded that so much confusion has been introduced into the discussion of Indian affairs. Widely diverse, for example, as are the criticisms popularly expressed on what is known as the "Indian policy" of President Grant's administration, the writer can confidently affirm, as the result of hundreds of interviews, formal and informal, stated and casual, friendly and the reverse, with men from every section of the country, of both parties, and of all professions, that he believes there is no political subject mooted to-day on which there are so slight differences of real opinion, or indeed such general consent, when men will once come to terms with each other, and begin to talk about the same thing. He has never known a man, even from the Territories or the border States, make objection, on a candid statement, to the intentions and purposes of that administration towards the Indian, unless it were some man peculiarly vulgar and brutal; such a one, for instance, as, if a Southerner, would give his time and breath to indiscriminate abuse of the negroes. Instead of there being two parties on this subject, there is, therefore, if the observations of the writer have been well made, no reason to suppose that any considerable division of opinion or feeling respecting the duty of the government, at the present moment, by the aborigines of the country.

* Forty Indians, not one of whom had skipped a meal for a month, have been known to eat two hundred and eighty pounds of dressed meat at a single pull.

Take the public sentiment of Arizona, for example. It is the almost universal belief throughout the country, that the people of this Territory have a deadly hostility to the Indians, and meditate nothing but mischief towards them; and it certainly must be admitted that press and people alike indulge in expressions which fairly bear that construction, and are quite enough to create an impression that the citizens of the Territory hate an Indian as an Indian, and have no humane sentiments whatever towards the race. And yet the writer would as soon leave the question, whether the government should render some kindly service to the Papagoes, or to the Penias and Maricopas, in the way of assisting them to self-maintenance, or of providing instruction in letters or in the mechanic arts, to the general voice of the people of Arizona, as to any missionary association in New York or Boston the coming May. When the press of Arizona cry out against the Indian policy of the government, and denounce Eastern philanthropy, they have in mind the warlike and depredating bands, and they are exasperated by what they deem, perhaps unreasonably but not unnaturally, the weakness and indecision of the executive in failing to properly protect the frontier. Indians, to them, mean Apaches, and their violence on the Indian question arises from the belief that the administration of Indian affairs has been committed to sentimentalists, who have no appreciation of the terrible stress which these Indian outrages bring upon the remote settlements. But were the question one of helping, in a practical fashion suited to the habits and views of life of a border community, a tribe of Indians who are peaceful, and in a poor way helpful, there is no reason to suppose that the inhabitants of Tucson or Prescott would be behind an Eastern congregation in readiness for the work. And this impression the writer derives, not alone from the amiable and cultivated gentleman who represents that Territory in Congress, but from contact and correspondence with many influential and representative citizens of Arizona, and from a study of the very journals that so teem with denunciations of the Indian policy of the government.*

* The writer does not intend to say that the citizens of the border States are always just or reasonable in their disposition towards the Indians. It cannot be denied that, in the exasperation of conflict, they often commit atrocities rivalling

On the other hand, in our prosperous and well-ordered communities at the East, a gentleman of leisure and of native benevolence, whose ears have never rung with the war-whoop, whose eyes have never witnessed the horrid atrocities of Indian warfare, and who is only disturbed in his pleasing reveries by the occasional tramp of the policeman about his house, is apt to dwell exclusively upon the other side of the Indian question. To such a man, as he recalls the undoubted wrongs done the Indian in the past, as he contemplates the fate of a race whose heroic and romantic qualities have been greatly exaggerated, or as he listens to the flattering tale of a missionary returned from some peaceful and half-civilized tribe, it is very pleasant to think that the original owners of the soil are to be protected by the government, saved to humanity, educated in the useful arts, and elevated to a Christian civilization. On such a man accounts of Indian outrages make little impression. He regards them as the invention of pioneer malice, or easily disposes of them by a mental reference to the crimes perpetrated daily in his own town or city. He is, perhaps, so ignorant of Indian matters as to think that all the Indians of the country form one homogeneous community, and cannot understand how it should be that, while Cherokees are supporting churches and colleges and orphan asylums at home, and sending their sons to receive classical and professional education in the best schools of the East, Kiowas should roast their prisoners alive, and brain the babe before the eyes of its mother. Is it a matter of wonder that men who are contemplating things so

those of the savages; that, moreover, under the smart of wrong, they are very often indiscriminating in their revenge, and do cruel injustice to peaceful bands; and that, with the recklessness characteristic of border talk, they indulge to a vast extent in denunciations of horrible sound. To this is added, that in such communities are found more than the usual number of persons of a natural malignity of disposition, often refugees from criminal justice, who delight in committing outrages upon the exposed and helpless members of an inferior race. The opinion which the writer has given above is entirely consistent with the present admissions. The animosities felt and expressed are not towards the Indians as Indians, but arise out of the sense of injuries suffered and the apprehension of further suffering. Were the Indians once rendered, by the extension and strengthening of our settlements, powerless for harm, the easy tolerance, the rough good-nature, and the quick condonement of wrong, which characterize pioneer communities, would speedily reconcile the whites to their presence, and establish relations not wholly unworthy of both parties.

different as are the Eastern philanthropist and the Western settler, when the Indians are spoken of, should imagine that they disagreed as to the policy of the government, and come to entertain contempt or repugnance for each other, while, in fact, on an honest statement of a given case, neither would dissent, in the slightest degree, from the views of the other? If there is, then, such a liability to confusion and misapprehension in the discussion of the Indian question, we may be allowed to insist strongly upon the necessity of the distinction indicated.

The actually or potentially hostile tribes of the United States number, on a rough computation suited to the rudeness of the definition, sixty-four thousand. It is these only which we have to treat under the first division of our question. What shall be done with the Indian as an obstacle to the national progress? This number of sixty-four thousand is made up as follows: the actually depredating bands, Northwest and Southwest, probably have not exceeded, during the past year, seven thousand, mainly Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches. The tribes with which these bands are directly and intimately connected contain about twenty thousand, including the marauders. There are further included in this calculation tribes and bands numbering in the aggregate about forty-four thousand, which are now generally at peace.

It will be seen that the number which we have taken for the potentially hostile Indians is many times greater than the number of the actually hostile. Yet, on the other hand, we have not intended to embrace all those tribes which might be exasperated to the point of resistance by a reckless disregard of treaties on the part of the government, or by a series of wanton acts of abuse on the part of white settlers. There is a line beyond which no man or people may safely be pressed; and there are few bands of Indians, East or West, however contemptible in numbers or character, which, if wronged and trampled on, might not in their indignant despair teach their oppressors a lesson at which the world would shudder. We are contemplating no such possibilities. We are assuming that the government will, as it has generally done in the past, respect treaty obligations, and that the intercourse of the Indians with their white neighbors will be marked by only such sporadic acts of individual wrong as are in the nature of the case.

The tribes to which we refer as potentially hostile are, first, those now in immediate contact with the whites, whose claims to territory are so far disregarded, either by the action of the government or by the unauthorized intrusion of pioneers and prospectors, or whose means of subsistence are so far impaired or threatened by the extension of railways and settlements, that hostilities are only prevented by the bounty of the government in feeding the members of such tribes, in whole or in part; by liberal presents of trinkets and useful goods; by the exercise of especial watchfulness in avoiding occasions of dispute and points of collision; and finally by a willingness on the part of the government to overlook offences and even to tolerate a degree of insolence rather than allow a breach of the peace: second, those tribes not now to any great extent in contact with the whites, and exhibiting no desire to go out of their way to make trouble, but of which the same must, in the inevitable course of the national progress, in a few years become true as of the tribes embraced under the first class.

But these classes, as we have thus described them, are yet far too numerous for the facts of the case. We must still further reduce them by excluding all such tribes as, from location, from traditional friendship for the whites, or from weakness of character, are unlikely, in any event reasonably to be contemplated, to become involved in hostilities.

Among the Indians who, by the force of their location and surroundings, are rendered powerless for armed resistance are not a few of the Indians of Minnesota and even some in Wisconsin, who have no love for the whites, and would make exceedingly bad neighbors to frontier settlements, but who, encircled as they are by powerful communities, submit sullenly to their condition. The same may be said of many bands in Kansas, Nebraska, and on the Pacific coast. These are Indians who have been overtaken, surrounded, and disarmed by the progress of population, but, either through the neglect of the government or by the failure of the usual agencies of instruction and industrial assistance, have remained barbarous, and, as their natural means of subsistence grow scantier, are becoming every year more miserable.

There is another and much larger class of Indians from

whom no organized violence is to be expected in the course of the complete settlement of the country, not because they are rendered helpless by the force of their location, nor because they have any traditional friendship for the whites, nor because they do not experience suffering enough to impel a warlike people to a struggle for life, but because they are not fighting Indians. Actual outrage might drive some of these tribes to resistance; but, under the slow wasting-away of their means of subsistence and the gradual pressure of the settlements, they are, and are likely to remain, wholly passive, accepting their fate and sinking to the lowest point of human misery without a single heroic effort. Some of these tribes have been "put upon" by their more warlike neighbors through many generations, driven from their original hunting-grounds, and harassed even in the mountains where they have taken refuge, until their spirit has been utterly crushed and they have become as submissive as the Southern negroes. This is true of large numbers of the Indians of Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and Southern California. They have neither the individual courage nor the instinct of confederation entitling them to be reckoned among the potentially hostile tribes.

Still again we count out several powerful tribes, able to bring five hundred or a thousand warriors each into the field, which, by reason of traditional friendship and their frequent alliance with our troops in campaigns against hostile Indians, are sure to remain the friends of the government under any tolerable treatment. Indeed, neglect and abuse seem insufficient to alienate these allies. Their faith once pledged, and friendship cemented by sacrifices and sufferings, they cling to the fortunes of the whites with romantic fidelity. Such are the Arickarees,* Mandans, and Gros Ventres of the Upper

* The relations of the Arickarees — or, as they are commonly called, even in official reports, the 'Rees — to the government form one of the most instructive chapters of Indian history. In 1838 the agent for the Upper Missouri Indian agency, in his annual report to the Department of Indian Affairs, used the following language in respect to this tribe: —

"The Riccaras have long been notorious for their treachery and barbarity, and, within my own recollection, have murdered and pillaged more of our citizens than all the other tribes between the western borders of Missouri and the heads of the Columbia River." — *Report on Indian Affairs*, 1838-9, p. 65.

This is language which one might expect from the agent of some exceptionally

Missouri; such the Pawnees of Kansas; such the Flatheads, Koutonais, and Pend d'Oreilles, whose boast is that their tribes never killed a white man; such, in a degree, the Crows of Montana. These tribes, and others of less consequence, are not only sure, in the event of kindly treatment by the government, to remain its fast friends, but they may be relied upon, in the future as in the past, to do much to check the audacity of their hostile neighbors, and, in the last resort, to furnish reinforcements of the most effective and economical sort to the troops operating against predatory bands. The 'Rees have for some years sent their warriors into the field at every call of the government, and a considerable body of scouts from this warlike tribe are constantly maintained in service. The Crows earnestly desire the completion of the Northern Pacific Railroad, which is destined to act as a complete barrier against the incursions of their mortal enemies, the Sioux; and they may be relied on for important assistance in covering the parties engaged in the construction of the road, and in protecting its trains and stations when finished.

Alliances of this character the government has no right to decline. Both for the protection of the settlements and for the sake of confirming these bands in their attachment to the government, the employment of Indians in a campaign, whether they be called soldiers or scouts, is not only justifiable, but highly expedient. It costs nothing to put such allies into the field, and little to maintain them. They are most useful auxiliaries while employed, and may be discharged without ceremony, and with no likelihood of "war claims" arising to worry

troublesome band of Sioux. But, to the contrary, in another portion of his report (*Ib.* p. 64) the same agent says: "No Indians ever manifested a greater degree of friendship for the whites in general, or more respect for our government, than the Sioux." This report was made thirty-four years ago, the limit of one human generation. To-day the Sioux are among the most dangerous and troublesome Indians on the hands of the government, while the Arickarees are our fast friends and allies. Lieutenant-General Sheridan, in 1871, writing of these Indians, now located at Fort Berthold, says: "They have always been civil and well disposed, and have been repaid by the government with neglect and starvation. Of all Indians in the country, they were the best entitled to be looked after and made happy and contented." Something, clearly, has made this difference, and an inquirer would doubtless find here an explanation of no small part of the difficulties which the United States government has experienced in dealing with the Indian tribes.

Congress for a few sessions, and be finally compounded at the rate of a thousand dollars a man for each three months of service. General Crook's campaigns on the Pacific coast, many years ago, and in Arizona during the past season, have shown most strikingly the advantages to be derived from such enlistment of friendly tribes. The objection urged against such employment of friendly Indians, that it tends to brutalize them and confirm them in savagery, and thus to defeat the efforts of the government to refine and elevate their sentiments and condition, is entitled to little respect. The country will not believe that an Indian is too precious to do the work to which white men are put. The white man is rarely a better citizen for having been a soldier; but the Indian is distinctly a better friend to the United States for having fought by the side of our troops and received the pay of the government. Congress should certainly provide authority and means for keeping in service as many of the friendly Indians as can be effectively employed, until the possibility of a general Indian war is past. Such a reinforcement of our army would be of incalculable value to the frontier settlements, while it would cost less than the maintenance of an additional squadron of cavalry.

Having excluded all tribes and bands of the character, or in the position, indicated under the three heads above, we make up the list of the potentially hostile Indians somewhat as follows: Of the Sioux of Dacotah, tribes, bands, and parties, to the number of 15,000; of the Indians of Montana, Blackfeet, Bloods, and Piegans, Assinaboines, and roving Sioux, to the number of 20,000; of the Indians in the extreme southwestern part of the Indian Territory and on the borders of Texas, Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, to the number of 7,000; of the Indians of Arizona, Apaches of several tribes, to the number of 9,000; of the Mountain Indians of Colorado, Utah, and Nevada, to the number of 5,000; of the Indians of New Mexico, to the number of 2,000; and of the Indians in Oregon and Washington Territory, to the number of 6,000. The 64,000 Indians thus enumerated comprise substantially all the tribes and bands with which the government is obliged to contemplate the possibility of war. It is in the highest degree improbable, however, that the United States would, even in the

event of what might properly be called a general Indian war, be called on to fight more than one half of these Indians at any one time; while, with a reasonable policy of concession, the number of actually hostile and depredating bands may be steadily reduced, and the whole body of dangerous Indians held in check until the advance of population shall render them incapable of mischief. The measures by which this is to be effected must be considered candidly, in the light of the alternative presented, and not as if they were proposed as measures wholly agreeable to the tastes or the temper of those who are called to administer Indian affairs.

That we may obtain a true impression of one of the conditions on which peace is maintained with certain Indian tribes, let us take a leaf out of the official record of the dealings of the government with the Sioux during the past year. Early in 1872, an unusually large number of Indians were assembled at the Red Cloud Agency near Fort Laramie in Wyoming. By far the greater part were *habitués* of this or some other Sioux agency; but among them were many Northern Indians, who were for the first time the guests of the government, and who, not having become accustomed to eat the bread of dependence, were much more intractable and insolent than the others. The presence of these Indians produced great turmoil at the agency, and considerable apprehension on the part of the agent. Nothing in the nature of an outbreak occurred, however; the strangers gradually went away to their summer hunt on the Powder River, and the agency was brought back to its usual condition. But while this was being effected, a ranchman named Powell, who had a large drove of cattle near Fort Laramie, was robbed and murdered. The bloody details were soon known, for Indians are such inveterate gossips that they can keep no secret, however dangerous disclosure may be to them. The murderers were Northern Indians, who had instantly left for their own country. At two successive councils, both the civil and the military authorities demanded the surrender of the guilty parties and the return of the stolen stock. The chiefs present and the great body of their followers most unmistakably disapproved and regretted the act, if for no better reason than because they apprehended the conse-

quences; but they disclaimed any responsibility therefor, the murderers not being of their own proper number; pleaded their inability to arrest the fugitives with their bloody spoils, and, for the rest, did nothing. The government, for that matter, after much expostulation, did the same; troops were not marched northward to seize the murderers; the rations of the Sioux were not ordered to be stopped until satisfaction had been given; and the murder of Powell remains to-day unpunished by the government of the United States.

A second condition on which peace is maintained is the subsistence of certain tribes at the expense of the government, without reference to their ability or disposition to work. Every five or seven days, twenty thousand Sioux, big and little, assemble around the agencies for the distribution of food. Soldiers' rations are dealt out; flour by the hundred sacks is delivered to them; beeves by the score are turned loose to be shot down and eaten up in savage fashion. The expense of this service is a million five hundred thousand dollars a year, — one seventh the total cost of poor-support in the United States. About one million more is expended for the total or partial subsistence of other tribes, especially in the Southwest.* Coincidently with this, occasions for increased expenditure have arisen in connection with tribes not upon the feeding-list, so that the average cost of the Indian service has gone up from four millions in 1866, 1867, and 1868, to seven millions at the present time. It should be remarked, however, that it is only the increase which measures the cost of the "peace policy," so called, more than one half of the four millions of ex-

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* The extent of this feeding business may be judged from the following exhibit of the contracts for Indian supplies entered into for the current fiscal year: —

Beef, on the hoof	$ 764,804.50
Bacon	131,546.99
Sugar	98,417.25
Flour	315,808.40
Coffee	108,179.60
Soap	6,242.09
Salt	960.75
Tobacco	55,464.00
Saleratus	362.50

Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, 1872, p. 25.

penditure in the former period being the lawful due of the Indians * under treaty stipulations, in consideration for the cession of lands; and the remainder covering the general expenses of the service. The following table exhibits the expenditures of the government on account of the Indian service for the twelve years 1861 to 1872: —

Year.	Expenditures on Indian Account.	Year.	Expenditures on Indian Account.
1861	$ 2,865,481.17	1867	$ 4,642,531.77
1862	2,327,948.37	1868	4,100,682.32
1863	3,152,032.70	1869	7,042,923.06
1864	2,629,975.97	1870	3,407,938.15
1865	5,059,360.71	1871	7,426,997.44
1866	3,295,729.32	1872	7,061,728.82

Now it must honestly be confessed that the United States government in such dealings with Indian tribes as have been recited does not act a very handsome part. To pay black-mail to insolent savages (for that is simply what it amounts to); to feed forty or fifty thousand people who make no pretence of doing anything for themselves, and who appear to think that they are conferring a distinguishing honor upon the government by accepting its bounty; to allow the murder of an American citizen, of whatever character or degree, to go unpunished; — these are not things pleasant to contemplate. It may be a duty to administer Indian affairs in this way; but it must be a duty far more disagreeable to any man of spirit than would be a call to take part in the punishment of the savages, at no more than the personal risk usually incident to a campaign. And yet, in the face of all this, we do not hesitate to say that the general course of the government in such dealings as have been described above is expedient and humane, just and honorable. This is a proposition which, in the view of

* The subsistence of the Sioux for the term of five years is guaranteed to them by the treaty of 1868, and may hence be said to be a part-consideration for the relinquishment of territory claimed by them. It is none the less, in fact, one of the present conditions of maintaining the peace; and, were it not provided by treaty, would unquestionably be provided, all the same, by law, as a manifest necessity of the situation, exactly as the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Witchitas, etc., in the Southwest, are subsisted, although no treaty provision to that effect exists.

such admissions as have been made, may seem to impose a formidable burden of proof; yet is it not only consistent with the highest reason of the case, but susceptible of very simple and direct demonstration.

In the first place, it should be remarked that there can be no question of national dignity involved in the treatment of savages by a civilized power. The proudest Anglo-Saxon will climb a tree with a bear behind him, and deem not his honor, but his safety, compromised by the situation. With wild men, as with wild beasts, the question whether to fight, coax, or run is a question merely of what is easiest or safest, in the situation given. Points of dignity only arise between those who are, or assume to be, equals. Indeed, nothing is at times so contemptuous as compliance. It indicates not merely a consciousness of thought, but of strength so superior as to decline comparison or contest.

Grant that some petty Sioux chief believes that the government of the United States feeds him and his lazy followers out of fear, or out of respect for his greatness: what then? It will not be long before the agent of the government will be pointing out the particular row of potatoes which his Majesty must hoe before his Majesty can dine. The people of the United States surely are great enough, and sufficiently conscious of their greatness, to indulge a little longer the self-complacent fancies of those savage tribes, if by that means a desolating war may be avoided.

And in this we shall only do what other nations have done, and esteemed themselves wise in doing. The Greeks and Romans, except in periods of ambitious frenzy, recognized the fruitlessness and folly of fighting absolute savages, and did not scruple, in the height of their conquering pride, to keep the peace with Scythians and Parthians as best they could. The English, the Dutch, the Spanish, the Portuguese, in their American colonies, only fought the natives when for their purposes they must, preserving the peace, when they could, by presents and even by tribute. Statesmen who would have embroiled Europe on a question of dinner etiquette, have fully recognized the principle that there could be no issue of dignity between a civilized power and a band of irresponsible savages;

and have submitted, without any feeling of degradation, to demands the most unreasonable, urged in terms the most insolent.

Nor is there any savor of treachery in the government thus biding its time. In this the government simply, for a wise consideration of the exposed situation of the settlements, refrains from the full exercise of the authority which it claims. It in no wise deceives the Indians, but only indulges their illusion till the time comes when the illusion must be broken. It watches the troubled sleep of the maniac, ready to restrain his violence if he wakes, yet mercifully willing that he should remain unconscious. And this forbearance of the government is not less kind to the aborigines than to those of our citizens who are building their homes within reach of the red man's hand. If the savages — Sioux, Kiowas, Cheyennes, Comanches, whom the United States are thus playing with — realized in any adequate measure what the next few years have in store for them, — how completely they will be surrounded and disarmed, how certainly they will be forced to labor like squaws for their bread, how stringently the government will enforce its requirements when their power of resistance shall have departed, — it is inconceivable that in their present temper, ignorant as they are of the real resources of the whites, and conscious that they can still bring eight thousand warriors into the field, they would precipitate a contest which, though it would involve untold misery to our border population, must inevitably end in their own destruction.

If, then, there is nothing inconsistent with national dignity or honor in thus temporizing with hostile savages, it certainly can be shown to be in a high degree compatible with the interests and the welfare of all the white communities which are, by their advanced position, placed at the mercy of the Indians. Thousands and even tens of thousands of our citizens are now living within reach of the first murderous outbreak of a general Indian war. Since 1868, when the trans-continental railroad was completed, population has found its way into regions to which the rate of progress previously maintained would not in fifty years have carried it; into nooks and corners which five years ago were scarcely known to trappers and guides. Instead

of exposing to Indian contact, as heretofore, a clearly defined frontier line, upon two or three *faces*, our settlements have penetrated the Western country in every direction, and from every direction, creeping along the course of every stream, seeking out every habitable valley, following up every indication of gold among the ravines and mountains, clinging around the reservations of the most formidable tribes, and even making lodgement at a hundred points on lands secured by treaty to the Indians. Even where the limit of settlement in any direction has apparently, for the time, been reached, we learn of some solitary ranchman or miner who has made his home still farther down the valley or up the mountain, far beyond sight or call.

It is upon men thus exposed, without hope of escape or chance of resistance, that the first wrath of a general Indian war would break. No note of recall would avert their doom. Long before friendly runners could reach them, the war-whoop would be in their ears, and alone, unfriended, undefended, unaided, they would perish, as hundreds and thousands of our countrymen have perished, at the hands of the infuriated savages. But it is not alone the solitary ranchmen who would be swept away on the first onset of Indian attack. Scores of valleys up which population has been steadily creeping would be instantly abandoned; streams that now, from source to mouth, resound the stroke of the pioneer's axe, would be left desolate on the first rumor of war; a hundred outlying settlements would disappear in a night, as the tidings of outbreak and massacre were borne along by hurrying fugitives. As the blood retreats, on the signal of danger, from the extremities to the heart, so would population retire, terror-struck and precipitate, from the frontier on the first shock of war. Towns even would be abandoned, and the frightened inhabitants, men, women, and children, cumbered with household stuff and overdriven stock, would crowd within the shelter of garrisons hardly adequate for their defence.

Let those who think the picture overdrawn refresh their memories by reading the account of some one good old-fashioned Indian massacre in the early history of the country, or even of the outbreak of 1862, in Minnesota, when, in a few days, nearly one thousand persons miserably perished at the hands of the

Sioux. Such as we have described it, no whit exaggerated, is the result which those who desire the government to take a dignified and decisive course with the Indians must bring themselves to contemplate as the price of that luxury. Pleasant indeed it would be to see justice done, without fear, to any marauding savage who dares to lift his hand against the majesty of the United States. Hard it is to the carnal heart to allow insolence and outrage to go unpunished. But it is not for legislators or administrators to indulge their tastes or their tempers, when such interests are at stake. By all means not dishonorable or wrong in themselves, the peace is to be preserved with the Indians, so long as they hold thousands of our own people as hostages. There is no question of dignity that can outweigh this, the supreme consideration of the situation.

There could be but one plea on which such considerations as these might be disregarded; and that would be the plea that such forbearance and indulgence on the part of the United States towards the savages only encouraged them to increased insolence and incited them to fresh outrages, rendering the situation less and less tolerable, and in the end involving greater sacrifice of life than would a prompt vindication of the authority of the government, once for all, however disastrous in the immediate result it might prove to existing settlements. If the policy of temporizing which has been described does indeed only serve at the last to aggravate the evil, and by a false appearance of peace to draw within the reach of Indian massacre larger numbers of whites, then it is plainly the duty of the government to recall, as far as may be, its citizens from the exposed frontier, and, at whatever expense of blood and treasure, make issue with the savages, and forever close the question by the complete conquest and reduction of all the hostile or dangerous tribes. But no assumption could be further from the facts of the case than that the effect of lenity has been to increase the sum of Indian outrage. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that any savage tribe has been incited by the forbearance of the government to increased depredations. On the contrary, the history of the past three years has shown a steady decline in the number of robberies and murders reported on the frontier. There is sufficient

ground for asserting, with respect at least to all the Northern tribes, that nearly every act of violence committed has been by irresponsible individuals and parties, without the sympathy of their own people, and at times to their extreme terror.

Even among the Northern Indians whom we have been disposed to except from the credit given to the Indians generally, who are the subjects of the "peace policy," the commission of outrages upon settlers seems to be on the decline. In the Report for the year 1872, the Indian Board of Commissioners say: —

"According to the evidence of a memorial of the Legislature of Arizona to the Congress of the United States, there were, in the year 1869, 82 men killed and wounded by Indians, 373 horses and mules and 991 head of cattle taken. In 1870 there were 83 men killed, 24 wounded, 354 horses and mules and 630 head of cattle stolen. From the official records of the War Department, for the two succeeding years, we learn that in 1871 there were 14 men and 1 woman killed by Indians, 5 wounded, and 131 head of horses and mules and 95 head of cattle taken. In 1872, there were 9 men and 1 woman killed, 1 man wounded, 17 horses and mules and about 25 head of cattle taken." — *Report*, p. 8.

If a humane consideration of the exposed condition of our frontier settlements requires the continuance of the policy of buying off the hostile and dangerous tribes, it is also true that the argument from economy equally favors this action on the part of the government. Expensive as is the Indian service as at present conducted in the interest of peace, it costs far less than fighting. What would be the expense of a general Indian war which should seek the complete subjugation of the tribes which we have described as potentially hostile, it is impossible to compute within a hundred millions of dollars, but it would undoubtedly reach an aggregate not much short of that of the year of largest preparations and largest operations during the Rebellion. Does this seem extravagant, impossible? Words of truth and soberness on such a subject surely might be expected from a commission comprising such men as Generals Sherman, Harney, Augur, and Terry of the Regular Army of the United States. Yet these officers united in a Report rendered to the President on the 7th of January,

1868, in which they use the following language in reference to the "Chirrington massacre" and the Cheyenne war of 1864: —

"No one will be astonished that a war ensued which cost the government thirty million dollars, and carried conflagration and death to the border settlements. During the spring and summer of 1865, no less than eight thousand troops were withdrawn from the effective force engaged in suppressing the Rebellion, to meet this Indian war. The result of the year's campaign satisfied all reasonable men that war with Indians was useless and expensive. Fifteen or twenty Indians had been killed, at an expense of more than a million dollars apiece, while hundreds of our soldiers had lost their lives, many of our border settlers had been butchered and their property destroyed."

This was the experience of the United States in a contest with an Indian tribe numbering, perhaps, four thousand men, women, and children, and able to bring into the field not one fifth as many warriors as the Sioux bands of to-day. Not to go back to wars waged with tribes now subjugated or extinct, were we to cast up the expenditures involved in the Sioux war of 1852–1854, the Cheyenne war of 1864, just referred to, the Navajo war, the second Sioux war in 1866, the second Cheyenne war in 1867, we should undoubtedly reach a total greatly exceeding one hundred millions of dollars. Yet there was sought only the submission of individual tribes to single demands of the government, and effected generally something less than that. It has been shown that the actual expense of the so-called "peace policy" is measured by the increase of the average expenditures of the period 1869 to 1872 over the average expenditures of the period preceding, that increase being about three millions of dollars. This is the sum which is to be compared with the cost of a war which should seek to reduce all the Indian tribes of the continent to complete submission by force of arms, instead of awaiting their gradual, and in the main peaceful, reduction through the advance of population and the extension of railways.

Nor is the necessity of temporizing with the savages and dealing gingerly with them in view of the exposed situation of so many of our citizens, and the importance of pressing forward, under cover of the feeding system, the settlement of the Territories, likely to continue long. On this point we may be

permitted to quote at length from the Annual Report of the Commissioners on Indian Affairs for 1872: —

"It belongs not to a sanguine, but to a sober view of the situation, that three years will see the alternative of war eliminated from the Indian question, and the most powerful and hostile bands of to-day thrown in entire helplessness on the mercy of the government. Indeed, the progress of two years more, if not of another summer, on the Northern Pacific Railroad, will of itself completely solve the great Sioux problem, and leave the ninety thousand Indians ranging between the two trans-continental lines as incapable of resisting the government as are the Indians of New York or Massachusetts. Columns moving north from the Union Pacific and south from the Northern Pacific would crush the Sioux and their confederates as between the upper and the nether millstone; while the rapid movement of troops along the northern line would prevent the escape of the savages, when hard pressed, into the British Possessions, which have heretofore afforded a convenient refuge on the approach of a military expedition.

"Toward the south the day of deliverance from the fear of Indian hostility is more distant; yet it is not too much to expect that three summers of peaceful progress will forever put it out of the power of the tribes and bands which at present disturb Colorado, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico to claim consideration of the country in any other attitude than as pensioners upon the national bounty. The railroads now under construction, or projected with a reasonable assurance of early completion, will multiply fourfold the striking force of the army in that section; the little rifts of mining settlement, now found all through the mountains of the Southern Territories, will have become self-protecting communities; the feeble, wavering line of agricultural occupation, now sensitive to the faintest breath of Indian hostility, will then have grown to be the powerful "reserve" to lines still more closely advanced upon the last range of the intractable tribes." — *Report*, pp. 8, 9.

We have thus far treated the policy of the government towards the dangerous tribes as one not requiring the use of the military arm in any emergency short of an actual outbreak. We have done so, first, that we might encounter the full effect of the objections to the plan of concession and conciliation; and, secondly, because we hold it true, that when the alternative is between allowing a considerable degree of insolence and outrage to go unpunished, and entailing upon the Territories a

general Indian war, duty and interest require the government to go to the last point of endurance and forbearance with the savages. But this alternative is not always presented; it is often practicable to repress and punish violence, without exposing the settlements to the horrors of massacre. Whenever this can be done, it is scarcely necessary to say it should be done, and done effectually. The feature of the present Indian policy of the government which allows this to be done without incurring general Indian war, is known as the reservation system, — a system shrewdly devised to meet the known weaknesses of the Indian character. By it extensive tracts have been set apart for the warlike tribes, within which they might pursue all their customs and habits of life and indulge themselves in savagery, being also subsisted thereon to the extent of their actual necessities, but outside of which bands or parties were liable to be struck by the military, at any time, without warning, and without any implied hostility to those members of the tribe who remained on their reservation and deported themselves according to the conditions of the compact. The brilliant campaign of General Crook in Arizona during the past season has been prosecuted with the most scrupulous observance of the reservation system, as marked out by the government, and accepted by the Indians themselves. Such a use of the military arm constitutes no abandonment of the "peace policy," and involves no disparagement of it. Military operations thus conducted are not in the nature of war, but of discipline, and are so recognized by the tribes whose marauding bands and parties are scourged back to the reservations by the troops. The effect of all this is something more than negative. It does not merely serve to chastise offending individuals and parties without a breach of peace with the tribe, but it is more the means of impressing the less enterprising Indians with an increasing sense of the power of the government. It was not to be expected that the entire body of a warlike tribe would consent to be restrained in their Ishmaelitish proclivities without a struggle on the part of the more audacious to maintain their traditional freedom. The reservation system allows this issue to be fought out between our troops and the more daring of the savages, without involv-

ing in the contest tribes with which our army in its present numbers is wholly inadequate to cope.

Nor will the full effect of this consideration be appreciated if it be not borne in mind that the Indian is intensely susceptible to severe punishment. His own wars are so bloodless, his skirmishing tactics so cowardly and resultless, that the savage fighting of the whites, their eagerness for close quarters, and their deadly earnestness when engaged hand to hand, impress him with a strange terror. With him, as with all persons and peoples in whom the imagination is predominant, the effect of disaster is not measured by the actual loss and suffering entailed, but by the source, the shape, the suddenness of it. Indeed, it is astonishing how completely the spirit of an Indian tribe may be broken by a catastrophe which does not necessarily impair its fighting power.

Nor even is it necessary that the Indian's sense of justice should be met by the chastisement received. Undiscriminating in his own revenge, he does not look for nicely measured retribution on the part of his enemy. Hence it is that certain of the so-called — and sometimes properly so called — massacres perpetrated by the army, or by frontier militia, have had very different results from what would have been predicted by persons familiar only with habits of thought and feeling among our own people.* Injustice and cruelty exasperate men of our race; but the Indian is never other than cruel and unjust under resentment. Let him feel that he has been injured by a white man, and he will tomahawk the first white man he meets, without a thought whether his victim be guilty or innocent. Let him suffer at the hand of a member of a neighboring tribe, and he will lie all day in wait for another member of that tribe with just as much anticipation of gratified hate as if he awaited the footsteps of the wrong-doer. Nay, let him have a feud with

* To take one of the most recent examples: Colonel Baker's attack upon a Piegan camp in 1869, even though it should be held to be justified on the ground of necessity, must be admitted to be utterly revolting in its conception and execution. Yet no merited chastisement ever wrought more instant and durable effects for good. The Piegans, who had been even more wild and intractable than the Sioux, have since that affair been orderly and peaceable. No complaints whatever are made of their conduct, and they are apparently as good Indians as can be found among the wholly uncivilized tribes.

one of his own blood, and he will devote the speechless babes of his enemy to his infernal malice. Here, undoubtedly, we find the explanation of the fact that massacres, damnable in plot and circumstance, have struck such deadly and lasting terror into tribes of savages; while, occurring between nations of whites, they would have kindled the flames of war to inextinguishable fury.

We have thus far treated the question, What shall be done with the Indian as an obstacle to the progress of railways and of settlements, to the exclusion of the inquiry, What shall be done to promote his advancement in industry and the arts of life, not merely because, for all those tribes and bands to which the first question applies (i. e. those which are potentially hostile, and towards which the government is, as we have attempted to show, bound in interest and humanity to exercise great forbearance till they shall cease to be formidable to the settlements and to the pioneers of settlement), that question is, in logical order, precedent to any discussion of methods to be taken to educate and civilize them, but also because it is in effect likewise precedent to any deliberate, comprehensive, and permanent adjustment of the difficulties experienced in treating the Indian tribes which are neither hostile in disposition nor formidable by reason of their situation or their numbers. So long as the attention of the executive department is occupied by efforts to preserve the peace; so long as Congress is asked yearly to appropriate three millions of dollars to feed and clothe insolent savages; so long as the public mind is exasperated by reports of Indian outrages occurring in any section of the country, — so long will it be vain to expect an adequate treatment of the question of Indian civilization.

It must not be understood that nothing is being done for the industrial and moral instruction of the peaceful and more advanced tribes* pending the reduction of their turbulent

* The Report on Indian Affairs for 1872 shows that, in addition to physicians, clerks, cooks, herders, teamsters, laborers, and interpreters, there are employed at all the agencies eighty-two teachers, eighty farmers, seventy-three blacksmiths, seventy-two carpenters, twenty-two millwrights and millers, seventeen engineers, eleven matrons of manual-labor schools, and three seamstresses. — *Report*, pp. 68–71.

brethren to terms; but the efforts and expenditures of the present time fall far short of the completeness and consistency necessary to constitute a system. Much that is doing is in compliance with treaty stipulations, and hence is well done, whether it have any practical result or not. Much, again, of what is doing, although so inadequate to the necessities of the situation as to yield no positive results, is preventing waste by keeping up established services and agencies, and, in a measure, preserving the character and habits of the Indians from further deterioration. Much, still, is in the way of experiment, from which may be derived many valuable principles and suggestions for the treatment of the Indian question on the larger scale which will be necessary in the future. Much, however, it must be confessed, is done out of an uneasy desire to do something for this unfortunate people, or in generous response to appeals from persons in official or private station who have chanced to become particularly interested in the welfare of individual tribes and bands, and thereafter fail not (small blame to them) to beset Congress and the departments for special consideration and provision for their *protégés*. It can scarcely need to be remarked, that these are not the ways to constitute a system.

It is a question not a little perplexing, What shall be done with the Indian when he shall be thrown helpless on our government and people? What *has* been done with tribes and bands which have reached this condition has been, as we have said, of every description, and the results have been not less various. We have had guardianship of the strictest sort. We have tried industrial experiments on more than one plan, and have attempted the thorough industrial education of Indian communities as a security for their social advancement. We have, on other occasions, let the Indian severely alone just so soon as it was ascertained that his power for harm had ceased, and have left him to find his place in the social and industrial scale; to become fisherman, lumberman, herdsman, menial, beggar, or thief, according to aptitude, or accident, or the wants of the community at large. True it is that the modes adopted, in fact, in dealing with particular tribes, have generally been due to chance, or to the caprices of administration; true, also,

that the experiments which have been made do not reflect much credit on the sagacity of the superior race to which have been intrusted the destinies of the red man; but there has been a vast amount of good-nature and benevolent intention exhibited; the experiments have been in many directions, and have covered a large field; and while the results, in the manifest want of adaptation of means to ends and of operations to material, cannot be deemed wholly conclusive of the philosophy of the situation, yet very much can be learned from them that bears upon the questions of the present day. As has been stated, the issues of the experiments tried have been of every kind. To assertions that the Indian cannot be civilized, can be opposed instances of Indian communities which have attained a very considerable degree of advancement in all the arts of life. To the more cautious assertion, that, while the tribes which subsist chiefly on a vegetable diet are susceptible of being tamed and improved, the meat-eating Indians, the buffalo and antelope hunters, are hopelessly intractable and savage, can be opposed instances of such tribes which, in an astonishingly short time, have been influenced to abandon the chase, to undertake agricultural pursuits, to labor with zeal and patience, to wear white man's clothes, send their children to school, attend church on Sunday, and choose their officers by ballot. To the assertion that the Indian, however seemingly reclaimed and for a time regenerated, still retains his savage propensities and animal appetites, and will sooner or later relapse into barbarism, can be opposed instances of slow and steady growth in self-respect and self-control, extending over two generations, without an indication of the tendencies alleged. To assertions that the Indian cannot resist either physical or moral corruption by contact with the whites, that he inevitably becomes subject to the baser elements of civilized communities, that every form of infectious or contagious disease becomes doubly fatal to him, and that he learns all the vices but none of the virtues of society, can be opposed instances of tribes which have freely mingled with the whites without debasement, and have acquired the arts of civilized life with no undue proportion of its evils. To the assertion that the Indian must gradually decline in numbers and decay in strength, his life

fading out before the intenser life which he encounters, can be offered instances of the steady increase in population of no small numbers of tribes and bands in immediate contact with settlements, and subject to the full force of white influence.

And yet it is undeniably true that many of the experiments have failed in a greater or less degree; that in some cases the Indians most neglected have done better for themselves than those who had received the care and bounty of the government; that many tribes and bands which had apparently emerged from their barbarous conditions have miserably fallen back into sloth and vicious habits; that the meat-eaters, who constitute the bulk of the tribes with which the latest advances of our settlements and railways have brought us in contact, are exceptionably wild and fierce; that the experiment of Indian civilization has far more chances of success when it is tried under conditions that allow of freedom from excitement and thorough seclusion from foreign influences; and, finally, that Indian blood, thus far in the history of the country, has tended decidedly towards extinction.

The Board of Indian Commissioners, in their report for 1872, make the statement that "nearly five sixths of all the Indians of the United States and Territories are now either civilized or partially civilized." (Report, p. 3.) The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in his report of the same date, places the number of reclaimed savages somewhat lower, dividing the three hundred thousand Indians within the limits of the United States as follows: civilized, ninety-seven thousand; semicivilized, one hundred and twenty-five thousand; wholly barbarous, seventy-eight thousand. He is, however, careful to explain that the division is made "according to a standard taken with reasonable reference to what might fairly be expected of a race with such antecedents and traditions." Perhaps, on a strict construction of the word "semicivilized," the Indian Office might assent to take off twenty or thirty thousand from the number stated.

We all know what a savage Indian is. What is a civilized Indian? what a semicivilized Indian? To what degree of industry, frugality, and sobriety can the Indian be brought? How well does he repay efforts and expenditures for his en-

lightenment and his advancement in the arts of life? How far does he hold his own when once fairly started on his course by the bounty of the government or by philanthropic enterprise, instructed and equipped, with no obstacles in his way, and with no interruptions from without? What, in short, may we reasonably expect from this people? What have they done for themselves, or what has been done with them, in the past? It is doubtful whether zeal or ignorance is more responsible for the confusion which exists in the public mind in respect to this entire matter of Indian civilization. The truth will be best shown by examples.

The Cherokees, who originally owned and occupied portions of the States of Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, have now a reservation of nearly four million acres in the tract known as the Indian Territory. They number about fifteen thousand, and are increasing. They have their own written language, their national constitution and laws, their churches, schools, and academies, their judges and courts. Their dwellings consist of five hundred frame and three thousand five hundred log houses. During the year 1872 they raised three million bushels of corn, besides large quantities of wheat, oats, and potatoes, their aggregate crops being greater than those of New Mexico and Utah combined. Their stock consists of sixteen thousand horses, seventy-five thousand neat cattle, one hundred and sixty thousand hogs, and nine thousand sheep. It is needless, after such an enumeration of stock and crops, to say that they not only support themselves, but sell largely to neighboring communities less disposed to agriculture. The Cherokees have sixty schools in operation, with an aggregate attendance of two thousand one hundred and thirty-three scholars. Three of these schools are maintained for the instruction of their former negro slaves. All orphans of the tribe are supported at the public expense. The Cherokees are the creditors of the United States in the sum of a million seven hundred and sixteen thousand dollars, on account of lands and claims ceded and relinquished by them. The interest on this sum is annually paid by the Treasurer of the United States to "the Treasurer of the Cherokee nation," to be used

under the direction of the National Council for objects prescribed by law or treaty.

From the statements made above, all upon the authority of official reports, it will doubtless appear to every candid reader that the Cherokees are entitled to be ranked among civilized communities. Their condition is far better than that of the agricultural classes of England, and they are not inferior in intelligence or in the ability to assert their rights.

There are in the Indian Territory several other important tribes, and a number of small and broken bands, aggregating forty or forty-five thousand persons, who are in the same general condition as the Cherokees, and are equally, though not, perhaps, in every case, with quite as much emphasis, entitled to be called civilized. Nor are the Indians of this class confined to the Indian Territory, so called. They are found in Kansas and Nebraska, in New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, and upon the Pacific coast. The eighty thousand Indians thus characterized will bear comparison on the three points of industry, frugality, and sobriety with an equal population taken bodily out of any agricultural district in the Southern or Border States. In general intelligence and political aptitude they are still necessarily below the lowest level of American citizenship, if we exclude the newly enfranchised element and the poor white population of a few districts of the South.

It is just and proper to call an Indian semicivilized, no matter how humble his attainments, when he has taken one distinct, unmistakable step from barbarism, since "it is the first step that costs." For examples of the semi-civilized Indians, we shall cite the Wahpeton and Sisseton Sioux of Dacotah, and the Pawnees of Nebraska, these being rather below than above the average of the class to which the report of the Commissioner assigns them.

The Sioux of the Lake Traverse Agency in Dacotah number about fifteen hundred, — to be exact, fourteen hundred and ninety-six. These are of the Indians of Minnesota, and escaped to the West after the massacre of 1862, though claiming to have been innocent of participation in it. They are genuine specimens of the Indian race in its pure

form. They have within three or four years made considerable progress in agriculture. Nearly all the men have of choice adopted the dress of the whites. Great interest is manifested in the education of the children of the tribe; four schools are in operation, with an attendance of one hundred and twenty-three scholars, and two more schoolhouses are in course of erection. By the provisions of the treaty of 1867, only the sick, the infirm, aged widows and orphans of tender years, are to be supported by the government. The number thus enrolled for subsistence during the past year was six hundred and sixty, made up as follows: ninety-two men, aged, infirm, blind, crippled, etc.; two hundred and sixty-four women of various conditions; one hundred and eighteen children under seven years; one hundred and eighty-six children between seven and sixteen years. The remainder of the tribe supported themselves fully by their own labor. The agent says: "It is highly gratifying to be able to report commendable progress in agriculture by these Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux on this reservation, who, almost to a man, have become fully satisfied that they cannot any longer rely upon the chase, but must of necessity turn their attention to the cultivation of the soil and stock-growing for the future, as the only reliable source of subsistence. Many of them have learned to work, and some of them have learned to love to work as well, and they evidently enjoy the labor of their hands."

Tribes which show a higher actual attainment might have been taken for illustration out of the semicivilized list: but these have been chosen, first, because they are meat-eating Indians; and, secondly, because the plan of partial support adopted with them is the one most likely to be applied to all the Sioux bands, as fast as the government shall find itself in a position peremptorily to control their actions and movements.

Again, we select the Pawnees, numbering twenty-four hundred and forty-seven, for illustration, for the reason that they have been long distinguished over all the plains for their warlike powers and ferocity, yet, under the care and instruction of the government, have, within three years, made a great degree of progress in the most important respects, as follows:—

First: while the Pawnees, from their situation, are still enabled and disposed to go upon the summer hunt, they are already engaged, to a small extent and with encouraging success, in the raising of vegetables and garden products, and even of corn and wheat. Two hundred and ten acres were planted by them last year in the several crops.

Second: while the chiefs and braves of the tribe still look to their traditional resource of hunting, the children of the tribe generally are being carefully instructed in letters and in labor. The day-schools and the manual-labor schools of the Pawnees have elicited the most enthusiastic praise from all persons, official or private, who have visited the reservation. The work of the farm is being largely done by the children of the manual-labor school, under competent instruction; and if the Agricultural Colleges, enjoying the bounty of the government, do not quicken their pace, they may find themselves outdone, in practical results, by an Indian school situated on the very verge of civilization.

Third: and this is a point to which we ask special attention, as indicating capabilities of higher things than are usually credited of Indians: the inveterate and ferocious animosities of the Pawnees toward the Brulé Sioux have been so far sacrificed to the requirements of the government and the personal entreaties of their agent, that the past summer witnessed the phenomenon, astonishing to all who were cognizant of the deadly feuds existing for generations between these tribes, of Pawnees and Brulés hunting almost side by side, the camp-fires of both being distinctly visible upon the same plain, without a murder being committed, or so much as a horse stolen, by either party.

If, then, we may assume that Indian civilization is not altogether impossible, let us inquire what should be the policy of the government towards the Indian tribes when they cease to be dangerous to our frontier population, and to oppose the progress of settlement, either by violence or by menace. In such a discussion, we are bound to have a reasonable consideration for the interests of the white man as well as for the rights of the red man; but, above all, to defer to whatever experience declares in respect to the conditions most favorable to the growth

of self-respect and self-restraint in minds so strangely and unfortunately constituted as is the mind of the North American Indian.

First. The reservation system should be made the general and permanent policy of the government. By this is meant something more than that the Indian should not be robbed of their lands in defiance of treaty stipulations, or that the Indian title should be respected, and the Indians maintained in possession until they can be made ready to cede their lands to the government, or to sell them, with the consent of the government, to the whites. The proposition is that the United States, as the only power competent to receive such lands by cession, or to authorize their sale, should formally establish the principle of separation and seclusion, without reference to the wishes either of the Indians or of encroaching whites; should designate by law an ample and suitable reservation for each tribe and band not entitled by treaty; and should, in any reductions thereafter requiring to be made, provide that such reductions shall be by cutting off distinct portions from the outside, and not in such a way as to allow veins of white settlement to be injected, no matter whether along a stream or along a railway.

The principle of secluding Indians from whites for the good of both races is established by an overwhelming preponderance of authority. There are no mysterious reasons why this policy should be adopted; the considerations which favor it are plain and incontestable. The first is the familiar one, that the Indian is unfortunately disposed to submit himself to the lower and baser elements of civilized society, and to acquire the vices and not the virtues of the whites. This need not be dwelt upon; but there is still another consideration even more important, yet not generally apprehended. It is that an Indian tribe is a singularly homogeneous body,* and, if not disturbed by the intrusion of alien and discordant elements, is susceptible of being governed and controlled with the greatest ease and effect. The public sentiment of an Indian community is absolutely conclusive upon all the members of it. There are no stragglers in Indian civilization; no large class who hold back from that

* We are speaking of the tribe socially, not politically. Factions and faction wars are known to the Indian as well as to his betters.

which the sentiment of the community prescribes, or practise openly and shamelessly what that sentiment reprehends. It is not necessary to point out the ways in which this peculiarity of the Indian character assists the agent of the government in his administration of a tribe, or to show how much more complete it makes his success, as, little by little, he is able, through the authority of the government, and the means of moral education at his disposal, to effect a change for the better in the public sentiment of the people under his charge.

The number of Indians now having reservations secured to them by law or treaty is approximately 180,000. The number of such reservations is 92, ranging in extent from 288 acres to 40,750 square miles, and aggregating 167,619 square miles. Of these reservations, 31, aggregating 2,693 square miles, are east of the Mississippi River; 42, aggregating 144,838 square miles, are between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains; and 19, aggregating 20,068 square miles, are upon the Pacific slope. In addition to the above, 40,000 Indians, having no lands secured to them by treaty, have had reservations set apart for them by executive order, out of the public lands of the United States. The number of reservations thus set apart is 15, aggregating 59,544 square miles. The Indians thus located have, however, in the nature of the case, no assurance for their occupation of these lands beyond the pleasure of the executive.*

It must be evident to every one, on the simple statement of such facts as these, that the reservations, as at present constituted, do not consist with the permanent interests of either the Indian or the government. There are too many reservations; they occupy too much territory in the aggregate; and, what is worse, some of them unnecessarily obstruct the natural access of population to portions of territory not reserved, while others, by their neighborhood, render large tracts of otherwise available land undesirable for white occupation. Indeed it may be said, that the present arrangement of reservations would constitute an almost intolerable affliction, were it to be maintained without

* Report on Indian Affairs, 1872, p. 84.

change. Nor are the interests of the Indians any better served by the existing order. Many tribes, even were they disposed to agriculture, would not find suitable land within the limits assigned to them. Others are in a position to be incessantly disturbed and harassed by the whites. Others still, while they stand across the path of settlement, are themselves, by ill-considered treaty provisions, cut off from access to hunting-grounds, to fishing privileges, or to mountains abounding in natural roots and berries, which would be of the greatest value to them. When it is considered that the present body of reservations is the result of hundreds of treaties, made too often, on the part of the government with ignorance and heedlessness, and on the part of the Indians with the childishness characteristic of the race, both parties being not infrequently deceived and betrayed by the interpreters employed; when it is considered, moreover, that many of these treaties have been negotiated in emergencies requiring immediate action, — it would be wonderful indeed if the scheme as it stands were not cumbersome and ineffective. With the single exception that the military operations and the diplomatic negotiations of 1867 and 1868 practically cleared the line of the Union and Central Pacific Railroads,* and left to settlement a straight path across the continent, — a result not so much a subject for felicitation, to be sure, as if the lands on that line were, as a rule, good for anything, — the present arrangement is nearly as bad as it could possibly be.

It is manifest, therefore, that the next five or ten years must witness a general recasting of the scheme of Indian reservations. This is not to be accomplished by confiscating the Indian title, but by exchange, by cession, and by consolidation. Let Con-

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* A few bands of friendly Indians are located within one hundred miles of the line of these railroads; but they occupy comparatively little territory, and offer no obstruction or injury to trains or passengers.

The relations of the Indians to the trans-continental railways, built and projected, are given as follows in the Report on Indian Affairs for 1872: Between the proposed northern route and the British Possessions live or range about 36,000; between the northern and central routes, 92,000; between the central and the proposed southern routes, 61,000; and between the southern route and Mexico, 85,000. This estimate is exclusive of Indians residing east of Minnesota and of the Missouri River, south of Dacotah.

gress provide the necessary authority, under the proper limitations, for the executive departments,* and the adjustment desired can be reached easily and amicably. The government, on the one hand, can always afford to offer the Indians more than their land is worth to them; while, on the other, the Indians are only too ready to sacrifice a permanent for an immediate possession. In such a relation of the two parties in interest, there can be no difficulty, with fair and kindly dealing, in finally placing the Indians pretty much where the government shall desire to have them.

Second. It is further evident that, in recasting the scheme of reservations, the principal object should be, while preserving distinct the boundaries of every tribe, so to locate them that the territory assigned to the Indians west of the Mississippi shall constitute one or two grand reservations, with, perhaps, here and there a channel cut through, so to speak, by a railroad, so that the industries of the surrounding communities may not be unduly impeded. Such a consolidation of the Indian tribes into one or two great bodies would leave all the remaining territory of the United States open to settlement, without obstruction or molestation.

Shall there be one general reservation east of the Rocky Mountains, or two? This is likely to be the most important Indian question of the immediate future. On the one hand, the recommendations of the executive, contained in both the messages of the President and the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Interior, for the past two or three years, have strongly favored the plan of a single reservation for all the tribes, North and South, East and West, who are not in a

* At the second session of the Forty-second Congress, the Department of the Interior was specially authorized to negotiate with certain Indian tribes for the relinquishment of their rights to certain portions of the territory secured to them by treaty, such action to be subject to confirmation or rejecture by Congress. The Indians concerned were the Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux of Dacotah, the Shoohones of Wyoming, and the Utes of Colorado. In two of the three instances, agreements were entered into between the United States Commissioners and the Indians, which met the approval of the department. In the third instance, the intrigues of citizens of the Territory prevented an immediate result. Some general system of negotiation ought, however, to be established by law, which shall define the initiative and prescribe the forms according to which treaties now in force may be modified for the advantage and with the consent of both parties.

condition to become, at an early day, citizens of the United States and take their land in severalty. The reservation upon which it is proposed to thus collect the Indians of the United States, is at present known as the "Indian Territory," although it actually contains but about one quarter of the Indian population of the country.* This tract covers all the territory lying between the States of Arkansas and Missouri on the east, and the one hundredth meridian on the west, and between the State of Kansas on the north, and the Red River, the boundary of the State of Texas, on the south; comprising about seventy thousand square miles, and embracing a large body of the best agricultural lands west of the Mississippi. Upon this tract, it is claimed, can be gathered and subsisted all the Indians within the administrative control of the government, except such as are manifestly becoming ripe for citizenship in the States and Territories where they are now found. Computing the maximum number likely, on the successful realization of this scheme, to be thus concentrated at 250,000, and taking the available lands within the district, exclusive of barren plains, of flint hills and sand hills, at an aggregate of thirty million acres, we should have one hundred and twenty acres for each man, woman, and child to be provided for.

On the other hand, the original plan of Indian colonization, as contained in the report of Secretary Calhoun, accompanying the message of President Monroe, January 27, 1825, contemplated two general reservations, — one in the Northwest for the Indians of Algonquin and Iroquois stock, and another, being the present Indian Territory, in the Southwest, for the Appalachian Indians. The ethnographical symmetry of that plan has been hopelessly violated by the introduction into the Indian Territory, and even the incorporation with the Southern tribes of individuals, broken bands, and even entire tribes origi-

* The Indians within the limits of the United States, exclusive of those in Alaska, number approximately 300,000. They may be divided, according to geographical location, or range, into five grand divisions, as follows: In Minnesota and States east of the Mississippi River, about 32,500; in Nebraska and Kansas and the Indian Territory, 70,650; in the Territories of Dacotah, Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho, 65,000; in Nevada and the Territories of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Arizona, 84,000; and on the Pacific slope, 48,000. — *Report on Indian Affairs*, 1872, p. 14.

nally from the North and Northeast. The bulk of the Shawnees, an Algonquin tribe, are actually incorporated with the Cherokees; two hundred of the Senecas, the very flower of the conquering Iroquois,* occupy a small reservation in the north-

* The popular and doubtless the correct use of the word "Iroquois" confines it to the Five Nations (subsequently the Six Nations) of New York, which, during the third quarter of the seventeenth century, destroyed or dispersed successively the Hurons or Wyandots, the nation called, for the want of a more characteristic name, the Neutral Nation, the Andostes of the Susquehanna, and the Eries. These four large and important peoples were closely kindred to the Five Nations, and the term "Iroquois" was long applied to this entire family of tribes. Later in the history of the continent, it embraced only the Five (or Six) Nations for the best of good reasons, as this formidable confederacy had practically annihilated all the other branches of the family. The career of the Iroquois was simply terrific. Between 1649 and 1672 they had, as stated, accomplished the ruin of the four tribes of their own blood, containing in the aggregate a population far more numerous than their own. A feeble remnant, a few score in number, of the Wyandots now survive, and are represented at Washington by an exceptionally shabby white man, who has received the doubtful honor of adoption into the tribe. These are all the recognizable remains of a nation once estimated to contain thirty thousand. The names of the Eries, the Andostes, and the Neutral Nation do not appear in any treaty with the United States. Many, doubtless, from all these tribes fled to Canada. Considerable numbers were also, according to the custom of the Five Nations, adopted by the conquerors to make good the waste of war.

Nor did the Iroquois wait to complete the subjugation of their own kindred, before turning their arms against their Algonquin neighbors. The Delawares (Lenni Lenape, or Original Men) were subjugated almost coincidently with the Hurons, and the same year which brought the downfall of the Andostes witnessed the expulsion of the Shawnees from the valley of the Ohio. Reinforced in 1712 by the Tuscaroras, a warlike tribe from the South, the Five Nations (now become the Six Nations) carried their conquests east and west, north and south. The tribes confronting the invaders in New England, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia were continually disturbed and distracted by their incursions. Taking the part of the English in the wars against the French, they shook all Canada with the fear of their arms, while to the west they extended their sway to the Straits of Michilimackinac and the entrance to Lake Superior. The height of their fame was at the close of the Old French War in 1763. Their decline and downfall, as a power upon the continent, followed with the briefest interval. Reduced by incessant fighting to seventeen hundred warriors, they took the part of England against the Colonies in 1775. The glorious and the terrible incidents of the Indian campaigns of the Revolution are familiar as household words. The peace of 1783 found the Iroquois broken, humbled, homeless, helpless before the power of the United States, whose pensioners they then became and have since remained. The bulk of these tribes still reside in New York, while fragments of them are found in the extreme West, having removed under the treaty of 1838.

Such, in brief, is the history of the Iroquois. They were the scourge of God upon the aborigines of the continent, and were themselves used up, stock, lash, and snapper, in the tremendous flagellation which was administered through them to almost every branch, in turn, of the great Algonquin family. It will not do to say

eastern part of the Territory; while the remnants of the Quapaws, Ottawas, Peorias, Kaskaskias, Weas, Piankeshaws, Pottawatomies, and of the Sacs and Foxes, — all Algonquin tribes, — are found injected at various points along the northern and eastern frontier. At the same time, the southwestern portion of the Territory is given up to tribes which are neither Algonquin, Iroquois, nor Appalachian in their origin, but are of the races living immemorially beyond the Mississippi. It will thus appear that nothing like an ethnographical distribution of tribes has been attempted; and, indeed, these distinctions have long ceased, with the Indians themselves, to be of the slightest significance. But many of the physiological and practical reasons urged by Secretary Calhoun for a double Indian reservation still remain in full force. Nor does this scheme rest upon his authority alone. The Peace Commission of 1867 and 1868, consisting of Indian Commissioner Taylor, Senator Henderson, Generals Sherman, Harney, Terry, and Augur, of the army, and Messrs. Sanborn and Tappan, concurred in the recommendation of two reservations for tribes east of the Rocky Mountains; one of which, the present Indian Territory, should be assigned to the occupation of certain tribes (embracing, besides those at present located there, the Navajoes of New Mexico), containing an estimated population of 86,425; and the other, bounded on the north by the forty-sixth parallel, east by the Missouri River, south by the State of Nebraska, and west by the one hundred and fourth meridian, be set apart for the occupation of tribes numbering in the aggregate 54,126, embracing the Sioux, Crows, Poncas, Arickarees and confederated bands, Flatheads and confederated bands, Blackfeet and confederated bands, Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and several minor tribes and bands not enumerated. The Commission further recommended that several bands be allowed to remain on their present district reservations, with

that, but for the Iroquois, the settlement of the country by the whites would not have taken place; yet assuredly, that settlement would have been longer delayed, and have been finally accomplished with far greater expense of blood and treasure, had not the Six Nations, not knowing what they did, gone before in savage blindness and fury, destroying or driving out tribe after tribe, which with them might, for more than one generation at least, have stayed the western course of European invasion.

a view to their final incorporation with the citizenship of the States of Nebraska and Kansas.

We are disposed to hold, not only that the reason of the case inclines to the plan of two general reservations for the tribes east of the Rocky Mountains, but that the matter will be settled practically in that way by the aversion and horror which the Northern Indians feel at the thought of moving to the South. Regarding the Indian Territory, as they do, though with no sufficient reason, as the graveyard of their race, there is ground for apprehension that, if the project be too suddenly sprung upon them, or pressed too far, the repugnance of some of these tribes may culminate in outbreaks like those with which the Black Hawk and Seminole wars commenced. There can, however, be no objection to the experiment being tried in such a way as not to endanger the peace. Certain of the Northern tribes,* notably the confederated Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and the confederated Arickarees and Mandans, manifest much less antipathy to removal than others, by reason of their relationship to Indians South, or of exceptional inconveniences sustained in their present location. If such tribes could be amicably induced to go to the Indian Territory, their experiences, if fortunate, might serve in time to remove the prejudices existing among the Northern Indians generally. But, on the whole, we look to see two general reservations established in the immediate future, for the Indians east of the Rocky Mountains, while the Indians of the Pacific slope are separately provided for.

Third. The intrusion of whites upon lands reserved to Indians should be provided against by legislation suited to the necessities of the case. By the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834 it was made a criminal offence to enter without authority the limits of any Indian reservation, and the prohibition was enforced by penalties adequate to the situation at that time. This

* The Cheyennes and Arapahoes of the North form one tribe with those of the South. The Arickarees and Mandans, when they attempt to hunt, are greatly distressed by the Sioux, who outnumber them; and when they attempt to subsist themselves by cultivating the soil, under cover of the troops, find their crops every few years destroyed by that scourge of the Upper Missouri and the Red River, the grasshopper.

provision, however, was aimed at individual intruders, rather than at organized expeditions completely equipped for offence or defence, and strong enough to maintain themselves against considerable bands of the savages or the ordinary *posse comitatus* of a distant territory. It is in the latter form that the invasion of Indian country now generally takes place; and for the purpose of resisting such organized lawlessness the Act of 1834 is far from sufficient. The executive may, it is true, in an extreme case, and by the exercise of one of the highest acts of authority, make proclamation forbidding such combinations, and enforce the same by movements of troops, as would be done in the case of a threatened invasion of the soil of a neighboring friendly state. But this remedy is of such a violent nature, the odium and inconvenience occasioned thereby are so great, and the lawful limits of official action in such a resort are so ill-defined, that the executive is most unlikely to make use of it, except in rare and extreme cases. To the honor of the government, it can be said that, on two distinct occasions during the past year, the President has, in spite of political clamor, vindicated the integrity of Indian reservations by the prompt use of military force.* But even such signal acts of authority will not

* The impudent character of these invasions will be best shown by a recital of the facts in one of the cases referred to above. In 1870–71 the Osages, living in Kansas, sold their lands, under authority of the government, and accepted a reservation, in lieu thereof, in the Indian Territory. Scarcely had they turned their faces towards their new home than a sort of race began between them and some hundreds of whites, which may be described, in the language of boys, as having for its object "to see which should get there first." In October, 1871, the agent reported that five hundred whites were on the Osage lands, and actually in possession of the Osage village, while the rightful owners were encamped outside. Orders having been issued from the War Department for the removal of these intruders, political pressure was brought to bear upon the executive to prevent the orders from being carried into effect. This effort failing, delay was asked, in view of the hardships to be anticipated from a removal so near winter. This indulgence having been granted, the number of the trespassers continued to increase through the winter, in spite of the notice publicly given of the intentions of the government, so that in the spring of 1872 the military authorities found fifteen hundred persons on the Osage lands in defiance of law. On this occasion, however, the land-robbers had failed in their calculations. The government was in earnest, and the squatters were extruded by the troops of the Department of the Missouri

The other instance referred to is that of an expedition projected and partially organized in Dacotah, in 1872, for the purpose of penetrating the Black Hills, for mining and lumbering. Public meetings, at which Federal officials attended, were

suffice to deter parties of lawless men from invading Indian reservations. The eagerness of the average American citizen of the Territories for getting upon Indian lands amounts to a passion. The ruggedest flint hill of the Cherokees or Sioux is sweeter to him than the greenest pasture which lies open to him under the homestead laws of the United States. There is scarcely one of the ninety-two reservations at present established on which white men have not effected a lodgement; many swarm with squatters, who hold their place by intimidating the rightful owners; while in more than one case the Indians have been wholly dispossessed, and are wanderers upon the face of the earth. So far have these forms of usurpation been carried at times in Kansas, that an Indian reservation there might be defined as that portion of the soil of the State to which the Indians have no right whatever.

Now, while it cannot be denied that there is something in all this suggestive of the reckless daring and restless enterprise to which the country owes so much of its present greatness, it is yet certain that such intrusion upon Indian lands is in violation of the faith of the United States, endangers the peace (as it has more than once enkindled war), and renders the civilization of tribes and bands thus encroached upon almost hopeless. The government is bound, therefore, in honor and in interest, to provide ample security for the integrity of Indian reservations, and this can only be done by additional and most stringent legislation.

Fourth. The converse of the proposition contained under the preceding head is equally true and equally important. Indians should not be permitted to abandon their tribal relations, and leave their reservations to mingle with the whites, except upon express authority of law. We mean by this something more than that a "pass system" should be created for

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held to create the necessary amount of public enthusiasm, and an invasion of Indian territory was imminent, which would, beyond peradventure, have resulted in a general Sioux war. In this case the emergency was such that the executive acted with great promptness. A proclamation was issued warning evil-disposed persons of the determination of the government to prevent the outrage, and troops were put in position to deal effectively with the marauders. This proved sufficient, and the Black Hills expedition was abandoned.

every tribe under the control of the government, to prevent individual Indians from straying away for an occasional debauch at the settlements. It is essential that the right of the authorities to keep members of any tribe upon the reservation assigned to them, and to arrest and return such as may, from time to time, wander away and seek to ally themselves with the whites, should be definitively established, and the proper forms and methods of procedure in such cases be fixed and prescribed by law. Without this, whenever these people become restive under compulsion to labor, they will break away, in their old roving spirit, and stray off in small bands to neighboring communities. No policy of industrial education and restraint can be devised to meet the strong hereditary disinclination of the Indian to labor and to frugality which will not, in its first courses, tend to make him dissatisfied and rebellious. Nothing but the knowledge that he must stay on his reservation, and do all that is there prescribed for him; that he will not be permitted to throw off his connection with his people, and stray away to meet his own fate, unprovided, uninstructed, and unrestrained, — will, under any adequate system of moral and industrial correction and education, prevent a general breaking up of Indian communities and the formation of Indian gypsy-camps all over the frontier States and Territories, to be sores upon the public body, and an intolerable affliction to the future society of those communities. When it is considered that there are approximately two hundred thousand Indians of whose civilization we have no decided assurance, and one half of whom are little, if any, removed from a wholly barbarous condition, the importance, at once, and the urgency of the consideration will be appreciated.

Fifth. A rigid reformatory control should be exercised by the government over the lives and manners of the Indians of the several tribes, particularly in the direction of requiring them to learn and practise the arts of industry, at least until one generation shall have been fairly started on a course of self-improvement. Merely to disarm the savages, and to surround them by forces which it is impossible for them to resist, leaving it to their own choice how miserably they will live, and how much they shall be allowed to escape work, is to render it

highly probable that the great majority of the now roving Indians will fall hopelessly into a condition of pauperism and petty crime.

"Unused to manual labor, and physically disqualified for it by the habits of the chase, unprovided with tools and implements, without forethought and without self-control, singularly susceptible to evil influences, with strong animal appetites, and no intellectual tastes or aspirations to hold those appetites in check, it would be to assume more than would be taken for granted of any white race under the same conditions, to expect that the wild Indians will become industrious and frugal except through a severe course of industrial instruction and exercise under restraint." — *Report on Indian Affairs*, 1872, p. 11.

The right of the government to exact, in this particular, all that the good of the Indian and the good of the general community may require, is not to be questioned. The same supreme law of the public safety which to-day governs the condition of eighty thousand paupers and forty thousand criminals within the States of the Union, affords ample authority and justification for the most extreme and decided measures which may be adjudged necessary to save this race from itself, and the country from the intolerable burden of pauperism and crime which the race, if left to itself, will certainly inflict upon a score of future States. Expressly excepted as the Indians are by the Constitution from the rights and privileges of citizens, the government of the United States is only bound, in its treatment of them, by considerations of policy and justice. That policy and justice alike require the moral and economical correction and instruction of the Indians, through a system of paternal control continued for a series of years, until the lawless, indolent, and wasteful habits of a nomadic life are completely uprooted, and at least the younger members of every tribe have learned the arts and appliances of industry, appears, in view of the probable consequences of abandoning this people to their own wayward impulses, and to the guidance and direction of the baser elements of our white communities, so clear that argument and illustration cannot be needed to expound and enforce it.

Sixth. The provisions made by the government for the

partial subsistence of Indian tribes, through the long and painful transition from the hunter life to the agricultural state, for their instruction and equipment in industrial pursuits, and for starting them finally on a course of full self-support and economical independence, should be liberal and generous, even to an extreme. The experiment should not be allowed to encounter any chances of failure which may be avoided by expenditure of money. The claim of the Indian in this respect is of the strongest. He has no right to prevent the settling of this continent by a race which has, not only the power to conquer, but the disposition to improve and adorn, the land which he has suffered to remain a wilderness. Yet to some royalty upon the product of the soil the Indian is incontestably entitled as the original occupant and possessor. The necessities of civilization may justify a somewhat summary treatment of his rights, but cannot justify a confiscation of them. The people of the United States can never without dishonor refuse to respect two considerations, — first, that the Indians were the original occupants and owners of substantially all the territory embraced within our limits; that their title of occupancy has been recognized by all civilized powers having intercourse with them, and has been approved in nearly four hundred treaties concluded by the United States with individual tribes and bands; and, therefore, every tribe and band that is deprived of its roaming privilege and confined to a "diminished reservation" is clearly entitled to compensation, either directly or in the form of expenditures for its benefit: second, that, inasmuch as the progress of our industrial enterprise is fast cutting this people off from modes of livelihood entirely sufficient for them and suited to them, and is leaving them without resource they have a claim, on this account again, to temporary support and to such assistance as may be necessary to place them in a position to obtain a livelihood by means which shall be compatible with civilization.

"Had the settlements of the United States not been extended beyond the frontier of 1867, all the Indians of the continent would to the end of time have found upon the plains an inexhaustible supply of food and clothing. Were the westward course of population to be stayed at the barriers of to-day, notwithstanding the tremendous inroads made upon

their hunting-grounds since 1867, the Indians would still have hope of life. But another such five years will see the Indians of Dacotah and Montana as poor as the Indians of Nevada and Southern California; that is, reduced to an habitual condition of suffering from want of food. The freedom of expansion which is working these results is to us of incalculable value; to the Indian it is of incalculable cost. Every year's advance of our frontier takes in a territory as large as some of the kingdoms of Europe. We are richer by hundreds of millions; the Indian is poorer by a large part of the little that he has. This growth is bringing imperial greatness to the nation; to the Indian it brings wretchedness, destitution, beggary. Surely there is obligation found in considerations like these, requiring us in some way, and in the best way, to make good to these original owners of the soil the loss by which we so greatly gain." — *Report on Indian Affairs*, 1872, p. 10.

Seventh. It is further highly desirable, in order to avoid the possibility of an occasional failure in such provision for the immediate wants of the Indians, and for their advancement in the arts of life and industry, and also to secure comprehensiveness and consistency in the general scheme, that the endowments for the several tribes and bands should be capitalized and placed in trust for their benefit, out of the reach of accident or caprice. Annual appropriations for such purposes, according to the humor of Congress, will of necessity be far less effective for good than would an annual income of a much smaller amount, arising from permanent investments.

To a considerable extent this has already been effected. For not a few tribes and bands provision has been made by law and treaty which places them beyond the reach of serious suffering in the future, and which, if their income be judiciously administered, will afford them substantial assistance towards final self-support. Stocks to the value of $4,810,716.83⅔ are held by the Secretary of the Interior in trust for certain tribes; while credits to the aggregate amount of $5,905,474.59 are inscribed on the books of the United States Treasury in favor of the same or other tribes, on account of the sales of lands, or other consideration received by the government,* making a permanent endowment of nearly ten millions of dollars, the Indians sharing in the benefits thereof numbering in the aggregate nearly eighty

* Report on Indian Affairs, 1872, p. 440.

thousand. Computing the average annual return from these funds at 5½ per cent, we should have an assured income of $550,000 a year, or about seven dollars for each man, woman, and child. Moreover, most of these tribes have still large bodies of lands which they can dispose of sooner or later, from which funds of twice the amount already secured may by honest and judicious management be realized; so that, taking these eighty thousand Indians as a body, they may be regarded as having a reasonable assurance of funds yielding an annual income of twenty dollars a head. Their general character and condition being considered, this may be accepted as an amply sufficient endowment, placing their future in their own hands, giving them all the opportunities and appliances that could reasonably be asked for them, and securing them against the calamities and reverses which inevitably beset the first stages of industrial progress.

Unfortunately, the same wise provision for the future has not been made in the case of other Indians who have ceded or surrendered to the government the main body of their lands. There is a painfully long list of tribes that have to show for their inheritance only a guaranty on the part of the United States of certain expenditures, more or less beneficial, for a series of years, longer or shorter, as the case may be. The Report on Indian Affairs for 1872, pp. 418–430, states the aggregate of future appropriations that will be required during a limited number of years to pay limited annuities at $15,819,310.46. The annuities covered by this computation have from one to twenty-seven years to run (the average term being about seven years), and embrace almost every variety of goods and services which human ingenuity could suggest. Many of the things stipulated to be given to the Indians, or to be done for them, are admirable in themselves, but far in advance of the present requirements of the tribes, and the expenditures involved are therefore practically useless. Other things would be well enough, if the Indians could have everything they wanted, but are absurd and mischievous as taking the place of what is absolutely essential to their well-being. Of other things embraced in the schedule of annual appropriations, it can only be said that the Indians need them

no more than a toad needs a pocket-book. For such waste of Indian moneys the responsibility rests, in many cases, upon the commissioners who, on the part of the United States, negotiated the treaties under which these appropriations are annually made. Had they been half as solicitous for the future of the Indians as they were for the attainment of the immediate object of negotiation, the government would have been left free to apply the amounts to be paid, in consideration for cessions, in such manner as to make them of substantial benefit; or, better still, the amounts would have been capitalized and a permanent income secured. As it is, many tribes now see approaching the termination of annuities which have for many years been paid them with the very minimum of advantage, and have no prospect beyond but that of being thrown, uninstructed and unprovided, upon their own barbarous resources.

Let us illustrate. A tribe makes a treaty with the United States, ceding the great body of their lands, and accepting a diminished reservation sufficient for their actual occupation. In consideration, it is provided that there shall be maintained upon the reservation, for the term of fifteen years, at the expense of the United States, a superintendent of teaching and two teachers, a superintendent of farming and two farmers, two millers, two blacksmiths, a tinsmith, a gunsmith, a carpenter, and a wagon and plough maker, with shops and material for all these mechanical services. This "little bill" is presumably made up without much reference to the peculiarities in character and condition of the tribe to be benefited by the expenditures involved. As soon as the treaty goes into effect, the United States in good faith fulfil their part of the bargain. The shops are built, the employees enlisted, and the government, through its agent, stands ready to civilize the Indians to almost any extent. But, unfortunately, the Indians are not ready to be civilized. The glow of industrial enthusiasm which was created by the metaphorical eloquence of the commissioners in council dies away under the first experiment of hard work; an hour at the plough nearly breaks the back of the wild man wholly unused to labor; his pony, a little wilder still, jumps now on one side of the furrow and

now on the other, and finally settles the question by kicking itself free of the galling harness, and disappears for the day. The Indian, a sadder and wiser man, betakes himself to the chase, and thereafter only visits the shops maintained at so much expense by the government to have his gun repaired, or to get a strap or buckle for his riding gear. But still the treaty expenditures go on; the United States is every year loyally furnishing what has been stipulated, and the Indian is every year one instalment nearer the termination of all his claims upon the government. Meanwhile, population is closing around the reservation, the animals of the chase are disappearing before the presence of the white man and the sound of the pioneer's axe; scantier and scantier grow the natural means of subsistence, fainter and fainter the attractions of the chase; and when at last hunger drives the Indian in to the agency, made ready by suffering to learn the white man's ways of life, the provisions of the treaty are wellnigh expired. One, three, or five years pass. All the instalments have been honorably paid; the appropriation committees of Congress, with sighs of relief, cross off the name of the tribe from the list of beneficiaries; and another body of Indians, uninstructed and unprovided, are left to shift for themselves.

The importance of the subject will justify us in dwelling so long upon it. Of the expenditures made within the last twenty years under treaty stipulations, probably not one half has been directed to uses which the government would have chosen had it been free to choose. It is most melancholy thus to see the scanty patrimony of this people squandered on worthless objects, or dissipated in efforts necessarily fruitless. The action of Congress at its last session in authorizing the diversion of sums appropriated under treaty stipulations to other specific uses, at the discretion of the President and with the consent of the Indians, is a step in the right direction. But the time has come for a complete and comprehensive fiscal scheme, looking to the realization from Indian lands of the largest possible avail, and their capitalization and investment upon terms and conditions which will secure the future of the several tribes, so far as human wisdom may be able to effect this.

In addition to the lands held by the seventy thousand Indians

who have already been spoken of as amply endowed, there are one hundred thousand square miles of territory yet secured by treaty to Indian tribes aggregating one hundred and ten thousand persons. Besides these, forty thousand Indians enjoy, by executive order, the occupation of other sixty thousand square miles of territory, which, or the substantial equivalent of which, should be secured to them by law, for their ultimate endowment. It is to these lands that such a fiscal scheme as has been indicated should be applied. The reservations assigned to tribes and bands are generally proportioned to the needs of the Indians in a roving state, with hunting and fishing as their chief means of subsistence. As the Indians change to agriculture, the effect is to contract the limits of actual occupation, rendering portions available for cession or sale, which, with proper management, may be so disposed of, without impairing the integrity of the reservation system, as to realize for nearly every tribe and band a fund equal, *per capita*, to that of many of the civilized tribes of the Indian Territory. But this cannot be done by helter-skelter or haphazard administration. The subject must be taken up as a whole, broadly considered, and intelligently treated; and the scheme which shall be adopted thereafter be regarded as not less sacred than the compromises of the Constitution, or than existing treaty obligations.

For the tribes and bands having no reservations secured to them, separate provision should be made. These number about fifty thousand persons, deduction being made of such as already have their lands in severalty, or as are hopelessly scattered among the settlements. Many of these tribes and bands might, with the assistance of the government, advantageously "buy themselves in" to the privileges of tribes already provided for, without involving any further donation of lands. This was done, with admirable effect, in the case of the Otter Tail Villagers of Minnesota, in 1872, under authority of Congress; these Indians being admitted on equal terms by the Chippewas of the White Earth Reservation, in consideration of the beneficial expenditure upon the reservation of the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars. The expenditure in itself was one which the government would have been glad to make for the advance-

ment of the White Earth Indians, while, incidentally to it, a body of their homeless kindred, to the number of two or three hundred, were provided for permanently, at no more than the cost of feeding them for a single year. Where it is found impracticable thus to place the unprovided bands, the government should secure their location and endowment separately. Their right is no less clear than the right of other tribes which had the fortune to deal with the United States before Congress put an end to the treaty system. We have received the soil from them, and we have extinguished their only means of subsistence. Either consideration would be sufficient to require us, in simple justice, to find them a place and ways to live.

The foregoing constitute what we regard as the essential features of an Indian policy which shall seek, positively and actively, the reformation of life and manners among the Indians under the control of the government, as opposed to the policy of hastening the time when all these tribes shall be resolved into the body of our citizenship, without seclusion and without restraint, letting such as will go to the dogs; letting such as can find a place for themselves in the social and industrial order, the responsibility of the government or our people for the choice of either or the fate of either being boldly denied; suffering, meanwhile, without precaution and without fear, such debasement in blood and manners to be wrought upon the general population of the country as shall be incident to the absorption of this race, relying upon the inherent vigor of our stock to assimilate much and rid itself of more, until, in the course of a few human generations, the native Indians, as a pure race or a distinct people, shall have disappeared from the continent.

The reasons for maintaining that nothing less than a system of moral and industrial education and correction can discharge the government of its obligations to the Indians, or save the white population from an intolerable burden of pauperism, profligacy, and petty crime, have been presented sufficiently at length in this paper. The details of management and instruction need not be here discussed. Most of them are within the administrative discretion of the department charged with Indian affairs; and where power is wanting to the department,

the good feeling of Congress may be safely trusted to give the necessary authority; but the points which have been presented are of vital consequence, and must, if the evils we apprehend are to be prevented, at an early date be embodied in legislation which shall provide means and penalties ample for its own enforcement.

Are the Indians destined to die out? Are we to make such provision as has been indicated, or such other as the wisdom or unwisdom of the country shall determine, for a vanishing race? Or are the original inhabitants of the continent to be represented in the variously and curiously composed population which, a century hence, will constitute the political body of the United States? If this is to be in any appreciable degree one of the elements of our future population, will it be by mixture and incorporation, or will the Indian remain a distinct type in our museum of humanity, submitting himself to the necessities of a new condition; adapting himself, as he may be able to do, to the laws and customs of his conquerors, but preserving his own identity and making his separate contribution to the life and manners of the nation?

The answers to these questions will depend very much on the course to be followed in the immediate future with respect to the tribes not yet embraced within the limits of States of the Union. If, for the want of a definite and positive policy of instruction and restraint, they are left to scatter under the pressure of hunger, the intrusion of squatters and prospectors, or the seductions of the settlements, there is little doubt that the number of Indians of full blood will rapidly diminish, and the race, as a pure race, soon become extinct. But nothing could be more disastrous than this method of ridding the country of an undeniable element. Not only would it be more cruel to the natives than a war of extermination, but it would entail in the course of its accomplishment a burden of vice, disease, pauperism, and crime upon a score of new States more intolerable than perpetual alarms or unintermitted war; while the ultimate result of thus dispersing the Indian tribes among the settlements would be to multiply threefold within a century the number of persons having Indian blood in their veins. Surely this is not the way in which we wish to see the Indian problem

solved! When one considers by what men and women, and with what patience, soberness, and faith, the foundations of the now great States of the Northwest were laid, he can but contemplate with dismay the prospect of a new generation of States of which ranchmen and miners are to be the fathers, and Indian squaws the mothers.

But if, on the other hand, the policy of seclusion shall be definitely established by law and rigidly maintained, the Indians will meet their fate, whatever it may be, substantially as a whole and as a pure race. White men will still be found so low in natural instincts, or so alienated by misfortunes and wrongs, as to be willing to abandon civilization and hide themselves in a condition of life where no artificial wants are known, and in communities where public sentiment makes no demand upon any member for aught in the way of achievement or self-advancement. Here such men, even now to be found among the more remote and hostile tribes, will, unless the savage customs of adoption are severely discountenanced by law, find their revenge upon humanity, or escape the tyranny of social observance and requirement. Half-breeds bearing the names of French, English, and American employees of fur and trading companies, or of refugees from criminal justice "in the settlements," are to be found in almost every tribe and band, however distant. Many of them, grown to man's estate, are among the most daring, adventurous, and influential members of the warlike tribes, seldom wholly free from suspicion on account of their relation on one side to the whites, yet by the versatility of their talents and the recklessness of their courage commanding the respect and the fear of the pure-bloods, and, however incapable of leading the savages in better courses, powerful in a high degree for mischief.

The white men who, under the reservation system, are likely to become affiliated with Indian tribes as "squaw men" are, however, probably fewer than the Indian women who will be enticed away from their tribes to become the cooks and concubines of ranchmen. One is surprised, even now, while travelling in the Territories, to note the number of cabins around which, in no small families, half-breed children are playing. However moralists or sentimentalists may look upon connec-

tions thus formed by men who are in effect beyond the pale of society and of law, they constitute already a distinct feature of border life, nor is any statute likely to prevent Indian women occasionally thus straying from their own people, or to compel their return, so long as they are under the protection of white men.

But while the seclusion of the two races upon the frontier is certain to be thus broken, in instances which will form no inconsiderable exception to the rule, the substantial purity of blood may be maintained by an early adjustment of reservations, the concentration of tribes, and the exercise of disciplinary control by their agents over the movements of wandering parties. Whether, in such an event, the Indians, thus left to meet their fate by themselves, with reasonable provision by the government for their instruction in the arts of life and industry, will waste away in strength and numbers, is a question quite too large to be entered upon here. Popular beliefs and scientific opinion undoubtedly contemplate the gradual, if not the speedy, decline of Indian tribes when deprived of their traditional freedom of movement, pent up within limits comparatively narrow, and compelled to uncongenial occupations. But there is grave reason to doubt whether these causes are certain to operate in any such degree as to involve the practical extinction of the race within that immediate future on which we are accustomed to speculate, and for which we feel bound to make provision. On the contrary, there are many considerations and not a few facts * which fairly intimate a possibility

* But for the want of space requisite for the adequate citation and discussion of the statistical evidence which alone would justify larger assertions than those of the text, we should have been disposed to advance an opinion contrary to the general belief, and to maintain that an Indian tribe reaches its minimum when it attains the point of industrial self-support, and that thereafter it tends to increase, though less rapidly, doubtless, than is usual with white communities. Not a little evidence favoring this view is to be found in the last Annual Report on Indian Affairs. The New York Indians show an increase of 101, or five per cent, over their number in 1871 (page 197). The census shows that these tribes have increased fully 1,000 since 1860. Of the tribes in Nebraska five exhibit an increase during the last year, and but two a decrease; while the gain of their aggregate population, after excluding accessions from abroad, is more than three per cent (page 216). The Menomonees of Wisconsin show a decided excess of births over deaths (page 205). The Chippewa agent of Minnesota says: "While procuring the rolls of the different bands, I made special inquiry with a view to ascertain the natural increase or

that the Indian may bear restriction as well as the negro has borne emancipation; and, like the negro, after a certain inevitable loss consequent upon a change so great and violent, adapt himself with increased vitality to new conditions. It is true that the transition, compulsory as, to a great degree, it must be, from a wholly barbarous condition of life, which remains to be effected for the eighty to one hundred thousand Indians still outside the practical scope of the Indian service, is likely to further reduce, for some years to come, the aggregate number of this race; but it is not improbable that this will be coincident with a steady increase among the tribes known as civilized.

In the foregoing discussion of the policy to be pursued in dealing with the Indians of the United States, there has been no disposition to mince matters or to pick expressions. The facts and considerations deemed essential have been presented bluntly. Some, who cannot bear to hear Indians spoken of as savages, or to contemplate the chastisement of marauding bands, may blame our frankness. But we hold fine sentiments to be out of place in respect to a matter like this which, in the present, is one of life and death to thousands of our own flesh and blood, and in the future one of incalculable importance to a score of States yet to be formed out of the territory over which the wild tribes of to-day are roaming in fancied independence. The country has a right to the whole naked truth; to learn what security our fellow-citizens have for their lives, and also to learn what becomes of the seven millions of dollars annually collected in taxes and disbursed on Indian account.

If the case has been fairly presented, it will doubtless appear

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decrease of the Chippewas in Minnesota. At only two points, White Earth and Red Lake, out of the six where the annuity payment was made, was I satisfied as to the accuracy of these returns. At Red Lake, in a population of 1,050, there have been fifty births and fourteen deaths. At White Earth, in an average population of 550, there were thirty births and twelve deaths" (page 210). The Sac and Fox Indians remaining in Iowa show a natural gain of nearly five per cent (page 211). The large tribe of the Navajoes in New Mexico is also increasing (pages 296, 304). Indeed, so far as indications may be gathered from the experience of a single year, it would be entirely safe to say that the civilized and semicivilized tribes are holding their own, if not actually increasing in numbers.

to our readers that, so far as the hostile and semi-hostile Indians are concerned, the government is merely temporizing with a gigantic evil, pocketing its dignity from considerations of humanity and economy, and awaiting the operation of causes both sure and swift, which must, within a few years, reduce the evil to dimensions in which it can be dealt with on principles more agreeable to the ideas and ways of our people.

For the rest, it will be seen that the United States have, without much order or comprehension, but with a vast amount of good-will, undertaken enterprises involving considerable annual expenditures for the advancement of individual tribes and bands, but that the true permanent scheme for the management and instruction of the whole body of Indians within the control of the government is yet to be created. Let it not for a moment be pretended that the prospect is an agreeable one. Congress and the country might well wish to be well rid of the matter. No subject of legislation could be more perplexing and irritating; nor can the outlay involved fail for many years to be a serious burden upon our industry. But the nation cannot escape its responsibility for the future of this race, soon to be thrown in entire helplessness upon our protection. Honor and interest urge the same imperative claim. An unfaithful treatment will only make the evil worse, the burden heavier. In good faith and good feeling we must take up this work of Indian civilization, and, at whatever cost, do our whole duty by this most unhappy people. Better that we should entail a debt upon our posterity on Indian account, were that necessary, than that we should leave them an inheritance of shame. We may have no fear that the dying curse of the red man, outcast and homeless by our fault, will bring barrenness upon the soil that once was his, or dry the streams of the beautiful land that, through so much of evil and of good, has become our patrimony; but surely we shall be clearer in our lives and freer to meet the glances of our sons and grandsons, if in our generation we do justice and show mercy to a race which has been impoverished that we might be made rich.

F. A. Walker.

Art. V. — Herder.

II.

In writing a history of German ideas, manners, and customs, it is impossible to lay too great a stress upon the close connection subsisting between the rise of German literature and the one great general principle which pervaded the whole of the eighteenth century, and which was, as we all know, the intellectual, moral, and social emancipation of the individual.

The entire age had been employed in resistance against every possible form of authority, whether Church, State, or Convention. Dogmas had become especially obnoxious, and, however skilfully they might be disguised, were speedily detected. For a time, at least, the adversaries of all established order were to be conquerors in this protracted struggle, and the close of the century was destined to witness the ruin of the traditional state as well as of positive religion in France, and of scholastic philosophy in Germany. Kant exercised the same influence over thought as the Revolution did over society. The individual was, or believed himself, forever released from the yoke of authority; everything was to begin again from the beginning; nor is this the place to narrate how many were the stones which had to be borrowed from the antique structure in order to prop up the new edifice. In order, however, to arrive at this result, Germany struck out for herself a very different road from that which France had taken. It was by so-called Pietism, by an appeal to inward faith, that the struggle against established religious authority began, and it was a lawful sovereign who originated the commencement of the modern German state. Frederick the Second and Weisse did much towards clearing the way for the friends of enlightenment and French propaganda. But what is of still greater importance is the warfare which took place on the field of literature; for — this point cannot be too forcibly urged — in spite of the events and transformations which convulsed Germany, her real history lay in her literature until 1848, if, indeed, we admit that history means the series of consecutive metamorphoses experienced by that living organism which we call a nation.

Already, towards the commencement of the eighteenth century, a movement of resistance had made itself felt at different times against authority in literary matters, however firmly established it might seem. This authority, we are aware, was no other than that French classicism of which Boileau's *Art Poétique* contained the code, and the tragedy of the *Grand Siècle* represented the most perfect form, and which people were anxiously endeavoring to imitate in a language and with a natural inspiration utterly at variance with, and incapable of accommodating themselves to, its requirements. It was to Lessing that the task fell of freeing Germany from the despotism of a foreign rule; which he, however, accomplished, not by dethroning that authority to which Frenchmen had appealed, but, on the contrary, by re-establishing it in its true acceptation. He did, in fact, for Aristotle what Luther had done for the Bible. Still, he did not submit to Aristotle merely because he was Aristotle, but because he recognized truth in him, "a truth as sure as that of Euclid." He would fain have paused there, satisfied with having freed the laws of penmanship from the hoary overgrowth of time, false interpretation, and erroneous application; he never had the slightest intention of attacking the laws themselves. But however great a man's genius may be, he cannot stem at his will the current which carries away a whole generation with it; particularly when he has himself cleared the road for it by removing the obstacles which stood in its way. Every Mirabeau finds a Danton to outstep him. Lessing had claimed the rights of individual genius to modify rule, and five years had hardly elapsed since the publication of his *Dramaturgie* when the literary *Montagne* already urged a radical abolishment of all literary legislation, and proclaimed the rights of genius to absolute self-government. Reform had drifted into Revolution, and Herder was marching at the head of the insurgents.

Herder, the dates of whose life and the tenor of whose intellect placed him midway between Lessing and Goethe,—Herder, who was neither a critic, like the former, nor a poet, like the latter, but who detected the hidden powers which were at work in history with a keener insight than either,—Herder was the real originator of the German civilization of the nine-

teenth century, the chief characteristic of which lies in its historical point of view. All that had been done in Germany previous to him since the awakening of the nation towards 1750 was mere preparatory work. Klopstock had succeeded in rehabilitating natural feeling and spontaneous enthusiasm which had been stifled beneath the formalism of all kinds then oppressing the German intellect. Wieland had done his best to import and acclimatize English and French culture. Winckelmann had, if we may be permitted to use the expression, blown away the dust from the ancients, thus revealing to view the purity of their outlines, buried as they were beneath a dense layer of rubbish.* Lessing had exercised a purely negative influence; he had removed obstacles, cleared the ground, and sorted the imported merchandise, carefully rejecting what was not of pure alloy. It was with Herder that Germany's positive co-operation in the century's labors began. He it was who first gave utterance to the German idea, who began to form that capital which was to be Germany's contribution to the work of humanity. No one, Kant, perhaps, alone excepted, has contributed a larger amount to this stock; nor did any one ever exercise greater or more lasting influence over an age, a nation, or the world at large than Herder, who, like the genuine rebel he was, began by turning the then reigning science and literature upside down, as Kant did with the philosophical speculation of his time, and the French Revolution with the political world. Before showing this influence exercised by Herder over his contemporaries, and tracing its vestiges through after-generations, let us see what was the nature of the new principle applied by him to theology, history, and poetry. It was the superiority of nature over civilization, and of intuition over reason. It was in the continual opposition of synthesis to analysis, of the individual to rule, of spontaneous impulse to conscious action, of organism to mechanism, of development to legislation; in a word, it was in placing the *fieri* above the

* Winckelmann's "History of Art" already forcibly urges the idea of development, showing the coherence between the literature, the state, and the art of the ancients. From this point of view, therefore, it may be looked upon as an anticipation of Herder; but it was not this part of the work which impressed his contemporaries; it was by his new definition of the ideal of ancient art that he struck them and formed a school.

facere that lay the zest of Herder's ideas, and the basis of the school of "original geniuses" he was leading to battle against the religious, literary, and scientific rationalism of the age.

No man finds his starting-point within himself. The starting-point of German civilization lay in France, as that of French civilization had lain in England. It was more particularly from Rousseau that Herder received his first impulse. The reaction against the exclusive worship of reason had begun precisely in those countries which had been foremost in establishing it. It was the land of Pope and Johnson which gave birth to Young and Macpherson; and the works of Lowth and Wood struck out in literature that path on which Rousseau was to lead the latter half of the century in political and social matters. Mankind was to return to Nature, to that good parent whose works had become disfigured by the manners and customs of polished, refined society. It is difficult for us in our days to form any adequate conception of the effect produced by Rousseau's discourse on "Inequality" at the time it appeared. "It is impossible to speak otherwise than with secret veneration of these lofty ideas and sublime thoughts," exclaimed Lessing, then a young man and already very little disposed to be sentimental. Kant actually forgot his daily walk while he perused *Émile*. In my chapter on Herder's life I have already quoted the enthusiastic verses he addressed to Rousseau while yet a student, in which he chooses him for "his guide through life." Even Schiller himself, although younger by fifteen years than Herder, compared Rousseau to Socrates. "Rousseau, who perished by the hand of Christians; Rousseau, who would fain make human beings out of Christians." One must read of the impression felt by the youth of Germany on reading Rousseau, as described by Goethe. What it was in France is well known. We smile at those English parks which replaced Le Notre's stately avenues, at the farm-yards established in royal demesnes, and at the queens who turned themselves into dairy-maids; and on beholding the great ladies of the eighteenth century giving the breast to their infants amidst a group of *élégants*, we are often tempted to see more affectation in it than there really was. Everything in this powdered, painted company had become so artificial that any excess of naturalism appeared as

a deliverance, passed for a protest against unnatural refinement, and really was a thoroughly justified reaction against the opposite extreme. Nothing, indeed, could be more justifiable than Rousseau's opposition to Voltaire and the Encyclopedists; for what was it but the rebellion of Feeling against Reason, which till then had restrained and enthralled it; Feeling, which burst the tight ligatures by which men had sought to confine their hearts, in the effort to shake off Reason's yoke and obtain breathing-room for herself?

The spirit of the *Encyclopédie* was at that time reigning supreme in Germany also. The great Frederick, Nicolai's followers, Wieland himself, were confirmed rationalists at heart. We find common-sense, not sentiment, ruling all things, even up to Lessing, and this spirit in which everything is clearness, precision, and accuracy leaves no room for obscure twilight. Now, this same precise, matter-of-fact, uncompromising thing we denominate common-sense never did engender poetry, and *chiar'oscuri* will exist in the depths of man's nature. Such things as vague apprehensions, presentiments, *rêverie*, forecast lie dormant within the innermost recesses of the human soul; nay, form, mayhap, the most precious of its treasures. If we seek to light up these dark corners by admitting the sun's rays too fully, and so hunt from their haunts the spirits which have taken up their abode there, we often only succeed in driving them to take refuge in mystery elsewhere, and to assume the form of a grosser superstition; or else they leave behind them a blank void, together with a painful longing to fill it up anew. And herein lay Herder's right of protest against the prose of common-sense, against the moralizing didacticism of German poetry, from which even Lessing was unable entirely to free himself, and against the petrified forms of citizen life, religion, and science in Germany. Whereas Rousseau had sought chiefly to re-establish Nature's rights in social matters, Herder wished to do so in things of the intellect. Here resides his originality. It was by this he developed and continued what Rousseau had begun, and it was by this that he was finally induced to turn round upon Rousseau and react against him. While searching for Nature's unconscious proceeding in her intellectual creation of what we call language, religion, and

poetry, he finished by surprising the secret of her process in creating society and the state, and found this process to be the very antipodes of the *Contrat Social.*

Friedrich Schlegel was wont to call Herder the "mythologist of German literature"; nor could a better name have been found for him. He not only sought after the prophetic part of human nature, but sought for it in a prophetic way. We have no right to expect from Herder, the scholar, a decided method, any more than a definite dogma from Herder, the believer, an established system from Herder, the critic, or a precise form from Herder, the writer. While Lessing's clear intellect is employed in portioning out the ground with strict impartiality, drawing the boundaries between science and art, and forbidding poetry to trespass upon the domain of painting, Herder seeks poetry in all things, introducing it even into philosophy and science, while as a counterbalance he puts philosophy and science into his own poetry. He had the most delicate perception ever known for detecting and relishing the poetry of every nation, age, and description, added to an extremely pliable imagination, which rendered their assimilation easy to him. And when I say pliable, I do not mean creative or tempered; for he never himself attains that ἐνάργεια (*evidenza*) he so greatly appreciates in others. Not one of his poems has become popular; not one of his personages is living; not a phrase of his has become proverbial. "My muse is wanting in that charming roundness with which you deceive the world," he himself wrote to Goethe. Herder abounds in ideas; but in unclassified ideas, without order or system. We feel that he preferred generalities to facts; hence arose his chief defect,—that of drawing hasty conclusions and forming superficial opinions. He never had the patience to collect solid materials as a foundation before proceeding to generalize. We owe to Herder all the numerous histories of poetry, languages, religions, and even of legislations which our century has produced; his own "Ideas of a Philosophy of History" (1784), unfinished, diffusely written in a loose, unconnected style, the style of a seer rather than of a thinker, still less of an historian, very insufficient if we look upon them as researches, form a book which is totally antiquated as far as form and ma-

terials are concerned; but as for the thoughts contained in it, it seems written but yesterday; it might easily be taken for a sketch from the pen of M. Taine.

Herder's very universality itself was injurious to him. He embraced too wide an extent to allow of his grasping anything firmly; or, as the French have it, *il embrasse trop pour bien étreindre.* His ever-wandering eye never could restrict itself to one narrow spot, and the flame of his enthusiasm bore a greater resemblance to the burning of a steppe than to the concentrated, persistent glow of a thoroughly heated fireplace. He caught glimpses, — we might almost say had visions, — of a genius upon all subjects, mastering none completely; and thus, while able to give the architect the most valuable suggestions, he was himself utterly at a loss to construct the smallest edifice. No man ever scattered abroad a greater quantity of fruit-bearing seeds than he; yet at the close of his life he found that he had not tilled a single corner of his own field according to rule. It is undeniable that his works are more remarkable for their variety than for the profundity of the learning they contain, as Herder himself was endowed with more imagination than good sense, more ardor than thoroughness.

It was precisely these defects, nevertheless, which determined his immense influence. He was certainly one of the greatest incentive powers the world has ever known. By dint of analyzing human nature and introducing into history the division of labor, people had come to such a point that, as Mephistopheles has it, "They held the parts in their hand, the intellectual link alone being wanting." It was Herder's unmethodical, visionary imagination which discovered the failing link, and reunited what intelligence had severed. "Everything that man undertakes to produce, whether by action, word, or in whatsoever way, ought to spring from the union of all his faculties; all that is isolated is condemnable." These were the words in which Goethe summed up the fundamental idea which inspired Hamann, that prophet of the gospel of nature, the mentor and initiator of Herder; an idea which his disciple adopted and adhered to steadily through life, and of which he became the missionary. Nothing, he would say, is

in reality isolated, and, just as each individual sense is assisted by the four others in the perception of any object which absorbs our attention, so do the memory and the imagination likewise co-operate with the judgment and perception in acquiring a knowledge of things. This union of all the faculties, this entireness of the individual, is what we must endeavor to recover, such as it was in primitive ages ere abstract rules had been thought of; times when each individual acted, thought, and wrote according to inspiration. "What is it in Homer that compensates for his ignorance of the rules deduced from the study of his work by Aristotle, and what in Shakespeare that makes up for his direct violation even of these laws of criticism? The unanimous answer to this question will be Genius."

Herder carried these words of Hamann's to very great extremes, and made originality the very corner-stone of his system, if the word "system" be applicable to any one so thoroughly unsystematic as Herder. "What do my profession and my views concern all the æsthetic school, newspapers, sects, and rubrics of fashionable task within and without Germany? . . . . I have endeavored to form my taste after more than one nation, epoch, and language, and may therefore claim the right of writing as I like for my own people, age, and tongue." Thus we already see individual fancy elevated to the rank of indisputable sovereignty. Not long after young Goethe will proclaim in the *Frankfurter Gelehrte Anzeigen* (1772) that "original genius" has its "own demeanor, expression, tone, system, and dress," and that "spectators are called upon to respect its ways." It is easy to perceive that all this differs widely from Lessing's manner of thinking, who was still occupied in laying down poetical rules to control individual caprice. Now, this much-vaunted originality not being of frequent occurrence in the essentially artificial society and poetry of those times, it became necessary either to ascend to epochs which preceded all civilization, in other words to primitive nations, or to descend to those popular strata of the existing period which had as yet escaped the contagion of our corrupt culture, in order to find it in all its purity. Herder, as we see, was a species of literary Rousseau; he may be said

to have renovated and regenerated the poetry of his time by immersing it in the only true sources of all poetry, — nature and the popular element.

Herder, who had already begun to bring primitive poetry into notice in his *Fragments* and *Sylvæ* (1767–68), did so henceforth still more forcibly in his *Blätter für Deutsche Art und Kunst* (1773) with the aid and support of his disciple, Goethe. He it was who first established a fact subsequently confirmed by historical discovery, namely, that poetry always preceded prose in the annals of mankind, and who found out the superiority of ages in which genuine, entire natures still existed.

"At the flourishing periods of elegant prose, nothing but art can prosper in poetry. Later on, we find mere versified philosophy or half-way poetry. On the other hand, the language of those times, when words like society had not yet been divided into nobles, middle class, and plebeians, nor had prose been sifted, was the richest for poetical purpose. Our tongue, compared with the idiom of the savage, seems adapted rather for reflection than for the senses or the imagination. The rhythm of popular verse is so delicate, so rapid, so precise, that it is no easy matter for us bookworms to detect it with our eyes; but do not imagine it to have been so difficult for those living populations who listened to, instead of reading it, who were accustomed to the sound of it from their infancy, who themselves sang it, and whose ear had been formed by its cadence.

"Nothing is stronger, more persistent in duration, quicker, or more delicate than the sense of hearing. How long it retains what it has once thoroughly seized! How forcibly, how vividly, how richly do things we have learnt in our earliest childhood, with our first attempts at speech, return upon us in after-life with the impressions of the living world!"

We find this priest of nature continually and persistently contemplating primitive ages, and incessantly opposing the primitive to the conventional world.

"Travellers' narratives tell us with what powers and energy avages invariably express themselves: defining what they have to say in a clear, vivid, comprehensible way; having a direct, accurate feeling of the object they have in speaking;

being disturbed by no shades of ideas, no half-way thoughts, or alphabetic and symbolic reason, of which there is not a trace in their language; as yet untainted by the corruption of refinement, of servile considerations, of a timid, grovelling prudence, of the premeditation which takes away self-confidence; blissful in happy ignorance of all the artifices which debilitate the intellect,— they seize the entire thought by the entire word, and *vice versa* the word by the thought. Either they remain silent, or speak at the moment their interest has been aroused with unprepared self-possession, with a firmness and spontaneous beauty which we Europeans, with all our study, are forced to admire, and can never ourselves hope to attain. Our pedantic bookworms, who compile and patch up everything previously, and are constrained to learn their speeches by heart in order to be able to stammer them forth methodically; our pedagogues, sacristans, half-way scholars, apothecaries, and all such as hurry through the sanctuary of science without gathering anything from it, unless, indeed, it be at the last the capability of speaking like Shakespeare's Launcelots, policemen, and gravediggers, — in other words, without any propriety in the choice of their expressions, in a random, incoherent manner, resembling the wanderings of delirium, — what are such "cultivated people" compared with savages? Whoever seeks among us the traces of a firm, precise language must look for it elsewhere! Children as yet uncontaminated, women, men possessed of natural good sense, men formed in the school of action rather than of reflection still are the best, or rather the only real orators of our times. . . . . It was the poet's, the bard's, and the scholar's mission, in the days of old, to unite beauty, dignity, and melody with the self-confident assurance of popular speech. Having once brought the lips and the soul thus into close connection, that they might mutually assist and support each other, instead of leading one another astray, they brought forth those marvellous works which are known to us as the lays of aëdes, bards, and minstrels. Homer's rhapsodies and Ossian's lays were improvisations, for at that time improvisation alone existed. Ossian was succeeded, faintly and from afar, it is true, but nevertheless succeeded, by minstrels, until art came and extinguished nature altogether. Then it

was that men commenced torturing themselves from their tenderest infancy by learning prosodic metres in foreign languages, to which both our ear and our nature are obtuse; to compose elaborately according to set laws, of which a very small proportion are acknowledged by genius to be dictated by nature; to make verses upon subjects which were capable of inspiring neither their thoughts, their feelings, nor their imagination; to counterfeit passions they did not experience, to imitate faculties of the mind which are no longer ours; and thus all things became false, effeminate, and refined. Even the clearest heads got confused, lost their sureness of eye, of hand, of thought, and of utterance, and consequently all genuine truth and real animation. Thus all was lost. Poetry, which ought, by right, to have been the firmest and most spontaneous of the offspring of the mind, became the lamest, the unsteadiest, and the least sure-footed, and poems dwindled into schoolboys' revised and corrected themes. No doubt it is only natural, such being the views and feelings of our times, that we should choose out for our admiration what is artificial rather than what is natural in the works of the ancients, and that we are likely to find too much or too little art in them, according to the humor we may happen to be in. What we are least likely to discover is what appeals loudly to us from every page they have ever written,—the spirit of nature. . . . . Were they to rise again from the dead, and hear themselves read and praised, Homer and Ossian would often marvel at much that is attributed to them, as well as at much that is denied them; at what is added; and what entirely escapes attention. It is true that our minds of to-day are differently formed, owing to the education of our youth for many past generations. We are accustomed to reflect and analyze so much that we hardly see or feel any more; we no longer poetize in or on the living world; our poetry is not the result of the contact of objects with our soul; we manufacture themes artificially, as well as the manner of treating them; and we have practised this for so long, so frequently, and we begin to do so at so early an age, that a free education would have small chance of success with us: for how should the lame walk upright? Hence the want of firmness, boldness, and well-defined

yet rounded outlines in all our modern poems, which the first sketch can alone bestow, and which no amount of after-work, aided by the compass, will ever give. Our poetical labor would evidently produce the same effect upon Homer and Ossian which the vacillating lines drawn by the trembling hand of an apprentice would upon a Raphael or an Apelles, accustomed to reveal their genius in the roughest sketch."

Words like these naturally fell like a thunderbolt upon that eighteenth century, so self-satisfied, so vain of the great progress it had achieved, and of the high culture it had attained. Versification as an art had been taught to such perfection, the criterion by which the merits and demerits of poetry were to be measured had been so accurately defined, poetry itself was so easily learned and taught, that the world was completely dumbfounded at this strange enthusiasm for miserable, despised savages. Moreover, Herder added practice to theory. Already, during his stay in Strasburg, he had begun with Goethe to search for popular songs, and great was his delight when he was able to send one to his affianced bride which he had gathered from the mouths of the people. No book, since the appearance of Percy's "Antient Reliques," had produced so great a sensation as the *Stimmen der Völker*, a series of volumes containing popular poems, published by Herder in 1778, and which became the model for all the numerous collections of the kind which have come out during the nineteenth century. Herder was eminently gifted for work of this sort. His delicate ear immediately distinguished the false from the true; it instantaneously seized the characteristics of melody, metre, and subject, while the pliability of his talent enabled him to render the whole in such forms of the German idiom as approached nearest to the original. These *Stimmen der Völker* contain specimens taken from every nation on the globe, every period of history, every class of society, written in every possible metre and on every imaginable subject. No one could have been better able to assimilate to himself, even occasionally to guess at the original tone of such productions, than Herder. He had no knowledge whatever of Sanscrit; yet, on reading *Sakuntala* in an English version towards the close of his career, he at once detected its true form, however transformed by the

translation. The last and the most popular work he published, the *Cid*, a cycle of romances, was made from a French translation; and yet, whatever syllable-counters may say, its whole tone is deliciously and surprisingly Spanish, *chevaleresque*. and Catholic, like that of all true Castilian romances, although the outward form does not exactly render that of the originals. Surely Herder was not the first to point out the merits of popular verse, nor did he attempt for a moment to make the world believe him to be ignorant of the passages relating to this question which are to be found in Montaigne's writings; he was wont even readily to quote them. But there is surely a very great difference between a few hurried glimpses caught *en passant* and a whole literary life dedicated to the cause. There is also a great difference between the effects produced by a vehement and persistent vindication of this cause in an age when it must of necessity at first sight have seemed paradoxical, and in which it ultimately succeeded in gaining the upper hand, and those produced by a scarcely noticed allusion of about half a page, written precisely at the time when the opposite tendency was about to triumph for the space of two centuries. Here are those charming words which Montaigne penned on the eve of the most despotic rule of artificial poetry the world has ever known: —

"La poésie populaire et purement naturelle a des naifvetés et graces par où elle se compare à la principale beauté de la poésie parfaicte selon l'art, comme il se veoid ez villanelles de Gascoigne et aux chansons qu'on nous rapporte des nations qui n'ont cognoissance d'aulcune science, n'y même d'escripture. . . . . À certaines mesures basses on la peult juger par les préceptes et par l'art, mais la bonne, la supresme, la divine est audessus des règles et de la raison."*

To these lines penned by the great sceptic, who, from the retirement of his retreat, had seen, heard, thought, and felt everything, Herder adds the following no less characteristic

* "Popular and purely natural poetry has a simplicity and grace by which it may compare advantageously with what forms the principal beauty in perfect poetry written according to the chief rules of art, as we may see in the *Villanelles* of Gascony and the songs brought to us from nations unacquainted with any science or even writing. . . . . It may be judged of by precept and art at certain low standards, but the really excellent, the loftiest, the truly divine is above all rules and beyond all reasoning."

words: "Poetry lived in the ears of the people, on the lips and in the harps of living bards; it sang of history, of the events of the day, of mysteries, miracles, and signs. It was the flower of a nation's character, language, and country; of its occupations, its prejudices, its passions, its pretensions, and its soul." The whole modern theory concerning epic poetry is contained in embryo in these words; yet Herder goes still farther, and formulates it so distinctly that F. A. Wolff had nothing to do but to develop and establish it firmly by means of that detailed and material system of argumentation which made him the true father of the Homeric idea as comprehended by our age.

"The greatest among Greek bards," says Herder, "was also the greatest among popular poets. His sublime work is no epopee; it is the *Epos*, the story, the legend, the living history of the people. He did not sit himself down on velvet cushions to compose an epic poem in twice twenty-four cantos, according to the rules of Aristotle."

Thus we see that Homer was no longer considered by Herder in the light of a *summa vis et quasi mensura ingenii humani;* but that in his eyes, as in those of Wolff, he was "the collective voice of singing antiquity," and his poems an "epopee issuing from the innumerable legends of the past." He does not yet quite give up Homer's individuality, it is true, but he looks upon him simply as "the most gifted poetical head of his age and nation, and deems that none of those who strove to imitate were able to equal him." But he did not seek for "the elements of his happy genius" beyond the limits of nature and of the age which formed him. "The better I become acquainted with those times the better I am able to explain Homer to myself; and the more, also, the inclination to judge him as the poet of all times and nations, and treat him as though he belonged by right of citizenship to my own time and people, disappears." We almost think we hear M. Taine and his theories of *milieu*, time, and race. Besides, will not Friedrich Schlegel say the same thing better and more clearly? Are not Wolff's *Prolegomena* contained in these words, just as Niebuhr's "Legendary History of the Kings of Rome," and the mythopœic faculty as defined and exhibited by Ottfried Müller and

Grote, to be found in other pages of Herder's works? And then people come and tell one that all this is plagiarism! That Vico said it all far better fifty years before Herder! Eternal mania of small minds, who thirst after the satisfaction of picking great men to pieces by proving, black on white, that they were not the only ones, nor even the first, to proclaim a truth! But, pray, who is not aware that, long ere Christopher Columbus came into the world, many men had dreamt of and foretold the existence of a new world? And is this any reason for depriving the man whose undeviating faith, whose courage, firmness, devotion, and genius accomplished the great work, of the glory and honor of having discovered America? Vico was undoubtedly one of the greatest minds which have ever existed; his knowledge and erudition were very vast; he foresaw and foretold a number of theories and laws which we now acknowledge to be right; but he nevertheless exercised no influence whatever over the world at large. Whether the fault lay in the undigested chaos of facts and ideas under which these atoms of gold-dust lie hidden, or in the eccentric form he has given them; or whether it be that the world, accustomed to turn a listening ear to England and France, disdained to learn from the Neapolitan thinker, certain it is that the *Scienza Nuova* was utterly unknown in Europe till our century; it was as certainly unknown to Herder. Now, great thinkers live in posterity, not only in virtue of their own intrinsic value, but also in virtue of the influence they have exercised. Were a poem incontestably superior to the Iliad in beauty and perfection to be discovered to-day in Polynesia, it never could be to mankind what the Iliad has been; so Vico likewise, in spite of the perspicacity of his genius, worthy of all admiration, never can be to history what Herder was. Even Young himself, whose book upon "Original Works" had prepared the way for Wood's celebrated volume upon "Homer's Original Genius," which in its turn led the way to F. A. Wolff's *Prolegomena*, — even Young himself has never been seriously looked upon as having inspired Herder. Herder's ideas immediately penetrated the whole nation; its youth eagerly caught at them; in a very few years even the schools adopted them, and Germany sent forth their rays to the rest of Europe, while England will

hardly admire and tolerate the ideas of Young and Wood even in our days.

But Herder not only discovered true poetry in the distant ages of Homer and the cloudy isles of Ossian, he found it out in modern times, in his own nation, lending a ready ear to the simple ditties of the woodcutter and the peasant, of the journeyman and the soldier, of the hunter and the shepherd. Germany owes the revival of the *Lied*, or song, entirely to Herder and to the *Stimmen der Völker*. When we read the verses Goethe wrote at Leipzig, — i. e. before meeting with Herder, — we may well be permitted to doubt whether Germany would ever have possessed those unrivalled pearls, his little songs of love, addressed to Friederike and Lili, if he had not known him. It is at any rate very certain that it would not have had either the *Erlkönig* or *Lenore*.

"What is the *Lied*," Herder inquired, even before he had communicated so many graceful specimens of this form of poem in his *Stimmen der Völker*, — "what is the *Lied?* It is neither a sonnet nor a madrigal, poems for the study and the saloon; it is no composition for painting with harmonious coloring; light and brilliancy are not its merits. . . . . The essence of the *Lied* is *song*, not *painting*. Its perfection resides in the melodious course of a passion or a sentiment. . . . . If this melody be wanting in a *Lied*, if it have not the poetical modulation, the right tone, it may contain ever so many images, it may be graceful, it may have coloring, it never can be a *Lied!*"

"Poetry was no longer the exclusive inheritance of a few cultivated minds, but a general gift of all nations," says Goethe in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, with reference to the new ideas started by Herder; nor must we forget that these ideas were those of a young man of twenty-four. That general philosophical view of the world at which most men do not arrive before the age of thirty was Herder's when he left the University and was but twenty years old. Even his maturer writings — those at least which have had a marked influence — were conceived in his youth. The *Stimmen der Völker*, which he published twenty years afterwards, were his favorite occupation when at Riga; and the power of their action upon German lyrics is

quite incalculable. It was at once the beginning of comparative literary history and of German philology.

Herder's universality seems surprising even in our days. Not satisfied with revealing Ossian and the Scotch ballads, Spanish romances and Italian *stornelli*, he had recourse to the East and even to America and Australia for the rough accents of savage verse. He was forever laboring to show that "popular legends, stories, and mythologies are the result of popular belief, ideas, faculties, instincts, and proceed from times when men dream because they know not, believe because they see not, and act with their whole, their undivided, and uncultivated soul. . . . . This is therefore a noble subject for the historian of mankind, for the poet, the critic, and the philosopher." The history of the human mind is called upon to seek and reunite those poetical traditions in which nations have depicted themselves, just as natural history describes herbs and animals. And all this in the very midst of the eighteenth century; that is to say, at the time when men's pretensions to create by means of formulas learnt by heart and according to taught processes had reached their highest pitch; at a time which manufactured epopees, religions, political constitutions, and civil codes! In order to realize to ourselves this strong contrast with the age, we need only compare for a moment what Herder and Lessing have said concerning *fables*, and to see the distance which separates the last-born of the rationalistic from the first-born of the historical age. This minor category of poem which the poetical genius of Lafontaine had transformed, and which the first German critics, who ventured to shake off the French yoke at the commencement of the century, had presented as the highest kind of poetry, — because it unites *utile dulci*, and that alone of all kinds it combines the true and the marvellous! — this fable, we say, was still defined in the following terms by Lessing, as an intentional form of moral instruction: "If we reduce a general proposition to a particular case, lending it reality and making a story out of it in which the general proposition may be recognized by means of intuition, we call this a fable." Herder, on the contrary, would have all that is conventional excluded from it, and not only all that is conventional, but even every striking point,

every ingenious sentence; "because," he says, "a sublime *naïveté* forms the gracefulness of fables, as simplicity is nature's grace." He likewise protests against animals having thoughts lent them of any kind, or being made to play any sort of part, by the writer of fables, without inquiring whether or no these thoughts or actions belong to the character or habits of such animals. The primitive poet observed animal life, and if he lent them speech and reason, it was by the *analagon rationis humanæ*. "In ancient fables animals act because all which in nature produces effects appears to primitive humanity to act. . . . . It is analogy which is the parent of poetry in fables, not abstraction, still less a dry deduction from the general to the particular." Therefore, also, like Lessing, he advocates a return to primitive fable, but he desires that it should be made by means of actual experience, i. e. by the simple observation of animals in real life, without any preconceived ideas. For "the fable rests on nature's eternal consistency and constancy. . . . . Its characters are types. . . . . The more natural the state in which a people lived, the more it liked fables." All this shows how far we are from the delicious *tableaux de genre* which Lafontaine painted under the name of fables, as well as from Lessing's concise, epigrammatic satires. In Herder's eyes, fables originally were, and would again become, were we to live less artificially, the poetical illustration of a lesson of experience by means of a characteristic trait drawn from animal life and developed by analogy. Now, Herder made this refutation of the mechanical theories then reigning throughout Europe from his point of view, i. e. that of poetical, spontaneous creation without special aim, not only on the domain of the fable, but on that of every other kind of poetry, small or large. To him material extension was of no consequence in works of art. For him Raphael's tiny painting of Ezekiel's Vision has no less value than the Stanze in the Vatican; and he deemed that as much genius might be shown in a *Lied* as in an epopee. He studied the nature of epigrams as he had done that of fables, of the drama as of the epic poetry of the ancients; and to say the truth, it was he who showed his country the true Homer and the true Sophocles, as he was

likewise to show it the true Shakespeare; the whole of the antique world has been looked upon with a different eye since Herder.

He opposed his own less refined conception of the ancient world, not only to the Alexandrinian rather than Athenian conventional antiquity which found favor with the French and with Wieland, but also indirectly and half unconsciously to Winckelmann's somewhat tight-laced idealism, in viewing the ancients with the eye of a realist. It was he who taught Goethe to laugh at powdered and patched Alcestes dressed in hoops, as he did in his poem *Götter, Helden, und Wieland.* It was from Herder likewise that Friedrich Schlegel took his ideas concerning Greek epic poetry. Herder alone, in opposition to the entire age in which he lived, protested against comparisons between the ancient and modern world, thus anticipating in fact Schiller's admirable essay "On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry." He strenuously opposed all imitation of ancient poetry; he fought with the exclusiveness of a reformer against the preference for Roman to Greek antiquity, which had been current for a century. He absolutely refused to see anything beyond an artificial imitation in Roman literature, which he considered utterly unworthy of comparison with the spontaneous, original productions of Greek authors. Virgil, in his eyes, was nothing but a learned, studied, self-conscious court poet; the Æneid a species of refined *Henriade;* and indeed I am afraid he was very near treating the author of the *Églogues* as that "wretched Virgil" he was afterwards termed by Friedrich Schlegel. We cannot lay too much stress upon the serious influence Herder exercised in this direction. The neglect — I had almost called it contempt — of Latin poetry which to this day exists in German public instruction dates from Herder. In spite of, or perhaps on account of, the injustice and exaggeration of his ideas, they made their way very rapidly; and if to this very day Greek language and literature still continue to form the basis of classical study in Germany, while all other European nations seek it in the Latin tongue and letters; if Homer is read, reread, commented upon, and learnt by heart during a period of six years' study at all German *gymnasien*, while Virgil is only superficially and hastily glanced at, — we

may attribute it entirely to Herder. The whole romantic school, with its contempt for Tasso and Racine, for Pope and Addison, with its enthusiasm for spontaneous, popular authors and productions of primitive ages, stands in indirect relationship to Herder. I have already remarked that F. A. Wolff's *Prolegomena* are contained in embryo within Herder's critical *Sylvæ*, written five-and-twenty years before.

Nor was Herder's example at all less influential with regard to the manner of appreciating, criticising, and enjoying Shakespeare, which was afterwards to prevail in Germany. In translating the English poet, Wieland had softened down and rounded off his asperities and angles, and had, in fact, produced a revised and embellished version of Shakespeare. Lessing, always wrapped up in his favorite Aristotle, had successfully directed all his endeavors towards discovering the observance of the intrinsic laws of dramatic poetry in Shakespeare, and opposing them to the merely external rules which presided over French poetry. Herder's pamphlet on the great dramatist, written at Strasburg, was at once a sequel to, and a reaction against, the *Hamburger Dramaturgie;* for, whereas Lessing imagined he saw, *mutatis mutandis*, a modern Sophocles in Shakespeare, Herder did his best to place the Elizabethan and Periclean poets in direct opposition to one another. He constantly has recourse to history for the explanation of the difference between them. He points out the dignified simplicity of the Greek drama; the one scene occupied at first by chorus and monologue, then the dialogue proceeding from this primitive chorus, the solemnity of the *mise en scène*, the religious nature of the performance and the national festival which gave rise to it. Then turning to the modern stage, "How different," he exclaims, "was the origin of the British drama! Instead of a Greek chorus, Shakespeare found *marionnettes* and showy, effective pieces. It was from humble clay such as this that he formed the sublime creations we have before us. Instead of a simple, homogeneous national and political life, he found a multitude of classes, ways of living, opinions, races, and tongues; and thus it came that he created classes and men, races and tongues, kings and jesters. He found no ancient simplicity like that of the Greeks in history, fable, or action. He there-

fore took history as he found it, and combined the most heterogeneous elements by means of his creative genius. If Shakespeare possessed the divine art of uniting a whole world of the most different scenes into a single action, and if, moreover, this action was to have the semblance of truth, time and place had, also, to be constantly individualized in order to keep up the illusion. Take away time, space, and individuality from man, and you take away the very breath of his soul."

Herder, not content with merely clearing the literary ground of Winckelmann's classical idealism, went a step farther in pursuing him on to his own territory, contesting the truth of his assertion, that the absolute ideal of the beautiful was to be met with in Greece alone, and vigorously attacking the theory of "serene grandeur and lofty simplicity." He demonstrated that if, previously to Winckelmann, things which painting alone could produce had been required of sculpture, it was erring as much in the opposite extreme to apply the laws of sculpture arbitrarily to painting. He was only too right in his views; for the would-be classical school of David and Cornelius, Carstens and Ingres, proceeds directly from Winckelmann; and an entire generation of critics, as well as artists, from Goethe to Canova and Bartolini, adopted this false direction, no one caring to follow Herder on this ground. Goethe, it is true, appeared at the outset inclined to rally to his side, his essay on Gothic art, with reference to the Strasburg Cathedral and its architect, Erwin de Steinbach, being still written in the spirit of Herder's views: "As men think and live, so do they build and dwell." Ancient German painters are raked up from the dust, and Merck, inspired by similar sentiments, encourages Herder in the pursuit in this direction. The eternal and absolute type of the ideal set up by Winckelmann is set aside for the moment. "The ideal, far superior to any special time or race, will remain foreign to, and far remote from, him who binds himself with servility to any particular period, be it in Greece or in France, and who deems the value of such forms to be eternal, abandoning his own living nature for an earthenware mould!" Golden words, which have been too little heeded since. Goethe himself, it is well known, repudiated in after-years the simple, popular style of his earlier productions, of his

"Wandering Jew," and his "Faust," for that of his "Iphigenia," and his "Tasso." He became so exclusive in his classicism with regard to architecture, that, when travelling in Italy, he could not bring himself to look at Florence, that beautiful city of mediæval palaces, nor would he condescend to glance at the Church of San Francisco or the frescos of Giotto at Assisi, having no eyes for anything beyond a small Minerva temple still in preservation there. His *critiques* and essays on painting likewise betray the renegade who has abandoned sounder principles, and merged into a *doctrinaire* of the Winckelmann school. But if Herder's views failed to prevail within the precincts of the history of plastic art, owing to the powerful and yet too recent influence and authority exercised in that department by Winckelmann, at any rate they penetrated rapidly into all other branches of intellectual activity in Germany. The chief conception he sought to inculcate was that of evolution, growth, *fieri*, which he had borrowed from the vegetable kingdom, in order to apply it to the political, religious, and literary history of art. "Rome alone could produce a Winckelmann for art, but Germany is capable of bringing forth a Winckelmann for poetry who would have to accompany his illustrious predecessor a good part of the way." Only a part, however; for the idea of perfection, at which Winckelmann stops short, is not Herder's; the latter admitting no superiority of Sophocles over Homer, of Æschylus over Hesiod, and viewing all ages and styles as equal in value, provided they be original and spontaneous. We should fall into a grave error, however, were we to imagine that he admired primitive poetry alone; for, had this been the case, he would only have been following the erroneous direction of Winckelmann, when he sees perfection in no age but that of Phidias. Herder wished to renovate and revive the intellect by means of regained simplicity and freshness. He thought that simple, spontaneous genius would have the power of doing so in every age, even in our own days, only under a different form from those of ancient times; but he had no contempt whatever for, or wish to dispense with, the benefits of civilization. He makes special reserves on this head. "You smile at me for my enthusiasm for savages almost as contemptuously as Voltaire did at Rousseau

when he admired men who went upon all-fours. Do not imagine that I despise the advantages of civilization and morality on that account. Mankind perform their progressive evolutions in a series of consecutive scenes resembling those of a drama. Woe betide the man who is dissatisfied with that scene in which he is called upon to live and act; but woe betide the philosopher, likewise, who reasons upon humanity and its morals, should he believe his own scene to be the only important one, and the first of all scenes to have been necessarily the worst; for if all form part of the drama which is being progressively performed, it is certain that each will, in turn, exhibit a new and curious side of humanity."

Thus, although he never carried out his intention of writing this history, he preached his doctrines in so many passages of his works, and with so irresistible eloquence, that the world listened to him, — with the exception of a period of ten or fifteen years, when Goethe's and Schiller's classicism was in its bloom, during which, as we have already seen, Herder turned, irritated and soured, from his former disciple. As for himself, he was a reader and a citizen of all ages. He deemed it necessary to know and appreciate the poetry of other countries, in order to be able duly to appreciate that of one's own; and that to be able to do this properly, it was indispensable that one should place one's self in the *milieu* which had produced it. Now, nature had endowed him for this purpose with a pliability of intelligence, an acuteness of perception, a keenness of sight and hearing, and a refined delicacy totally unrivalled. This faculty of relishing and entering into the spirit of the most diverse countries and periods constitutes his chief and true grandeur. This was in reality his cosmopolitism, which has been so often misrepresented, and about which a legion of historians have been content to repeat stereotyped judgments, without attempting to subject them to the slightest criticism or control. But this cosmopolitism never for a moment prevented him from being the most German of all German writers in the general tone of his inspiration, still less from heralding the German idea to the world at large. In fact, Herder not only put an end to the remnants of reasoning, didacticism, and moralizing which Lessing had still admitted

into the domain of poetry, leaving nothing at all beyond the arbitrary inspirations of the poet, but he also rose up against the idea of *rule*, which Lessing defended, in opposition to the essentially German conception of *individualism*. He gave back, if I may say so, its originality to German poetry, by putting a limit to the imitation of the ancients.

"We shall be false Romans," he says eloquently, "in language, philosophy, mythology; in the ode, in didactic verse, in the elegy, satire or eloquence, from the moment that we strive to be Romans only, — to be Horace, Lucretius, and Cicero!" It was certainly not his fault if Germany did not entirely go back to the interrupted traditions of the sixteenth century, to Luther and Hans Sachs, as it seemed disposed to do from 1770 to 1780, instead of again taking to imitation of the ancients, — a freer and truer one, it is true, than that of old, but nevertheless an imitation. "O, that accursed word *classical!*" he exclaims. "It would have made a classical orator of Cicero, poets of the classical school of Horace and Virgil, a pedant of Cæsar, and a rhetorician of Titus Livius. It has separated the thought and its expression from the opportunity which gave rise to it. It is this word which prevents us from forming ourselves after the ancients as they were when they lived; this word which has invented the absurd glory of being a *connaisseur* of the ancients without having any further object in view; this word has buried more than one genius beneath ruins of words, made a chaos of strange expression of his head, and has carried off from our country many a blossoming tree which promised to yield fruit. . . . . Let us therefore be *idiomatic* writers; let us be original; let us write for our own people in our own tongue. Let us leave it to posterity to decide whether we be classical or not."

He deplores for his country the interruption of the national tradition, without insisting upon a return to Arminius and the Cherusci who lived assuredly less in the popular memory of the Germany than Achilles and his myrmidons.

"We absolutely do not possess a single scrap of living poetry belonging to ancient times from which our modern poetry could have put forth as the branch does from the stem," he says, alluding to Klopstock's unfortunate attempts at regener-

ating primitive Teutonic mythology and history. "Other nations, on the contrary, have progressed with the ages, developing out of national productions on their native soil, and out of the remnants of the past on the foundation of popular belief and popular taste. Hence it is that their poetry and language became national. Whereas we poor Germans were destined never to remain true to ourselves. Our song is the cry of Pan, an echo of the days of the Jordan, the Tiber, the Thames, and the Seine; our very spirit is a hired one, ruminating what others have trodden under foot. And now that we are just beginning at last to have a poetry of our own, now that German courts are beginning to spell in German and to pronounce a few German names, good heavens! what important personages we think ourselves! How barbarous would that man appear in our eyes who should trouble himself about the 'coarse' people, and its vulgar food of tales, prejudices (superstitions), songs, and rude expressions! How he would defile the purity of our classical literature, so precise in its prosody! He would indeed be the owl amidst the brilliant, melodious throng of songsters; and yet, it will remain an eternal truth that the part of any literature which concerns the people must be popular on pain of becoming a classical bubble. It will remain an eternal truth, that we can have neither public, nation, language, nor poetry of our own living and acting within us, without the people. We do nothing but write for the sage and the scholar. We compose odes, heroic poems, songs for the church, — or may be for the kitchen, — of a kind that nobody understands, feels, or relishes. Our whole classical literature is a bird of paradise, gaudy in plumage, spruce in appearance, all soaring, all elevation, but having no footing on the German soil!"

It is easy to conceive what must have been the effect produced by such bold assertions as these, at a time when the nation imagined itself to have left the golden age behind it, because, forsooth, it had succeeded in producing a few correct rhymers and an inspired imitator of Milton; and we need not be at a loss to comprehend why Herder should cordially greet any truly spontaneous emanations from the national soul, were they even such mediocre productions as the *Grenadier Songs*, with which the Seven Years' War inspired Vater Gleim. The

sensation produced by these new doctrines was incalculable, not only upon the rising poetry of Germany, which took its inspirations exclusively from them, not only upon philology and classical instruction, as I have already stated, but upon every branch of science, regenerating and invigorating in every direction. To quote a single example of this extraordinary influence, Herder's ideas upon the origin of language itself were destined to become laws, and, in fact, the works of Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm von Humboldt are a mere development of them; indeed, the whole of our modern linguistic science, and especially of Teutonic philology, proceeds directly from Herder. When he maintained that "language was nothing but the superior development of reason, and that it was a natural product of the intellectual powers of mankind," was he not giving utterance to an idea which has since prevailed over the opinions of those who deemed it to be a special revelation, as well as of those who regarded it as a rational, conscious invention? Now, this one idea alone has become the starting-point and condition *sine qua non* of all true linguistic science.

These and other analogous notions besides introduced a completely new way of writing history, and may be said to have created the philosophy of history. It was already something to have influenced a Goethe so far as to induce him to forsake the direction he had taken at Leipzig and leave pastoral poetry *à la Française* for the more vigorous and popular style he adopted in his *Götz*, his *Lieder*, *Hans Sachs' Mission*, the *Wandering Jew*, and in the first scenes of his *Faust;* it was something to have brought forth a school of philologists like Heyne and Wolff, — for both proceed from him; but Herder did still more: he regenerated the science of history in Germany, and caused the historical point of view to prevail in every other branch of science; first of all, in literary history, which till then had been a mere series of biographies, or a catalogue of works with analyses, and which, from that time forward, became what it always should be, an exposition of the gradual growth and development of ideas and literary forms in the relationship they bear towards the general civilization of a nation. Herder saw as clearly as M. Taine the close connection existing between the innate character and the climatic and historic

circumstances of a people on the one hand, and its intellectual productions on the other.

"The sphere of general taste must always differ," he says, "according to the difference of the times, although the same laws are always acting; for the materials and aims are constantly changing. . . . . A worthy man who sees the world only through the medium of the market, the *café*, or the *Hamburg Correspondence*, is always surprised, when he stumbles upon an historical work, to find that tastes and ways of thinking change with climates, zones, and countries. Paris is not more amazed when some Indian prince appears. His astonishment usually resolves itself into a hearty laugh. 'What fables books contain!' he exclaims; 'who is to believe all this?' At times, again, he will admit the truth of such things, but then he looks upon those nations as mad; and why? because they think differently from what his mamma, his worthy nurse, and his wise companions have taught him to think. Do we not often render ourselves guilty of this defect when we pronounce the way of thinking of savages absurd or incredible, simply because it is not our own? Do we not laugh at the Chinese for considering their own country as the centre of the world, and placing us poor inhabitants of the globe at the four corners of it, like so many monsters and caricatures? Why? Because they did not know us, and believed themselves to possess the monopoly of wisdom and taste. How often is one tempted to think one's self in China when one hears certain Chinese appreciations in every-day life, which, through ignorance or pride, anathematize all that is at variance with our own way of thinking and understanding!"

Herder carried the same spirit into what is properly called history. An abyss separates him from the historians of his time as well as from men of erudition, such as Schlözer and Spittler, as from painters of history, like Schiller and Johannes von Müller, all four in reality his juniors, but in appearance his seniors by a century at least. That father of modern history, as understood in our age, Niebuhr, was the first historian who wrote with Herder's views; the first who was able to feel the beat of the nation's pulse whose vicissitudes he undertook to release. We have traced the origin of Herder's "Ideas of a

Philosophy of Mankind" to the first impressions he imbibed at Riga, and on his voyage on the Baltic Sea and Northern Ocean. However incomplete this work may be, it made an epoch in German literature. It is still written in the same poetical style which caused even his friend Hamann to shrug his shoulders, and which renders his critical studies so indigestible to a soberer generation. Besides, as in his literary *critiques*, he never directs his attacks upon details and errors of fact, but upon the general point of view, so also generality dominates in his "Philosophy of History." We find here, not exactly allegories in the Platonic acceptation, nor the prophetic visions to be met with in his earlier works, but still the same vagueness pervading the whole; general ideas have always more importance for him than positive facts. Herder's science and that of his time was incomplete, and the philosopher therefore frequently arrives at hasty conclusions. But there is one principal fact in his writings which made itself felt long after: Herder placed the history of civilization far above political history. M. Guizot's chief work would have been impossible without Herder's precedent. Up to his time the most mechanical teleology had reigned in history as in philosophy, and Providence was represented to have created cork-trees that men should have wherewithal to stop their bottles; as also, of course, to have prevented Cromwell from setting out for America, in order that an instrument might not be wanting to accomplish the Revolution in England. Herder was the first who ventured to leave the alleged aims of Providence in historical events out of the question, and, opposing himself alike to the idea of a preconceived plan and that of mere chance in history, refused to see anything in it beyond the development of given germs, — which has undoubtedly proved the most fertile of all modern ideas. "Each nation contains its centre within itself, as a bullet its centre of gravity. There is nothing within the whole kingdom of God which is a mere *means;* everything is at once *means* and *end.* . . . . The God I look for in history must be the same as the God of nature; for man is but a tiny particle of the whole, and the history of mankind resembles that of the worm closely connected with the tissue it inhabits; therefore, the natural laws by which the Deity reveals itself must reign in man likewise."

All this singularly resembles pantheism, and these are words which Herder would most certainly not have penned while at Bückeburg, at the time when he made his first rough sketch of his "Philosophy of History." But since then, he, like Lessing, Goethe, and nearly all the eminent minds of the age, had tasted of Spinoza and relished him extremely. In spite of the scandal produced among believers by this change, Herder never renounced his new faith. He sought to conceal it, as much from himself as from others, and in order to do this he put much into Christianity which does not really belong to it, as many others before and since have done. "The pearl is found," he says; "no one can build upon any other foundation than that of Christ. As this gospel needs no external sign, being its own proof, neither can it be overthrown by theological or other doubts. . . . . The seed is sown, and it contains strength enough in itself to become the tree which is to shelter all nations under its foliage. Every sort of temperature, good or bad, must be favorable to its growth. In all events which occur in the world, it is its kingdom which is coming. For this is the business of Providence; and it is the aim and character, the very essence, of the human race to accomplish Providence's work. Place no trust in phantoms. The kingdom of God is within you."

This religion, we see, was a wide one, and this species of Christianity very closely resembled the doctrines of Spinoza. But it was precisely in virtue of the peculiar wideness of his Christianity that Herder exercised so great an influence over his country. If the German people be the only one which has remained deeply religious without paying any great attention to exterior worship and religious observance, it merely followed the example which Herder gave it. "The question has been raised," he said, "whether a man can be moral without religion. Independently of religious dogma is doubtless what was meant, for otherwise this question would be resolved by itself. True religion cannot exist without morality, and true morality is religion under whatever form it may show itself." This, translated into Luther's language, means that faith goes before works. The man who lives in the ideal cannot be immoral. As far from orthodoxy as from rationalism, Herder

constantly appeals from dogma and reasoning to religious feeling: "Flee religious controversy as you would the pest. For it is impossible to dispute about what religion is. It is as impossible either to deny or affirm it by discussion as to paint the mind or hear light." It is precisely because Christianity is an especially humane religion that Herder himself is a Christian, not at all because he is particularly attached to any dogma.

Herder's religious development is very characteristic of Germany in the past century. The Bible, as we have already seen, was the earliest source of his intellectual culture. At an early age, however, he rebels against the idea of its being a revealed book. The Book of Genesis became in his eyes a species of Theogony, like that of Hesiod, nor could he see anything beyond a collection of national poetical effusions in the rest of the Old Testament. What he discovers in it above all is poetry; and we find him defending the Song of Solomon as energetically against mystics as against moralizing rationalists. It is necessary to read his eloquent pages on the Mosaic epopee in order to understand the effect which they produced in their apparent profane treatment of the subject, which Herder and his countrymen looked upon, on the contrary, as a new form of admiration. "Burn all rationalistic metaphysics!" he exclaims; "the living commentary on the Mosaic monument blows with the morning air." Herder it was who first taught the world to understand the Oriental way of thinking, who first showed it what Oriental poetry was, and opposed the primitive simplicity of the Bible to the dogmatic interpretation of theologians. "What other people of antiquity had a voice so pure and so powerful as Israel's prophets? What Greek or Roman poets are there whom we could place by the side of an Isaiah, from the point of view of a pure and sublime morality, or that of a wide, elevated national mind?" Herder, in his two celebrated Biblical works, did but develop the germ of those ideas which he had received from his teacher and friend, Hamann, ten or fifteen years before. "What are all the *miracula speciosa* of an Odyssey and an Iliad," the Königsberg Magus had written to him, "compared with the simple, grand life of the patriarchs? What is the gentle, loving soul of the blind bard of Mæonia compared with the soul of a Moses, ardent with the

consciousness of his own exploits and inflated with lofty inspirations ? "

These ideas, which Herder brought forward for the first time in his " Most Ancient Document " (1774), which " he had cherished in his heart from his tenderest infancy," were taken up again and developed still further, ten years later, in the " Spirit of Hebrew Poetry " (1784). He never tires of telling the world that the Bible is not only the basis of our own religion, but also contains that which is the most elevated and most ancient in the world. At that time the Vedas had not been discovered. It was Herder who opened the world's eyes anew to that poetry which had been hidden from its view by the mass of allegory, morals, dogmas, philosophical ideas, and law-texts with which it had been stifled. Herder had the boldness to treat the Bible like any other human document ; and by doing so, he made the history of religions, which belongs essentially and exclusively to our age, possible ; for nothing less than the example of Herder's deep and sincere religious feeling would have sufficed to enable men to study religion itself without placing themselves at the point of view of any given religion. The various forms under which mankind have successively or simultaneously tried to satisfy their craving for the infinite and the supernatural had to be duly respected and loved ; but the point at which the believer no longer requires that the infinite and supernatural should have a definite conventional form, in order to adore and dread it, had also to be reached. An enthusiastic nature like Herder's, capable of understanding a mystical glow, and yet free-thinking enough not to attribute to himself and his sect alone the privilege of such mystical glow and the immediate conception of the Deity, was required. The Tübingen school would have been an impossibility without Herder, and we may say exactly the same thing with regard to its adversaries. Ewald would never have written his " History of the People of Israel," Bunsen would never have composed his great " Bible-Work," nor his " God in History," if Herder had not opened out fresh horizons. His theologico-political thoughts were already those of young Schelling. D. F. Strauss drew his idea of myths and legends, which has transformed religious history entirely, from Herder. Even Renan finds himself still upon ground

which Herder had conquered; respect and sympathy for religion is here allied to an independence of view which regards all religions as issuing from the same religious want felt by men, and which puts inner revelation in the place of outer. Herder no longer explains the origin of positive religion, as it was customary to do in the philosophical camp, by the imposture of the priests, but historically. First, he sees fear and superstition; then curiosity creating cosmogonies, and, with the aid of poetical imagination, mythologies. He shows that religious ideas only become simplified, generalized, and purified by degrees. In the beginning they could only be instinctive, intuitive, sentient, and consequently local and determined.

"It was natural that these traditions should be more national than anything else in the world. Every one spoke through the mouth of his forefathers. He saw by the standard of the world which surrounded him. He gave himself solutions concerning the problems which interested him most, and these explanations were those best adapted to his climate, nationality, and ideas. He drew his conclusions according to his interest and his views, according to the language and the customs of his country. The world and humanity were therefore organized in his eyes according to the ideas of his own time, nation, and civilization; everything in them was national and local, from the greatest to the smallest thing. Scandinavia built a world of giants, the Iroquois made the turtle the machine which explained to him the existence of the earth."

The whole of modern religious criticism, its fertility as well as its perils, is contained in these words, — for how should a grosser mind, a less poetical, less respectful soul than Herder's translate all this otherwise than by the words of the scoffer *par excellence?* — "God created man after his own image, and man gave it him back." Nor are gross minds, prosy, irreverential souls, less numerous among the defenders of, than among the detractors from, positive religion. Hence the great unpopularity of Herder and his disciples in both camps.

It is usual to call Herder the apostle of humanitarian ideas, and not without reason, provided a contempt for nationalities be not implied. Herder placed humanity above nationality. In his eyes the title man was the noblest which can be im-

agined; and he belongs entirely to his essentially optimist age by this very exalted idea of man. In his eyes national prejudices were as contemptible as were religious and caste prejudices. He thought that the day would come when a single bond would unite all peoples, when a single, unwritten religion, a single civilization, a single morality, would bring men together in a common brotherhood. He protested vehemently against national exclusiveness, as he protested against every other species of exclusiveness. He did not wish that any people, not even his own, should be trumpeted forth as the elect; but he was not the less full of love and reverence for his country on that account. "National pride," he said, "is absurd, ridiculous, and dangerous; but it is every one's duty to love his country, and it cannot be loved if it is not honored, if it is despised and allowed to be disparaged; it must be defended, and each of us must contribute the utmost in his power to its honor and its welfare." Far from being a despiser of his native country, Herder was, perhaps, the most, I had almost said the only, patriotic German writer of the last century, as he undoubtedly was the one who understood best the degradation, and who most deplored the fragmentary condition, the slavery, and the political *décadence* of Germany. He laments that Germany was but "a thing of the imagination," that she had no "general voice," that there was no Frederick the Second seated upon the worm-eaten throne of the German Empire. And as, in opposition to Schiller, he desired that poetry should seek her inspirations in real life, and not in the ideal world, he likewise desired, in opposition to Goethe, that this reality should be that of public, not always that of private life. In particular his "Letters on Humanity," especially the first, are full of these political and patriotic ideas. But it would be unjust not to add, that, in his eyes, the nation was but a "member of humanity." He asked that nations should exercise a mutual influence over each other by means of their moral and intellectual qualities only, and saw in a "free competition of activity of the most different nationalities the fundamental condition of the civilization of mankind." And this man it is who, thanks to some ill-comprehended sentence of a speech made in his youth, and thanks especially to the error by which the ideas he professed with re-

gard to literature have been attributed to him likewise on political subjects, has had the misfortune to become "the apostle of cosmopolitism" in the eyes of posterity. One ought far rather to say that, after having been the standard-bearer of the revolt of the Germanic against the Latin spirit of the eighteenth century, by his literary criticism, he was at once the first and most eloquent defender of that great nationality principle which has agitated our own century so deeply. By restoring national poetry to its place of honor, he contributed to the revival of patriotic sentiments; by formulating the German idea, he became the forerunner of those who, long after, created the German state. It is this universality, this breadth of horizon, which constitutes the real greatness of Herder. Understanding nationality as no one else in the century did and subordinating it to humanity, brought up in reverence for Hellenism and the first to point out its true character, he discovered the East by intuition; in heart a Christian, he knew how to assimilate all the pagan "humanism" in the Renaissance; full of admiration and intelligence for the classical authors, he found the secret of primitive and religious poetry; liberal in his political sympathies, he demonstrated the legality and undeviating consistency of history; and Goethe might well say of his friend and initiator, "He who looks upon the cause of humanity as his own has taken a part in the affairs of the gods and of fate."

Herder's ideas have penetrated our whole method of thinking in such a degree, his works are so incomplete and so disconnected, that it is hardly possible for us to account for the extraordinary effect these ideas and works produced in their day, or for the surprising influence exercised by Herder personally. From his twenty-fifth year he was indeed a sovereign. True, his actual and uncontested sway was not prolonged beyond a period of fifteen years, albeit his name still figured long after on the list of living potentates. The generation of the *Stürmer* and *Dränger*, or, as they were pleased to denominate themselves, the "original geniuses," looked up to Herder as their leader and their prophet. They turned from him later on, and went back to the exclusive worship of classical antiquity; but their very manner of doing homage to it bore witness to Herder's influence. The following generation threw itself no less exclusively

into the Middle Ages; but, after all, what was it doing but following Herder's example when it raked up Dantes and Calderons out of the dust in order to confront them with and oppose them to Virgils and Racines? However they might repudiate, nay, even forget their teacher, his doctrines already pervaded the whole intellectual atmosphere of Germany, and men's minds breathed them in with the very air they inhaled.

Herder is certainly neither a classical nor a finished writer; he has gone singularly out of fashion, because his style is pompous and diffuse, his composition loose and disconnected, because his reasoning lacks firmness, and his erudition solidity. Still we repeat, that no other German writer of note toward the end of the last century exercised the important indirect influence which it was Herder's privilege to do. Niebuhr, in revealing to us the growth of Rome, the birth of her religious and national legends, the gradual but slow formation of her marvellous constitution, the struggle between patricians and plebeians in this small municipal republic, so similar to that of his dear Ditmarsiaus; F. A. Wolff, when he points out to us the process of epic poetry; Savigny, when he proves that masterpiece of human ingenuity, the Roman civil law, not to have been the work of a wise legislator, but rather the wisdom of generations and of centuries; A. W. Schlegel and his school, when they transplanted the poetry of other nations to Germany by means of imitations which are real masterpieces of assimilation; his brother Friedrich, when, in the "Wisdom of the Hindoos," he opens out that vast field of comparative linguistic science which Bopp and Lassen and so many others have since cultivated; W. von Humboldt, when he established the laws of language; and J. Grimm, when he brought German philology into existence, while his brother made a science of Northern mythology; still later on, D. F. Strauss, when, in our own days, he places the myth and the legend with their unconscious origin and growth, not alone in opposition to the Divinity intervening to interrupt established order, but also to the imposture of conscious fraud; Ottfried Müller, when he proves that Greek mythology, far from containing historical facts or moral sentences, is the involuntary personification of surrounding nature, subsequently developed by the imagination; or when he

shows us one or several legislators satisfied to compile and codify the customs of their country in the place of the traditional Lycurgus taught us in our school-days, who is represented as inventing a constitution after the fashion of the Abbé Sieyes; Adalbert Kuhn and Max Müller, when they erect the new science of comparative mythology upon the basis of comparative linguistics, — what else are they doing but applying and working out Herder's ideas? And if we turn our eyes towards other nations, what else are Benjamin Constant, De Tocqueville, Renan, Taine, Carlyle, and Darwin doing, each in his own particular branch, but applying and developing Herder's two fundamental principles, i. e., that of organic evolution and that of the entireness of the individual? It was Herder, indeed, who discovered the true spirit of history, and in this sense it is that Goethe was able to say of him, when personifying him with his *Humanus*: —

"Ein edler Mann, begierig zu ergründen
Wie überall der Menschen Sinn entspriesst,
Horcht in die Welt so Ton als Wort zu finden
Das tausendquellig durch die Länder fliesst;
Die ältesten, die neuesten Regionen
Durchwandelt er und lauscht in allen Zonen.

. . . . .

Wo sich's versteckte, wusst' er's aufzufinden,
Trübhaft verhüllt, verkleidet leicht als Spiel:
Im höchsten Sinn der Zukunft zu begründen
Humanität sei unser ewig Ziel!" *

KARL HILLEBRAND.

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* A noble mind, desirous of fathoming
Man's soul in whatsoever direction it may shoot forth,
Searcheth throughout the universe for sound and word
Which flow through the lands in thousand sources,
Wanders through the oldest as the newest regions,
And listens in every zone.

. . . . .

He knew how to find it wherever it lay hid,
Whether robed in grave disguise, or lightly clothed in the garb of play,
In order to found for the future this lofty rule:
Humanity be our eternal aim!

Art. VI. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — *The Rise of the Republic of the United States.* By Richard Frothingham. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1872.

If the people of the United States were more familiar with the history of their own country, and understood better the conditions under which republican government has succeeded with them so remarkably, we should hear less of that political school which sees in Napoleonism the only cure for the vices of our system; and, on the other hand, should be less eager to extend our national congratulations whenever, among the various phases of anarchy in any quarter of the globe, the republican is for a moment uppermost. A thorough understanding of those conditions is indispensable indeed, if we are to deal successfully with the political questions which arise in the administration of our government; and to such an understanding Mr. Frothingham's book is a valuable contribution.

He has aimed to separate from the general history of the country that part which concerns its political development. Taking the colonists as they were when they landed, with the ideas of political science which they brought from Europe, he has sought to show how those ideas were moulded by the necessities of their life here, and how they were gradually developed till they became the "glittering generalities" of the Declaration. The book is a history of the education by which the people of the Colonies were fitted to undertake the responsibilities of self-government. But it is not a philosophical history. The reader will find in it little original thought, and the abundance of authority which Mr. Frothingham cites to sustain his simplest propositions almost seems to indicate a dread of originality. It is, in fact, a compendium of American political literature, a digest of state papers, resolutions of public bodies, the correspondence of leading men, addresses, speeches, and newspaper articles, so arranged with reference to the public events which called them forth as to present an accurate view of public opinion on political questions, and its gradual changes during the century and a half before the adoption of the Constitution. The author's industrious research is conspicuous on every page. He has spared no pains to make his record of opinion complete, and the result is a very valuable book of reference; but it can hardly be called an entertaining history. Perhaps this ought not to be expected when we consider the nature of the subject. To give a perfect idea of public sentiment at a given time in thirteen colonies, it may be necessary to print thirteen

sets of resolutions in as many popular assemblies; but when those assemblies were unanimous, when in fact the first set of resolutions served as a model for the other twelve, none but an enthusiast on the subject of resolutions can enjoy reading the series consecutively.

We cannot but think, however, that Mr. Frothingham's treatment of his subject is unnecessarily dry. He contents himself with results, and deals too little with causes and processes. His method is to give an important event which exercised an influence on public opinion, and then tell us how the colonists expressed themselves about it. Such a measure of Lord North's ministry led to the passage of such and such resolutions: the measure is described simply, the resolutions are given verbatim. The coloring of the picture is wanting. We are told that the colonists thought thus and thus; but all the thousand influences which led them to take this position, derived from their traditions, their situation, and their habits of life, are neglected. Man has another than the resolution-passing side, to which the author gives little thought. This is particularly noticeable when he discusses the idea of local self-government. He is inclined to believe that the colonists, in forming their system, were guided by traditions of their rights as freemen, handed down from their Germanic ancestors, and kept alive by the Saxons. Undoubtedly, the national characteristics of the emigrants had much to do with the government they formed. A body of Asiatics certainly, a body of Frenchmen or Spaniards probably, would not have adopted the same system; but it was not considerations of abstract right, but the practical exigencies of their position which determined their action. They governed themselves amid the perils and hardships of their new situation as men do on a sinking ship, or in the presence of any common danger, thinking less of their rights than of their necessities, — so few in number that the counsel of every man was necessary in deciding how they should avoid famine and extermination. The author does not bring out as he might have done the influence which the physical situation of the colonies, their isolation, the differences in race, faith, and purpose between them, the neglect which they suffered from England till they had become too valuable to be overlooked, must have exercised on their form of government. The circumstances of their settlement made them separate states; they became one nation when they were united by a common purpose and a common danger.

The book, though not likely to interest the general reader, will well repay the study of any one who cares to understand the causes which insured the success of republican government in this country. It is not every people which is capable of self-government. Why one nation is, and another is not, what conditions must exist to make a

republic possible, are questions which no American can afford to neglect, and which have a peculiar interest now when the oldest monarchies of Europe are seeking to become republics. Certain advantages the colonists had which cannot fail to strike the reader, and a little thought will enable him to see how the absence of any one would have rendered the success of our Revolution impossible. Nothing is more remarkable in the character of our ancestors than their inherent respect for law as law, which on the one hand enabled them to present a united front of resistance to the measures of the English ministry, even when, like the Tea Act, directly beneficial, because those measures were the assertion of a right whose existence they denied; and on the other dictated that dignified forbearance from all riotous disturbance, which not even the sufferings of Boston under the operation of the Port Bill or the presence of hostile soldiers among them could drive its people to forget. This jealous regard for principles rendered vain all efforts of the crown to divide the colonies by concessions made to them individually, without yielding the claim of right in dispute. Nor can it be doubted that, if the popular cause had been disgraced by exhibitions of mob violence or premature outbreaks of resistance, the necessary union would never have been attained, and the repressive measures of the ministry would have been justified in the eyes of the world.

Nor is the willingness to sacrifice individual advantage and individual opinion for the common good a less indispensable condition of a republic; and this spirit of self-sacrifice possessed our fathers to a wonderful extent. Unless this had been present, how could thirteen colonies, in some cases almost at swords' points with each other, have consented to waive the matters in dispute, and have agreed for seven years of hardship to obey the commands of a Congress which had no power to enforce them? Nothing but the existence of a common purpose of no ordinary intensity would have rendered this government of purely moral force possible; and the existence of such a common purpose is another essential condition of a republic.

Lastly, it is impossible to overrate the influence of tradition. It is interesting to see how old the ideas and some at least of the phrases in the Declaration of Independence were, and how, in slightly varied language, they had appeared over and over again, and it is curious to trace the origin and gradual development of those theories of government which were embodied in the Constitution. Republican government was no experiment in this country when its independence was declared. The experiment had succeeded for a century and a half. The method adopted for harmonizing the conflicting jurisdictions of state and nation was, perhaps, an experiment; but the fundamental idea of self-government was rooted in the very natures of the people.

No one can read Mr. Frothingham's history without seeing how each of these conditions — the respect for law as law; the willingness to sacrifice private advantage for the general good; the common purpose; and the influence of tradition — was essential to our success, and how impossible it would have been in the absence of either to have maintained the necessary union. It is equally obvious that in neither France nor Spain do these conditions exist to-day; and with the recollections of the Commune still fresh, one may be pardoned for doubting whether they ever will. To compare the prospects of the French and Spanish republics with our own would require more space than we can give; but one essential difference may be pointed out in a few words. In America the idea of an imperial government, or of any but a republican, is so foreign to all the traditions of our people that it could not live an hour. The popular leader who should attempt to subvert our system would find himself alone against the country. In France and Spain the possibility of a *coup d'état* is always present, to the leaders of faction as a recognized move in the game of politics, to the people as something inevitable. Hence, when it happens, it meets with acquiescence, because it is just what everybody expected. The Imperialists among us overlook that difference. Where a revolution is always expected, no government can be stable, for revolution is always the resort of the disaffected. Hence, we can hardly hope for the permanence of the new republics, or expect that the form of government will cure vices which are inherent in the characters of the governed. Nor is such a comparison a mere matter of speculative interest. The questions presented by those countries are questions which we must understand in order to meet the issues of our own politics during the next half-century. If we are satisfied that the republics in France and Spain have little or no chance of success, what must we think of the prospect for such a government in the countries adjoining our own, over which we shall be asked to extend our system before many years? Can we safely admit those to share in governing us who not only have never been able to govern themselves, but have shown an utter incapacity to be governed by any system? We may well pause and be sure that the respect for law in our own people, upon whose existence our continued success depends, has not been perceptibly weakened, before we admit to participation in our government other peoples who know no higher law than force. From the Secretary of the Treasury down to James Fiske, Jr. and David Dudley Field, there seems a growing tendency to disregard the law in the pursuit of ends which seem desirable, whether those ends be the moving of the crops or the plunder of a rich corporation. That the law should be violated is of comparatively trifling

importance; but that the intentional violation should be condoned, if done with no bad motive, is a principle pregnant with evil, and one which Congress, by approving Mr. Boutwell's course in negotiating the recent loan at a higher rate than that fixed by law, seems to have sanctioned; and their action shows the dangerous tendency against which it behooves us to struggle. Nothing but the same jealous watchfulness against encroachments wrong in principle, even though in effect beneficial, which carried our fathers successfully through their contest for self-government, will enable us to maintain their work; and a constant recurrence to their writings will tend to stimulate our care.

There is one feature of Mr. Frothingham's book which is very annoying to the reader, though it does not injure its value as a book of reference. This is his habit of repeating his text in notes, of giving some quotation more or less at length, and then, in a note which contains the reference to his authority, repeating the same language, with, perhaps, some additions. The simple reference to his authority would seem to have been enough.

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2. — *Myths and Myth-Makers: Old Tales and Superstitions interpreted by Comparative Mythology.* By JOHN FISKE, M. A., LL. B., Assistant Librarian and late Lecturer on Philosophy, at Harvard University. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company. 1873.

MR. FISKE has done the public good service by collecting in a volume of convenient size these various essays which embody the latest results of modern scholarship in regard to the many myths and superstitions that have come down to us from a remote antiquity, together with many ingenious remarks of his own. Most of them had appeared last year in the Atlantic Monthly, where they had aroused very general interest in this fascinating subject. Almost all the authorities from which Mr. Fiske quotes will be found entertaining reading, but their number, and very often their size, and the philological reasoning on which they are based, combine to make them less attractive to those readers who instinctively and naturally enough shrink from whatever bears a likeness to a scientific book. Such persons, however, need not fear being dragged into too deep water in the volume before us. Mr. Fiske has been through all that is arid in the work of investigation, and gives us simply the results of his study in a most agreeable form. This he has done without sacrificing accuracy to smoothness; his book can be read with perfect confidence by those who have not the time to look up the various matters for themselves. He has the rare merit of avoiding both error and dulness.

In his first essay Mr. Fiske begins with the mention of one of the greatest victories which scientific investigation has had over popular rumor, — the story of William Tell, which is taken out of history and put back where it belongs, in a misty antiquity as one form of the solar myth which underlies so many tales. Incidentally he introduces many similar cases, and explains with great clearness — what it is not so easy to understand — in what way the rising and setting of the sun, and the course of the seasons, could so impress the minds of our early ancestors and inspire those tales which fill our literature, in "Mother Goose" as well as in the greatest tragedies and epics of the greatest poets of the world. For both Homer and Shakespeare are shown to have unconsciously followed the older traditions of the sun-god and the struggle of winter and summer, which are read now only by the light of philology. It is in this patient power of elucidation that lies Mr. Fiske's chief merit as an expounder to the public of the works of specialists. For example, he says, p. 18: "The same mighty power of imagination which now, restrained and guided by scientific principles, leads us to discoveries and inventions must then have wildly run in mythologic fictions whereby to explain the phenomena of nature. Knowing nothing whatever of physical forces, of the blind steadiness with which a given effect invariably follows its cause, the men of primeval antiquity could interpret the actions of nature only after the analogy of their own actions. The only force they knew was the force of which they were directly conscious, — the force of will. Accordingly, they imagined all the outward world to be endowed with volition, and to be directed by it. They personified everything, — sky, clouds, thunder, sun, moon, ocean, earthquake, whirlwind. . . . . The yellow-haired sun, Phoibos, drove westerly all day in his flaming chariot; or, perhaps, as Meleagros, retired for a while in disgust from the sight of men; wedded at eventide the violet light (Oinone, Iole), which he had forsaken in the morning; sank, as Herakles, upon a blazing funeral-pyre, or, like Agamemnon, perished in a blood-stained bath, or, as the fish-god, Dagon, swam nightly through the subterranean waters, to appear eastward again at daybreak. Sometimes Phaëthon, his rash, inexperienced son, would take the reins and drive the solar chariot too near the earth, causing the fruits to perish, and the grass to wither, and the wells to dry up. Sometimes, too, the great, all-seeing divinity, in his wrath at the impiety of men, would shoot down his scorching arrows, causing pestilence to spread over the land." Following this we have some examples of the way in which this wonderful and beautiful theory has been worked out by the researches of philologists. But Mr. Fiske is far from letting this theory run away with him, as

sometimes happens to investigators in this field, and, notably, to Mr. G. W. Cox in his "Mythology of the Aryan Nations." He says elsewhere, p. 134, "It seems to me that the unguarded language of many students of mythology is liable to give rise to misapprehensions, and to discredit both the method which they employ and the results which they have obtained. If we were to give full weight to the statements which are sometimes made, we should perforce believe that primitive men had nothing to do but to ponder about the sun and the clouds, and to worry themselves over the disappearance of daylight. But there is nothing in the scientific interpretation of myths which obliges us to go any such length. I do not suppose any ancient Aryan, possessed of good digestive powers and endowed with sound common-sense, ever lay awake half the night wondering whether the sun would come back again. The child and the savage believe of necessity that the future will resemble the past, and it is only philosophy which raises doubts on the subject. The predominance of solar legends in most systems of mythology is not due to the lack of that Titanic assurance with which we say the sun *must* rise; nor, again, to the fact that the phenomena of day and night are the most striking phenomena in nature. Eclipses and earthquakes and floods are phenomena of the most terrible and astounding kind, and they have all generated myths; yet their contributions to folk-lore are scanty compared with those furnished by the strife between the day-god and his enemies. The sun-myths have been so prolific because the dramatic types to which they have given rise are of surpassing human interest. The dragon who swallows the sun is no doubt a fearful personage; but the hero who toils for others, who slays hydra-headed monsters and dries the tears of fair-haired damsels, and achieves success in spite of incredible obstacles, is a being with whom we can all sympathize, and of whom we are never weary of hearing."

These extracts will show how well Mr. Fiske is fitted for his task by the clearness of his style and the intelligence with which he criticises and sifts the testimony of enthusiastic collectors of material.

In addition to the discussion of the simpler form of sun-myth, we have a chapter on the divining-rod, which is even now, at the end of the nineteenth century, regarded with superstitious reverence by people who ought to know better; for only last December we saw an extract from a letter in the Boston Daily Advertiser, in which the writer spoke of a stream discovered by the wand, as if he were recommending a true scientific method. There is besides a very entertaining chapter on werewolves and swan-maidens, and one on the myths of the barbaric world.

Mr. Gladstone's *Juventus Mundi* has a careful criticism, in which

that eminent statesman receives the great credit he deserves for the careful study he has given to his subject, and it is also indicated how very far he is from holding correct views about the "Iliad" and "Odyssey" in those matters which have been explained by "pure and applied philology." Mr. Fiske says: "Mr. Gladstone's knowledge of the *surface* of the 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey,' so to speak, is extensive and accurate. It is when he attempts to penetrate beneath the surface and survey the treasures hidden in the bowels of the earth, that he shows himself unprovided with the talisman of the wise dervise, which alone can unlock those mysteries. But modern philology is an exacting science: to approach its higher problems requires an amount of preparation sufficient to terrify at the outset all but the boldest; and a man who has had to regulate taxation, and make out financial statements, and lead a political party in a great nation may well be excused for ignorance of philology. It is difficult enough for those who have little else to do but to pore over treatises on phonetics, and thumb their lexicons, to keep fully abreast with the latest views in linguistics."

The last chapter in the volume consists of an admirable notice of that most entertaining and valuable book, Mr. Tylor's "Primitive Culture." In conclusion, we warmly commend this book to our readers as an interesting and useful exposition of the present condition of a science which has grown up very silently, but has gone very far; which concerns us all much more closely than a superficial observer might imagine. There are minor points of detail at which exception might be taken, as, for instance, Mr. Fiske's explanation that our objection to the slamming of a door is due to the traces of the old feeling that we thereby pinch a soul in it. Had that belief never existed, we fancy that we should find it equally objectionable, quite as jarring to our nerves as the upsetting of a heavy table, to which we are opposed from very good reasons which are not in the least superstitious. But this is a trifling fault.

We think a great addition to the usefulness of the volume might be made by the insertion of a list of books on all the subjects treated, similar to that given about the legend of William Tell. It might be done in a subsequent edition.

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3. — *Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life.* By GEORGE ELIOT. 2 vols. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1872.

PERHAPS the first impression that forces itself upon the reader's mind after he has laid down this remarkable novel is one of profound admiration, almost of reverence, for the mind of a writer who is able

to take so comprehensive a view of life, to seize what to most of us is a knot of tangled threads, and unravel it, showing the mutual relations of people to one another, and to the circumstances which encompass them, and, while this is done with breadth of treatment, losing none of even the pettiest links which are forever serving as either clogs or aids. The book has all the multifariousness of life; the author has, as it were, created a world in which we see the diverse feelings, passions, and interests of complicated characters without the veils of self-adulation or of exaggerated distrust with which we view our own lives, or the prejudice with which we regard those of our neighbors. Ordinary terms of praise sound insipid before the excellence with which this task is done. The very truth which this writer possesses seems so like simplicity that we feel inclined to take it for granted as a *sine qua non*, which we ought to accept with as little emotion as we do the air we breathe. But however great the merit of such excellence, and in spite of its rareness, it is so obvious that we may content ourselves with this bare mention.

But it was not the author's intention merely to set before us living pictures: she aimed to tell us the story of certain sorts of human lives, which bear within themselves the elements of tragedy from the incongruity between their aspirations and the possibility of attaining them under the conditions imposed upon them by their surroundings. So much may be said of Dorothea, at least. She, we are told, is one of the "many Theresas who found for themselves no epic life wherein there was a constant unfolding of far-resonant action; perhaps only a life of mistakes, the offspring of a certain spiritual grandeur ill-matched with the meanness of opportunity; perhaps a tragic failure which found no sacred poet and sank unwept into oblivion. With dim lights and tangled circumstance they tried to shape their thought and deed in noble argument; but after all, to common eyes their struggles seemed mere inconsistency and formlessness; for these later-born Theresas were helped by no coherent social faith and order which could perform the function of knowledge for the ardently willing soul. Their ardor alternated between a vague ideal and the common yearning of womanhood; so that the one was disapproved as extravagance, and the other condemned as a lapse." It is only too probable that any woman, born with such lofty yearnings, is unlikely to have them satisfied in a state of society like that of the present time, — we need not speak now of any possibilities in the remote future of the enthusiasts, — in which girls are taught, and by no means entirely repugnantly to their nature, to modify their character and tastes to the selfish demands of men. Indeed, it is the quality of every lofty nature to fall short of its highest

ideal, whether from its ignorance, due to too exalted an opinion of conflicting obstacles, or from its clashing with other lofty aims, whose supporters lack sufficient breadth of vision to have perfect sympathy with different work which may be as good, but which they do not comprehend. But the mere possession of such desires, however impossible of attainment, exalts the owner and makes the path easier for others. It is not success only which ennobles the world; it is what the people are who live in it.

Of Dorothea's two marriages — the first with a withered, sensitive, morbid scholar, who is himself more than half conscious of his failure in life, of his incompetency for the vast work he has chosen, and who finds in Dorothea a strong mind judging his own with a certain coldness, which he exaggerates into something like contempt; the second with a young, superficially attractive, brilliant man, who leaves upon our mind (we can but record our own opinion) the impression of a light-weight — the author says: "Certainly those determining acts of her life were not ideally beautiful. They were the mixed result of young and noble impulse struggling under prosaic conditions. Among the many remarks passed on her mistakes, it was never said in the neighborhood of Middlemarch that such mistakes could not have happened if the society into which she was born had not smiled on propositions of marriage from a sickly man to a girl less than half his own age, on modes of education which make a woman's knowledge another name for motley ignorance, on rules of conduct which are in flat contradiction with its own loudly asserted beliefs. While this is the social air in which mortals begin to breathe, there will be collisions such as those in Dorothea's life, when great feelings will take the aspect of error, and great faith the aspect of illusion. For there is no creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not greatly determined by what lies outside of it."

But with regard to her married life with Mr. Casaubon, it seems to us that the author is far from leaving the impression on the reader's mind which she intended. As it was, Dorothea simply adored him; when she first made his acquaintance, she fancied she saw in him a great man whom she would be able to aid in his difficult studies, and who, from his wider experience, could help her solve the problems of life; she considered him a man who understood the loftiness of her nature, and who shared with her a devotion to all that made life noble; she felt a natural distaste for the young man who merely said, "Exactly," when she expressed her doubts; to her Mr. Casaubon was everything that was opposite to mediocrity. She was young, and perfectly inexperienced. She had seen nothing of the world. Of course

she was bitterly disappointed in her married life; instead of all those merits which she had thought she saw, she found only pedantry, the sourness of a mind that is gradually coming to the certainty of its own failure, and a petty nature warped by a sensitiveness which forbade its uttering the explanation that would have done so much toward setting to rights their discordant relations. By the superiority of her mind Dorothea was a keen-eyed critic of her husband's shortcomings, and, seeing them, she felt acutely the shock of surprise at their discovery. She found him an arid recipient of even what interest she could assume with respect to his studies, while all the time she was miserably conscious of the extent of the mistake which she had made. As George Eliot says, Mr. Casaubon deserves our pity; the marriage was a great mistake, but it was a sort of mistake for which the conventionalities of society are not alone to blame. The feeling which each had for the other before marriage was a natural one; and society, or at least the small portion of it which Dorothea saw, certainly did not smile upon the match. In the face of every one she married Mr. Casaubon; and had the opposition been more violent, we may be sure that she would only have persevered the more strongly in her opinion, and have married him in defiance of every attempt to forbid her. That she would have considered glorious, yet her disappointment would have been only the greater. There are cases in which an artificial society encourages such distasteful unions, but can it be fairly said that this was one?

As to the other marriage with Ladislaw, it is not easy to make out the author's opinion, whether it is one of approval or of disapprobation. The same obscurity exists with regard to Ladislaw himself, who seems to be a favorite with the writer to an extent which hardly justifies itself to the mind of the reader. There is, at the best, a certain personal charm about him, — at least such is implied if it is not given; but, notwithstanding, there is room for some disappointment when a Theresa contents herself with the life which this marriage promised her; and this, not because marriage in itself would mar our ideal, but because one cannot help feeling a diminution of reverence for Theresas who can replace their lofty yearnings by what in this case would seem to promise such meagre consolation. If that is the solution of the question, if these loftily aspiring women can rest satisfied with the humble duties of domesticity, men certainly have no need to complain, and society may well pride itself about its eager match-making.

But even if Dorothea is happy in her second marriage, she fails in the main, so far as she had hoped to make her life a different one. She had yearned to be a Saint Theresa, and the result was far different. And here we cannot help thinking that the reader would have drawn a

stronger moral if the author had not impressed upon him the comparison to be made with the saint. The book would have been impressive enough simply as a picture of life: the alleged similarity does not add to its force; for a Saint Theresa is not like a spoiled actor who spurns any but the principal *rôles;* she does not impotently yearn, but she puts her hand to the work before her without complaining of its meanness, and ennobles it by the vigor with which she does it. He alone is the truly noble character who takes the world as he finds it, and does what he has to do there without longing for the world to be made over again, when some more glorious lot may fall to his share. Every one will like Dorothea, — but for her own sake, not for any resemblance to the Spanish saint.

In Lydgate, the hero of the story, we see a much sadder failure, because what he had set before him was no vague ideal, but a very thoroughly understood, definite object, — success in his profession. He had every reason to feel confident, he knew fully the excellence of his powers and the advantage which his careful training had given him. It is by no means difficult to imagine for him a life in which he might have easily attained the success he desired. The "commonness" of his mind, however, as George Eliot somewhat obscurely calls it, which in his case, we take it, means a confidence that what he regards as less important matters will take care of themselves and set themselves right without particular care from him, for the reason that they must be subservient to the greater things with which he occupies himself, and must necessarily adapt themselves to these nobler aims, — this commonness, we say, is the flaw which maims his whole life. While he is intellectually the finest man in the novel, his impatience of others, his lack of high-mindedness in his earlier relations with Bulstrode, his unfortunate choice of a wife, and, moreover, the very fact that he persists in loving her, and, in spite of her antagonism, treats her kindly, combine to bring down upon his head the heavy load of suffering under which he labors. The whole description of his misery is most melancholy reading. While the story is told with much relentlessness, while we see the man sink into debt, severed daily more and more from his wife; and all the time we see the absolute necessity of it, its coherency with his nature, and the mistakes it led him into, we yet feel a profound pity, and perhaps a certain opposition of feeling to the grim resemblance to life which makes the picture so impressive. A redeeming part, a bit of poetic justice (it may be called poetic, for every truly noble action bears to human eyes the stamp of poetry) is found in the scenes of Dorothea's intervention, in the first place to aid Lydgate, — to which, it will be remembered, she made up her mind without that

comparison of reasons for and against, with the same feminine, confident certainty which directed all her actions, — and, again, when she visited Rosamond. That chapter and those immediately preceding it are the most beautiful in the book. Dorothea's simplicity, her confidence in right-doing being the only necessity, her resignation, which melts even Rosamond's pettiness, are wonderfully set before us. We see the contrast between the mode of action which is alone possible for so lofty-minded a person as she is, and the way in which others let themselves be overcome by circumstances. She rises superior to them here, and if, as some of her soundest critics say but which we think may be disputed, the book is written to show how character is influenced by circumstances, it should be borne in mind that the writer herself says, "It always remains true, that if we had been greater, circumstance would have been less strong against us." Can it be denied that this is a case in point? And in the matter of invention, a quality for which the novel is by no means remarkable, those scenes are certainly the most prominent. Nowhere does Dorothea so truly justify herself as here. She is not deceived by any illusion; she is free from a certain hardness, or, perhaps, more properly, a certain coldness, which we fancy is to be detected in her relation with Mr. Casaubon after she is awakened to a sense of his inferiority; her conduct is noble in its freedom from conventionality, instead of throwing open a certain opportunity for ridicule on the part of an indifferent world, as was the case with what we are told her sister used to call her "fads."

Perhaps another reason for our liking these chapters is the fact that they come after a long and depressing account of the troubles of all the people; after we have been reading of Lydgate's sordid cares, his debts, and his terrible life with Rosamond; after the grim horrors of Bulstrode's exposure and its implication of Lydgate; in fact, at the end of a long novel in which both the irony and the relentless realism of the writer have given us no relief from a feeling of profound melancholy, — a melancholy which is only the intenser from the admiration which her wonderful genius demands. Up to this point there has been no relief; so far the story has been as sad as life itself appears to us in our gloomiest hours. Dorothea's love for Ladislaw has but a slight hold upon our sympathy; the humor which the author shows so invariably in her treatment of the minor characters, as, for instance, with Trumbull, the auctioneer, in this novel, is far from relieving the intense strain which all the rest causes. Hence, when we see Dorothea's single-mindedness, her simple honesty interfering to maintain her own dignity and bringing a revelation of help to Lydgate in his sore distress, we feel keenly, to be sure, a sense of the mightiness of the

tragedy, but it is all exalted into something higher than mere freedom from debt and unjust suspicion; we feel that comfort which can only come from the contemplation of a lofty action. That Dorothea finds from her visit to Rosamond that Ladislaw is and always has been true to her, is but a small matter; our real joy is due to the fact that she is true to the highest impulses of her nature, that she sees so clearly what her course should be, and that she rises above all pettiness in taking it.

It is only here that George Eliot abandons the irony which is so marked in the treatment of the other incidents of the book. It is not so much to an irony of incident that we refer; that is natural enough; and even an author who, apparently, prefers a long and even monotonous narration which shall resemble the uneventfulness of so many days of human life to an artificially rounded story where dramatic effect is sought, deserves no blame for employing what is so common in our experience, namely, the way in which events curtly and grimly belie our wishes and most reasonably formed hopes. We must allow any one who is writing a novel to employ the resources of his art; no one is less guilty of introducing the *deus ex machina* than our author; she lets the events follow one another in direct sequence; and if they seem ironical, it is because they make so clear the difference between man's expectations and his deserts. As a special instance, we would mention Bulstrode's overthrow at the moment when he seemed to himself to have the best ground for congratulating himself upon his success. It is not to irony of this sort, however, that we would take exception, but to that irony of treatment which is shown in almost the whole of the book. It is wonderful. One must bow down with respect before the intelligence of a human being who can devise such distinct creations, breathe into them such genuine life, and meanwhile, although not without partisanship, — for why should Celia be a greater favorite with the writer than Rosamond? — should keep herself aloof from all, seeing through them, and detecting their littleness with such extraordinary acuteness. But it may be fair to consider the issue of the whole book, to weigh the impression it leaves upon us of the failure of human life, especially of the higher aims of life, and to ask ourselves if this novel attains the highest position among works of art. Not necessarily with regard to execution, though that, too, should be considered, but simply in the matter of final judgment of the book as a whole. The continual presence of this ironical spirit would incline us to give a negative answer. Irony is so barren a method, it seems so like contenting one's self with an easily attained renunciation of the endeavor to ask questions which can never be satisfactorily answered, it is so much the

result of a mood, or a fashion of a time, that a comparison of it with other feelings would seem to lead to its condemnation. Not that every one who sets before us distinct problems which baffle us whenever we pause to consider the perplexities of life, is obliged to solve them any more than a man who asks difficult questions of any sort is obliged to answer them himself, nor do we demand a wilfully contrived effort to please us by a joyous ending; but it does seem to be necessary for any work of art to give us lasting pleasure, and before it can take its place among immortal works, that it should give us, not necessarily in the attractiveness of the incidents, but in the treatment, some expression of the hopefulness, of the belief in the existence of something better than what we see, which really forms so great a part of the nature of man, however often it may be overclouded by temporary gloom or even by the prevailing pessimism of a generation. While at the end of the book, as we have said, there is something to redeem the grimness of the earlier part, still it may not be impossible that these strictures may apply to the rest, which is terrible in its realism. Perhaps with the advance of man in enlightenment, idealism will disappear along with other superstitions, and the scientific spirit will demand only complete realism; but we doubt it.

As to the skill with which, in this novel, life is set nakedly before us, there can be but one opinion, nor can the irony ever be called false to itself. But as we in this country, owing to our less exact knowledge of the scenes, circumstances, and people which she describes, may possibly stand in the position of posterity, for whom much will be obscure that is now familiar or as good as familiar to those in the country where the book is written, we may prophesy a lack of interest in the future for what depends so much on the ability of the reader to stamp with his approval what he himself knows to be true. If an exact imitation of certain special modes of life is the chief claim to merit of a great part of the story, if the reader is not able to appreciate the truth he will find the interest of the delineation lacking. Still it is to be remembered that posterity makes up its own mind with but little regard for the prophecies of its forefathers, for whom it is apt to have some contempt. But then this is a rule which may work both ways. Without wishing to usurp any of the privileges of our descendants, we cannot forbear saying that many will find, or, more exactly, many have found the long episode of Featherstone less interesting than other parts; though even here it is not from any failure of the author's power, but rather from the nature of the subject. With time, much may fall into the same category which now we read with no doubt of its lastingness. However this may be, we cannot close without gladly welcoming the

novel as one of the most remarkable books of one of the greatest living writers. He is a cautious critic who has left himself words fit to describe its merits. From its wonderful accuracy in depicting life, from the morality of its lesson, from the originality, keenness, and fate-like sternness of the author, we may draw the conclusion that it is a book which every one should read for a wider knowledge of the world. But is this the highest praise that a novel can receive?

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4. — *The Reformation.* By GEORGE P. FISHER, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale College. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1873.

IN expanding for a wider public the lectures delivered two years ago before the Lowell Institute, it has been the primary aim of Professor Fisher to furnish the ordinary reader with a compendium of the principal events connected with the Reformation, together with a discussion of its causes and results, while at the same time the researches of the historical student are furthered by references and notes. The lack of any similar work in the English language, with the exception of Mill's translation of the very unsatisfactory Essay of Villers, was a sufficient reason for undertaking so difficult a task; and the extremely thorough and conscientious manner in which it has been performed leaves hardly any room for supposing that it could have fallen into more competent hands. The two special qualifications of fairness and accuracy, required by such an undertaking, the author possesses in a very high degree. The subject was by no means new to him when he engaged to prepare the lectures on which the volume is based; and before giving them to the press he has greatly enriched them with the results of additional and laborious investigation. While his plan, comprehending, as it did, so vast a field and such endless variety of topics, of necessity compelled him to rely, for the most part, upon the conclusions of others, he has made most diligent use of the ample literature created by the Reformation, including as well the writings of the leading Reformers themselves as the voluminous material which the researches of modern scholars have brought to light. The two authorities to whom he has justly paid the greatest deference are Ranke and Gieseler, the accurate summaries of the latter being, in some passages, very closely reproduced. For the corresponding [illegible]h period he has made most use of the more popular history of [illegible] Martin. With this, however, has been coupled a constant [illegible] to other writings of German, French, Italian, and English

scholars, at once indicating the very wide range of the author's reading, and giving assurance that nothing of importance relative to the subject has been overlooked. With no unnecessary parade of erudition, the usefulness of the volume has been greatly enhanced by this discriminating citation of authorities, and especially by the convenient list of works in the Appendix. A careful Chronological Table forms a distinct and valuable feature. We are, throughout, impressed with the evident desire of the author to render a real service to his readers. He is especially entitled to the gratitude of those students of history whose needs he has kept so considerately in mind.

It is not too much to say that the subject which Professor Fisher has undertaken to discuss, considered in all its bearings, is undoubtedly the most perplexing of any with which the historian is required to grapple. The difficulty does not lie, mainly, in the vast extent of the field, although that alone is enough to render a lifetime hardly sufficient for a thorough survey into the peculiar nature of the subject. We may arrive at an impartial judgment respecting the constitution of Kleisthenes, and not fly into a passion in discussing the imperial policy of Cæsar. But the Reformation touches the very core of modern society; it is wrapt up with living issues; it is entangled with profound political as well as theological problems; it involves the most far-reaching questions that human thought has raised; it appeals to violent and deeply rooted prejudices, and to diversities of mental apprehension that seem permanent as the race itself. After three centuries we stand no nearer a solution of the fundamental problems than when the worn-out Emperor fled for rest to the cloisters of Yuste. Professor Fisher does not disguise from himself these difficulties. In his preface he earnestly disclaims any polemical intent, and discloses the temper in which his labors have been pursued in the frank avowal of his conviction that the points on which Protestants and Roman Catholics agree, outweigh in importance the points on which they differ. It is simple justice to the author to say that his work is executed in this spirit throughout. Although he does not arrive at the precise conclusion which so irenical a premise would seem to justify, his moderation and impartiality are conspicuous on every page. No charge of misrepresentation can be brought against him. With a marked aptitude for presenting concisely and plainly the knotty points of theological controversy, is combined a rare capacity of appreciative insight, which lends extreme interest to all the author's discussions of the doctrinal differences of the Reformers. He has no word of unkindness for those whose views depart most widely from his own. Indeed, this disposition to hold an even balance is so persistently maintained that we

not quite sure that it does not at times approach a fault. Especially in his occasional portraiture of character, had he been less under the sway of this judicial temper, he might have heightened the effect without lessening the fidelity of his touches. The lights and shadows are so evenly distributed, that the canvas seems at times a little indistinct. But we can scarcely censure the excessive exhibition of a quality which, even in a moderate degree, is unfortunately so rare.

The plan of the work is very comprehensive. Beginning with a discussion of the general character of the Reformation, the author sketches the rise of the Papal hierarchy of the Middle Ages, and the causes of its decline, and then surveys the special causes and omens of the impending Revolution. This portion of the work is evidently elaborated with much pains, and presents little to which any one will feel inclined to take exception. Dismissing with slight notice the various inadequate explanations of the Reformation that have been presented, the author examines with more care the definition of Guizot, who sees in it mainly "an insurrection of the human mind against religious absolutism"; and of Laurent, who views it as simply a transition that leads logically to a denial of the "fundamental dogmas of historical Christianity," strongly affirming that it must first of all be regarded as an event within the domain of religion, and as having a positive no less than a negative aspect. But while thus insisting on its essentially religious character, the author does not regard the Reformation as an isolated phenomenon, but as a "great transaction in which sovereigns and nations bear a part." Giving it this comprehensive meaning, he follows Guizot in making the era of the Reformation end with the Peace of Westphalia. Since, however, he subsequently includes in his survey of its results the reign of Louis XIV., and the Revolution of 1688, it strikes us that it would have been more consistent for him to have adopted the division of Van Praet, who regards the long struggle that began with the preaching of Luther as definitely closed by the Treaty of Ryswick, when Louis XIV. recognized the throne of William III. Where so many things must, of necessity, be omitted, opinions will differ as to what should be retained. To our mind it seems hardly required, in reviewing the rise of the mediæval hierarchy, to enter upon the controverted question of the constitution of the early Church. Latin Christianity dates from Constantine. We are acquainted with the organization of the Church in the fourth century, but are by no means agreed as to its organization in the second. Whether the disciples formed a community of equal brethren was one of the questions which the Reformation raised, and which it has left unsettled. In stating what was held by the Roman Church, a discussion of the true

interpretation of the Gospel was out of place. So, too, we think, in fixing his attention so exclusively upon the hierarchical aspect of Latin Christianity, the author has been led to underrate the immense services which it rendered, — services which need especially to be remembered when we ask the question, How much was effected by the Reformation for culture and civilization? While he allows that the Church, through its hierarchical organization, did a good work by fusing the peoples of Western Europe into a single community, he does not consider in what a variety of ways it touched the life of society. He regards it as a mitigated evil. That the Latin hierarchy entailed great evils no one will deny; but what institution has been the source of greater blessings? It may be true, as he remarks, that the mediæval type of religion was pervaded by a certain legalism; but it is not less true that mediæval Catholicism was full of life, full of progress, full of aspiration. The true awakening of the intellectual life of Europe must be dated, not from the epoch of the Medici, but from that stirring century that gave us the cathedrals, the universities, and the scholastic philosophy.

When the author reaches his proper subject, he narrates minutely the external course of the Reformation in Germany, Switzerland, the Scandinavian kingdoms, Geneva, France, the Netherlands, England, and Scotland. The counter-reformation in the Church is then described, and the struggle between the opposing faiths is traced down to the close of the seventeenth century. To compress so much within so brief a compass, to trace the many threads of so intricate a story, demanded equal judgment in selection and skill in arrangement. So far as it was Professor Fisher's purpose to furnish the reader with a concise and accurate epitome of the period of the Reformation, the result must be regarded as an eminent success. We are amazed at the amount of information condensed into his chapters. Not an important event, not a character of note, has been omitted. And, in the main, these events are presented in just proportion, and the characters are judged with unvarying impartiality. This is true, especially, of the leading reformers, whose careers and influence are analyzed with evident yet discriminating admiration. Luther, Zwingle, and Calvin are portrayed with equal care, and the blots upon their fame are fairly contrasted with their shining virtues. The only regret is, that the minuteness of this comprehensive survey has condemned the author to a certain uniformity of treatment, at times suggestive of a manual. The narrative, though always clear, lacks the salient points which fix themselves in the reader's memory. There is, too, as it seems to us, a want of historical perspective. More space should have been devoted to political events. These are not overlooked, but their

relative significance is not fully brought out. It was, as Ranke truly remarks, the coincidence of spiritual and temporal motives which gave the Reformation its significance. Its success was wholly determined by the state of general politics. But for this, it might have remained what Leo termed it, — a quarrel of monks. The author complains of Charles V. for having no adequate appreciation of the moral force of Protestantism. But we are apt to forget that to Charles the Lutheran movement was merely an episode in the mighty events of his reign. Nor is it quite just to blame a man for not fully comprehending a movement which never fully comprehended itself. It seems to us that the author metes out scanter justice to Charles than to any of the great characters with which he has to deal. He describes him as a bigot and a tyrant. He takes pains to repeat the story that Charles, in his last days, looked back with regret upon his honorable treatment of Luther. But Charles was the great personage of the age, and holds beyond dispute the central place in any historical picture of the epoch. And when we take into account the unprecedented difficulties with which he was surrounded, the unexampled variety of interests for which his provision was demanded, the physical disability with which he was forced continually to wrestle, can we withhold some sympathy for one who, if guided by ambition, was at least guided by a noble ambition; who, amid the strife of sects, was almost the last to abandon hopes of peace; who could not without grief see the Catholic unity of Europe forever broken? Charles was capable of large views and was under the sway of noble sentiments. If his conduct with regard to the Reformation vacillated, it should be borne in mind that the precise aims of the reformers were by no means fixed. It was surely to his credit that he preferred treating with the reformers to destroying them. Another great personage of this period, it seems to us, is not made prominent enough. Three times have the Saracens played a conspicuous part in European history, — in their struggle with the Franks, during the Crusades, and at the epoch of the Reformation. The vast and disciplined array, that hung like a cloud about Vienna, did more to shape the decrees of the imperial Diets than the protests of princes; and the direct influence exerted on the Reformation by Solyman the Magnificent was altogether too mighty to admit of his being disposed of in a single line. In analyzing the course of political events which rendered the Reformation a success, this influence exerted by the East should surely have been brought more prominently forward. We do not forget that Professor Fisher would regard the political aspects of the Reformation as subordinate; yet even in the background a right proportion should be observed.

So, too, in the author's treatment of the latter period of the Reformation, we cannot help thinking that his careful narrative might have been constructed in some passages with more strict regard to the relative significance of events. He devotes nearly as much space to the discussion of the "casket letters" as he does to the Council of Trent. The story of the religious wars in France is given in considerable detail; but we have no explanation of the mode in which the subsequent religious and political attitude of France was determined by the triumph of the *Politiques*. The result of the Reformation in France was unique, and only in a limited sense did it deserve to be called a failure. And with regard to his estimate of individuals, we must believe that the term "guilt" is too harsh a word to apply to that act of Henry IV. by which he placed himself at the head of a nation. No character of this period is mentioned with more unqualified praise than Admiral Coligny; yet, according to the Duc d'Aumale, whose history of the Princes of Condé the author very justly commends, it was the pride and obstinacy of the Admiral that cost the reformers the battle of Jarnac and the life of Condé. The Admiral is surely entitled to our veneration, but it strikes us as too strong to say that he was "without a peer in all the qualities that constitute human greatness."

In no portion of the work are the characteristic excellences of the author more happily displayed than in the chapters in which he traces the doctrinal differences between Protestants and Catholics, and exhibits the various ecclesiastical systems to which the Reformation gave rise. His habitual impartiality and admirable powers of statement here have ample scope. On the other hand, the part which satisfies us least is the concluding chapter, in which he undertakes the difficult task of tracing the relation of Protestantism to culture and civilization. Here we miss the author's usual clear discrimination. He sometimes uses the term "Protestantism" and sometimes "Reformation," but giving them, so far as we have observed, the same meaning. But the Reformation he has been throughout describing as an essentially religious event. Its two positive factors were the assertion of the doctrine of justification by faith and of the supremacy of Scripture. While he admits that the reformers, in transferring their allegiance from the Church to the Word of God, practically asserted a right of private judgment, yet it is clear that this right was not one of the things for which they so earnestly contended. If we define the Reformation in the sense in which they would have defined it, it was the positive affirmation of certain theological and ecclesiastical dogmas. In this sense, too, Professor Fisher defines it; and, in conformity with this definition, he has traced its origin and course. The heroes of the Reformation, as

he describes it, are Luther, Zwingle, and Calvin. It is plain that what he means throughout by Reformation is religious reform; and in all this the author is entirely consistent with himself. But now that he begins to trace more broadly the results of the Reformation, he uses the phrase in a different sense, and includes under it, not only the religious, but also the intellectual revolution. Indirectly, it may be said, the Reformation involved this by involving the right of free inquiry; but how much of the modern spirit of free inquiry is due to Luther and his associates? The spirit of inquiry was rife in Europe long before the dispute about indulgences. The religious revolution was one of its effects, not one of its causes. If we would embrace among the results of the Reformation all that the author claims, we must give the word a very different meaning from that which he has all along been giving it. We cannot admit that the striking material and political contrasts presented by modern Europe are due to simple differences of opinion on the questions of justification by faith, or the relative authority of Scripture and the Church. Still less can we trace to Luther and Calvin the intellectual progress of modern times. When we rank Spenser and Raleigh, Shakespeare and Bacon, among the distinctive products of the Reformation, we surely must mean by the Reformation very much more than the religious movement of which the great Saxon was the soul. It is perfectly true, as Taine asserts, that we may see in all of them "a settled faith in the obscure beyond"; but, in the eyes of the reformers, this would have seemed a lean confession of faith. What strikes us most in these writers is the absence of any trace of those dogmatic controversies in which they lived. We think that Matthew Arnold correctly describes them as men, not of the Reformation, but of the Renaissance. The founder of modern speculative philosophy lived and died a Roman Catholic. The author will not allow that the Reformation is responsible for the sceptical tendency of modern times; but it is not easy to see how Protestantism can claim Hume and Adam Smith, and disavow Lessing and Kant. In a previous chapter the author discusses the question why the Reformation stopped; but surely, if it thus includes all modern progress, it has not stopped. The precise dogmas affirmed in the Confession of Augsburg and in the Institutes failed to win universal acceptance; and no small part of that movement, which the author understands by the relation of Protestantism to culture, has consisted in departing more and more from their letter and spirit; but the spirit of free inquiry is surely no less active. We repeat, that in this chapter the author confounds the results of the definite religious movement, which he has been all along describing, with the much more comprehensive movement of which it was only a part.

The Reformation and the Renaissance were great parallel events. We think that Professor Fisher's work would have been more satisfactory if this had been more distinctly kept in view throughout. It is only when they are regarded as inseparable that we can say "that the problem of the reconciliation of religion and culture is one for the solution of which Protestantism has the key."

In the printing we notice only a few trifling errors. The expressions, "French Parliament" (p. 49) and "German king" (p. 103) are not accurate; Margaret did not compose the "Heptameron" in her later days (p. 246), but began it in her nineteenth year; Mary of England was not succeeded by Edward VI. But these are very trifling matters, which deserve mention only that they may be corrected for another edition. They only bring out in stronger relief the uniform correctness of the work.

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5. — *Handbuch der Römischen Alterthümer.* Von JOACHIM MARQUARDT und THEODOR MOMMSEN. Erster Band: *Römisches Staatsrecht.* Von TH. MOMMSEN. I. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel. 1871. 8vo. pp. xviii and 527.

ROMAN antiquities may conveniently be treated in several different methods. For many purposes the best arrangement is the alphabetical one of a dictionary, each topic being treated independently: this is the sole method familiar to English students, as the only complete treatise on classical antiquities which we possess is Dr. Smith's valuable series of dictionaries, inferior, however, in everything but the externals to Pauly's *Encyclopädie der Alterthumswissenschaft.* Lange's *Römische Alterthümer,* to whose merits we recently called attention,* is arranged on the principle of historical development, and may as correctly be called a constitutional history as a treatise on antiquities. The third great German treatise, the Becker-Marquardt *Handbuch der Römischen Alterthümer,* has a systematic arrangement; Topography, Constitution, Administration, Worship, and Private Life are assigned to separate volumes, and in each volume the subjects are arranged in their natural order, but each is treated independently. Of course each method requires a certain degree of the other. Lange has a separate chapter for the systematic treatment of each special topic, and Becker and Marquardt follow the chronological order under each head.

Becker and Marquardt's *Handbuch* has been for some years out of print; and in meeting the demand for a new edition, the part which

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* See North American Review, October, 1872.

Becker had completed before his death — the Constitution (Vol. II. of the original work) — is assumed by Mommsen, who makes of it, however, not a revision, but an entirely new work, on a totally different plan. This is the logical development of the constitution from its most fundamental ideas; the institutions are treated dogmatically, from the point of view of the theory which underlies them, and in recognition of the precision and rigorous logic which characterized the legal conception of the Romans.

The fundamental principle in Mommsen's theory of the Roman constitution, from which his discussion starts, is the *imperium*, or full power of command, *volles Befehlsrecht*, which, in the earliest constitution, was possessed without restriction by the highest magistrate, the king: all other magistrates exercised command only in virtue of authority issuing from him. In a certain sense, in its relation to the constitution as a whole, *imperium* may be considered as equivalent to the modern *sovereignty;* it was not identical with sovereignty, however, for, at least in republican times, it was distinctly recognized that sovereignty resided in the people, and that the *imperium* was conferred by them. Further, the entire authority of the state, however, was derived from the gods, in their will as expressed by signs distinctly sent to the possessors of the *imperium*, the magistrates, and interpreted according to fixed rules. To any one, therefore, who has an accurate conception of the religious side of the Roman constitution, and the degree in which it was conceived to emanate from the divine powers, it will not seem strange that the book opens with a chapter upon the Auspices, as the essential foundation of the *imperium*. The two terms are, indeed, he says, essentially identical; "in fact, only indicate the same conception from different points of view, — the one of intercourse with heaven, the other with earth." (p. 15.)

As *imperium*, or unlimited power to command, is the fundamental idea of Roman constitutional law, so in the history of the *imperium* is read the history of the constitution. "The entire internal history of the Roman constitution is summed up in the weakening of the *imperium*." (p. 56.) The establishment of the republic consisted essentially in a twofold weakening of the *imperium*, — by dividing it between two colleagues with equal powers, and by limiting its tenure to a year's time. These two principles, together with a third, the recognition of the sovereignty of the community, as expressed in the right of appeal, *provocatio*, are given (p. 94) as the distinctive conceptions of the republic; "neither of which can be carried back to the Monarchy, nor dispensed with in the Republic." The republican institutions of Rome set out, therefore, with the *collegialität* of the *imperium;* by which is

meant that each of the two colleagues possesses the full power of command, exactly as it was possessed by the kings, except that it is possessed only for a year, and that his colleague, the possessor of a *par potestas*, has a power of hindering, *intercessio*, commensurate with the power of command. This important power, resulting from the collegiate character of the magistracy, is justly characterized (p. 216) as "in itself nothing but a development of the magisterial right in general, and the necessary reverse (*Kehrseite*) to its positive function."

The establishment of the republic, with the collegiate relation, not merely in the case of the highest magistrates, but, as a general rule, in the tenure of magistracies, is the first step in the weakening of the *imperium*. Soon a new principle came in, the development of which lies at the bottom of the most important later constitutional changes. This was *Competenz* or limitation of functions. The *imperium*, as held by the consuls, had no limitations except those defined above, which had reference, not to its sphere, but its degree and the responsibility attached to it. If the two consuls divided their work between them, — if one went into the field while the other stayed in the city, if one went against the Veians and the other against the Æquians, — this was simply a private arrangement between them, legally binding upon neither; either could go into the other's province, and exercise there his full power of command.

This new principle of *Competenz* operated by the establishment of inferior grades of magistrates, with defined powers, but deriving their powers from the comitia of the people, not from the magistrates above them. In earlier times the inferior officials were not magistrates; their powers were delegated to them by the king or consul, whose functionaries they were, and under whose *imperium* and auspices they acted; this was originally the case with the quæstorship. But, as the republic went on, a number of lower magistracies were established, whose authority emanated from the people; and, although the consul, by virtue of his *major potestas*, had a certain authority over the prætor, ædile, and quæstor, especially in the way of prohibition, yet he could not himself undertake their functions. The prætor, for example, was in a certain sense the colleague of the consul, and possessed the full *imperium*, by virtue of which he could exercise all the functions of the consul, if there was need; his power was, however, a *minor potestas* as towards the consul, in whose presence his *imperium* was suspended. On the other hand, the consul could not exercise civil jurisdiction; for this power was specially conferred by law upon the prætor alone.

A still more remarkable limitation of the supreme executive power was the tribunate of the plebs. The plebs is, he says (p. 46), "an

association of the entire body of citizens, with the exception of the old burgher [patrician] families, which from the beginning is, and desires to be, more than a mere private corporation, and puts forward the claim, which at last it makes good, to place its corporate self-government on an equality with the self-government of the community (*lex sive id plebi scitum est*)." The ordinances of this corporation acquired by law, as is well known, the force of statutes; and in like manner the officers of the corporation (tribunes and plebeian ædiles) came to be magistrates of the community, although these officers were elected and these ordinances passed in an assembly which excluded a certain number of the citizens, and therefore could not be, in the strict sense of the terms, *magistrates* and *laws*. It was a process very analogous to that of the mediæval municipalities, in which guilds and other private associations were invested with powers of government, and thus became public bodies, with political instead of merely corporate powers. This most important and interesting subject — the history and powers of the tribunate — is treated in this volume only incidentally; it would therefore be premature to discuss in detail the views presented. It will be enough to say that they consist mainly of two points, — that the tribunes, when they had acquired the position of magistrates of the whole people, were in possession of a *major potestas*, as towards every other magistrate, except the dictator; and that the imperial dignity was essentially developed from this plebeian magistracy. That the power of the tribune was higher than that of the consul, is a startling doctrine, which rests mainly upon the fact that the tribune could "intercede" against the consul, while the reverse was not the case; and that the tribunes possessed extraordinary powers of *coercitio* against the consuls, being themselves, as *sacrosancti*, wholly exempt from any such control. It should be noticed, however, that this *major potestas* was essentially of a negative nature, consisting merely in forbidding and obstructing; and that the tribunes were wholly devoid of the *imperium*, or power to command.

This whole volume may, therefore, be described as an analysis of the doctrine of the *imperium*, and history of its development. It is, as might be expected, far from being an elementary treatise. It requires in the reader a thorough preliminary knowledge of Roman institutions, which alone will enable him to follow the close reasoning and detailed illustrations of the discussion. Abstruse as much of the reasoning is, profound in erudition and compact in expression, it is nevertheless characterized by the vigor and lucidity for which Mommsen is distinguished. No words are wasted in irrelevant discussion, and the arrangement is so good, and the table of contents so full, — of course there is no index

to an unfinished work, — that it is always easy to find what one wants, and, when found, it is exactly what one desires to know.

It would require too much space to enter into all the questions which receive new light from the detailed discussions of this remarkable book. It will be well, however, to mention some of the most important points in which the views here presented are at variance with the prevailing views. In opposition to Rubino, whom he follows in general on the subject of the auspices, he holds that it was not by a mere declaration *de cælo servasse*, but by an actual announcement (even false) that lightning had been seen, that the *comitia* were deferred. On the subject of the *Lex curiata de imperio*, he takes the ground that this law did not confer the *imperium*, which the magistrate already held in virtue of his office; but that its effect was to pledge the community to recognize and obey his authority, — for the matter of that, the law extended to the mere *potestas* of the lower magistrates, as well as to the *imperium* of the higher ones. The military *sacramentum* was precisely analogous in this respect.

In regard to the responsibility of the magistrates, which is usually assumed to exist only at the close of their term of office, the doctrine is here presented (p. 90) that in theory there was a complete responsibility even during the term of office, as soon as the republic had introduced "collegiality" and annual terms of office, but that there was a practical irresponsibility of the highest magistrate, from the fact that there was no one of power superior to his own who could enforce the responsibility. With the establishment of the tribunate, with *major potestas*, the consul was at once subjected to an effective control; not, however, by legal process, since this was administered by the prætor, a magistrate with *minus imperium*. In like manner the common doctrine of the irremovability of magistrates is held (p. 513) to be only true of the usual procedure. "Without question the right of the popular assembly to remove any magistrate played as important a part in the Roman theory, as keystone of the democratic constitutional law, as its practical application, especially towards the regular patrician magistrates, was, in the better periods, absolutely refrained from."

Of other topics which receive a new light, we will especially mention the distinction of the *imperium domi* and *militiæ* (p. 95), the theory of the pro-magistracy, upon which, next to the tribunate, the empire was built (p. 350); and the discussion of the rules which regulated the iteration and intervals of the several magistracies, which are subjected to a searching investigation, extending over more than fifty pages (pp. 423 – 476). The succeeding volumes will be looked for with eager interest, although it is not likely that either of them will present so

much that is new as the present; since the second is to treat in detail of the several magistracies, the general theory of which is established by the present volume; while the third, — "The Citizens and the Senate," — will cover ground and embrace results already made familiar by the *Römische Forschungen.*

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